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ERRATUM
Several years ago I published Holding Women's Psyches Hostage: An Inter-
pretive Analogy on the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 171 (1992).
This article began with a short narrative describing the experiences and
death of a sexually harassed woman named Betty. The article notes that
Betty's death occurred in conjunction with and was partially motivated by
the Thomas/Hill hearings. In writing the narrative, I relied on several
knowledgeable sources and Betty's unemployment benefits case file. Nev-
ertheless, a year later I received information indicating Betty's death oc-
curred before, rather than concurrent with, the Thomas/Hill hearings. I
write to acknowledge my mistake and to express regret for the error.
Penelope E. Bryan
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Contract law has progressed and evolved sounder principles since the days
of ritualistic and formalistic sealed instrument requirements.1
I. SALEs LAW AND THE CURRENCY BAZAAR
The cheerful evaluation of contract law by the Court of Appeals in
V'Soske v. Barwick is stunningly naive. At least one important branch of
contract law, sales law, may be ill-equipped to serve the needs of the mod-
ern international financial marketplace. In the global currency bazaar,
banks, corporations, investors, and governments buy and sell foreign cur-
rency from one another. Their transactions are conducted on tenuous
legal grounds.2 Fundamental issues of the scope of sales law and the en-
forceability of contracts are unresolved.
Perhaps if the currency bazaar were economically insignificant it
would not matter whether sales law served the needs of foreign exchange
traders. This bazaar, however, is the world's largest financial market. At
the end of an average day, roughly $1 trillion worth of currencies has
changed hands.3 This figure represents a 35 percent increase in turnover
in just three years (1989-92). 4 Hence, explosive growth, as well as enor-
mous size, is a salient feature of the bazaar. Moreover, the currency bazaar
never closes. 5 At any time of the day or night millions of U.S. dollars are
1. V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921
(1969).
2. For an overview of foreign exchange transactions, see Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-offs in the
Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Derivative Markets, 1 THE FINANCIER 34 (1994); ROGER M.
KUBARYCH, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNrTED STATES (rev'd. ed. 1983).
3. MONETARY & ECONOMIC DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BAsLE, SWITZERLAND),
CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET Acrwv IN APRIL 1992 1, 5-6 (1993)
[hereinafter, CENTRAL BANK SURVEY]. In April 1992, the total reported gross turnover in spot,
forward, and derivative foreign exchange contracts was $1.354 trillion. (After correcting for
double counting and estimated reporting gaps, the figure was $880 billion.) Id. at 6 tbl. I; see
alsoJames Blitz, AU Change in Foreign Exchanges: The Nature of the International Currency Dealing
Has Altered, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 2, 1993, at 17.
4. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6 tbl. I.
5. See Scott E. Pardee, Internationalization of Financial Markets, 72 ECON. REv. (Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo.), Feb. 1987, at 3, 3 (noting that "[iln the 1970s, foreign
exchange became a 24-hour market, with the major banks dealing with each other each day
through their offices in the markets in the Far East (Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore) the
Middle East (once Beirut, now Bahrain), then Europe (London, Frankfurt, Zurich), and
finally, the United States (New York for interbank trading and Chicago for futures trad-
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traded for Japanese yen, millions of German marks are exchanged for
French francs, millions of English pounds are sold against Swiss francs,
and so forth.6 The buy and sell decisions of banks, businesses, and institu-
tional and individual investors establish exchange rates. In turn, the ex-
change rates critically influence the international flow of goods, services,
and money. The currency bazaar is too big, growing too rapidly, and too
important to the international economy to ignore.
This important bazaar, however, has been ignored by legal scholars.
7
Because foreign exchange trading raises fundamental contract issues, this
neglect must end. A legal assessment of the needs of foreign exchange
market participants is required, not only by the participants themselves,
but also by judges and regulators who are trying to cope with a small but
increasing number of breakdowns in foreign exchange trading.
Of course the participants expect to find currency trading profitable;
otherwise they would channel their resources into a different financial
market. Yet, participants can no longer dismiss the breakdowns as isolated
incidents in their race for profits. Formal adjudication results from mis-
haps that involve high monetary stakes; but when a bank, business, or in-
vestor goes to court or to a regulatory agency over a foreign exchange deal
gone sour, they get little comfort. Judges and regulators are groping.
They do not know whether to apply sales law to the transactions, and if so,
which sales law should be used. Judges and regulators do not know
whether the transactions are enforceable. Worst of all, they do not have a
conceptual framework for dealing with these issues.
This article attempts to fill the large and dangerous void in legal
scholarship on foreign exchange transactions. It further seeks to provide
a conceptual framework for judges and regulators that will help them re-
solve problems in the currency bazaar. It addresses two fundamental con-
tractual problems that arise in the currency bazaar under Article 2 of the
ing.)"). Technically, the trading week begins in New Zealand on Monday morning at ap-
proximately 8 a.m. and ends in New York on Friday at approximately 5 p.m. While trading
volumes are thin at other times, it remains possible to find counterparties with which to enter
into foreign exchange transactions.
6. The five most widely traded currencies are the dollar, mark, yen, pound, and Swiss
franc. The percentage of turnover accounted for by these currencies are 82, 40, 23, 14, and
9, respectively. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 9 tbl. 11(a).
7. With the exception of a fifteen year-old student Note, law reviews are largely devoid
of articles on commercial law problems associated with foreign exchange transactions. See
Michael L. Manire, Note, Foreign Exchange Sales and the Law of Contracts: A Case For Analogy to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1173 (1982). This Note asserts that Article 2
should apply to foreign exchange transactions, yet provides no theoretical basis for the asser-
tion. See id. at 1174, 1188, 1192, 1200, 1206, and 1209. The Note fails to account for the
highly significant fact that conversations between parties negotiating and concluding foreign
exchange transactions typically are tape-recorded. It incorrectly suggests that all foreign ex-
change transactions are confirmed in writing: See id. at 1186-87. As page proofs of this arti-
cle were being prepared, a brief article on foreign exchange transactions and Article 2
appeared. See Stephen C. Veltri, Should Foreign Exchange Be "Foreign" to Article Two of the Uni-
form Commercial Code?, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 343 (1994). This welcome addition to the litera-
ture provides an excellent review of relevant pre-U.C.C. cases. It does not advocate a
particular approach, like the pragmatic strategy argued for herein, to the issue of the scope
of Article 2, nor does it dicuss the statute of frauds.
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Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). First, should the scope of sales law
cover foreign exchange? Second, should oral foreign exchange contracts
be enforceable despite the statute of frauds?
This article proposes that these questions be answered using a prag-
matic strategy which emphasizes the needs of foreign exchange market partici-
pants in relation to Article 2. The pragmatic strategy identifies an integral
relationship between the problems of scope and enforceability in order to
ensure that sales law does not impinge on the vitality and dynamism of the
currency bazaar. Thus, according to this proposed strategy, the resolution
of the first problem hinges critically on the outcome of the second
problem.
Courts and regulators have failed to cope adequately with the prob-
lem of scope. Courts have adopted a "carelessly inclusive" approach. Reg-
ulators, most notably the Federal Reserve,8 have used an "aggressively
exclusive" approach. Instead, an examination of the key rules of Article 2
in the context of the currency bazaar is needed before the problem can be
resolved. The statute of frauds is such a rule. How it functions in the
currency bazaar is a critical indicator of whether Article 2 should govern
transactions in this bazaar.
Currently, courts and regulators misguidedly adhere to what is best
termed the "tangibility paradigm"-the fixation on a tangible document
to satisfy the statute of frauds. The paradigm should be abandoned be-
cause it does not serve the needs of the currency bazaar. It is a strict ap-
proach to the problem of enforceability that clashes with the telephonic
technology of the bazaar. It is also incongruous with the repeat-player,
high-trust culture of the bazaar. Legislative amendments to, or a judicial
re-interpretation of, the statute of frauds is needed. Unless these changes
are made, the pragmatic strategy suggests foreign exchange transactions
may be appropriately excluded from the scope of Article 2. In that event,
other commercial laws, considered below, may be applicable.9
By no means is the thesis advanced herein limited to the foreign ex-
change market. The underlying and general theoretical question is at
what point is it appropriate to codify a market or industry? The foreign
exchange market is a case study of this question. Recently, Professor Ray-
mond T. Nimmer set forth three criteria to determine when a market is
ripe for codification: the area of the contract (i) achieves national scope
(the nationality criterion); (ii) affects substantial commercial volume (the
volume criterion), and (iii) would benefit from codification instead of
common law governance (the relevance criterion). 10 Because the prag-
matic strategy suggests that market needs must be examined, the strategy
appears consistent with the relevance principle. Moreover, the foreign ex-
change market clearly satisfies the nationality and volume criteria. The
8. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the "Federal Reserve" refers to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
9. See infra notes 218-235 and accompanying text.
10. Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and Reinvigo-
rating Article Z 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337, 1367-73 (1994).
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problem then becomes one of the relative weight to be given to the crite-
ria. If two of Professor Nimmer's criteria are satisfied, is the conclusion in
favor of codification inexorable? Not necessarily. The thesis herein sug-
gests that the relevance principle may be relatively more important than
other criteria. We cannot rush to include or exclude foreign exchange
from Article 2 until we have determined whether the statute "works" for
the market.
There are five remaining parts to this article. Part II sets up a hypo-
thetical but highly realistic foreign exchange transaction. The hypotheti-
cal transaction raises the issues of scope and enforceability, and it is used
in parts II1-V to advance the thesis of this article.
Part III considers the scope issue, namely, whether foreign exchange
should be a "good" within the ambit of Article 2. In part III, both the
carelessly inclusive and aggressively exclusive approaches are rejected; but
the pragmatic strategy, which centers on the relationship between contract
enforceability rules and the needs of the currency bazaar, is advanced.
Part IV applies the pragmatic strategy to the statute of frauds issue.
This part highlights the clash between a formal legal approach to the stat-
ute of frauds on the one hand, and the way transactions are negotiated
and concluded in the currency bazaar on the other hand. The argument
rejects the tangibility paradigm and advocates changing the statute of
frauds (either legislatively or judicially) to meet the needs of the market.
Even though parts III and IV focus on the application of Article 2 to
the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, no shortage exists of other
sales laws for judges to apply directly or by analogy. Accordingly, Part V
extends the pragmatic strategy to three other potentially applicable sales
law regimes:' 1 first, the proposed revisions to Article 2 ("revised Article
2"), which are presently under consideration by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Insti-
tute;' 2 second, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods ("CISG"), to which approximately 34 countries are
Contracting States, including the U.S., China, France, Germany, Switzer-
land, Italy, Canada, and Australia;' 3 and third, private contract law, specifi-
11. The common law of contract is, of course, potentially applicable to disputes arising
from foreign exchange transactions. However, there is no question of the scope of this legal
regime; it purports to cover all contracts unless displaced by other law. There is not a com-
mon law statute of frauds for the sale of goods.
12. U.C.C. REVISED ARTcICE 2, pts. 1-3, 7 (Tentative Draft Dec. 21. 1993) and pts. 1-6
(Tentative Draft Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter, December 1993 Draft and September 1993
Draft, respectively] (on file with author) and Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2.
Sales (Draft July 29-Aug. 5, 1994) [hereinafter, August 1994 Draft] (on file with author).
13. The United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 (Final act, entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].
Documents and summary records of the Conference appear in U.N. CONFERENCE ON CON-
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.V.5 (1981). The text of the Conference and reservations taken by Contracting States are
reprinted in Selected International Conventions, 1994 MARTINDALE-HuBBLE INTERNArIONAL
LAw DIGEsr, pt. VII, at IC-29 [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBLE]. The legislative history of the
Senate advice and consent action is found at Proposed United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 98-9 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
1994]
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cally, the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement ("IFEMA")
which is a standard-form contract devised recently by banks that actively
trade foreign exchange.14 Part V argues that the IFEMA is unhelpful in
resolving the statute of frauds problem because that contract lacks the es-
sential quantity term. Part V further argues that it may be appropriate to
extend the scope of the CISG and revised Article 2 to cover foreign ex-
change transactions because these regimes omit a statute of frauds
provision.
Part VI synthesizes the arguments of Parts III-V and draws conclusions
from the application of the pragmatic strategy to the scope and enforce-
ability problems in the currency bazaar.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL SPOT TRANSACTION
The foreign-exchange market is one of the world's slickest. It is
screen-based, genuinely international and open for business 24 hours a
day. There are many buyers and sellers; prices adjust rapidly and for the
most part smoothly. And it is huge.
15
United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). A list of Contracting States is maintained by
the Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
Curiously, even though the U.S. is a Contracting State, no court or commentator has
considered the applicability of the CISG to foreign exchange transactions directly or by anal-
ogy. See, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18 INT'L LAw. 17
(1984); Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443 (1989); James E. Joseph, Contract
Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Dic,. J. INr'L L. 107 (1984); Courtney P. Smart, Comment,
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana Under the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of
Goods, 53 LA. L. REV. 1339 (1993).
14. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MASTER
AGREEMENT § A (1993) [hereinafter IFEMA]. Even though the Foreign Exchange Commit-
tee first published the IFEMA in November 1993, it is already being used by foreign ex-
change market participants in New York, London, and Tokyo. It is not the only example of a
privately-negotiated, standard-form written agreement in the global currency bazaar. In
1992, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) published a revised master
agreement which can be tailored for use in spot foreign exchange transactions by altering
the schedules to the agreement. FXNET, a London-based system for netting foreign ex-
change trades on a bilateral basis, has issued a Worldwide Agreement.
The IFEMA, however, appears to have the brightest prospects for widespread adoption
by spot market participants. In part, the IFEMA bears the informal imprimatur of the Fed-
eral Reserve. The Foreign Exchange Committee (specifically, the Financial Market Lawyers
Group) drafted the IFEMA. This Committee advises and operates under the auspices of the
Federal Reserve. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMrrrEE, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1993) [herein-
after FEC 1992]. In addition, the IFEMA reflects what seems to be commonly regarded as
the best foreign exchange market practice. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, GUIDE TO
THE 1993 INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MASTER AGREEMENT § C (1993) [hereinafter
IFEMA GUIDE]; Ruth W. Ainslie, Foreign Exchange: The New Master Foreign Exchange
Trading Agreements 1, (Apr. 20, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks, Washington,
D.C., May 18, 1994, on file with the International Monetary Fund).
15. The Last of the Good Times?, ECONOMisT, Aug. 15, 1992, at 61.
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A. The Basic Terms
The most basic and common foreign exchange transaction is a spot.16
A spot contract involves a commitment by one party to deliver a specified
quantity of one currency against another party's delivery of a specified
quantity of a second currency. In effect, each party is buying one currency
and paying for it with another currency. The date the commitment is
made is the trade date. The value date, which is the date on which the
reciprocal deliveries occur, is within two business days of the trade date.'
7
For example, suppose on November 1 Citibank and the Development
Bank of Singapore ("DBS") enter into a dollar-yen spot foreign-exchange
transaction.18 Citibank agrees to buy 120 million yen from DBS in ex-
change for U.S. dollars at a price, or exchange rate, of 104 yen per dol-
lar.' 9 Hence, Citibank pays DBS $1,153,846.15 for the yen. Payment of
the dollars, and the reciprocal yen payment, must occur on the value date,
November 3.
16. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 16 ("The spot market is still the single
most important segment of the foreign exchange market.").
17. See id. at 16. Thus, in a spot foreign exchange transaction, the settlement of pay-
ment obligations is said to occur on "T+2" (where "r" stands for the trade date). Settlement
occurs, however, on T+I in the spot markets for Mexican pesos and Canadian dollars. The
analysis and arguments in this article are equally applicable to a forward foreign exchange
transaction, i.e., one in which the value date is more than two days after the trade date.
18. Citibank is a commercial bank headquartered in New York. DBS is a commercial
and investment bank headquartered in Singapore. The parties are deliberately put in differ-
ent parts of the world not only to simulate real-world conditions but also to illustrate that
trading in many different currencies occurs far away from the home countries of those
currencies.
Non-bank parties-such as corporations, institutional investors, individual investors, and
governments (mainly central banks)-actively participate in the foreign exchange market.
Inter-bank dealing, however, accounts for 70 percent of total market activity. See CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1, 11-12; Manire, supra note 7, at 1183. Of the transactions
between interbank dealers, 41 percent are with dealers located abroad and 29 percent are
with dealers in the same jurisdiction. CENRaAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 11-12.
19. In practice, exchange rates are quoted in more precise terms because finer move-
ments are observed that result in large profits and losses. The dollar-yen rate is quoted in
terms of hundredths of yen per dollar. For example, the rate on Friday, April 15, 1994 was
103.45 yen per dollar. Currency Trading-Exchange Rates," WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at C15.
DBS need not actually possess 120 million yen at the time that it enters into a spot
contract to sell yen. If it did not, it would be short selling-that is, selling foreign currency
that is not held. For an example of selling 400 million pounds short against the dollar, see
ANDREW J. KRIEGER, THE MONEY BAZAAR: INSIDE THE TRILuoN-DoLuLA WORLD OF CURRENCY
TRADING 65-79 (1992). If DBS sells yen short, it will have to obtain 120 million yen to cover
its short position before it is contractually obligated to deliver the yen to Citibank's desig-
nated account on the appropriate value date.
DBS could cover its short position in a number of ways. First, it may take a long position
in another spot transaction, for instance, buy yen in the spot market. DBS risks losing money
if the spot rate for yen rises above 104 yen per dollar. Suppose the yen appreciates relative to
the dollar to 103 yen per dollar. Then, DBS will have to buy 120 million yen at the market
rate of 103 yen per dollar and sell them to Citibank at the previously agreed rate of 104 yen
per dollar. The purchase will cost DBS $1,165,048.54, but the sale will fetch only
$1,153,846.15, resulting in a loss of $11,202.39. Of course, DBS would not short sell yen if it
thought yen would appreciate. It expects to profit by buying 120 million yen at, say, 107 yen
per dollar and selling the yen at 105 yen per dollar. A second way for DBS to cover a short
sale is to enter into a foreign currency option transaction. DBS could buy a call option on
yen. This option would entitle DBS to obtain yen at a pre-set price.
1994]
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B. Negotiating the Deal
The dollar-yen spot agreement is reached between foreign exchange
traders at Citibank and DBS through direct telephone negotiations.
20
The telephone conversations are tape recorded by each of the parties.
21
Either Citibank or DBS may initiate the transaction. Assume a Citibank
trader in New York calls a trader at DBS in Singapore. The Citibank
trader asks for "a quote on dollar-yen," but does not necessarily indicate
whether she intends to buy or sell yen.2 2 The custom in the foreign ex-
change market is to quote "two-way rates," i.e., both the bid and offer
prices. 25 The DBS trader does not learn the Citibank trader's intention
until the Citibank trader proposes a specific trade.
24
Assume the DBS trader tells her counterpart at Citibank that the bid-
offer rates are "105-104."25 The Citibank trader indicates a desire to buy
120 million yen. The DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours, at
104." At that juncture, according to the custom in the foreign exchange
market, the traders believe a spot contract is established for the sale of 120
million yen by DBS to Citibank at a price of 104 yen per dollar. Citibank is
20. See RUDI WEISWEILLER, INTRODUCTION To FoREIGN EXCHANGE 14 (2d ed. 1984) (stat-
ing foreign exchange traders may transact by telephone); Thomas M. Campfield & John G.
O'Brien, Foreign Exchange Trading Practices: The Interbank Market, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
HANDBOOK § 2.4, at 3 (Abraham M. George & Ian H. Giddy, eds., 1983) (noting "[m]odem
sophisticated communications" like telephones link market participants).
An alternative way for the Citibank and DBS traders to communicate directly is through
an electronic messaging system. Such computer-to-computer communication requires the
banks to be members of the same automated dealing system. The systems are sponsored by
third-party vendors such as Reuters. About one-third of all foreign exchange deals are con-
cluded through these systems. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 21, 24. The effect
of automated dealing on the resolution of the scope and enforceability problems is beyond
the scope of this article.
As an alternative to direct dealing, the Citibank and DBS traders might deal with each
other indirectly through one or more foreign-exchange brokers who act as agents for their
respective principals. See Bhala, supra note 2, at 100. Around one-third of all foreign ex-
change transactions between inter-bank dealers are arranged through brokers. See CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 21 tbl. VI, 23-24. All telephone conversations between the
traders and their respective brokers, and between the brokers, would be taped. Conse-
quently, the analysis presented herein is unaffected by the use of brokers.
21. Tape recording the telephone conversations between foreign exchange traders is
customary practice in the currency bazaar. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim
Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. (June 14, 1994).
22. See KRiEGER, supra note 19, at 31.
23. Because Citibank is willing to act as either a buyer or seller in any foreign exchange
transaction, it contributes importantly to market liquidity. It will take either side of the spot
deal.
24. See KRIEGER, supra note 19, at 31.
25. These rates are expressed in terms of number of yen per dollar. The bid price of
105 yen per dollar reflects the exchange rate at which DBS is ready, willing, and able to buy
yen. The offer (or asking) price of 104 yen per dollar reflects the rate at which DBS is ready,
willing, an! able to sell yen.
The difference of one yen per dollar between the bid and offer prices is the "spread."
The bid price necessarily must be lower than the offer price. If it were not, then DBS would
perpetually lose money. DBS would buy yen at a higher price and be forced to sell at a lower
price. At the 105-104 rates, a 120 million yen transaction implies that DBS will pay
$1,142,857.14 to buy the yen. The rates also imply that DBS will receive $1,153,846.15 from




obligated to deliver $1,153,846.15 to DBS in two days. Conversely, DBS is
obligated to deliver 120 million yen to Citibank in two days. The word
"yours" is the magic trade term indicating entry into a spot contract. 26
After the traders conclude their conversation, each trader fills out a
deal ticket.27 The ticket states the name or initials of the trader, name of
the counterparty, trade and value dates, type and amount of currency
purchased, exchange rate, and payment (i.e., currency delivery) instruc-
tions. Citibank and DBS do not exchange deal tickets. Rather, the tickets
are used by each bank for internal accounting and control purposes, for
example, to monitor the total amounts of yen, dollars, marks, pounds, and
other currencies bought and sold by the bank.
In addition, Citibank and DBS might use the deal tickets as a basis for
preparing written confirmations of the transaction. In many, but not nec-
essarily all, foreign exchange transactions, the parties exchange two confir-
mations.28 First, the traders exchange confirmations of the terms of the
transaction by telex. Second, the operations departments of the respective
parties exchange confirmations, usually by mail.29 This article analyzes
26. After the traders conclude the transaction, employees of the operations department
of each bank may endeavor to confirm the terms of the transaction. Citibank's operations
department may send a written confirmation of the transaction to the operations department
at DBS, and vice versa. Each operations department may check the confirmation received
with its own records of the transaction. These records will include the tape recording of the
transaction, coupled with any written record. Naturally, the written confirmations should
match the records of the deal.
How do Citibank and DBS ascertain the designated account of the other to which the
currencies must be delivered on the value date? The currencies are delivered to designated
accounts of each bank. DBS will inform Citibank of its bank account name and number at
which the dollars are to be delivered, and DBS will inform Citibank of the account name and
number to which the yen must be transferred. The exchange of account information, or
settlement instructions, may occur as part of the written confirmation process. Alternatively,
assuming Citibank and DBS routinely trade with one another, they may have previously ex-
changed settlement instructions. Finally, Citibank and DBS may have signed a master agree-
ment such as the IFEMA and set forth settlement instructions therein.
27. The telephone negotiation lasts only several seconds or a few minutes. In order to
profit, foreign exchange traders must conclude transactions rapidly for two reasons. First,
foreign exchange rates are volatile even in the short-term. The price quoted on a currency
can move dramatically in seconds. If there is a delay in negotiating a transaction, then a
prospective buyer or seller of a currency may elect not to proceed because exchange rates
have changed such that the originally quoted rate is now an off-market rate, or no longer a
rate at which the transaction would be profitable.
Second, profits are generated by market participants like Citibank, DBS, and their bro-
kers by entering into a large volume of transactions. With respect to highly liquid currencies
like the U.S. or Canadian dollar, Swiss or French franc, Japanese yen, German mark, and
English pound, the bid-offer spread is small. Consequently, a large volume of purchase and
sale transactions are necessary. A smaller number of high-risk trades, such as betting cor-
rectly against perceived market trends, are also a source of profits. Naturally, the pressure to
conclude transactions rapidly makes oral negotiation by telephone an ideal means in the de-
centralized, global currency bazaar.
28. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. (June
16, 1994).
29. This department is also known as the "settlements department" or "back office." In
addition to exchanging confirmations, the operations departments exchange payment in-
structions, usually by electronic means, through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunications (SWIFT).
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the case where Citibank and DBS do not exchange these confirmations, as
well as the case where they are exchanged.
30
C. The Dispute
Shortly after the deal is concluded, the bid-ask spread moves from
105-104 to 107-106 yen per dollar. The Citibank trader observes that as a
result of short-term volatility, the financial asset (yen) she is buying has
depreciated relative to the currency (dollars) in which she will render pay-
ment. Accordingly, she backs out of the deal with DBS and buys 120 mil-
lion yen from a third bank at the cheaper rate of 106 yen per dollar.3 ' In
the meantime, the DBS trader has rejected offers from other banks to buy
the yen.
DBS learns of Citibank's unscrupulous action no later than the value
date. At that point, DBS transfers 120 million yen to Citibank but does not
receive the reciprocal payment of $1,153,846.15. The DBS trader insists
on selling 120 million yen at the original exchange rate of 104 yen per
dollar. After all, it relied on Citibank's oral representations and turned
down other opportunities to sell the yen at this rate.3 2 Citibank refuses to
go through with the transaction.
Thus, DBS sues Citibank for breach of contract in the appropriate
federal court. Citibank argues that U.C.C. Article 2 applies to the dispute
and raises the affirmative defense that if there was a spot contract, then it
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201.33
Because there is no signed writing to evidence the contract, Citibank ar-
gues, this statute is not satisfied. 34 DBS's response is that the scope of
Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not encompass foreign exchange transactions,
hence the statute of frauds is inapplicable.
The thesis of this article implies that Citibank's defense should be
rejected and, while DBS's response may have some merit, it too should be
rejected. DBS's response is an over-reaction. The pragmatic strategy sug-
gests that whether foreign exchange transactions ought to fall within the
scope of Article 2 depends on a comprehensive assessment of the provi-
sions of Article 2 in relation to the needs of foreign exchange market par-
30. For the case where confirmations are not exchanged, see infra notes 107-156 and
accompanying text. For the case where confirmations are exchanged, see infra notes 167-216
and accompanying text.
31. At the cheaper rate, 120 million yen cost $1,132,075.41, as compared with
$1,153,846.15 at the original rate of 104 yen per dollar. If the yen appreciated relative to the
dollar, then a dispute could arise because DBS sought to renege on the deal with Citibank
and sell 120 million yen at the new, higher market rate to a third party.
32. Of course, it is not reliance that leads to the creation of a contract; there is a con-
tract here. Citibank and DBS have certain expectations that contract law is designed to pro-
tect regardless of the reliance factor.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1990). Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, the ref-
erences to the U.C.C. are to the 1990 Official Text, approved and published by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Note
that Citibank's defense raises the possibility of the judicial admissions exception to the stat-
ute of frauds. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (3) (b). This issue is not addressed herein.
34. Citibank does not dispute that a contract was formed. Cf U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (stating
that a contract may be made in any manner, including conduct by the parties).
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ticipants. Examining the statute of frauds in relation to these needs is an
important part of this assessment. The results of the examination, how-
ever, cannot be dispositive because there is obviously more to Article 2
than section 2-201. Citibank's defense should be rejected, and the con-
tract enforced, because the statute of frauds does not meet the needs of
market participants. The statute should be modified or reinterpreted to
conform with these needs.
III. SCOPE-SHOULD FOREIGN EXCHANGE BE A "GOOD"?
Without question the [Uniform Commercial] [Clode was designed to
bring the body of commercial law into the contemporary world of busi-
ness.... Its principal purpose was to meet the contemporary needs of a
fast moving commercial society.
35
The wisdom of the General Electric Credit decision is lost on courts and
regulators struggling with problems in the currency bazaar. Courts and
regulators understand that sales law is needed to establish precisely the
rights and obligations of Citibank and DBS in the dollar-yen spot transac-
tion. Yet, these decision-makers employ conventional, sequential reason-
ing to the dispute: first, decide the scope of U.C.C. Article 2; second,
consider the enforceability of the contract under section 2-201. Thus, un-
til the scope of sales law is clear, the risks of engaging in spot transactions
cannot be allocated with precision.
In their haste to establish rights and duties, courts take a carelessly
inclusive approach to the scope issue. Regulators, in contrast, take an ag-
gressively exclusive approach. Both approaches are imprudent. The prag-
matic strategy says the conventional, sequential reasoning is rigid. Courts
and regulators should first determine if Article 2 works for the currency
bazaar; in the words of General Electric Credit, does it meet the "contempo-
rary needs of a fast moving" market?3 6 Only then should courts and regu-
lators consider whether the scope of Article 2 ought to include
transactions in that bazaar.
3 7
A. The Carelessly Inclusive Approach
Many courts fail to discuss adequately why U.C.C. Article 2 governs
transactions in the currency bazaar. They assume it applies, but provide
scant analysis of the language of Article 2 to support this assumption.
Courts disregard the implications to the foreign exchange market of ap-
plying Article 2 to spot transactions.
35. General Electric Credit Corp. v. RA. Heintz Construction Co., 302 F. Supp. 958, 967-
8 (D. Or. 1969).
36. Id. at 968.
37. A short-cut solution to the problem of scope would be to rely on the first clause of
U.C.C § 2-102 which states, "[u]nless the context otherwise requires." It could be argued that
even if foreign exchange is not a "good," the context mandates the application of Article 2 to
foreign exchange transactions.
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1. The Five Careless Courts
No fewer than five decisions adopt this carelessly inclusive approach
to the problem of applying U.C.C. Article 2 to foreign exchange transac-
tions. Consider the opinion of a New York appellate court in United Equi-
ties Co. v. First National City Bank.3 8 The court decided a claim arising from
a dollar-yen forward foreign exchange transaction.3 9 The parties did not
dispute the applicability of Article 2. The court nonchalantly applied Arti-
cle 2 without considering whether the transaction involved the sale of
"goods."40
In Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), a New York appellate court again
neglected to explore carefully the reason Article 2 applies to foreign ex-
change transactions. 41 There, a bank failed to execute an oral foreign
exchange order from its customer who unreasonably declined to mitigate
his damages. The court asserted that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code is
applicable to foreign exchange transactions, since 'the Code excludes
"money" only when it is a medium of payment, not when treated as a com-
modity.' "42 The decision provided no theory for a distinction between
money as the subject of a contract and money as the medium of payment.
In Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., the New York Court of Appeals
considered whether a written confirmation slip of a foreign exchange
transaction is the final expression of the parties' agreement for purposes
of the parol evidence rule.43 The court baldly stated: "[t]here seems to
be no question that the UCC applies to foreign currency transactions."
44
In Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York uncritically
relied on the Intershoe decision and applied the Article 2 parol evidence
rule to disputed foreign currency conversions.
4 5
Finally, in Koreag v. Refco FIX Associates, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit provided only a sketchy overview of the meaning of
"goods" under section 2-105. This overview justified the court's applica-
tion of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions between a New York
corporation, Refco, and a Swiss bank, Mebco. The court granted Refco, as
the seller of U.S. dollars, a right to reclaim the dollars from Mebco, an
38. 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 395 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. 1977).
39. United Equities entered into a contract on April 12, 1971 for the purchase of 360
million yen against $1,018,710. Under the six-month forward contract, the yen were to be
delivered on Oct. 14, 1971. Between the trade and value dates the Japanese government
declared that non-residents could not open a yen-denominated bank account if they did not
already have one before Sept. 6, 1971. United Equities lacked such an account, and thus it
was unable to receive delivery of the yen. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. See also discussion regarding
forward transactions supra note 17.
40. See United Equities, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 9-13; cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 and 2-105(1) (discussing
the scope of the Article and definition of "goods," respectively).
41. 556 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
42. Id. at 262 n.2 (citing New York Annotations to U.C.C. § 2-105 at 97).
43. 568 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991); see aso Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Wins Suit on Currency
Deal Am. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1991, at 2. The facts of Intershoe are discussed infra note 193.
44. Intershoe, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (citations omitted).




insolvent buyer.4 6 The court failed to consider whether this remedy is in-
consistent with other provisions of the U.C.C., namely, the receiver finality
rule of Article 4A.
4 7
Perhaps these courts carelessly applied Article 2 to foreign exchange
transactions because the official commentary thereto sometimes invites ap-
plication by analogy. Official comment 1 to section 2-105 states that while
investment securities are expressly excluded from the scope of Article 2,
[i]t is not intended by this exclusion.., to prevent the applica-
tion of a particular section of this Article by analogy to securities
... when the reason of that section makes such application sensi-
ble and the situation is not covered by the Article of this Act deal-
ing specifically with such securities (Article 8).48
Judges may reason that even if they are incorrect as a matter of law about
the scope of Article 2, the statute encourages courts to apply it where ap-
propriate by analogy.
Such reasoning is specious. There is no such invitation issued by the
official commentary to judges adjudicating cases involving foreign cur-
rency. Moreover, direct application provides parties with the certainty
that the entire statute governs. In contrast, application by analogy empow-
ers the court to pick and choose among the provisions of Article 2. Selec-
tive application breeds uncertainty.
46. 961 F.2d 341, 356 (2nd Cir. 1992). In Koreag, Refco engaged in two types of spot
foreign exchange transactions with Mebco. First, Refco bought foreign currency from
Mebco for $7.4 million U.S. dollars. On April 28, 1989, Refco transferred $7.4 million by
wire to Mebco. Second, Refco sold $4.1 million worth of foreign currencies to Mebco in
exchange for U.S. dollars. Between April 28 and May 2, 1989, Refco transferred these cur-
rencies by wire to Mebco. Mebco, however, was declared insolvent and closed by the Swiss
bank regulatory authority on April 27, 1989. The closure occurred before Mebco transferred
the foreign currencies Refco had bought for $7.4 million, and before Mebco paid Refco for
the $4.1 million in foreign currencies. Refco sought to reclaim the $7.4 million and the
foreign currencies it had transferred to Mebco. Id. at 344-46.
With respect to the first type of transaction, the court found that Refco was a seller of
U.S. dollars and, therefore, was entitled to reclaim the foreign currencies-the "goods"-
under U.C.C. §§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2). Id. at 355-56. Sections 2-310(a) and 2-
507(2) are relevant if the foreign exchange transaction is considered a cash sale. U.C.C. § 2-
310(a) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, payment is due at the time and place at
which the buyer is to receive the goods. . . ." Section 2-507(2) indicates that "[wihere pay-
ment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods .... [the buyer's] right as
against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment
due." The Koreag court found the interaction of these two sections "to create a seller's right
to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer who takes possession of the goods, but fails to
tender payment" [citations omitted]. 961 F.2d at 356. Section 2-702(2) is relevant if the
transaction is considered a credit sale. The existence of a seller's right of reclamation in the
case of a credit sale is clear from the statutory language; § 2-702(2) states, "[w ] here the seller
discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the
goods upon demand made within ten days after [their] receipt." See also infra note 74.
With respect to the second type of transaction, the court stated that Refco was a buyer of
U.S. dollars and, therefore, Article 2 did not provide a right equivalent to reclamation.
Koreaq, 961 F.2d at 357.
47. See infra note 74.
48. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1; see also B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis
2699 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1993) (applying the parol evidence rule of§ 2-202 in a case involving
transactions in debt securities of less developed countries).
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The failure of the five courts to assess carefully the scope of Article 2
cannot be tolerated because the stakes in the trillion-dollar-a-day currency
bazaar are high. A plenary extension of Article 2 to the currency bazaar
must be accompanied by a close reading of the relevant scope provisions
of Article 2. Such a reading suggests the issue is more complex and subtle
than the courts have acknowledged, and that non-conventional reasoning
is needed.
2. Statutory Ambiguity
The first and most important point to acknowledge is that the lan-
guage of U.C.C. Article 2 does not clearly indicate whether a foreign ex-
change transaction is included within its coverage. The starting point is
section 2-102, which provides that Article 2 applies to "transactions in
goods." Nowhere in Article 2 is "transaction" defined.49 Surely the
purchase of yen and sale of dollars by Citibank qualifies as a "transaction"
as distinct from a "security transaction" governed by Article 9.50 More-
over, the Citibank-DBS deal entails neither the provision of a service nor a
lease of currency.
The lack of such complications has an important repercussion. The
common law has developed the "essence" or "predominant factor" test for
deciding whether hybrid contracts and sale-lease deals are subject to Arti-
cle 2.51 Problems in deciding whether to apply Article 2 to a hybrid sale-
service contract, or categorizing a transaction as a sale governed by Article
2 or a lease governed by Article 2A, do not exist with respect to foreign
exchange transactions. 52 Accordingly, the well-developed commercial law
jurisprudence on these matters is inapposite. Similarly, frequently used
treatises are unhelpful because they dwell on hybrid contracts and sale-
lease agreements. 53 In the currency bazaar, an entirely new approach to
the scope of Article 2, such as the pragmatic strategy advocated herein, is
needed.
The crux of the scope problem, as the Koreag court acknowledged, is
that the subject of a spot foreign exchange transaction (a currency issued
49. There are hints in Article 2 that the drafters meant that a "transaction" is a "sale."
For example, U.C.C. § 2-101 provides that the tide of Article 2 is "[s]ales." Section 2-106(1)
indicates that a "contract" or "agreement" refer to a "sale of goods." Many sections of Article
2 refer to a buyer and seller. Nevertheless, it is curious that the drafters chose the word
.transaction" in § 2-102 instead of "sale."
50. See U.C.C. § 9-102. U.C.C. § 2-102 and the official comment thereto make clear that
a "transaction" does not include a security transaction.
51. This judicially-created test asks whether the sale of a good was the essence of the
contract, or the predominant factor in the transaction, or whether it was merely incidental or
collateral to the provision of a service, sale of real estate, or a lease arrangement. See, e.g.,
Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the essence of
a contract was the sale of goods and the provision of services was merely incidental to that
sale); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing the predominant factor
test).
52. For a discussion of these problems, see Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Con-
struct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. REV. 470 (1982).
53. See, e.g., JAM.sJ. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-1 at
25-26 (3rd ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHrrE AND SUMMERS].
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by the United States, foreign country, or internationally recognized eco-
nomic zone 54 ) is not necessarily a "good."55 According to section 2-
105(1), "goods" are "all things... which are movable at the time of identifi-
cation to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid... and things in action."56 Movability is central to the concept of a
'good." 57 Undoubtedly, foreign exchange in the form of physical cur-
rency is movable.5 8 On the value date, Citibank is entitled to receive deliv-
ery of 120 million yen in physical currency, and DBS is entitled to get
$1,153,846.15 in physical currency. The yen and dollar notes could be
shipped to the respective parties.
In practice, however, participants in the foreign exchange market-
in contrast to a tourist buying foreign currency-do not receive physical
delivery of cash. Foreign exchange is transferred from a seller to buyer by
a funds (or wire) transfer.59 A 120 million debit in yen is entered elec-
tronically to the bank account of DBS, and a corresponding credit is en-
tered to Citibank's bank account. A debit of $1,153,846.15 is made to
Citibank's bank account and a credit of that amount is made to the bank
account of DBS. The transfer of yen and dollars around the world occurs
in seconds. Thus, buying foreign exchange in the interbank market typi-
cally involves buying a bank balance, or bank deposit obligation, denomi-
nated in a foreign currency.
6°
54. There is an active spot market for the European Union's European Currency Unit
(ECU); thus, it would be incomplete to think only in terms of currency issued by individual
sovereign nations.
55. 961 F.2d 341, 355 ("[a]s a threshold matter, therefore, it must be determined
whether the foreign currencies that Refco and Mebco agreed to exchange were 'goods'
within the meaning of section 2-102.").
56. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (emphasis added). Identification of goods occurs when the con-
tract is made if, as in the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, it is for the sale of goods
already existing and identified. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1)(a); see also infra note 60. "Money" is de-
fined in U.C.C. § 1-201(24) as "a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic
or foreign government as part of its currency." Thus, money is not narrowly viewed as legal
tender, but rather that which has the sanction of government. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 24.
57. U.C.C. § 2-105 official cmt. 1.
58. Manire, supra note 7, at 1193, 1196 (erroneously stating that foreign exchange trans-
ferred through banking channels-by which he presumably means wire transfer-is not
moveable). See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
59. Funds transfers are more commonly known as "wire transfers." See generaUy Ernest T.
Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Raj Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and
the Role of Counse4 23 UCC L.J. 219 (1990) (discussing U.C.C. Article 4A, which governs funds
transfers, and other relevant laws, regulations, and private rules).
60. See GLENN G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 401 (F.L. Garcia ed.,
8th ed. 1983). Foreign exchange transactions "are more accurately described as the transfer-
ring by individuals or corporations in one country of credits or debits through their banks by
obtaining credits or debits on the books of the banks in other countries that are correspon-
dents or branches of the banks through which the transmission is arranged." Id.
An interesting question is whether foreign exchange is identified to the contract. The
definition of "goods" in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) indicates that the thing is movable "at the time of
identification to the contract for sale." Trading foreign exchange entails entering debits and
credits electronically to bank accounts maintained on computers. In a traditional sense-a
tangibility paradigm-identification might mean that the buyer of foreign exchange with-
draws the funds purchased, handles the physical currency, and re-deposits this currency. Ar-
guably, if foreign exchange is not identified to the contract because of its intangible,
electronic nature, then it cannot be a "good" for purposes of Article 2.
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Are movable funds like yen and dollars the "money in which the price
is to be paid" and, therefore, excluded from being "goods"? The official
comment to section 2-105 indicates that foreign currency is not automati-
cally excluded by this phrase:
The exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from
the definition of goods does not mean that foreign currency
which is included in the definition of money may not be the sub-
ject matter of a sales transaction. Goods is intended to cover the
sale of money when money is being treated as a commodity but
not to include it when money is the medium of payment.6 1
The official comment suggests that every foreign exchange transaction
consists of two legs, a "commodity leg" and a "payment leg." The Practice
Commentary to New York's codification of the definition of "goods" rein-
forces the bifurcation: " 'money', other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, is included in the definition of 'goods': thus a contract
for sale of coins or of foreign currency is a contract for sale of goods."
62
Citibank buys yen and pays dollars. The transfer of yen is the "com-
modity leg," while the transfer of dollars is the "payment leg." From DBS's
perspective as a buyer,63 the situation is the reverse: it buys dollars with
yen, thus the dollar transfer is the commodity leg and the yen transfer is
the payments leg. If both parties are viewed as buyers, then there is an
inconsistency in the legs. Accordingly, one party must be viewed as a
seller.6 4 DBS, for example, sells yen and receives dollars for the sale.
Then, the commodity leg from both parties' perspective is the yen trans-
fer, and the payment leg is dollars.
6 5
Nevertheless, the movable yen in the commodity leg may be excluded
from the U.C.C. section 2-105(1) definition because the yen are "things in
action." The Intershoe and Koreag courts neglect to consider this possibility.
Those courts read the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. section 2-105 as if it
stopped with the phrase "other than the money in which the price is to be
paid." A "thing in action" is not defined in Article 2. It "denotes a claim
or right to personal property not in one's possession, as distinguished
from property actually in one's possession." 66 The factual predicate for
61. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
62. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105 Practice Commentary note 2 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis
added).
63. A "buyer" is "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a)
(1989).
64. A "seller" is "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods." Id. § 2-103(1) (d).
65. It is not strictly necessary for the transaction to have a purchase price in money in
order to be governed by Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-304(1) addresses barter transactions, i.e., situa-
tions where a good is paid for with something other than money. The purchase price "can
be made payable in money or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-304(1). Because the word "otherwise"
includes any form of consideration sufficient to support a contract, it covers foreign cur-
rency. See, e.g., Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 724, 726 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966). However, viewing the dollar-yen spot transaction as barter instead of a
purchase of yen with money (namely, dollars), or a purchase of dollars with money (namely,
yen) would be inappropriate because both dollars and yen are "money" as defined in U.C.C.
§ 1-201(24). See supra note 56.
66. GLENN G. MUNN ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 181 (9th ed. 1991).
The above-quoted definition concerns a "chose" in action which is the same as a "thing" in
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classifying yen as a thing in action is intimated above. Citibank is buying a
bank credit (an intangible, electronic bank balance, not physical cur-
rency) denominated in yen.67 As one court put it, "[e]ven when the obli-
gation is performed and the credit established, the customer is only the
owner of an obligation or chose in action and not of any actual foreign
money."
t8
The rationale in two pre-U.C.C. cases seems to contemplate the dis-
tinction between physical currency and things in action. In the 1922 case
of Melzer v. Zimmerman, a New York Supreme Court considered whether
the sale of Austrian currency, kronen, was governed by New York's Per-
sonal Property Law ("PPL") as a sale of goods.69 The contract called for
delivery of physical currency to the buyer. The court stated the contract in
dispute "was an agreement for the purchase by the plaintiff and a sale by
the defendant over the counter of said Austrian kronen in the form of
currency, and not a deposit account payable by such a draft."70 Accord-
ingly, the contract fell within the ambit of the PPL. Similarly, in a 1925
case, Zimmerman v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co.,71 a New York appel-
late court considered whether a contract for the sale of marks involved
"goods" under New York's former Sales of Goods Act. The court observed
that the contract contemplated the delivery of marks, not the credit of
marks to a bank account, because the parties did not specify a time or
action. A "chose in action" is defined in a manner similar to the meaning of a "thing in
action," namely, as "a right of bringing an action or right to recover a debt or money."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 241, 1479 (6th ed. 1990). Moreover, "chose" is the French word for
"thing." The drafters of the U.C.C. undoubtedly sought to simplify and modernize terminol-
ogy. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a). "Things in action" are discussed in Alphonse M. Squillante,
Commercial Code Review, 76 CoM. LJ. 42 (1971).
67. See Manire, supra note 7, at 1192 (concluding that foreign exchange transactions
involve the sale of choses in action). Indeed, in 1955 the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion stated in its study of the Uniform Commercial Code that:
The more limited exclusion of "the money in which the price is to be paid" is
designed to permit the Sales Article to govern a transaction when, in the language
of Comment 1, "money is being treated as a commodity": a sale of an ancient Ro-
man coin or a modern coin collection. This leads one on the question whether the
Sales Article reaches a transaction for the exchange of dollars into pounds or pesos.
Comment I (fourth paragraph) contains language which supports such coverage.
But the provisions of the Sales Article hardly seemed designed to cope with foreign
exchange transactions; perhaps they would be excluded from the article on the
ground that they do not involve "things... movable" or in any event are "things in
action". [sic]
1 STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF ThE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 362 (1955).
68. Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 296 F. 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1924); see also Manire, supra
note 7, at 1192 n.138 (citing other relevant cases). Of course, even if a court decides foreign
exchange is a chose in action, it may well apply Article 2 by analogy. See, e.g., Zamore v.
Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978) (applying the U.C.C. by analogy to a sale of a chose in
action) overru/ed by Bahre v. Pearl, 595 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1991). For scholarly treatments of the
application of the U.C.C. by analogy, see Jane P. Mallor, Utility "Services" under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in For a Shock?, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 89 (1980); Daniel E.
Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 447 (1971).
69. 194 N.Y.S. 222, 223-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 198 N.Y.S. 932 (N.Y. App. Div.
1923). The Melzer court relied on an 1847 decision, Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N.Y. 230 (1874).
70. Melzer, 194 N.Y.S. at 223.
71. 207 N.Y.S. 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.), aff'd, 148 N.E. 659 (1925).
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bank account for such a credit. Accordingly, the contract was held to in-
volve "goods."
72
The concept of "things in action" and pre-U.C.C. cases suggest that
the distinction between (1) a bank credit denominated in foreign cur-
rency; and (2) physical currency; should determine whether yen (or any
other foreign currency) is a "good" under U.C.C. section 2-105(1). For-
eign currency-denominated bank credits are "things in action." Such
credits are rights to the payment of money, and these rights, which may be
bought and sold in the market, are excluded from Article 2. The support-
ing logic is a strict interpretation of "goods": Article 2 applies only to para-
digmatic goods, which in effect are tangible items, not to transfers of
intangible interests such as interests in deposit accounts.
This distinction should not be dismissed lightly. An ill-considered ex-
pansion of Article 2 to include purchases and sales of bank credits would
open the door to the inclusion of transfers of claims against insurers, cor-
porate debt (to the extent not covered by U.C.C. Article 8), and accounts
receivable (to the extent not governed by U.C.C. Article 9). The reach of
Article 2 would extend to a far broader array of commercial and financial
transactions than its drafters ever envisioned, and the provisions of Article
2 might be ill-suited to the needs of the many and varied transactors. Nev-
ertheless, for the reasons discussed below, the distinction and supporting
logic are problematic.
73
B. The Aggressively Exclusive Approach
The leading advocate of the aggressively exclusive approach is the
Federal Reserve. For over two years it has acted through the Subcommit-
tee on Payments (Subcommittee) of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on the Uniform Commercial Code and urged the Subcommittee to
adopt a report calling for the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions
from the scope of U.C.C. Article 2.74 The Federal Reserve's position suf-
fers from four serious flaws.
72. 207 N.Y.S. at 371-72.
73. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy General Counsel and Senior Vice
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments
(Mar. 30, 1994) and the accompanying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerning
the Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to a Foreign Exchange Trade 2-7 (discussion draft,
on file with author); Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Sept. 29, 1993) and the accompa-
nying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerning the Application of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to a Foreign Exchange Trade 2-4, 9-10 (second discussion draft, on file with author).
See generally Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H. Freis, Jr., Resolving Funds Transfer Disputes Re-
lated to Currency Exchange Transactions: What Law Governs?, Com. L. ANN. (forthcoming).
The key reason for the Federal Reserve's position is a fear that if such transactions are
subject to Article 2, then the receiver finality rule of Article 4A of the U.C.C. will be under-
mined. Section 4A-405(c) provides that a funds transfer is final and irrevocable upon accept-
ance of a payment order by the beneficiary's bank on behalf of the beneficiary. U.C.C. § 4A-
405(c), 2B U.L.A. 532 (1991). Thus, for example, when DBS's bank accepts dollars on be-
half of DBS, the credit of dollars to the DBS account is final. The fear arises from the conclu-
sion that under §§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2), a seller of foreign currency has a right to
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1. The Stalemate of Pre-U.C.C. Cases
The position relies on outdated, pre-U.C.C. cases-Me/zer and Zimmer-
man-for guidance in resolving modern-day international commercial
and financial problems. The Melzer and Zimmerman courts were not faced
with a large and rapidly growing global currency bazaar. These courts fo-
cused on the difference between accepting physical delivery of currency
and a deposit account denominated in foreign currency payable by a draft
drawn on a foreign correspondent bank.7 5 This distinction is arcane inso-
far as foreign exchange typically moves from seller to buyer by funds
transfer.
Furthermore, there are pre-U.C.C. cases that plainly support the
proposition that a foreign exchange transaction involves the sale of a
"good" or commodity. Three such cases, Reisfeld v. Jacobs,76 Liepman v.
reclaim currency from a buyer under certain circumstances. See Koreag v. Refco F/X Associ-
ates, Inc., 961 F.2d at 356.
The Federal Reserve's fear, however, is unfounded. To say that the payment of the dol-
lar or yen leg of the transaction between Citibank and DBS is final for purposes of funds
transfer law is one matter. To say that the seller of the currency at issue has a right to reclaim
under sales law is a separate matter. There is no inconsistency between the two statements;
rather, they simply reflect different legal effects of certain actions. See Letter from Patricia B.
Fry, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (Nov.
2, 1993) with attached draft letter from Patricia B. Fry to Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy
General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2-4 (on file with author).
The Federal Reserve's concern that Koreag conflicts with Donmar Enter., Inc. v. South-
ern Nat'l Bank of N. Carolina, 828 F. Supp. 1230 (W.D.N.C. 1993) is also unfounded. See
Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Chairman and Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file
with author) (stating that Donmar "adds fuel to the fire because it seems to conflict with
Koreag"). In Donmar, the plaintiff bought 280,000 pounds from Stephen's Trading Corpora-
tion ("STC") for $540,680. The plaintiff transferred by wire the U.S. dollars in two install-
ments, the second one in the amount of roughly $524,000, to the Southern National Bank
(SNB). STC received this sum and, in turn, transferred it to a third party. When STC in-
structed SNB to pay 200,000 pounds to the plaintiff, SNB informed STC that STC's account
lacked 200,000 pounds to make the payment. SNB informed the plaintiff of the insuffi-
ciency, and the plaintiff sought to recover the $524,000 it had paid to STC. 828 F. Supp. at
1233-34.
The Federal Reserve's fear of an inconsistency between Donmar and Koreag is unfounded
because the plaintiff in Donmar, in contrast to Refco in Koreag, never argued it was a seller of
dollars under Article 2 and thereby entitled to a right of reclamation. Indeed, no Article 2
provision was raised in Donmar. The plaintiff argued that it had a right to reclaim the
$524,000 under § 4A-207 (which concerns payment orders that do not identify a beneficiary),
and the court properly rejected the argument. Donmar, 828 F. Supp. at 1239.
Two additional concerns might lie behind the Federal Reserve's position. First, reclama-
tion could allow a creditor of a failed bank to circumvent a foreign insolvency proceeding.
Second, reclamation could undermine regulatory efforts to develop systems for netting (or
off setting) foreign exchange delivery obligations among the players in the global currency
bazaar. These concerns, like the fear discussed above, are dubious. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regula-
tion in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHo L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1995) (manuscript at 33-35, on file with author).
75. See Meler, 194 N.Y.S. at 223; Zimmerman, 207 N.Y.S. at 371.
76. 176 N.Y.S. 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). In Reisfeld, the buyer purchased Russian ru-
bles. At issue was whether the contract of purchase was enforceable under the statute of
frauds in New York's Personal Property Law whose coverage excluded "money." The notes
were issued by the Tsarist government that had been overthrown in the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution and, therefore, could not be used as a medium of payment. The court decided
that because the buyer purchased the notes for resale, they were not excluded from the
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Rothschild,77 and Richard v. American Union Bank,78 established an intended
use test. They focused on the intent of the buyer of foreign currency to
determine whether foreign currency is a commodity or a means of pay-
ment under the relevant statute of frauds. Under the reasoning of these
cases, if Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen, then the yen are
commodities and fall within Article 2. Alternatively, if Citibank plans to
use the yen in Japan to purchase goods (other than foreign currency) and
services, then the yen are a medium of payment and excluded from the
statute. All three cases held that foreign currency was a commodity sub-
ject to the relevant statute. 79 Thus, it is not difficult to line up pre-U.C.C.
cases against, as well as for, the Federal Reserve's position.
Of course, the pre-U.C.C. cases against that position are as outdated
and unworthy of reliance as the cases in the Federal Reserve's favor. For
example, classifying foreign exchange as a commodity versus a medium of
payment based on the buyer's intent raises doctrinal and evidentiary
problems. Should an objective or subjective test be used to determine in-
tention? How should intention be proved? Moreover, the distinction be-
tween resale and use as a medium of payment makes little sense. Suppose
Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen to another bank. Why
should this case be treated differently from a case where a U.S. importer of
Japanese goods buys 120 million yen in order to pay a Japanese exporter
for the goods? Finally, the intended use test suggested by the Reisfeld,
Liepman, and Richard courts is at variance with the plain meaning of
"goods" in section 2-105. The U.C.C.'s definition does not contemplate a
focus on anything other than the immediate transaction.8 0 In sum, the
net result from reviewing pre-U.C.C. cases is an unhelpful and essentially
irrelevant stalemate.
2. A Formalistic Distinction
The second problem with the aggressively exclusive approach is that it
relies on an overly formalistic distinction-physical currency versus bank
credit-to determine the scope of U.C.C. Article 2. Just because Citibank
statute. Its holding also rested on the characterization of the rubles as choses in action. Id. at
224.
77. 262 S.W. 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924). The contract in Liepman involved the purchase of
marks and the issue was enforceability of the contract under a statute of frauds that covered
goods but excluded "money." Id. at 685. Because the U.S. and Germany were at war, the
court reasoned, the buyer could not have intended to use the marks as a medium of pay-
ment. Therefore, they were a commodity within the statute of frauds. Id. at 686.
78. 170 N.E. 532 (N.Y. 1930). This case involved a contract to buy two million
Romanian lei. The contract called for a cable transfer of foreign currency into the buyer's
bank account in Bucharest, but delivery was delayed and the buyer sued for damages. Id. at
533-34. The court held that the transaction was for a commodity because the buyer intended
to resell the lei in the U.S., not spend the money in Romania. Id. at 535.
79. See Resfeld, 176 N.Y.S. at 224; Liepman, 2626 S.W. at 686; Richard, 170 N.E. at 535.
80. Compare U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (defining "Goods" as "all things... movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale.") with Reisfed, 176 N.Y.S. at 224 (noting "that the
rubles were bought for resale") and Liepman, 262 S.W. at 686 (because of the war with Ger-
many, the marks were intended to be a commodity) and Richard, 170 N.E. at 535 (buyer
intended to resell the lei in the U.S.).
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obtains a credit of 120 million yen does not prohibit it from withdrawing
that credit in physical currency. Presumably, unless a buyer and seller
agree otherwise, a buyer of foreign exchange has the right to demand
delivery of physical currency in place of a credit. The fact that Citibank
elects to keep its yen in the form of a bank balance on deposit instead of
physical currency should not affect Citibank's contractual rights and obli-
gations. Citibank's decision is merely one of convenience, economy, and
security. It is easier, cheaper, and safer to store 120 million yen electroni-
cally than in bills in a Brooklyn warehouse.
More fundamentally, the scope of Article 2 should not depend on
whether the buyer converted bank credits to cash. If it did, then form
would triumph over substance and form could be manipulated. Citibank
could easily "shop" among legal regimes, opting into or out of Article 2, by
choosing the form of delivery. Only an agreement with DBS that Citibank
would maintain the yen in a specific form would limit Citibank's freedom
to manipulate the legal rights and duties of the parties. A much more
pragmatic evaluation-whether Article 2 serves the needs of Citibank and
DBS-ought to determine the scope of the statute.
3. The Drafters' Intention
The exclusionary approach may be inconsistent with the intention of
the drafters of the U.C.C. The official comment to section 2-105 clearly
suggests that the drafters intended to include the sale of money as a com-
modity within the scope of the Article. 8 1 It is not a question of the drafters
failing to foresee foreign exchange transactions-the comment evinces
this foresight. Rather, the drafters did not anticipate that foreign ex-
change would occur electronically and that it would appear in computer-
ized bank account records. If they had envisioned these developments,
then they might have incorporated a definition of "things in action" to
avoid confusion as to scope.
More generally, aggressively excluding foreign exchange transactions
reflects an intransigence that is inconsistent with the drafters' goal of cre-
ating a workable and adaptable statute. They wanted the statute to be
interpreted flexibly and liberally.8 2 Only then could it could be adapted
to new commercial contexts like the currency bazaar.
4. Underlying Principles
The exclusionary approach may be inimical to the underlying princi-
ples of the U.C.C.: simplification,8 3 modernization, 84 uniformity,85 cer-
81. See, e.g., New York U.C.C. § 2-105, Practice Commentary, at 94-95 (McKinney 1964);
§ 2-105, New York Annotations, at 97 (McKinney 1964). But see id. § 2-201, New York Annota-
tions, note (1)(a) at 119-20 (McKinney 1964) (stating that the original version of the Uni-
form Sales Act governed contracts for choses in action but later the Act was amended to
exclude choses in action).
82. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1; infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
83. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1-102(2)(c).
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tainty,8 6 and support for commercial transactions. 8 7 If foreign exchange
transactions are wholly excluded from Article 2, then they become subject
to non-uniform, obsolete legal regimes, namely, pre-U.C.C. common law
or non-U.C.C. sales statutes.
8 8 Yet, pre-existing sales law was simplified
and modernized by Article 2,89 and Article 2 unified the sales law of vari-
ous states. 90 Potentially applying the sales laws of fifty different states ren-
ders the law of sales as it pertains to foreign exchange transactions more
complex, arcane, and disjointed.9 1
This possibility generates uncertainty for foreign exchange market
participants. Providing a precise and predictable legal framework that en-
hances certainty for businesspersons is a founding principle of Article 2.92
Taking foreign exchange transactions out of this framework obviously con-
tradicts this principle. Uncertainty is further exacerbated if courts, seek-
ing to keep a foreign exchange transaction within Article 2, manipulate
facts to make foreign exchange more closely resemble a paradigmatic
good.
The drafters of Article 2 sought a sales statute that would foster com-
mercial development. 93 Tossing foreign exchange transactions to the va-
garies of non-U.G.C. law may inhibit innovation in the foreign exchange
market.9 4 For example, market participants like Citibank and DBS may
face difficulty devising a uniform practice of confirming transactions elec-
tronically because many different statutes of frauds potentially apply. The
need to protect ongoing commercial relations is concomitant with the
86. While certainty is not expressly mentioned in U.C.C. § 1-102, the principles set forth
in that section imply increased certainty as to legal rights and obligations. It has been ar-
gued, however, that simplification and clarification are fallacious principles, seee.g., Charles
E. Clark, The Restatement of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643, 653 (1933), and costly to achieve. See,
e.g., James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 140, 156-7 (1981).
87. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
88. An analogous problem exists for hybrid sales-service contracts and (to a lesser extent
given the enactment of Article 2A) lease contracts. An example of a non-U.C.C. sales statute
is New York's General Obligations Law. See infra note 108.
A tension may exist between providing certainty and predictability for commercial par-
ties through codification, on the one hand, and stifling innovation in a market as a result of
codification, on the other hand. The difficult, time-consuming nature of revising a code-as
the current experience with Article 2 illustrates-reinforces concerns about inhibiting the
expansion of new commercial practices. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces,
Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1405 (1994).
89. For a discussion of the need to simplify and update sales law, see Arthur L. Corbin,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE LJ. 821, 834-5 (1950); Karl
Llewellyn, The General Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1950 N.J. ST. B.A.Y.B. 73, 75.
90. For a discussion of the importance of unifying sales law, see Llewellyn, supra note 89,
at 73.
91. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 68, at 456 (discussing wide variations in non-U.C.C. stan-
dards among states).
92. E.g., In re Automated Bookbinding Serv. Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972).
93. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 89, at 73.
94. For a discussion of how the solar energy industry was harmed by the denial of the
application of the implied warranties of Article 2 to the sale and installation of solar energy
devices, see Harry R. Wright, Jr., Comment, The Sales-Service Dichotomy: A Roadblock to Con-
sumer Acceptance of Domestic Solar Energy Devices, 30 MERCER L. Ray. 547, 552-54 (1979).
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need to support commercial development. 95 Currency bazaar participants
like Citibank and DBS are repeat players-they are well known to each
other and deal with one another on a daily basis. Application of Article 2
may place these relations, particularly with respect to matters of contract
formation, on a firm legal foundation.
96
C. The Pragmatic Strategy
Official comment 1 to section 1-102 aims to prevent U.C.C. Article 2
from aging while maintaining its strength as a foundation for commercial
parties:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is in-
tended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is
intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to
be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new
circumstances and practices.
97
The drafters knew subsequent generations of lawyers would face new
transactional horizons. They realized Article 2 would be discarded if it
failed to satisfy the needs of the parties. 98 Thus, they drafted Article 2 so it
could adapt to a variety of contractual contexts that were not overtly con-
templated by the drafters. 99 The statute's style is deliberately "loose" and
"open-ended."10 0 Many of its provisions articulate standards of contract
law and principles of justice rather than specific, technical rules.10 1
Neither the carelessly inclusive approach of the United Equities,
Saboundjian, Intershoe, IBJ, and Koreag courts, nor the aggressively exclusive
approach of the Federal Reserve, heeds the advice of the drafters. The
first approach lacks articulated standards and reasoning. The second ap-
proach is rigid. Both approaches neglect new ways of conducting business
and the realistic needs of businesspersons. A new pragmatic strategy is
95. See Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 230 (1966).
96. One practical mechanism that repeat players can use to avoid a statute of frauds
problem is to waive the statute of frauds defense in a model or master agreement. Strangely,
the IFEMA contains no such waiver. See generally, IFEMA, supra note 14. If it had the waiver,
then the problem would be acute only for non-repeat players, i.e., non-parties to the IFEMA.
97. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
98. Indeed, "[tlhe origins of the Uniform Commercial Code lie in the law merchant, a
specialized body of usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with commercial mat-
ters until the seventeenth' century." 1 E. A.AN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 1.9, at 34 (1990). The rules laid down in the U.C.C. can be viewed as a reflection of what
the drafters thought was the best market practice of merchants. Not surprisingly, therefore, a
number of provisions of Article 2 impose higher standards on merchants than on other sorts
of parties. Id. § 1.10, at 42-43.
99. SeeWilliam D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 'Code'Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291,
314 (1962); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoDs. 330, 333 (1951); see also Farnsworth, supra note 98, § 1.10, at 40-41 (discuss-
ing the adaptability of a general body of contract law to many different types of transactions).
100. Grant G. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl LlfeUyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962); see also
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 321, 328.
101. Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of
Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. RE,. 470, 484 (1982).
1994]
DENVER U VERITY LAW REVIEW
needed to decide whether foreign exchange fits the definition of "goods"
and, accordingly, whether foreign exchange transactions are subject to Ar-
ticle 2. This model gains support from Article 2's invitation to courts and
commentators to consider the needs of commercial parties by expanding
the scope of the statute accordingly.
10 2
Under the pragmatic strategy, the determining factor is whether Arti-
cle 2 furnishes rules that meet the needs of participants in the currency
bazaar. Insofar as Article 2 serves these needs, it retains its vitality in new
transactional settings. In turn, it promotes certainty in foreign exchange
dealings and the development of the foreign exchange market. Article 2
should be tailored to avoid the undesirable repercussions of applying the
statute of frauds to foreign exchange transactions. Such a revision would
follow the pragmatism countenanced by the drafters of the official com-
ment quoted above.
10 3
The sine qua non of the pragmatic strategy is the acknowledgment that
foreign exchange trading is inherently fraught with uncertainties and
risks. For example, Citibank buys yen and sells dollars because it expects
yen to appreciate relative to the dollar. There is currency risk-yen could
depreciate and Citibank could lose money on the transaction. Rules of
sales law, such as the statute of frauds, potentially exacerbate the uncer-
tainties and risks associated with foreign exchange trading. Uncertainties
and risks should be minimized.
Put another way, problems that Citibank and DBS might incur in
their dollar-yen deal should be resolved efficiently. Efficiency in the con-
text of the foreign exchange market is a two-dimensional concept involv-
ing certainty and cost. Market participants need unambiguous rules
setting forth whether foreign exchange contract obligations are enforcea-
ble. The rules should not impose unnecessary transaction costs on the
participants. In sum, rules of contract enforceability that enhance cer-
tainty and reduce cost should be the legal cornerstone for wealth-generat-
ing foreign exchange transactions. 10 4 To the extent sales law does not
serve as this cornerstone, it should be changed.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine every provision of
Article 2 from this pragmatic perspective in order to decide c6nclusively
whether the statute ought to govern foreign exchange transactions. The
102. A feature of the pragmatic strategy is that it is designed for cases where it is arguable
whether a transaction should be included within the scope of Article 2. Because real estate
transactions, for example, clearly are excluded, the strategy is inapplicable. But how close is
close enough? There is no attempt herein to set forth criteria as to how persuasive the argu-
ments must be for and against inclusion in Article 2 before the pragmatic strategy should be
used.
103. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
104. Another important goal, appropriate risk-allocation, should be noted. The risks that
the rules address should be allocated between two banks engaged in a foreign exchange
transaction according to a "better position" criterion-the bank that can most cheaply insure
against the loss should bear the risk in question. With respect to the statute of frauds, the
risk that a contract is unenforceable is evenly distributed. Similarly, if the proposals dis-




pragmatic strategy, however, can yield a tentative resolution to the scope
problem within the confines of one article. It can be applied to an Article
2 provision of fundamental importance, the statute of frauds. As Professor
Farnsworth writes, " [i] t would be difficult to imagine a question more im-
portant to a person expecting to make agreements in an unfamiliar legal
system than this: when is a writing required to make an agreement en-
forceable?"' 0 5 Further, the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201 has
caused consternation among foreign exchange market participants. How
this section affects the market is an important piece in the puzzle of the
scope of Article 2.
V. ENFORCEABILITY-DOES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SERVE MARKET
NEEDS?
Had the statute offtauds been always carried into execution according to
the letter, it would have done ten times more mischief than it has done
good, by protecting, rather than by preventing, frauds.10 6
The statute of frauds, set forth in section 2-201(1), states:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the par-
ties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker.
1 0 7
105. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1.
106. 1 WiuiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMFS 601 (1844) (quoting Justice Wilmot's con-
currence in Simon v. Metivier); Robert L. Misner, Tape Recordings, Business Transactions Via
Telephone, and the Statute of Frauds, 61 IowA L. REv. 941, 942 (1976).
107. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1) (emphasis added). Because of the tense used in § 2-201 (namely,
the words "has been made") it is evident that the statute of frauds does not require that a
contract be in writing; it can be oral. Rather, the statute of frauds requires that a document
exist to provide reliable evidence of the existence of the contract. Otherwise it is not en-
forceable. See, e.g., Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F. 2d 1178, 1182, 1185 (7th
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). This distinction between contract formation and enforceability is
seen in the IFEMA. Section 8.3 of the IFEMA indicates a foreign exchange contract is oral
and that the IFEMA is the written evidence thereof. See IFEMA, supra note 14.
In attempting to show that a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds exists, it is
impermissible to rely on oral testimony. See Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181; Southmark Corp. v.
Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988). The writing, however, need not
take the form of a single document. The integration of several documents prepared at differ-
ent times may satisfy the statute of frauds. See Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d
1330, 1333 (5th Cir. 1991); Hunt Oil Co. v. FERC, 853 F.2d 1226, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988). The
writing or writings need not be directed or delivered to the other party, nor do they have to
be made for purposes of satisfying the statute of frauds. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98,
§ 6.7, at 406-07.
The statute of frauds applies prospectively as well as retrospectively. For example, it
applies to future oral modifications of a contract that originally fell within the statute. Also, if
a contract that did not originally fall within the ambit of the statute of frauds is modified, and
the modified contract falls within the statute, then the requirements of the statute must be
satisfied. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
Some commentators suggest that the statute of frauds does not cover every transaction
that is within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 402-03 &
n.5. As discussed above, U.C.C. § 2-102 states that Article 2 governs "transactions" in goods.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. In contrast, § 2-201(1) quoted above refers to
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If section 2-201 (1) were applied strictly to the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen
spot agreement, then it would be unenforceable.1 0 8 Assuming written
confirmations are not exchanged, Citibank and DBS have nothing to sign,
and clearly the value of the transaction exceeds $500. The tape recording
of the telephone conversations between the traders does not satisfy the
writing requirement of the statute of frauds.
10 9
More generally, all of the foreign exchange transactions in which writ-
ten confirmations are not exchanged are unenforceable if the Article 2
statute of frauds is strictly construed.1 10 Immediately, then, it is apparent
.contract[s]" for the sale of goods. This reasoning, however, does not appear to have been
widely accepted; hence it seems unlikely that a court would rule that foreign exchange trans-
actions are governed by Article 2 but excluded from the statute of frauds on the basis of the
"transaction"/"contract" distinction.
108. Courts sometimes confuse enforceability with validity. See, e.g., Tri-State Petroleum
Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the litigants are
not "asserting that any oral contract is invalid because of the statute of frauds"). A contract is
not void just because it fails to satisfy the statute of frauds. This failure means that the trans-
action cannot be "judicially enforced in favor of a party to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt.
4; see also Glover School & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221, 223 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1977) (stating "the beginning premise is that an oral contract is valid and enforceable
unless prohibited or restricted by some statutory provision [such as the Statute of Frauds]").
This result contrasts with that which would be obtained under § 5-701 (a) of New York's
General Obligations Law ("G.O.L."), a non-U.C.C. statute of frauds. The G.O.L. is poten-
tially relevant to the global currency bazaar because the U.S. is one of the three largest for-
eign exchange trading centers in the world. The three countries with the largest average
daily turnover of foreign exchange transactions are the United Kingdom ($300 billion daily),
the U.S. ($192 billion daily), andJapan ($126 billion daily). Central Bank Survey, supra note
3, at 13-14. Undoubtedly, New York accounts for the bulk of the U.S. activity. Section 5-
701 (a) of the G.O.L. states that a contract is absolutely void "unless it or some note or memo-
randum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his
lawful agent, if such [contract]... [b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw. § 5-701 (a) (1) (McKinney 1989). This statute of
frauds would not render a spot foreign exchange contract void because it is performed
within two days. (Nor would § 5-701 (a) of the G.O.L. render a forward foreign exchange
contract void so long as the value date of the contract is within one year. Most forward
contracts are completed in less than one year). Hence, there is a potential conflict between
U.C.C. § 2-201, which renders a spot contract unenforceable, and G.O.L. § 5-701(a)(1),
which does not render it void. Under U.C.C. § 1-103, which states that pre-U.C.C. law is
applicable unless displaced by provisions of the U.C.C., § 2-201 prevails. See H & W Indus. v.
Formosa Plastics Corp., 860 F.2d 172, 180 (5th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the application
of this statute of frauds, see Cathy L. Scarborough, Foreign Exchange Contracts: What Statute of
Frauds Applies in New York?, 4 INT'L L. PRAnCCUM 17, 20-21 (1991).
109. See infra notes 117-66 and accompanying text. For a recent discussion of electronic
signatures and the requirement of a signed writing, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The Applica-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 13J.L. &
COM. 143 (1993).
110. Section 2-201 is not the only statute of frauds in the U.C.C. that would render such
transactions unenforceable. For example, U.C.C. § 8-319 sets forth a writing requirement for
the sale of investment securities. See infra note 130. Similarly, U.C.C. § 9-203 establishes a
requirement for security agreements.
In the context of foreign exchange transactions, U.C.C. § 1-206 could be relevant. It is a
residual, gap-filling provision that covers sales of personal property not otherwise covered by
the aforementioned sections. U.C.C. § 1-206(2) & cmt. U.C.C. § 1-206(1) states that a con-
tract for the sale of personal property is unenforceable beyond $5,000 "unless there is some
writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a de-
fined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent."
The official comment to U.C.C. § 1-206 states that two "principal gap[s]" are filled by
that section. The first gap relates to the sale of general intangibles as defined in U.C.C. § 9-
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that strictly applying section 2-201 (1) could wreak destructive havoc in the
currency bazaar."' This result indicates section 2-201(1) does not serve
the needs of market participants: no law should threaten the foundations
of an otherwise well-functioning market that is worthy of preservation.
This conclusion is reinforced by the application of the pragmatic strat-
egy-specifically, the analyses of the costs, benefits, and purposes of the
statute-set forth below. 112 Thus, the model calls for the rejection of Ci-
tibank's affirmative defense. The model also suggests DBS's response has
merit, namely, that foreign exchange should be excluded from section 2-
105(1) and thus from the reach of section 2-201(1). This argument, how-
ever, cannot yet be accepted.
A. The Clash of Cultures
There is an uneasy tension between the technology and business prac-
tices of the foreign exchange market on the one hand, and the demands
of contract enforceability rules in sales law on the other hand. The tech-
nology is telephonic. It expands the ways in which market participants
negotiate and execute currency trades. Communications between Ci-
tibank, DBS and the like are not face-to-face meetings in which written
draft contracts are exchanged and marked up by lawyers representing the
106. See also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 404. As discussed above, foreign ex-
change can be categorized as a thing in action. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text;
U.C.C. § 9-106. Section 9-106 specifically includes things in action in the definition of
"[g]eneral intangibles."
The second gap concerns transactions excluded from Article 9 by U.C.C. § 9-104. Sec-
tion 9-104() of the U.C.C. indicates that Article 9 is inapplicable "to a transfer of an interest
in any deposit account." A "deposit account" covers "a demand, time, savings, passbook or
like account maintained with a bank." U.C.C. § 9-105(e). Certainly, accounts maintained by
Citibank and DBS for foreign exchange trading purposes would be "deposit accounts" ex-
cluded from Article 9.
Consequently, contracts for foreign exchange could fall into either or both of the gaps
and thereby come within the ambit of § 1-206. This result is obtained only if foreign ex-
change is a thing in action and not a good governed by Article 2 and its statute of frauds.
Such a result would not affect the analysis in this article. The same concerns about the
costs, benefits, and purposes of the statute of frauds are relevant to U.C.C. § 2-201 or § 1-206.
Indeed, because U.C.C. § 2-201 requires that a writing contain only a quantity term, while
§ 1-206 requires more, the arguments below apply to U.C.C. § 1-206 a fortiori. Compare
U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 with U.C.C. § 1-206(1). See generaUy Note, The Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 1-206-A New Departure in the Statute of Frauds?, 70 YALE L.J. 603 (1961) (comparing the
requirements of § 1-206 and § 2-201).
111. This unhappy scenario has spurred legislative action in New York. Recently, the New
York legislature passed an amendment to G.O.L. § 5-701 that excludes "qualified financial
contracts" from the statute of frauds. Act of July 20, 1994, ch. 467, sec. 1, § 5-701 (b), 1994
N.Y. LAws 467 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAw § 5-701 (McKinney 1994).
Such contracts include spot and forward foreign exchange contracts and currency swaps.
The bill was transmitted to Governor Mario Cuomo for his signature on July 8, 1994. N.Y.A
11513, 215th G.A., 2d Sess. (1994). Similar amendments are proposed in the bill for §§ 1-206
and 2-201, which raises the specter of non-uniformity in New York's U.C.C. vis-a-vis the
U.C.C. of other states. The bill is actively supported by the ISDA, a trade association repre-
senting participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. See Memorandum from
Daniel Cunningham and Catherine Struve to ISDA Board of Directors re: Amendment of
New York Statute of Frauds (June 2, 1994) (on file with author). The ISDA memo is accom-
panied by a form letter favoring the amendments that ISDA members are encouraged to
send to New York legislators.
112. See infra notes 167-216 and accompanying text.
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parties during endless rounds of coffee and take-out sandwiches. The
trading floors of Citibank and DBS are entirely different from the conven-
tional lawyers' conference room; traders often communicate by tele-
phone. In sum, the deals made in the currency bazaar are oral and are
concluded rapidly and informally.'
1 3
The statute of frauds must adapt to this telephonic technology. Eng-
land accepted a similar proposition many years ago. In 1954, the English
Law Reform Committee successfully advocated the repeal of the statute of
frauds, in part because a writing requirement is " 'out of accord with the
way in which business is normally done.' "114 Unfortunately, this proposi-
tion has not gained respectability in the U.S. Except for the current note-
worthy attempt at revising U.C.C. Article 2, "[t]here has been no serious
movement to abolish the statutes of frauds in this country, though they
have had many critics." 11 5 Foreign exchange market participants might
not reduce their agreements to writing for good reason. Because bid-ask
spreads are thin for trading in liquid currencies, profits are made through
a high volume of trading. To maximize profits, market participants seek
to conclude as many transactions as cheaply and quickly as possible. Out-
dated legal formalities like the statute of frauds requirements lead to
higher transaction costs and delay the completion of transactions. Not
surprisingly, many market participants prefer tape recordings of conversa-
tions among traders instead of written agreements.
The law also must account for the culture of the currency bazaar.
Trust among participants in the foreign exchange market is high. Perhaps
this aspect of business culture also distinguishes the trading floor from the
conference room. The participants repeatedly deal with one another. To
engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices is to invite ostracism: a
trader's unctuous behavior quickly becomes widely known and other trad-
ers decide it is risky and imprudent to deal with the rogue trader. In 1966,
an author of a textbook on foreign exchange observed that "[m ] ost deal-
ers with very long experience have never had a single lawsuit arising from
misunderstandings in respect of foreign exchange transactions." 116 The
observation remains true today.
Two variations of the hypothetical spot transaction presented in Part
II will illustrate that the statute of frauds should be reformed or abolished
in the context of the foreign exchange market. In Case One, the tele-
phone conversation between the Citibank and DBS traders is taped. How-
ever, no written confirmations are exchanged between the parties. Case
113. Undoubtedly, these features, and the phenomenon of telephonic and computer-to-
computer communications, are found in many other modem markets. Accordingly, the po-
tential applicability of the pragmatic strategy is not limited to the foreign exchange market.
114. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371 (quoting UNrrED KINGDOM LAW REVISION
COMMrrrEE ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE DocrRINE OF CONSIDERATION, SIXTH INTERIM
REPORT, CmD. No. 5449, 6-7 (1937)).
115. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371. Farnsworth is referring specifically to
non-U.C.C. statutes of frauds enacted in most states, but his remark is equally true with re-
spect to U.C.C. § 2-201.
116. PAUL EINZIG, A TEXTBOOK ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE 41 (1966).
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One raises the problem of compliance with section 2-201 (1), the funda-
mental statute of frauds provision. The problem is solved if section 2-
201 (1) is judicially reinterpreted or legislatively modified so that tape re-
cordings satisfy the "writing" and "signature" requirements of that section.
In Case Two, the operations departments of Citibank and DBS ex-
change such confirmations subsequent to the tape-recorded, telephonic
conversation between their traders. This Case raises a the problem of
compliance with section 2-201(2), the merchant's exception to section 2-
201 (1). It is argued that the microeconomic costs of such confirmations
do not justify the requirement that they be used.
B. Case One: Tape Recordings as "Writings"
1. The Tangibility Paradigm
Twenty years ago Professor Misner argued that tape recordings
should satisfy the statute of frauds.' 17 His argument, however, is incongru-
ous. He did not advocate that a tape recording be considered a "writing"
for purposes of U.C.C. sections 1-201(46) and 2-201. Instead, Misner ar-
gued that the recording's voiceprint should satisfy the "signature require-
ment of U.C.C. section 1-201(39).118 The real problem with Misner's
argument, however, is that it is disappointingly conservative.
Misner's argument is mired in the tangibility paradigm. This para-
digm does not consider the needs of a particular market like the currency
bazaar. The market must fit the law, not the reverse. Most importantly,
this paradigm requires some physically cognizable piece of paper to evi-
dence a contract under the statute of frauds. A " 'voiceprint'-the
graphic output of high-speed sound spectrograph"1 9-meets the require-
ment. Thus, Misner's argument does not strike at the heart of the statute
of frauds: it will not allow a tape recording alone to satisfy the statute.
Ironically, in trying to cope with telephone business deals, Misner in
effect advocated two writings to satisfy the statute of frauds-the
voiceprint (which would be the "signature") combined with a written
memorandum (which would be the "writing").120 This solution is not only
needlessly cumbersome and costly, but also inapposite to the special tech-
nologies and business practices of the currency bazaar. A more radical
and efficient solution is required, whereby the tangibility paradigm is dis-
carded and full legal effect is given to tape recordings.
2. Possible Legislative Amendments
One such solution-rejected by Misner with little reasoning 12 1- is
legislative action. Two straightforward legislative amendments might be
appropriate. U.C.C. section 2-201(1) states the "writing" must be "signed"
117. Misner, supra note 106.
118. Id. at 942, 945-56, 964.
119. Id. at 946.
120. Id. at 950.
121. Id. at 943-46.
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by the party (or her broker) against whom enforcement of the contract is
sought. Under section 1-201(46), a "'writing' includes a printing, type-
writing or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."1 22 A legisla-
tive amendment is needed to bring tape recordings squarely within the
meaning of a "writing." The following phrase could be added at the end
of section 1-201(46) to accomplish this goal: "and a tape recording or
other recording on magnetic tape."
123
Under U.C.C. section 1-201(39), "'signed' includes any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writ-
ing." To ensure consistency with the term "writing" as amended, the
following phrase could be added at the end of section 1-201(39): "and any
statement of a speaker identifying the speaker that is tape-recorded or re-
corded on magnetic tape."
Amending section 1-201(46) in the manner previously suggested,
however, may be incongruous with the structure of U.C.C. Article 3 and
other non-Article 3 provisions dealing with negotiable instruments. Rules
regarding negotiable instruments are property rules that turn on the phys-
ical delivery of a tangible item. Such rules become nonsensical in an in-
tangible world. Accordingly, adjusting section 1-201(46) could do more
harm than good. 12 4 It is wise to consider two other legislative options in
lieu of amending sections 1-201(46) and 1-201(39).
One alternative is to add a definition of "record" in section 1-201.
Indeed, in April 1994 the American Bar Association's Working Group on
Electronic Writings and Notices of the Subcommittee on Electronic Com-
mercial Practices ("Working Group") approved a proposed definition of
"record" that would embrace tape recordings: "'[r]ecord' means a dura-
ble representation of information which is in, or is capable of being re-
trieved or reproduced in, perceivable form. A record may be in writing or
in any electronic or other media." 125 As the Working Group explains:
The term "record" is new. Throughout the Code, numerous
provisions of the various Articles have required parties to com-
municate in "writing" as defined in Section 1-201(46). Given the
rapid development of electronic and other communication and
storage technologies, the requirement that documents or com-
122. U.C.C. § 1-201(46). Obviously, a tape recording is not a "printing" or "typewriting."
It can be transcribed, but then the transcription and not the tape itself is the writing. More-
over, a key feature common to printing and typewriting is that each is readable by the un-
aided human eye. This feature is not present with respect to tape recordings. See 1 RONALD
A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:134 (2d ed. 1970).
123. An alternative proposal may be derived from Professor Anderson's argument that a
tape recording is not a "writing" because it "lack[s] the element of being 'readable' by the
unaided human eye which is characteristic of printing and typewriting." 1 ANDERSON, supra
note 122, § 1-201:134 This proposal calls for adding "or on any substance" after the words
"tangible form" in § 1-201(46). Id. Anderson's argument has been criticized by Misner for
citing no authority. See Misner, supra note 106, at 947-48.
124. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commer-
cial Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 607, 612-16, 622-24 (1993).
125. Letter from Patricia B. Fry, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Af-
fairs, University of North Dakota School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 5 (June 27, 1994).
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munications be "written" or "in writing" no longer reflects ex-
isting or developing commercial practices. Examples of current
technologies commercially used to communicate or store infor-
mation include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical
discs, digital voice messaging systems, audio tapes and photo-
graphic media.
12 6
With the addition of the term "record" to section 1-201, there should be
no need to modify the term "writing." The Working Group's proposal is
gaining acceptance among other American Bar Association committees
charged with studying the revision of the U.C.C. For example, the term
"record" may be used in revisions to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 5.127
Another legislative option would be to change the statute of frauds to
allow parties to vary it by agreement. While freedom of contract is a foun-
dation of Article 2, Citibank and DBS currently are not permitted to opt
out of section 2-201(1).128 Adding a phrase or sentence to section 2-
201 (1) that would allow them to vary the statute by agreement would pro-
vide the necessary freedom.
129
3. Judicial Re-interpretation
A different way of accomplishing the same task would be for judges to
reinterpret sections 1-201(39) and (46) to encompass tape recordings.
While this may be a time-consuming and uneven process, there is a textual
basis for such judicial action. U.C.C. sections 1-201(39) and (46) contain
the word "includes." Because this word does not limit the definition, a
court could reasonably extend the definition to include non-paradigmatic
writings.
Unfortunately, some courts adhere to the tangibility paradigm. These
courts take a formalistic view of tape recordings and, consequently, decide
these non-paradigmatic writings do not satisfy the statute of frauds. For
example, the issue in Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc. was
whether a tape-recorded oral contract for the sale of securities is enforcea-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2.
128. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 ("[T]he statute of frauds found in Section 2-201 . . . does
not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies
enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable .... ."); U.C.C. § 1-
205 cmt. 4 (referring to the Article 2 statute of frauds as a "mandatory rule... whose very
office is to control and restrict the actions of the parties, and which cannot be abrogated by
agreement, or by a usage of trade").
129. The word "sign" (or "signature," "signatures," "signed," or "signer") appears in
U.C.C. §§ 2-205 (the merchant's firm offer rule) and 2-209 (concerning modification, rescis-
sion, and waiver). The word "writing" (or "written") appears in U.C.C. §§ 2-202 (the parol
evidence rule), 2-203 (providing that seals are inoperative), 2-205, 2-207 (concerning addi-
tional terms in an acceptance or confirmation), 2-209, 2-316 (regarding the exclusion or
modification of warranties), 2-509 (concerning risk of loss in the absence of a breach of
contract), 2-605 (regarding a waiver of a buyer's objections to a delivery of goods), 2-607
(relating to notice of a claim of litigation), and 2-616 (relating to notice of a material or
indefinite delay). Modifying the statute of frauds as suggested above, or re-interpreting it as
discussed below, is unlikely to upset these other provisions of Article 2. Foreign exchange
contracts are between two parties and neither multiple writings nor signatures are involved.
Thus, the rights and obligations of third parties would be unaffected by the proposals.
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ble under the statute of frauds in Article 8 of the U.C.C.130 The court
assumed that a tape recording is an "intentional reduction to tangible
form" and, therefore, a "writing" under section 1-201(46).131 Neverthe-
less, the court held that the recording failed to satisfy the statute of frauds
because it was not "signed" by the party against whom enforcement of the
contract was sought.'
5 2
The court in Roos v. Aloi also refused to re-interpret the statutory lan-
guage to reflect market practice. 135 Again, the issue was the enforceability
of an oral agreement for the sale of stock. 1 4 The buyer argued the tape
recorded conversation of the agreement satisfied the relevant statute of
frauds.'5 5 The court rejected this argument in a highly ironic manner.'1
6
On one hand, the court noted that the parties (two equal shareholders in
a closely-held corporation) were well known to each other. Consequently,
strict adherence to the intricacies and formalities of corporate law was un-
necessary.'5 7 On the other hand, the court slavishly followed a single pre-
cedent on the statute of frauds, even though the relationship of the parties
and the surrounding facts and circumstances reliably indicated the exist-
ence of an enforceable contract.
15 8
The facts of the Swink and Roos cases did not suggest that the tape-
recorded voices were not genuine. Perhaps the courts' decisions were
based on concerns that a voice on tape is more difficult to authenticate
than a handwritten signature. For such courts, reliability is the core of the
statute of frauds "signature" requirement. Obviously, contracts should not
be enforced if it is uncertain whether the defending party assumed con-
tractual obligations; but it is folly to think that authenticating recorded
130. 584 S.W.2d 393, 394-96 (Ark. 1979). U.C.C. Article 8, which governs transactions in
investment securities, contains a statute of frauds in § 8-319:
[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless:
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities
at a defined or stated price.
U.C.C. § 8-319. The fact that the statute of frauds at issue is U.C.C. § 8-319 does not render a
case inapposite to the analysis of the Citibank-DBS dispute under U.C.C. § 2-201. The critical
terms "writing" and "signed" are used in both sections and defined in exactly the same way in
U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (46) and 1-201 (39), respectively. Moreover, U.C.C. § 8-319 cmt. 1 states that
"[t]his Section is intended to conform the statute of frauds provisions with regard to securi-
ties to the policy of the like provisions in Article 2 (Section 2-201)." Indeed, examining cases
arising under U.C.C. § 8-319 for clues about the interpretation of § 2-201 is commonly done.
See, e.g., Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988).
131. Swink & Co., 584 S.W.2d at 398-99.
132. Id.
133. 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 640. Those provisions were U.C.C. § 8-319 and New York's General Obligation
Law. Id. at 642-43; see also infra note 130.
136. Roos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the General Obliga-
tions Law.
137. Roos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
138. Id. at 642-43.
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voices is any more difficult than authenticating a signature on paper.
13 9
Indeed, impersonating a voice is probably far harder than forging a signa-
ture; hence, a tape recording may well be more reliable than a signature.
Further, the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions, like the agree-
ment in the Roos case, involve repeat players whose voices are well-known
to each other. Certainly the parties introduce themselves to each other
before negotiating a spot foreign exchange deal. Courts that consistently
apply the tangibility paradigm, such as the Swink and Roos courts, never
entertain these considerations.
The court in the Citibank-DBS dispute should avoid this paradigm's
inherently formalistic approach. Instead, it should follow the opinion ren-
dered in Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein and hold that the tape-recorded con-
versations between Citibank and DBS satisfy section 2-201.140 The facts of
Bernstein closely resemble the disputed dollar-yen transaction. Bernstein
orally agreed to sell the stock in United Packers, a company he owned and
operated, to the Ellis Canning Company. Bernstein and the Ellis Canning
representatives agreed to record the essential elements of the transac-
tion.' 4 ' After the taped conversation, letters and draft agreements were
exchanged between Bernstein and Ellis Canning, though the parties'
agreement was not memorialized in a signed writing.' 42 Subsequently, a
third party offered to buy the United Packers stock at a higher price than
Ellis Canning had offered. Bernstein reneged on the deal with Ellis Can-
ning and sold the stock to the third party.
1 43
The court rightly rejected Bernstein's affirmative defense that the
contract with Ellis Canning was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds.144 It held that the tape recording satisfied the statute of frauds
writing requirement because the parties had previously agreed in writing
to be bound by the tape recording. 145 The court reasoned that if the par-
ties agreed to bind themselves to a recording of their agreement, then
139. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 106, at 956-63 (discussing the scientific aspects of
voiceprints).
140. 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972). Professor Misner wrongly rejected the Bernstein
decision, discussed below, as too liberal and, therefore, unlikely to be followed in different
jurisdictions in a uniform manner. Misner, supra note 106, at 949-50, 964. A court decision
in one jurisdiction that is squarely consistent with the needs of the market and the technolog-
ical and business culture of that market, and that makes rational economic sense, should be
an attractive precedent for courts in other jurisdictions. Of course, possibly the best way to
ensure that the Bernstein holding is uniformly adopted is to enact it legislatively. Yet, Misner
rejected legislative solutions. Id. at 945-46.
141. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1215-17.
142. Id. at 1217-20. The letters and drafts are analogous to the written confirmations
discussed in Case Two below. See infra notes 167-215 and accompanying text.
143. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1220.
144. Bernstein unsuccessfully argued that no contract had been formed with Ellis Can-
ning because no meeting of the minds occurred. The court held that all the essential terms
of the stock sale were agreed to notwithstanding certain objections to the structure of the
transaction raised by Bernstein. Id. at 1221, 1225-28.
145. Id. at 1228. While the court characterized this decision as a holding, a more con-
servative interpretation of the case is possible. The court plainly held that the letters and
draft contracts exchanged by the parties satisfied the writing requirement of U.C.C. § 8-319.
The court stated that it went "a step farther" in deciding that the tape recording, agreed to by
the parties, satisfied the statute of frauds. Id. This step could be regarded as dicta.
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"the contract [was] 'reduced to tangible form' when it [was] placed on the
tape. "146 Similarly, the signature requirement was met because its "clear
purpose ... is to require identification of the contracting party and.., the
identity of the oral contractors [was already] established" on tape.1 4 7 Un-
doubtedly, the court's outrage at Bernstein's behavior compelled this
holding. After the taped conversation was concluded, Ellis Canning had
provided working capital and management expertise to United Packing.
As a result, the financial performance of United Packing markedly im-
proved. 148 Bernstein took advantage of this improvement by selling his
stock in United Packing to a higher bidder.
In the hypothetical Citibank-DBS dispute, the court benefits from two
additional recent precedents that break away from the tangibility para-
digm. In Londono v. City of Gainesville, the court held that a tape recording
of the city commissioner's action at a public meeting satisfied the signa-
ture requirement of the statute of frauds. 149 In Color & Design Exchange
Inc. v. Standish, the court held that an oral statement made on the record
in open court satisfies the statute of frauds. 150 The Londono and Standish
decisions reflect a well-placed confidence in the reliability of tape record-
ings as evidence of a contract that is lacking in the Roos and Swink
opinions.15 1
4. Certainty
By discarding the tangibility paradigm and enforcing the dollar-yen
spot transaction, a court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute ensures
that the statute of frauds serves the needs of market participants. One
such need is certainty as to the enforceability of spot deals. Knowing that
existing obligations will be enforced, sellers of foreign exchange, like DBS,
can comfortably reject new offers to buy currency. This certainty is partic-
ularly important in the volatile foreign exchange market where new offers
are the inevitable result of dramatic, swift changes in rates.
146. Id.
147. Id. But see Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393 (1979)
(holding that a tape recording was a "writing," but the "signature" requirement was not met;
hence the contract at issue was unenforceable).
148. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1218.
149. 768 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985).
150. 593 A.2d 169, 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991). The statement was not made by the
party to be charged, Standish, but by the attorney for the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the
contract. The contract involved a personal guarantee made by Standish, the president of a
corporation, for payment of a judgment rendered against his corporation.
151. The Court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute also has the benefit of several
precedents establishing a liberal approach to the signature requirement. See, e.g., Barber &
Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823
(1987) (the trademark of a seller satisfied the signature requirement); Procyon Corp. v.
Components Direct, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (a buyer signed a letter of
credit essentially by adopting the signature of the bank that issued the credit); Paloukos v.
Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1978) (the business name of the seller
printed on a worksheet satisfied the signature requirement); Automotive Spares Corp. v.
Archer Bearings Co., 382 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (letterhead satisfied the signature
requirement); A&G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976)
(typed name was sufficient to satisfy the requirement).
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5. Fraud Prevention or Fraud Promotion?
A decision in the Citibank-DBS dispute that is consistent with the
Bernstein, Londono, and Standish cases serves a second important market
need-promoting market integrity and preventing fraud. Like Bernstein,
Citibank is asking a court to ratify its unscrupulous behavior through the
statute of frauds. Notions of fairness and justice dictate that the tape-re-
corded telephone transaction between Citibank and DBS should be an
enforceable contract.1 52 Applying the statute of frauds in this case is at
best a hinderance to achieving a just result. It gives a party like Citibank a
legal basis for welshing.
153
On the other hand, the statute of frauds was intended to prevent
fraudulent claims by thwarting perjured testimony in contract cases and by
generally avoiding "the maladies of fraud and deceit."1 54 As Professor
Llewellyn stated:
The effort of the Code (2-201) has been to deal with the essential
purposes for which the Statute was designed, while getting and
keeping away from the abuses: to wit, to make utterly essential
some evidence in writing and over signature, or else some pretty
good other evidence that rests on something more tangible than
words of mouth. . . . [T]he Code adds both the desire and a
reasonable machinery for a businessman to be able to rely on
what both parties sign and on the fact that he has procured a
memo signed by the other party.
155
Thus, one could argue that circumscribing or abolishing the statute
of frauds as an affirmative defense would constrain the ability of a court to
render just opinions in egregious cases. Carefully applying the fundamen-
tal rules of contract formation, however, is a protective substitute. Sup-
pose that after the DBS trader provides the Citibank trader with a dollar-
yen quote, the Citibank trader says she is "strongly interested" in buying
120 million yen and provides delivery instructions to the DBS trader. On
the value date, DBS delivers 120 million yen to Citibank, but no reciprocal
payment of $1,153,846.15 is made by Citibank. Assume that after the trade
date, the yen depreciated relative to the dollar. Consequently, DBS is anx-
ious to sell its yen at the higher exchange rate that prevailed on the trade
152. This position assumes that the tape recording meets the two basic requirements set
forth in U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. First, there is "a basis for believing that.., a real transaction"
occurred. Second, the quantity term is set forth.
153. A contract should be enforced, even if the court must resort to the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel. See Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d 1178, 1185-86 (7th
Cir. 1991) (discussing whether promissory estoppel can be used to avoid limitations on the
enforcement of oral promises placed by the statute of frauds); Southmark Corp. v. Life Inves-
tors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 771 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that promissory estoppel should be
invoked only when it would be inequitable for the court to apply the statute of frauds).
154. Misner, supra note 106, at 943; see also DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920,
922, 924 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., plurality and Flaum, J., dissenting respectively); Holley
Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Campbell v.
Campbell, 371 So.2d 55, 60 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)); Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th
Cir. 1986).
155. 2 WiutAam D. HAWELAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIFS § 2-201:01, at 9-10
(1992).
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date than at the currently-prevailing rate. 15 6 Therefore, DBS argues that a
dollar-yen contract exists. The statute of frauds allows a court to avoid
enforcing the alleged contract.
Yet, a court need not apply the statute of frauds to achieve this result.
A court can reason that the offer-acceptance process was not completed.
The statement of "interest," even when coupled with the provision of deliv-
ery instructions, is not an acceptance of DBS's offer to sell yen. Ostensibly,
such reasoning is a doctrinal sleight-of-hand, that is, using contract forma-
tion rules to deal with enforceability problems. Any theoretical distinction
between formation and enforceability, however, is of no practical moment
to the Citibank trader. Whether a court decides that no valid contract
ever was formed or that a contract exists but is unenforceable, the result is
the same-Citibank has no obligation to buy 120 million yen.
157
As the Citibank-DBS example illustrates, the statute of frauds can de-
feat its own purpose. 158 In effect, the statute of frauds is lop-sided. It is
designed in part to prevent the fraudulent assertion of contractual claims,
yet it allows a party to renege on a deal when an agreed price subsequently
becomes unprofitable because of subsequent market developments. Eng-
lish law reformers have acknowledged this lop-sidedness. As Justice Wil-
mot's opinion (quoted at the outset of this Part) suggests, English jurists
had complained for many years that the statute promotes fraud. The Eng-
lish Law Reform Committee finally agreed:
"The Act," [the Statute of Frauds] in the words of Lord Campbell
. .. "promotes more fraud than it prevents." True, it shuts out
perjury; but it also and more frequently shuts out the truth. It
strikes unpartially at the perjurer and at the honest man who has
omitted a precaution, sealing the lips of both. Mr. Justice
Fitzjames Stephen . . .went so far as to assert that "in the vast
majority of cases its operation is simply to enable a man to break
a promise with impunity, because he did not write it down with
sufficient formality."
159
In 1954, almost three centuries after it first enacted the statute of frauds,
Parliament repealed the statute.'
60
156. DBS might cite U.C.C. § 2-204 in its favor, claiming sufficient appropriate conduct
thereunder by Citibank to establish an agreement.
157. The statute of frauds is unnecessary to prevent injustices in other types of cases.
Suppose a wrongdoer claiming she is a Citibank trader telephones a DBS trader and asks for
a dollar-yen quote. The DBS trader provides the quote, and the wrongdoer says "mine, 120
million yen," thereby indicating a purchase of yen for dollars from DBS. The statute of
frauds is a means for a court to ensure that the alleged contract is not enforced against
Citibank. Citibank can argue, however, that under applicable agency law principles the
wrongdoer lacked authority to bind Citibank to an enforceable agreement.
158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
159. UNITED KINGDOM LAW REVISION COMMrrTE, SixTH INTERiM REPORT, CMD. No. 5449,
9 (1937), quoted in Misner, supra note 106, at 942-43; see also E. ALLAN FANswoRTH, CON-
TRAcrS § 6.1, at 371-72 (1982).
160. FARtswoRTm, supra note 159, at 370-71; see also C. Grunfeld Law Reform (Enforcement
of Contracts) Act, 1954, 17 MOD. L. REv. 451 (1954). For discussions of the history of the
English statute of frauds pertaining to the sale of goods, see Thomson Printing Machinery
Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1983); Hugh E. Willis, The Statute of Frauds-




Admittedly, rejecting the tangibility paradigm and applying the prag-
matic strategy may amount to results-oriented jurisprudence inconsistent
with the aims of the drafters of U.C.C. Article 2. After all, it would be
incorrect to say the drafters intended the statute of frauds to be satisfied
by a tape recording. The official commentary to section 2-201, as well as
related definitional provisions in section 1-201(39) and 1-201(46), indi-
cate that the drafters took a paradigmatic pencil-and-paper approach. 161
This objection, however, must be answered using two fundamental
aims of the drafters. First, the U.C.C. should be interpreted flexibly in
order to promote commercial development. Second, the freedom of par-
ties to contract with one another in a manner they find efficient should
not be abridged. 162 The proposed legislative modifications and judicial
re-interpretations call for Article 2 and the relevant definitions in Article 1
to be changed in the light of technology and culture in the currency ba-
zaar. If legislatures adopt these changes, then the pragmatic justification
for the inclusion of foreign exchange transactions in Article 2 is strength-
ened. Surely the drafters would prefer to see their sales law "work" for this
market through some modest, constructive tinkering rather than wholly
exempting the market from the law.
Judge Posner-hardly an exponent ofjudicial activism-provided an
illustration of useful tinkering consistent with the drafters' fundamental
aims. In Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corporation,163 he confronted the
issue of whether a memo that precedes the actual formation of a contract
constitutes a writing which satisfies section 2-201. Posner overcame the
perfect tense contained in the statutory language, which says the writing
must be sufficient to show that a contract "has been" made. The plain
meaning is obvious: contract first, writing second. Nevertheless, Posner
held that a pre-contractual writing that indicates acceptance of all the es-
sential terms of an offer satisfies section 2-201 (1).164 Posner reasoned that
a rule of strict temporal priority is unnecessary where one party unilater-
ally performs its obligations under the alleged contract. The plaintiff who
sought to enforce the contract had conveyed all of its inventory, records,
and other assets to the defendant who invoked the statute of frauds. This
unilateral performance is unthinkable unless a contract exists.
ship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 ItAv. L. REv. 329 (1913); Crawford Henning, The Orignal Drafts
of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. REv. 283 (1913); Justice Stephen &
Frederick Pollack, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 LAw. Q. REv. 1 (1885).
161. U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 1-201(39), 1-201(46). U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 states:
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and
such material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated. All that is required is
that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
real transaction. It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad.
This comment also indicates the drafters' aim to minimize the number of terms a "writing"
must contain. See also Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508 (1989);
1 STATE OF NEw YoR, RePORT OF THE LAw REviSION COMM'N FOR 1954, at 117-18 (1954)
(memorandum by K.N. Llewellyn).
162. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) & cmt. 2; 1 HAwI AND, supra note 155, § 1-102:12 (1984).
163. 931 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 1182, 1185.
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Posner's flexible approach to the language of section 2-201 is applica-
ble to a tape-recorded spot foreign-exchange trade that lacks any eviden-
tiary writing. The partial performance exception to the statute of frauds,
set forth in U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c), reinforces such an approach.
1 65
That exception states that a contract that fails to satisfy section 2-201(1)
"but which is valid in other respects is enforceable ...with respect to
goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have
been received and accepted."1 66 Suppose DBS delivers 120 million yen to
Citibank on the value date whereas Citibank fails to deliver $1,153,846.15.
Without a contract, DBS would not deliver the yen, just as the plaintiff in
Monetti would not have turned over its entire business to the defendant
without a pre-existing (albeit oral) contract. Accordingly, a formalistic in-
terpretation of the writing requirement in the statute of frauds would be
unwarranted. The only reasonable inference from the facts is that a con-
tract exists and should be enforced. In sum, Posner-like tinkering isjustifi-
able in contexts where the facts, and the basic aims of the drafters,
demand enforcement of an oral contract.
C. Case Two: The Costs and Benefits of Confirmations
1. The Tangibility Paradigm Again
Case Two is a paradigmatic situation envisioned by section 2-201(2): a
deal made orally, evidenced by a subsequent confirmation slip.' 6 7 Be-
cause the confirmations are unsigned or transmitted electronically, they
do not comply with the requirements of U.C.C. section 2-201 (1). How-
ever, the merchant's exception of section 2-201(2) provides that:
[b]etween merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in con-
firmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is re-
ceived and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents,
it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within
10 days after it is received. 168
Strictly speaking, this provision is not an "exception" to the statute of
frauds but rather "an alternate method of satisfying the writing require-
ment" of section 2-201(1) that is available for merchants.
169
165. Curiously, Posner does not discuss this exception in detail in the Monetti opinion.
166. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c). A three-pronged definition of "acceptance" is set forth in
U.C.C. § 2-606.
167. Monetti, 931 F.2d 1178; see also Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 761 F.2d
1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving an oral offer to sell followed by a written invoice). The non-
paradigmatic situation is the reverse: a writing is prepared before the actual formation of the
contract. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
168. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
169. Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1991). Accord-
ingly, some commentators provide a misleading explanation of U.C.C. § 2-201(2). See, e.g.,
Scarborough, supra note 108, at 20.
A "merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
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Accordingly, one way of satisfying the statute of frauds is to require a
written confirmation between parties like Citibank and DBS. 170 Case Two,
then, involves the exchange of written confirmations between dealing
banks after the banks' traders conclude their recorded telephonic com-
munication. The confirmations identify the currencies involved, the
buyer and seller of the currencies, the exchange rate between the curren-
cies, the amount of currencies to be delivered, and the value date. A cost-
benefit analysis of the exchange of confirmations pursuant to the statute
of frauds indicates that requiring this exchange does not serve the needs
of the market.
Llewellyn envisioned parties like Citibank and DBS making contracts
by telephone:
These days we are making contracts over the long-distance
telephone as an increasingly standard practice. Decent business-
men having made a contract over the long-distance telephone
confirm before five o'clock or close of business that day. As the
statute now stands, any crook who wishes to play it both ways
against the middle has only to fail to communicate [i.e., to an-
swer the counterparty] and the other guy is stuck. He can hold
him or get out according to the market.
This happy opportunity for fraud is unfortunately being in-
dulged in to a considerable extent.
We think that the machinery provided in the section [sec-
tion 2-201(2)], not by any means wholly satisfactory, at least is a
safeguard against this particular type of abuse and fits the prac-
tice of constantly closing deals at a distance, and orally.'
7 1
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Surely, Citibank and DBS are merchants because they deal in currency, satisfy the
"knowledge or skill" test, or meet the attribution test.
There is no bright-line test for what constitutes a "reasonable time." It "depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances" of the action that is required. U.C.C. § 1-204(2). Be-
cause of the short-term volatility of exchange rates, a "reasonable time" may be a shorter
period in the context of the currency bazaar than in other markets. See, e.g., Lish v.
Compton, 547 P.2d 223, 227 (Utah 1976) (holding that twelve days was not a "reasonable
time" with respect to the wheat market in which prices fluctuated rapidly).
The correct approach to U.C.C. § 2-201(2) appears to be that it is an exception to the
signature requirement, not the writing requirement. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) states that a writing
must be "sufficient against the sender." This phrase implies that while a written confirmation
is required, the signature of the recipient on the confirmation is not needed. To enforce a
contract, the sender of a confirmation must produce that confirmation and must have signed
it; but the sender need not also show that the recipient signed the confirmation. In other
words, to deprive the confirmation recipient of the statute of frauds defense, the confirma-
tion need only be signed by the sender and indicate the existence of a contract. If the recipi-
ent receives the confirmation and does not make a timely objection to it, the recipient loses
the statute of frauds defense. Therefore, U.C.C. § 2-201(2) excuses the need for the recipi-
ent of a confirmation to sign the confirmation.
170. See, e.g., Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that written
confirmation of an oral telephone contract satisfied § 2-201). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra
note 159, § 6.7, at 405 (1982) (stating that "the usual way to satisfy the statute [of frauds] is
still by a signed writing, commonly called a 'memorandum' ").
171. 1 STATE OF NEw Yoa, REPORT OF THE LAw RmSION COMM'N FOR 1954 179.
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But, like Misner, Llewellyn could not overcome the tangibility paradigm.
In fact, Llewellyn successfully advocated the adoption of section 2-201(2).
Yet, contrary to Llewellyn's view, there is nothing indecent about conclud-
ing a deal by telephone without exchanging written confirmations.
Llewellyn and Misner are not alone in defending the tangibility para-
digm. The leading advocate of the use of written confirmations, as well as
the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2, is
the Federal Reserve. Acting through the Foreign Exchange Committee
("FEC")-an informal advisory group of roughly thirty U.S. and foreign
commercial and investment banks and foreign exchange brokers-the
Federal Reserve repeatedly encourages market participants to exchange
written confirmations. 172 The FEC "believes that the practice of confirm-
ing trades by personnel other than traders is the best protection against
misdirected trades, payments problems, and other potentially costly mis-
takes as well as a deterrent to unauthorized dealing."
173
In spite of the doubt cast below on written confirmations, the FEC
continues to advocate the exchange of confirmations.1 74 A possible expla-
nation for this intransigence is the regulatory influence of the Federal Re-
serve on the FEC. The Federal Reserve is responsible for supervising many
of the commercial banks (and their holding companies) that participate
172. See, e.g., FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9; FoREIGN EXCHANGE COMMIrrEE, 1990 ANNUAL
REPORT 5 (1991) [hereinafter FEC 1990]; FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, 1989 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 9 (1990) [hereinafter FEC 1989].
173. FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 5. Accordingly, the IFEMA, which was drafted by the
Financial Market Lawyers Group of the FEC, states that foreign exchange transactions gov-
erned by the IFEMA "shall be promptly confirmed by the Parties by Confirmations ex-
changed by mail, telex, facsimile or other electronic means." IFEMA, supra note 14, § 2.3.
Section 8.15 of the IFEMA, allows parties to agree on a specific timing for the exchange,
checking, and challenge of confirmations. Absent manifest error, confirmations are deemed
correct three business days after receipt by a party. An example of manifest error would be
where there is a conflict between the confirmation and a tape recording of the conversation
between traders. See IFEMA GUIDE, supra note 14, § III.C, at 7. Under § 8.3 of the IFEMA, a
tape recording is the preferred evidence of the terms of a transaction. The definition of
"Confirmation" in § I of the IFEMA lists the elements that should be included in the docu-
ment. But, no sample confirmation form is appended to the IFEMA because no single for-
mat is accepted in the foreign exchange market as a standard. IFEMA GUIDE, supra note 14,
§ III.C, at 8. Breach of the obligation to send a confirmation, however, carries no penalty;
failure to exchange confirmations "shall not prejudice or invalidate" any foreign exchange
transaction. Id.
174. See infra notes 176-216 and accompanying text. As the FEC recently reaffirmed:
Nevertheless, the [Foreign Exchange] Committee felt strongly that uritten confirma-
tions were still necessary and that tapes did not provide a sufficiently secure and
continuous alternative record .... [I]n [a] .. . letter to foreign exchange market
participants responding to the CIB proposal ..., the Committee emphasized that it
is as necessary as ever to have timely, written confirmations for all spot deals with
banks and other dealers.
FEC 1990 supra note 172, at 5-6.
The only modification to this position concerns the means of transmitting confirma-
tions. The Federal Reserve now acknowledges that transmitting confirmations in a timely
manner, namely, electronically, by telex, or fax, is preferable to sending them in the mail.
FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 6, 29; see also FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9. Electronic transmis-
sion occurs through one of two linkages among trading banks: the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system or a direct-dealing system. While
such transmissions would entail a transaction cost, at least they would be available before the
value date of a spot transaction.
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in the foreign exchange market. 175 The Federal Reserve may suspect that
the foreign exchange market is plagued by questionable and possibly ille-
gal trading practices that threaten the safety and soundness of the partici-
pants it supervises. Written confirmations provide the Federal Reserve
with an "audit trail," that is, potential evidence of improper practices. De-
termined wrongdoers, however, will not hesitate to falsify records. Hence,
the practical value of written confirmations for Federal regulators and law
enforcement agencies is limited. Tape recordings of traders' and brokers'
conversations are themselves audit trails.
2. Delays and Costs
Exchanging confirmations is by no means a universal practice in the
foreign exchange market. Many market participants find it time-consum-
ing and costly. Traders seek to conclude their transactions quickly. It is
infeasible to require traders to spend much time confirming their trades.
After concluding one deal over the phone, their attention turns immedi-
ately to the next deal. Not surprisingly, the task of confirming-if it is
performed-is left to the trading bank's operations department. The
main point, however, is that the merchants exception provides little help
to traders. In effect, the statute of frauds "interfere[s] with expeditious
contracting by delaying mutual obligation from legally attaching until
some later time."
176
In addition to these delays, exchanging confirmations entails prepara-
tory, transmission, and storage costs. Preparatory costs are those con-
nected with the preparation of the confirmation. The officials in the
operations department of Citibank and DBS must ascertain the terms of
the trade (e.g., the currencies involved, exchange rates, value date, and
delivery instructions) by listening to the tape recorded conversations of
the traders, talking with the traders, and checking any written records like
trade tickets. The officials must be paid for their time and effort. Sending
the prepared confirmation via mail, telex, or fax entails a transmission
cost. While this cost may be small for a single confirmation, the fact that
Citibank and DBS enter into hundreds of deals every day means that the
cumulative transmission cost could be significant. Finally, cautious market
participants may seek to store confirmations for the statute of limitations
period. Under U.C.C. section 2-725(1), the statute of limitations for an
action involving a contract for sale is four years from the date the claim
accrues. Either the writings must be stored in a warehouse, leading to
inventory and property costs, or converted to microfiche, resulting in stor-
age costs. The sum of preparatory, transmission, and storage costs is a
sizeable transaction cost connected with every foreign exchange trade.
177
175. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has supervisory author-
ity over all bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988). It is also responsible for su-
pervising commercial banks that are state-chartered and members of the Federal Reserve
System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1988) (defining "appropriate Federal banking agency").
176. Misner, supra note 106, at 945.
177. As the FEC admits:
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Curiously, in Monetti, Judge Posner observed that one purpose of the
statute of frauds is "to make the contractual process cheaper and more
certain by encouraging the parties to contracts to memorialize their agree-
ment."1 78 Posner, however, failed to elaborate on this purpose. It could
be that compliance with the statute of frauds leads to less litigation and,
thus, greater certainty and lower legal costs. 179 Here, the statute of frauds
acts in tandem with the parol evidence rule set forth in U.C.C. section 2-
202. By forcing parties to reduce their deal to a writing, the terms thereof
will be recorded. Parties will not have to rely on their memories or notes
to check the terms. Because such sources are potentially inconsistent, reli-
ance thereon could generate uncertainty. Thus, prudent parties might
not only reduce their agreement to writing, but also include a merger
clause to ensure their agreement is integrated.
1 80
If this logic is what Posner had in mind, then it seems to be under-
mined by the statute of frauds itself. As discussed below, exactly what a
document must contain to be a "writing" and to satisfy section 2-201 (1) is
unclear.1 81 Accordingly, if disputes about the terms of the transaction
arise, then surely the parties will rely on the tape recorded conversations
of their transaction for guidance.1 82 Yet, if the tape is the key evidentiary
means for resolving disputed trades, then why bother with a writing in the
first place?
Some banks operate on the assumption that confirmation for a spot trade by a
recorded telephone conversation is adequate as long as the contracts settle; they
retain written confirmations only for use in the case of a disputed or failed trade.
These banks have adopted this procedure in order to reduce office costs. They are
willing to accept the risk that their more informal confirmation procedures may
expose them to a larger number of misdirected spot trades.
FEC 1989, supra note 172, at 9 (emphasis added). The FEC's view that reliance on tape
recordings exposes banks to greater risk is questioned below.
178. Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d at 1181.
179. See, e.g., DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d at 925 (Flaum, J., dissenting). In-
deed, in Monetti Posner cites Professor Farnsworth's treatise in support of the proposition
that the statute of frauds "is largely based on distrust of the ability ofjuries to determine the
truth of testimony that there was or was not a contract." Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181 (citing
FARNSwoRTH, supra note 159, § 6.1, at 85 (1990)). The inference that Posner draws from this
proposition is that it is more costly, and the outcome less certain, to leave this determination
to a jury than to memorialize an agreement in writing. An alternative-and not necessarily
inconsistent-inference is that ajury is less competent than the parties (or ajudge) to make
the determination.
180. This clause (also called an integration clause) is designed to prevent inconsistent
sources from undermining the integrity of the agreement because of the parol evidence rule.
See generally 2 FARmNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 7.3.
181. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
182. Disputes about representations and warranties are unlikely because the participants
are likely to be well-known to each other and to have dealt with each other on several previ-
ous occasions. A dispute could arise about the designated account to which the yen are to be
delivered. Reference to the tape-recorded conversation of the traders might be fruitless in
resolving this dispute. Officials of the operations departments of Citibank and DBS, and not
the banks' traders, would be responsible for exchanging delivery instructions. Referral to




There are very few benefits to requiring the exchange of written con-
firmations that offset the aforementioned delays. The FEC argues that
"[c]onfirmations are an important defense against error and fraud."
183
The comments above regarding fraud promotion rebut this argument.
84
Moreover, the alleged benefit assumes that confirmations are, in fact, ex-
changed promptly. Suppose Citibank sends a written confirmation to DBS
on November 1. DBS, which has reason to know of the contents of the
confirmation, fails to respond to the confirmation by November 10. The
confirmation would satisfy the writing requirement of section 2-201(1).185
By failing to answer Citibank's written confirmation, DBS loses the defense
of the statute of frauds, but Citibank must still prove that an oral contract
was made prior to the written confirmation.
18 6
As a practical matter, however, this result would be irrelevant. The
value date of the spot transaction is November 3, and therefore, the dollar
and yen legs should settle on that date. Thus, while confirmations ex-
changed by mail among foreign exchange market participants satisfy sec-
tion 2-201(2), they rarely, if ever, arrive in time to identify problems
before the value date of a spot transaction.' 87 Not surprisingly, in 1989
the U.S. Council on International Banking ("CIB") recommended that
banks discontinue the exchange of confirmations by mail because the
practice serves no practical purpose.'
88
The only way to detect an error before November 3 would be to check
the tape recording of the traders' oral agreement or to exchange confir-
mations electronically, by telex, or by fax on November 1 or 2. Again,
written confirmations transmitted by these swift means are unnecessary
where tape recordings of that transaction exist. The CIB's recommenda-
tion correctly pointed out that taped telephone conversations are a more
efficient method of detecting problems with a trade. 189 They are immedi-
ately available for use by the operations departments.
4. Helping the Sophisticated
Given the trusting nature of currency bazaar participants, it is not sur-
prising that many foreign exchange traders find written confirmations un-
necessary. After all, repeat players are unlikely to attempt to defraud one
another for fear of being ostracized from the marketplace. Citibank's at-
tempt to renege on its agreement with DBS jeopardizes Citibank's own
standing in the market. The foreign exchange market has been character-
ized (in gender-biased terms) as a "gentleman's market" where "a trader's
183. DEW GuIDE, supra note 14, § III.C, at 7.
184. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
185. The same writing standard set forth in U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt 1 applies to sub-sections
(1) and (2) of§ 2-201. See, e.g., Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Indus. Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508
(1989).
186. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
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word is his bond." When the DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours,
at 104," a deal is struck. To renege is to lose credibility.
Overall, market participants police themselves by refusing to deal with
those who cannot be trusted to fulfill obligations to which they have com-
mitted verbally. Because the market has been generally free from the mal-
adies of fraud and deceit, this self-regulating mechanism has worked.
Rigid adherence to section 2-201(2) is, therefore, unnecessary.
This point leads to a reconsideration of one of the purposes of the
statute of frauds, namely, precluding the enforceability of contractual
claims where a party does not knowingly assume a contractual obliga-
tion. 190 The hidden presumption is that parties are unsophisticated and
need protection from wandering unwittingly into a legally enforceable ob-
ligation. Yet, foreign exchange market participants hardly need such pro-
tection. They are large commercial and investment banks, corporations,
and investment funds. Not surprisingly, they are acutely aware not only of
the risks of trading in the currency bazaar, but also of how trades are nego-
tiated, executed, and consummated.
5. The Tension with the Parol Evidence Rule
Written confirmations are not only irrelevant in practice and unnec-
essary for the sophisticated market participants of the currency bazaar, but
they are also potentially dangerous. Insofar as the contractual terms in
them are inconsistent with those stated in the tape recorded telephone
conversations, they may generate problems of parol evidence. Suppose
the dollar-yen transaction between Citibank and DBS is a thirty-day for-
ward purchase of yen entered into on November 1, i.e., the value date is
November 30.191 The operations department official of Citibank records
the terms of the transaction; however, instead of indicating that 120 mil-
lion yen are purchased, she records that yen are sold. This confirmation is
sent to DBS within a reasonable time, and DBS does not send an objection
to the confirmation within ten days after it is received. Pursuant to U.C.C.
section 2-201 (2), the formal requirements of section 2-201 (1) are met.
While enforceability is not an issue, what exactly should be enforced
is in doubt. On the value date, Citibank demands $1,153,846.15 from
DBS, which replies that Citibank is entitled to 120 million yen. Plainly,
Citibank's written confirmation is incorrect. It is certain to be inconsistent
with the tape recording of the conversation between the Citibank and DBS
traders. It also may be inconsistent with Citibank's deal ticket. To ascer-
tain whether Citibank bought, instead of sold, yen, the operations depart-
ment officials of the two banks must speak with each other, examine their
deal tickets, and check the confirmations against the tape recordings and
deal tickets.
The point is that the greater the number of sources which evidence
the agreement, the greater the probability of inconsistencies in the
190. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 108, at 22.
191. For a discussion of forward transactions, see supra note 17.
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sources. Requiring more confirmations of a trade is not necessarily a safe-
guard against error. To the contrary, it can foster errors, thus exacerbat-
ing risk and confusion in the currency bazaar.1 9 Had the parties relied
on the tape recordings, the mess may have been averted. This scenario is
hardly far-fetched. Indeed, its facts resemble those in Intershoe, Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co.19 3 Moreover, as one foreign exchange market observer
stated, "[t]here cannot be any market dealer anywhere who has never
done a deal 'the wrong way round', or for the wrong amount, or the
wrong value date, or some other major error at some time."
19 4
In this Citibank-DBS dispute, the parol evidence rule of section 2-202
must be applied to determine the terms of the transaction.1 9 5 This appli-
cation yields two principal difficulties. First, the methodology used when
applying this rule is uncertain. Second, the rule can produce erroneous
results.
With respect to methodology, the Court must decide whether Ci-
tibank's written confirmation is the final expression of the parties with
respect to the terms of their agreement. Then, the court must decide
whether the confirmation constitutes an integrated agreement. Assuming
the writing itself does not indicate that it is or is not the complete, conclu-
sive statement of the terms, the Court must make this determination. To
be sure, the standard the Court must apply under Article 2 is clearer than
192. It can also foster disputes about whether the contents of a document are adequate to
allow a court to conclude that the document constitutes a writing for purposes of the statute
of frauds. See, e.g., Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir' 1986) (concerning whether a
written memorandum contained enough of the essential terms, with sufficient specificity, to
evidence a contract).
193. In Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991), a shoe importer, Intershoe, entered into
thirty-week dollar-Italian lira forward transactions with Bankers Trust. (The court errone-
ously referred to these transactions as "futures." Because they took place in the over-the-
counter market and not on an organized exchange, they are forwards. See Bhala supra note 2,
at 100). Bankers Trust sent Intershoe a confirmation indicating that it had bought
537,750,000 lira from, and sold $250,000 to, Intershoe. Intershoe signed the confirmation
and returned it to Bankers Trust. Just before the delivery date, Intershoe said that it had
bought, not sold, lira. Intershoe's attempt to introduce a supporting affidavit was rebuffed by
virtue of Section 2-202. The court found the confirmation to be the final expression of the
parties' agreement. Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
Curiously, while the disputed transactions were negotiated and concluded by telephone,
the court did not refer to the tape recordings of the parties' conversations. Moreover, the
court's dicta that "a confirmation slip or similar writing is usually the only reliable evidence
of such transactions," id. at 336-37, is factually erroneous.
194. JoHN HEYwooD, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE COP'O.AT TREASURER 109 (2d ed.
1979).
195. U.C.C. § 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement
but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade ... or by course of performance; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writ-
ing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
(emphasis added).
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under the common law.196 Official comment 3 to section 2-202 states that
extrinsic evidence of contractual terms must be excluded "[i]f the addi-
tional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been
included in the document.
1 9 7
Unfortunately, the U.C.C. Article 2 standard may be non-sensical and
lead to uncertain results in a dispute such as that between Citibank-DBS
where one party has confused the deal. Surely if Citibank had agreed to
sell yen, then it would have stated so in the confirmation; consequently,
tape recordings must be excluded from consideration. Yet, in fact, selling
yen is exactly what Citibank agreed to do, as the tape recordings can
prove. Citibank did not state it sold yen because of a clerk's innocent
error in making the confirmation, the dishonesty of a trader in writing a
deal ticket, or some other reason. Thus, on the one hand, a court might
hold the Citibank confirmation is not an integration and, therefore, ex-
trinsic evidence such as the tape recording should be admitted. 19 8 But, on
the other hand, following a strict construction of the test in official com-
ment 3, a court could come to the opposite conclusion. In sum, because
application of the parol evidence rule may yield inconsistent results in sim-
ilar cases, the important goal of providing certainty and predictability to
foreign exchange market participants is lost. 199
196. One common law test, proposed by Professor Williston, focuses on whether reason-
able parties, situated as were the parties to this contract, would have naturally and normally
included the extrinsic matter in the writing. 4 SAMUEL WILISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 638-39 (3d ed. 1961). Williston's test leads to the result that merger clauses
usually are conclusive evidence of the completeness of a writing.
Professor Corbin advocated a two-step inquiry, not an objective "reasonable person" test.
The judge should consider extrinsic materials to determine whether there is "respectable"
evidence that an antecedent agreement was made. If so, then the judge should determine
whether the antecedent agreement was discharged by the subsequent writing. 3 ARTHUR L.
CoRBIN, CORaIN ON CoNRApcrs § 582 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs
§§ 210(3), 214 (1981). Under Corbin's test, a merger clause is only one item of evidence
weighed against other facts.
Yet another test, found in Sections 229 and 230 of the RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF CON-
TRACTS (1932), asks whether reasonable persons in the parties' situation would have included
the disputed provision in the contract.
Not surprisingly, Professor Murray, while discerning a movement toward the Corbin test,
concluded that the case law "has been generally ineffective in articulating a workable ration-
ale ... " JOHN E. MubRAY, MURAY ON CoNrAcrs § 107, at 235-36 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (foot-
note omitted).
197. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). This comment is commended as a "consis-
tent starting point" that improves on the common law. See, e.g., Manire, supra note 7, at 1204.
U.C.C. § 2-202 manifests Llewellyn's approach to the problem of deciding whether a writing
is integrated.
198. One ground for this conclusion could be that Citibank's confirmation is "merely to
furnish an aid to the writer's recollection." 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COM.
MON LAW § 2429, at 96 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). A different ground could be that the confir-
mation is designed solely to satisfy the statute of frauds under U.C.C. § 2-201(2). Some cases
have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777,
782 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that if a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds, the
entire contract may be explained and proved by parol evidence); Nathan v. Spector, 120
N.Y.S.2d 358, (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (holding that parol evidence may even be used to deter-
mine whether a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds).
199. An interesting question is whether reformation of the terms stated in the confirma-
tion is possible based on the tape recordings.
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Strangely, neither the Intershoe nor IBJ courts applied the "would cer-
tainly" standard. In addition, neither court explained why it rejected this
standard.2 0 0 Both courts were inevitably dragged into fact-specific inquir-
ies, but each court emphasized different facts. The Intershoe court focused
on the terms stated in the confirmation itself.20 1 In effect, it applied the
four-corners test, looking only at the writing to decide its completeness.
The IBJ court examined all the evidence of completeness and exclusivity,
including evidence beyond the writing. It considered the intention of the
parties, the history of their negotiations and relationship, and the omis-
sion of a signature from the confirmations.
20 2
Not only did each court highlight different facts, but they also ren-
dered diametrically opposed judgments. In Intershoe the parol evidence
rule barred out extrinsic evidence, while in IBJ such evidence was admit-
ted. Consequently, these cases have created considerable uncertainty in
the currency bazaar. Participants cannot predict exactly how a court
might analyze whether a confirmation is an integrated agreement or the
likely result. Suppose the Court determines that Citibank's written confir-
mation is an integration of the agreement. The second difficulty resulting
from the application of section 2-202 is that it leads to an erroneous result.
The tape recording cannot be introduced as evidence because it contra-
dicts the confirmation. The result is that incorrect contractual terms are
enforced, namely, that Citibank delivers rather than receives yen. DBS was
in the best position to correct the confirmation but failed to do so. This
factor, however, should not be dispositive.
200. One possibility arises from a close reading of U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3, which refers to
subsection (b). The comment indicates that the court should focus on whether the parties
intended the writing to be a complete and conclusive statement of all the terms. If the par-
ties so intended, then evidence of consistent additional terms must be kept from the trier of
fact.
201. 569 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336. The facts of the case are discussed supra note 193.
202. IB, supra note 45, at 422-23. In IBJ, a Chilean company, Compania Sud-Americana
de Vapores (CSAV) received foreign currencies in payment for its shipping services. The
currencies were deposited in an account maintained by IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust ("Schro-
der"), which was responsible for converting the currencies into U.S. dollars and crediting
CSAV's account with Schroder. Schroder confirmed each currency conversion transaction
with CSAV. The gravamen of CSAV's complaint was that Schroder charged exchange rates
that were in excess of spot market rates. Id. at 415-16.
These facts are distinguishable from those in Intershoe in certain key respects. Intershoe
involved a written confirmation of a single transaction. The confirmation was an integrated
document that reflected the terms to which the parties had agreed over the telephone. Con-
sequently, the parol evidence rule barred the admission of extrinsic evidence to supplement
or alter the terms of the transaction. Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 337. IBJ involved a large
number of currency conversions, and CSAV did not telephone Schroder to negotiate and
conclude these transactions. Rather, the currency conversions were performed by Schroder
pursuant to a prior overarching management agreement made with CSAV. The confirma-
tions of each conversion were not intended to reflect this agreement. Hence, the parol evi-
dence rule could not bar extrinsic evidence about its terms. IBJ, supra note 45, at 432.
The fact that Intershoe involved one confirmation whereas IBJ involved several is irrele-
vant for purposes of applying the parol evidence rule. A final expression of an agreement
may be manifested in one or more documents. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-10, at
98. Accordingly, the decision in B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 794 F. Supp. 1291,
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1993), is suspect. The B.N.E. court stated that
Intershoe was irrelevant because it involved a single document whereas the case at hand in-
volved several confirmation slips. Id. at 1292.
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The effect of the parol evidence rule is "to give preference to the
written version of [the] terms [of a contract]." 20 3 The justification for this
preference is that "[w]ritings are more reliable than memories to show
contract terms, and forgery is supposedly easier to detect than is lying on
the witness stand."20 4 Many critics of the rule emphasize that it is inconsis-
tent with conventional processes of proof-juries should be allowed to
hear all relevant evidence.20 5 The criticism is even more poignant in the
context of the currency bazaar where the conversation between the con-
tracting parties is tape recorded. Obviously, a tape recording is the most
reliable evidence of the transaction terms. The parol evidence rule com-
pels a court to behave like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Applica-
tion of the rule may specifically exclude the one form of evidence that can
conclusively resolve whether Citibank bought or sold yen.
In sum, there is a tension between section 2-201(2) and the parol
evidence rule. The former can be satisfied with a written confirmation to
which there is no objection. The confirmation, however, generates a po-
tential problem under section 2-202. It may transform the most reliable
evidence of the transaction, the tape recording, into parol evidence.
Therefore, the use of tapes to resolve disputes about terms becomes
uncertain.
6. The Tension with the Battle of the Forms Rule
A similar tension exists between U.C.C. section 2-201(2) and Article
2's provision on the battle of the forms, section 2-207. Suppose both Ci-
tibank and DBS issue and exchange written confirmations on the trade
date, November 1, after they reach an oral agreement evidenced by a tape
recording.20 6 These confirmations, printed on each bank's standard
form, conflict. Citibank's confirmation says that it bought 120 million yen
for value on November 30, whereas DBS's confirmation says that the value
date is November 3. DBS does not notify Citibank of any objection to the
terms of Citibank's confirmation, but on November 3 it sends 120 million
yen to Citibank and asks Citibank for the reciprocal delivery of
$1,153,846.15. Citibank objects, saying the deal involved the forward, not
spot, sale of yen.
20 7
203. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-9, at 95.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 95 & n.3.
206. The above hypothetical is a combination of Cases (1) and (6) in WHIrr & SUMMERS,
supra note 53, § 1-3, at 30-36, 43-46. See also Douglas G. Baird & George Weisberg, Rules,
Standards, and the Battle of the Forms; A Reassesment of Section 2-207, 68 VA. L. Rav. 1217-19
(1982) (discussing the scenarios to which the battle of the forms refers). For a recent survey
of proposed revisions to U.C.C. § 2-207, see Ending the "Battle of the Forms": A Symposium on the
Revson of Sedion 2-207 of the Uniform Commerial Code, 49 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1994). Except for
the additional fact regarding the tape recording, the hypothetical is one of the two paradig-
matic cases that U.C.C. § 2-207 is designed to deal with: "the written confirmation [situa-
tion], where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence
between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda
embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed." U.C.C. § 2-207
cmt. 1.
207. See supra note 17 regarding forward transactions.
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Here the problem is the battle of the forms and application of section
2-207. Assuming the confirmations do not constitute an integrated agree-
ment, if the terms of the Citibank and DBS confirmations conflict or if
one confirmation omits a term that the other includes, then a court must
determine which terms are part of the contract.20 Applying section 2-207
again highlights the importance of the tape recorded conversation and
the disruption caused by the very use of written confirmations.
20 9
Because the confirmations state different delivery dates, the threshold
question is whether section 2-207(2) covers different as well as additional
contractual terms.2 10 The answer is uncertain. Even though U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-207(1) expressly refers to "different" terms, section 2-207(2) does
not contain this language. "[T]he drafters could easily have inserted 'or
different' if they had so intended."211 Official comment 3 to U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-207 and some case law, however, do indicate that different terms are
covered.212
Assuming section 2-207(2) governs, its application is problematic.
One interpretation is that the language "additional term" means "addi-
tional or different terms." Interpreted this way, U.C.C. sections 2-
207(2) (b) and (c) indicate that an additional term automatically becomes
part of the contract unless (i) that term "materially alter[s]" the contract
or (ii) the recipient of the confirmation with the additional term objects
to it within a "reasonable time" after receiving the confirmation. Because
DBS failed to answer Citibank's confirmation "within a reasonable time
after additional terms were proposed, it is both fair and commercially
208. Note that U.C.C. § 2-202 automatically construes the writings as integrated to the
extent that they agree on certain terms. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron
& Metal,lnc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979). Note also that U.C.C. § 2-207 has received consid-
erable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Charles M. Thatcher, Battle ofthe Forms: Solution by Revision
of Section 2-207, 6 UCC L.J. 237, 240 (1984) (arguing that § 2-207 has "discouraged the expan-
sion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties" and
yielded "unsettled case law and consequent lack of uniformity.... ."); W. David Slawson, The
New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 21, 59 (1984) (arguing that offer and acceptance forms can be drafted to prevent the
making of a contract, with the result that the common law mirror-image rule is reinstated);
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 206 (arguing that § 2-207 is so vague that it leaves a number or
questions unresolved).
209. According to the common law mirror image rule, one confirmation (presumably the
first one sent) would be treated as an offer, while the other confirmation would be an effec-
tive acceptance only if it did not vary the terms of the offer. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRA irs §§ 58-60 (1979); see also WHIrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 29-30. Be-
cause such a variation exists in the Citibank-DBS case, one of the confirmations would be
treated as a counter-offer. To decide the terms of the contract, the Court would examine
evidence of a prior oral agreement, including the tape recordings.
210. This section may be particularly relevant to the dispute because Citibank and DBS
are "merchants." See supra note 169.
211. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 32 (footnote omitted).
212. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) operates automatically to convert a confirmation with different
terms as a proposal for an addition to the contract. Official comment 3 indicates that
"[w]hether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends on
the provisions of subsection (2)." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Nielsons, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D. Colo. 1986); Steiner v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977) (holding that § 2-207(2) applies to different and addi-
tional terms). But see WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 32 nn.11-12.
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sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to."2 13 The trans-
action, regardless of what the Citibank and DBS traders agreed to on tape,
becomes a yen forward unless DBS persuades a court that the November
30 delivery date is a material alteration of the contract. Thus, the Ci-
tibank-DBS dispute becomes one of materiality of the delivery term.
This result is unsatisfactory. "Materiality" is a fact-specific determina-
tion that may involve protracted litigation.2 1 4 While official comment 4 to
U.C.C. section 2-207 provides limited guidance on what constitutes a "ma-
terial alteration," the statute itself is silent on the matter. Thus, there is no
guarantee of consistent results in other like cases.
An alternative and preferable approach to the application of section
2-207(2) is to focus on the advice provided in official comment 6:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict
each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other con-
flicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result
the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found
in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not be-
come part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations
agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection (2).
The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under
that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior
oral agreement; under this section a failure to respond permits
additional terms to become part of the agreement.2 1 5
Plainly, the conflicting terms stated in the confirmation are not part of the
contract (though this may not be the case under the proposed revisions to
Article 2). Rather, a court relies on the tape recordings of the agreement
as evidence of the value date that was originally agreed to by the Citibank
and DBS foreign exchange traders.
In sum, under the latter approach to its application, section 2-207(2)
may be equipped to handle the problem of inconsistent confirmations.
Yet, this resolution begs the question of the repercussions of using such
confirmations. There is a tension between the statute of frauds (specifi-
cally, section 2-201 (2)) and section 2-207 (2) in the context of the currency
bazaar: satisfying the former with written confirmations lays the founda-
tion for battle of the forms problems. Such problems are best avoided by
eliminating confirmations and relying on the tape recording for disposi-
tive evidence of the terms of the dollar-yen transaction.
D. Linking the Resolutions of the Scope and Enforceability Problems
The pragmatic strategy links the resolution of the enforceability and
scope problems. Whether the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. section 2-
105(1) ought to encompass foreign exchange should depend in part on
213. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6.
214. See, e.g., Luedtke Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600 (7th
Cir. 1984); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 827
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
215. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
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whether the application of the statute of frauds serves the needs of foreign
exchange market participants. As presently constituted and interpreted, it
does not. The statute of frauds would render unenforceable many foreign
exchange transactions that should be enforced. The statute may lead to
problems of parol evidence and the battle of the forms. Therefore, Llew-
ellyn's argument that "after two centuries and a half the statute stands, in
essence better adapted to our needs than when it was first passed"2 16 is
unpersuasive. At least in the context of the foreign exchange market, the
statute of frauds in U.C.C. Article 2 must be reformed or abolished
through legislative or judicial action.
Does this argument necessarily dictate that foreign exchange should
not be considered a "good"? The argument strongly suggests an affirma-
tive answer. Such an answer, however, would be an overreaction. Thus,
the Court should reject DBS's response to Citibank's statute of frauds de-
fense. A final resolution of the scope problem depends on more than the
outcome of the enforceability problem. A complete assessment of other
significant Article 2 provisions in relation to the needs of the currency
bazaar is needed.
2 17
V. EXTENDING THE PRAGMATIC STRATEGY TO OTHER SALEs LAw
Parts III and IV considered the potential applicability of the U.C.C. to
the Citibank-DBS dispute chronicled in Part II. This assumption is now
relaxed. The application of three other sales laws to the scope and en-
forceability problems is considered below: revised U.C.C. Article 2, the
CISG, and private sales law. Part V argues that the pragmatic strategy can
be extended to deal with these problems under other sales law regimes.
A. Current Proposals to Revise U.C.C. Article 2
One proposed revision would decisively resolve the scope problem by
excluding all foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2. Sec-
tion 2-102(a) (23) of the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts of revised
Article 2 defines "goods" as "all things ... that are movable... [h]owever,
the term does not include . . .foreign exchange transactions."2 18 Unfortu-
nately, the Reporter's Notes do not indicate why foreign exchange transac-
tions are expressly excluded. There is no siggestion that the exclusion
reflects a calculated decision that the provisions of revised Article 2 would
be inapposite to the currency bazaar, though this indeed may be the case.
Interestingly, the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts also abolish
the statute of frauds, thus resolving the enforceability problem. Section 2-
201 states that "[a] contract ... is enforceable whether or not there is a
216. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747
(1931).
217. Such provisions include those relating to contract formation and remedies. See
Bhala, supra note 74.
218. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(23) (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993) (emphasis added). Foreign
exchange transactions are not excluded from the definition of "goods" in the September
1993 Draft.
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writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforce-
ment is sought .... "219 This change-a complete rejection of the tangi-
bility paradigm-would, of course, meet the needs of foreign exchange
market participants.
A more radical proposal regarding Article 2 is to revise it according to
a "hub-and-spoke" model.220 Core rules applicable to all contracts would
form the hub from which spokes would emanate. The spokes would set
forth principles designed for special transactions. Conceivably, one spoke
could apply to foreign exchange transactions. The pragmatic strategy
could support this radical approach if major provisions of Article 2, in
addition to the statute of frauds, are not applied to the currency bazaar
context.
B. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods ("CISG")
A literal reading of Articles 1 (1) and 2(d) of the CISG makes it impos-
sible to argue that the scope of the CISG encompasses foreign exchange
transactions. Article 1 (1) states that the CISG applies to "contracts of sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States,"
but Article 2(d) excludes sales of money from the Convention. 221 Unlike
U.C.C. section 2-105(1), Article 2(d) does not distinguish between money
that is the subject of the contract (the commodity leg) and money that is
used as payment (the payment leg). CISG Article 2(d) also fails to men-
tion "things in action."
The crude scope clause in the CISG is unfortunate because the way in
which the CISG resolves the enforceability problem serves the needs of the
currency bazaar. There is no statute of frauds in the CISG-here again
rejecting the tangibility paradigm. Article 11 of the CISG states that "[a]
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing."22
2
Thus, if the CISG applies to the Citibank-DBS dispute, then Citibank can-
not argue that the dollar-yen contract is unenforceable. Moreover, ques-
tions about tape recordings as evidence of a contract, costs associated with
written confirmations, and potential difficulties arising under Article 19 of
219. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993). The September 1993 Draft contains
essentially the same revision of Section 2-201 as the December 1993 Draft.
220. See U.C.C. REV. ART. 2 (Discussion Draft Feb. 10, 1994); Nimmer, supra note 10.
221. CISG, supra note 13, at 672. The States must be Contracting States (i.e., they have
ratified or acceded to the CISG), or the applicable choice of law rules must lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State. Pursuant to CISG Article 95, the United States
has taken a reservation to the choice of law provision. See id. at 693; MAR-TNDALE-HUBBELL,
supra note 13, at IC-35; Smart supra note 13, at 1344-46. Under Article 6, parties are free to
exclude the application of the CISG. CISG, supra note 13, at 673.
222. CISG, supra note 13, at 674. However, under CISG Article 96, a state can take a
reservation to Article 11 if the law of that state provides that contracts must be in writing. Id.
at 693-94. (Article 96 refers to "legislation" which presumably means that the law must take
the form of a statute or civil code.) If a party to a sales contract has its place of business in a
reserving state, then CISG Article 11 is inapplicable. Id. at 674 (Art. 12). Argentina, Belarus,
Chile, China, Hungary, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine have taken reservations




the CISG (the provision on the battle of the forms) are irrelevant. In sum,
the CISG's resolution of the enforceability problem strongly suggests that
the scope of the CISG should cover the Citibank-DBS dispute.
The literal language of CISG Article 2(d) remains problematic, how-
ever, thus requiring a new judicial interpretation of that Article. For ex-
ample, a court could find that a distinction is implied between commodity
leg and payment leg monies. Yen are the subject of the contract and
"goods" for purposes of determining the scope of the CISG. This finding
is not unprecedented. In In re Midas Coin Co., the court distinguished be-
tween those coins sold as a commodity for numismatic purposes and those
coins used as a means of payment.2 23 The Midas court was confronted
with the definition of "goods." Like the CISG definition, the court noted
without further elaboration that the term " 'includes all things which are
movable . . . but does not include money.' "224
Here again, a court that renders a Midas-type decision under the
CISG may be criticized for engaging in judicial activism or subscribing to
results-oriented jurisprudence. 2 25 The global nature of the currency ba-
zaar, however, remains. Many foreign exchange transactions cross inter-
national borders.22 6 The participants in different countries will benefit
from the lack of a statute of frauds and from certainty that the CISG ap-
plies to their transactions, instead of wondering which country's contract
law governs.
C. Private Contract Law
The outstanding example of private contract law in the currency ba-
zaar is the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement
("IFEMA").227 Strictly speaking, there is no problem of scope under this
law. Scope is a matter for the parties to decide. Parties can freely enter
into the master agreement and designate the foreign exchange transac-
tions that they want covered therein. Thus, for instance, Citibank and
DBS can sign the IFEMA and indicate that it will govern dollar-yen spot
transactions between their respective New York and Singapore offices.
228
When a dispute arises concerning a transaction governed by the
IFEMA, the scope problem resurfaces. The dispute must be resolved not
by the IFEMA, but by interpreting the IFEMA under some other sales law
regime, whether it be U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG.
223. 264 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Commu-
nity Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968). The application of Article 2 to such transactions is
not controversial. See, e.g., Morauer v. Deak & Co., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1142
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1979) (applying Article 2 to the sale of gold and silver foreign coins).
224. Midas, 264 F. Supp. at 195 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-105(1)(f) (Vernon 1965).
225. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 18.
227. See IFEMA, supra note 14.
228. Alternatively, they could specify that the IFEMA governs spot transactions in all cur-
rencies between these two offices, spot transactions between multiple offices of Citibank and
DBS, or some other category of transactions and offices.
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Therefore, the IFEMA does not necessarily afford the parties certainty as
to whether their transactions are enforceable.
The utility of the pragmatic approach again becomes evident;
whether a particular sales law should govern the disputed transaction
should depend on whether that law meets the needs of the parties. The
IFEMA expressly states that in the event of a dispute between the parties as
to the terms of their transaction, the tape recording is "the preferred evi-
dence" of the terms, "notwithstanding the existence of any writing
[namely, the IFEMA] to the contrary."229 This provision, which states that
market participants signing the IFEMA agree in writing to be bound by a
tape recording, parallels the criterion from Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein.
230
Accordingly, if the Bernstein holding is adopted by the Court in the Ci-
tibank-DBS dispute, then those parties may be afforded greater certainty
as to the enforceability of their foreign exchange trades.
Regardless of the IFEMA applicability, the disputed dollar-yen trans-
action would be enforceable under either revised Article 2 or the CISG
because a statute of frauds is absent under both regimes. This result sug-
gests that including foreign exchange transactions governed by the IFEMA
within the scope of revised Article 2 or the CISG would support market
needs. A different result is reached with respect to U.C.C. Article 2. A
court may feel compelled to accept Citibank's defense that the IFEMA
does not satisfy the minimal writing requirements of section 2-201 (1). It
certainly qualifies as a "writing" under section 1-201(46) and is "signed"
according to section 1-201(39). 2 31 Uncertainty remains, however, as to
whether the IFEMA must state the quantity of currency purchased, and if
so, whether the IFEMA meets that requirement.
Arguably, the statute of frauds does not require that a writing state a
quantity term, because there is no reference to such a term in section 2-
201. Moreover, official comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-201 indicates that
"[a]ll that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the
offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." A liberal construction
suggests that a quantity term is not essential for the establishment of an
enforceable contract.2 32 If true, then all of the transactions covered by
the IFEMA are enforceable.
229. IFEMA, supra note 14, § 8.3.
230. 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972).
231. An interesting question arises as to whether the IFEMA is nothing more than a mani-
festation of intent to enter into a contract or is the contract itself.
232. See Caroline N. Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the U.C.C. 's
Substantive Provision - The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. ILL. L. Rav. 811 (1983). Professors
White and Summers adopt a similar approach: "a close reading of Section 2-201 indicates
that all commentators may be wrong. An alternative interpretation is that only if the writing
states a quantity term is that term determinative." WHrIE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 76
n.12; see also American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 966 (D.Del. 1986)
(finding that the word "all" is sufficient to create an output contract under the statute of
frauds and that parol evidence may be admitted to ascertain the exact amount); Riegel Fiber
Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 789 n.ll (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that under the
White and Summers reading, if a quantity term is present, then it controls, but if no quantity
term is contained in the writing, then the party seeking enforcement of the agreement can
establish the term by parol evidence).
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This construction, however, conflicts with the plain meaning of a dif-
ferent passage from the same official comment: "The only term which
must appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but
recovery is limited to the amount stated."2 33 In the context of the cur-
rency bazaar, the "quantity term" refers to the amount of currencies
bought or sold. Yet, parties sign the IFEMA before negotiating or con-
cluding any particular spot transaction. The IFEMA cannot predetermine
how many yen Citibank purchases from DBS in a particular transaction.2 3
4
Consequently, no master agreement can be effective against Citibank's
statute of frauds defense.
2 35
VI. CONCLUSION
Private contract law does not resolve the problems of scope and en-
forceability. It simply leads judges, regulators, and market participants
back to U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG. With respect to
Article 2, absent legislative modification or judicial re-interpretation, the
statute of frauds and associated tangibility paradigm are inimical to the
technology and business practices of the currency bazaar. This fact is
strong, but not conclusive, evidence that including foreign exchange
transactions in the scope of Article 2 is at variance with the needs of mar-
ket participants. Thus, the pragmatic strategy suggests that Citibank's de-
fense under the statute of frauds should be rejected. It indicates that
DBS's response to that defense, while perhaps an over-reaction, has merit.
With respect to revised Article 2 and the CISG, the pragmatic strategy
suggests that it may be appropriate to include the foreign exchange trans-
actions in the scope of these regimes. They properly reject the tangibility
paradigm. Because these sales laws omit a statute of frauds, neither re-
vised Article 2 nor the CISG renders important transactions in the global
currency bazaar, like the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen deal, unenforceable.
233. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. The same requirements for a writing apply to § 2-201(1) and
(2). To be sure, the official comment is deceptively simple. In effect, more may be required
in a writing in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 159, § 6.7, at
409 (stating that the identity of the parties and the nature, subject matter, and the essential
terms of the contract must be expressed).
234. Indeed, there is no separate quantity clause in the IFEMA. The definition of "FX
Transaction" refers to a transaction between the parties "of an agreed amount" of one cur-
rency in exchange for another currency. IFEMA, supra note 14, § 1, at 4. Section 3.1 dis-
cusses the obligation of each party to deliver an "amount" of currency. Id. at 7.
235. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that, assuming a quantity term is re-
quired, it is not clear what types of phrases constitute a "quantity term." At one extreme is a
general quantity clause such as "a quantity of yen to be determined." The polar opposite is a
specific quantity term, such as "120 million yen." The issue in choosing these alternatives (or
some intermediate language) is whether to adopt "a mechanical construction of the quantity
language of section 2-201 (1)." Bruckel, supra note 174, at 815. For example, a mechanical
construction is used in New York. See Int'l Commercial Resources, Ltd. v. Jamaica Pub. Serv.
Co., 612 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that even though the total dollar
amount of a transaction was established, a writing that referred to "various goods that [de-
fendant] intends to purchase" and "various material and equipment" lacked a quantity term
and, therefore, did not satisfy the statute of frauds) (citations omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
The important thing in [athletic competition] is not to win but to take
part; the important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle.
Pierre de Coubertin, founder of modern Olympics
Over twenty years ago, Congress passed Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 mandating gender equity in federally funded educa-
tional institutions.' Since that time, however, women have made little real
progress in achieving equality in intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics.
Seven years after Congress passed Title IX, the Department of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare found women made up only 30% of the intercollegi-
ate athletes, but made up 48% of national undergraduate enrollment.2 In
the 1990s, despite over twenty years of Title IX's clear mandate against sex
discrimination, women still make up only one third of Division I intercol-
legiate athletes, even though women actually make up over 50% of all col-
lege students enrolled. 3 Women athletes still lag well behind men in
terms of financial assistance, operating dollars, and athletic participation
opportunities afforded to them by their schools. Through weak enforce-
ment of Title IX by the Office of Civil Rights, and alleged "voluntary com-
pliance" efforts by educational institutions, Title IX had proved nothing
more than placebo legislation with no real remedial effect on gender ine-
quality in athletics.
Effective litigation under Title IX has begun to change all that. In the
last few years, women athletes have taken Title IX enforcement into their
own hands and taken their educational institutions to court. No longer
satisfied with administrative complaints, informal requests, or strategic
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
2. See Tide IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, app. A at 71,419 (1979) [hereinafter Final
Policy Interpretation] (stating 1977-78 national averages).




protests4 as their weapons against gender inequality in athletics, women
athletes have enlisted attorneys to champion their cause for equality
through litigation.
Although Title IX is over two decades old, litigation aimed at federally
funded educational institutions' athletic departments is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Four new cases have addressed some of the issues
presented by this type of litigation. 5 These cases, however, have only
scratched the surface of the issues presented by Title IX litigation aimed at
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics. Many issues, both procedural
and substantive, remain unresolved by the courts. Using the course of liti-
gation as a logical outline, this article explores the substantive and proce-
dural issues presented by Title IX litigation in athletics. As background,
the article first discusses the history of Title IX as it applies to athletics and
the recent victories and defeats by women athletes in litigation aimed at
bringing gender equity to intercollegiate athletics.
The article further discusses the prima facie elements of Title IX dis-
crimination claims brought against educational institutions' athletic de-
partments and legitimate affirmative defenses to those claims. Although
courts in recent federal cases have found Title IX violations by schools,
those courts failed to provide consistent methods of analysis by which fu-
ture courts and litigants can gauge an educational institution's conduct.
Thus, using statutory, regulatory and practical guidelines, this article
presents a method of analysis for evaluating whether Title IX has indeed
been violated. In particular, the article explores at what level of female
athletic participation an educational institution will be found to be provid-
ing equal athletic opportunity to women in compliance with Title IX.
Finally, the article explores the remedies which are or should be avail-
able to athletes who successfully prove Title IX violations. In particular,
this article presents scholarly debate of the availability of monetary dam-
ages for Title IX violations, extrapolating from and analyzing analogous
statutes and Supreme Court decisions. Unlike other commentaries, this
article concludes monetary damages should be available under Title IX
even in instances of unintentional, or disparate impact, discrimination.
4. In 1976, the Yale women's crew team sought shower facilities in their boathouse.
Polite protest went unheard. To get shower facilities, the women resorted to what has be-
come known as the "Title IX strip"; the women painted the letters of Title IX on their bare
backs and chests and disrobed for, among others, a New York Times photographer. Before
resorting to such drastic measures, they had been reminded by the school administrators that
the athletes were there to improve their athletic skills, not to powder their noses. See
Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE
L.J. 1731, 1762 (1991); see also Yale Women Strip to Protest a Lack of Crew's Showers, N.Y. TIMES,
March 4, 1976, at A33.
5. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888
(lst Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d
332 (3d Cir. 1993).
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I. HISTORY OF TITLE IX As IT APPLIES TO ATHLETICS
Congress passed Title IX as a result of perceived gender discrimina-
tion in federally funded educational institutions. In relevant part, Title IX
reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 6
Title IX serves two main federal objectives: (1) to restrict the use of
federal funds from supporting institutions engaging in discrimination;
and (2) to protect individuals from that discrimination. 7 To meet these
objectives, Congress explicitly granted authority to effectuate the provi-
sions of Title IX to federal agencies that extend financial assistance to any
educational institution, program, or activity. 8 The Department of Educa-
tion has been the primary agency enforcing the Title.
9
In 1974, the Department of Education's predecessor, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"), submitted proposed regula-
tions implementing Title IX. 10 The regulations ("Regulations"), signifi-
cantly revised from those proposed, were finally signed into law by
President Gerald Ford on May 27, 1975.11 Unlike Title IX itself, the Regu-
lations explicitly address Tide IX's application to athletics offered by fed-
erally funded educational institutions.' 2 In this regard, the Regulations
require educational institutions to provide "equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes."1 3 The Regulations also explicitly address the
provision of scholarship monies by federally funded educational institu-
tions. 14 The Regulations gave educational institutions three years to com-
ply with its equal athletic opportunity requirements.1 5 That period
expired on July 21, 1978.16
Because Title IX called for the withdrawal of federal financial assist-
ance from educational institutions that violated the statute's provisions,
many educational institutions cried out for a clear delineation of the stat-
ute's requirements. 17 In response, HEW published a proposed Policy In-
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
7. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
9. See Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: The Supreme Court Implies a
Damages Remedyfor Title IX Sex Discrimination, 45 VAND. L. Ray. 1367, 1368 & n.11 (1992).
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1993)) (proposed June 20,
1974).
11. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531-33 (1982); Final Policy Inter-
pretation, supra note 2, at 71,413 (detailing history of regulation); Diane Heckman, Women &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX 9 U. MiAmi ENr. & SpoRrs L. Rav. 1, 12-13
(1992).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1993).
13. 34 C.F.RL § 106.41(c) (1993).
14. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1993).
15. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1993).
16. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,413.
17. See Heckman, supra note 11, at 13; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,413 (discussing filing of 100 complaints against over 50 educational institutions during
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terpretation on December 11, 1978, to give further guidance to
educational institutions in providing equal athletic opportunity to mem-
bers of both sexes.18 After comments and revisions, HEW issued a Final
Policy Interpretation on December 11, 1979, specifically addressing inter-
collegiate athletic programs.1 9 HEW intended the Final Policy Interpreta-
tion's general principles to apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic
athletics as well.20 Although not reviewed or approved by Congress, the
Final Policy Interpretation, as the definitive, published interpretation of
the agency charged with implementing Title IX and its accompanying
Regulations, is entitled to substantial deference by the courts.
2 1
Despite the explicit language of the Regulations and the Final Policy
Interpretation, several courts and commentators struggled with the issue
of whether Title IX could apply to a specific program within an educa-
tional institution if that program did not receive direct federal financial
assistance. 22 The "program-specific" debate was seemingly resolved when
the Supreme Court decided Grove City College v. BelL23 There, the
Supreme Court definitively ruled that federal financial assistance received
by students did not inure to the benefit of the college as a whole but only
to the financial aid department. Thus, Title IX only prohibited sex dis-
crimination in the financial aid department and not in the school as a
whole.24 Following the Supreme Court, lower courts refused to apply Ti-
tle IX to athletic programs because few, if any, receive direct federal
funding.
25
three year grace period and university community's lack of guidance in complying with
Regulations).
18. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,413 (describing process of pro-
posed Policy Interpretation and comments).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.) (deferring
substantially to the Final Policy Interpretation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); see also
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n., 499 U.S. 144, 149-50 (1991) (defer-
ring to Commission's interpretation). This deference to the Final Policy Interpretation is
supported by the Supreme Court's analysis of the analogous EEOC Guidelines interpreting
Title VII. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (holding the EEOC
Guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance") (citations omitted); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1991) ("The administrative interpretation of [Title VII] by the enforc-
ing agency is entitled to great deference."). Congress's failure to take any action disapprov-
ing the Final Policy Interpretation, particularly since Congress has addressed Title IX twice
since 1979, creates a strong inference that Congress endorses HEW's interpretation. See
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982).
22. Compare, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3rd Cir. 1982) (support-
ing institution-wide approach), aff'd, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) with Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d
992 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (supporting program-specific approach), vacated as moot,
456 U.S. 986 (1982).
23. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
24. Id. at 572.
25. See, e.g., Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
ministerial relationship between financial aid department, which received federal funds, and
athletic program insufficient to bring the latter under Title IX). On the general lack of
direct receipt of federal financial assistance by intercollegiate athletic programs, see Note, Sex
Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IowA L. REv. 420, 469 (1975); B. Glenn George,
Miles to Go and Prmises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX 64 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 555, 558 & n.16
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Congress, however, had the last word in the "program-specific" debate
when it overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell
with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987:
The Congress finds that-(1) certain aspects of recent decisions
and opinions of the Supreme Court . .. cast doubt upon the
broad application of title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 ... and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore the prior
consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation
and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as previously
administered.
26
Under the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Title IX's prohibitions against sex
discrimination apply institution-wide to any educational institution receiv-
ing federal financial assistance in any form.
2 7
In addition to the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation, the
Department of Education, through the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"),
further interpreted Title IX as it applied to athletics by issuing the Title IX
Athletics Investigator's Manual ("Investigator's Manual").2 8 The manual
was designed to assist OCR investigators in their investigations of intercol-
legiate and interscholastic athletic programs.2 9 For the same reasons the
Final Policy Interpretation is given great deference, 30 so too should the
Investigator's Manual receive deference from the courts. Unlike the Final
Policy Interpretation, however, the Investigator's Manual is an internal
agency document which was not subject to public notice and comment.
Therefore, any inconsistencies between the Final Policy Interpretation and
the Investigator's Manual must be resolved in favor of the Final Policy In-
terpretation as the implementing agency's authoritative interpretation of
the Regulations.
The Investigator's Manual is divided into thirteen areas that address
specific components of athletics programs. These areas are discussed be-
low in relation to litigation initiated under Title IX.
(1993). At least one lower court, however, found Title IX applied to an institution's athletic
department. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 537-38 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding
athletic scholarships are subject to Title IX scrutiny because federal financial support is given
to financial aid department and athletic scholarships are a part of that department).
26. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)); see also West Virginia Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-
14 (1991)).
27. Id. The retroactive application of the Civil Rights Restoration Act is now irrelevant.
Only cases pending before the Act would need to address retroactivity. Whether the Act is
retroactive or not, evidence of discrimination prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act is relevant and admissible to prove that an institution's present conduct perpetu-
ates past discrimination. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 396 n.6 (1986) (Brennan,J.,
concurring); EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 1974).
28. VALERIE M. BONNErE & LAmtu DANIEL, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RiGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S
MANUAL].
29. See id. at [i].
30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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II. RECENT ATHLEIcs LITIGATION UNDER TrrLE IX
Federal Courts have heard and decided a handful of key Tide IX
cases dealing with gender equity in athletics within the last few years.
These cases have been and will continue to be central to the evolving legal
issues in determining the application of Tide IX's gender equity directive
to athletics. This section briefly discusses these important cases and sets
the scene for a discussion of issues that have been or will be pursued by
women athletes under Tide IX.
A. Roberts v. Colorado State University3 l
In Roberts, the Colorado State University women's softball team filed
suit in their individual capacities to have their team reinstated after its
abrupt termination by the University. The women softball players sued
under the interests and abilities compliance area of Title IX,3 2 alleging
Colorado State failed to provide equal athletic opportunity to women in its
federally funded athletic department.
33
The federal district court found Colorado State in violation of the
interests and abilities compliance area and granted the softball players a
permanent injunction requiring Colorado State to reinstate the softball
team with all incidental benefits accorded other varsity sports at Colorado
State.3 4 The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
Tenth Circuit ruled the district court had overstepped its authority by or-
dering Colorado State to organize a fall season of play for the softball team
that had not been the practice at Colorado State prior to the team's termi-
nation.35 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit agreed Colorado State was in
violation of Title IX's interests and abilities compliance area and fully sup-
ported the district court's order to reinstate the softball team.
3 6
B. Cohen v. Brown University
3 7
In Cohen, members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams
brought a class action suit seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate the
varsity status of their teams. The women athletes alleged a violation of the
interests and abilities compliance area of Title IX and presented evidence
of unequal treatment in receiving other athletic benefits. 38 The district
court agreed with the women athletes and granted a preliminary injunc-
tion restoring women's gymnastics and volleyball to varsity status and man-
dating adequate funding and benefits to those reinstated teams. 39 The
31. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub noam. Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 580 (1993).
32. See infra section IV.A.3.
33. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11.
34. Id. at 1518-19.
35. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 835.
36. Id. at 832-34.
37. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 994-97.
39. Id. at 1001.
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First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction order in
full.40
C. Cook v. Colgate University4
Cook involved claims by the women's club ice hockey team, in their
individual capacities, that Colgate's refusal to upgrade them to varsity sta-
tus violated Title IX. The women athletes alleged a violation of the other
athletic benefits compliance area,42 stating that the men's ice hockey
team, and the men's athletics program as a whole, received far greater
benefits in such areas as equipment, funding, travel, and coaching.4 3 The
magistrate judge at the district court level ordered Colgate to grant varsity
status to the women's ice hockey team and to supply the team with
"equivalent athletic opportunities.""4 The Second Circuit vacated the or-
der and remanded the case.4 5 Since the athletes brought their claims in
their individual capacities, not as representatives of the hockey team, and
because the last of the plaintiffs would graduate before the order to up-
grade the team could take effect, the Second Circuit ruled their claims
were moot and remanded the action with orders to dismiss the
complaint.
46
D. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania
47
In Favia, athletes on the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams
brought a class action suit against Indiana University of Pennsylvania
("IUP") seeking reinstatement of their teams. Like the plaintiffs in Roberts,
the Favia plaintiffs alleged a violation of the interests and abilities compli-
ance area of Title IX. The district court agreed that IUP failed to provide
equal athletic opportunity to women and ruled IUP was in violation of
Title IX. 48 The Third Circuit affirmed and denied IUP's motion to mod-
ify the injunction. 49 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit suggested an appro-
priate order for final injunctive relief should focus not so much on the
interests of the representative plaintiffs, but instead, should allow IUP to
institute women's sports other than gymnastics or field hockey which
could meet the needs of more women athletes.
50
40. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).
41. 802 F. Supp 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. See infra section IV.A.2.
43. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
44. Id. at 751.
45. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
46. Id.
47. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
48. Id. at 584-85.
49. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
50. See id. at 344.
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III. PARTIES TO TITLE IX ATHLETICS LITIGATION
A. Private Right of Action Established in Cannon v. University of Chicago
Tide IX began as a public remedy statute wherein federal administra-
tive agencies were given authority to withdraw federal funds from educa-
tional institutions that discriminated on the basis of sex.5 1 For several
years after Tide IX's passage, courts interpreted Tide IX's relief provisions
to foreclose any private right of action by individuals who were harmed as
a result of an educational institution's discriminatory practice.5 2 Thus, Ti-
de IX was relegated to "administrative legislation" whereby administrative
agencies had discretion to pursue individual claims against an educational
institution. In such claims, an individual complainant had no participa-
tion in the investigation or subsequent enforcement proceedings.
53
In 1978, the Supreme Court gave the reins of Tide IX to the individu-
als it was meant to protect.54 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,55 the
Supreme Court found Title IX implied a private right of action for individ-
uals harmed by the discriminatory practices of a federally funded educa-
tional institution.56 The Court so held because (1) Tide IX was enacted
for the benefit of a specific class,5 7 (2) Congress intended to create a pri-
vate right of action,58 (3) a private action would not frustrate the underly-
ing purpose of Tide IX,59 and (4) implying a federal remedy would not
infringe states' rights.60 Thus began the enforcement of individuals'
rights under Tide IX through private litigation.
B. Title IX Plaintiffs
Under Title IX, an appropriate plaintiff is any person who is excluded
from, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under any
educational program which receives federal funds.6 1 As expressed by the
Court in Cannon, persons who are "private victims of discrimination" are
51. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1988).
52. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 1976) (hold-
ing female applicant twice denied admission to medical school had no right of action against
the institution under Title IX), rev'd, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (describing adminis-
trative enforcement process).
54. Congress's intent to protect individual women from discrimination is evident from
Tide IX's legislative history. Congress passed Title IX with the express intent to provide solid
legal protection to women as they seek education and training for later careers. See 118
CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (comments of Sen. Bayh); see aLso Final Policy Interpretation,
supra note 2, at 71,423 (stating legislative history of Title IX demonstrates it was enacted
because of discrimination against women in educational institutions).
55. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
56. Id. at 709.
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id. at 703 (analogizing to Title VI remedies in which the Court understood Congress
authorized private causes of action for victims of prohibited discrimination).
59. d. at 703-04 (identifying purposes of Title IX as (1) avoiding use of federal funds to
support discrimination, and (2) providing individual citizens effective protection against
discrimination).
60. Id. at 708-09.
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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entitled to bring a claim under the statute. 62 This section explores the
standing of individuals and organizations to bring Title IX claims against
educational institutions' athletics departments allegedly violating Title IX.
1. Female Athletes: Individual Claims and Class Action Suits
Individual female athletes who allege they have been excluded from,
denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under their educa-
tional program obviously fit squarely within Title IX's standing provi-
sion. 63 Indeed, Title IX's focus, as it applies to athletics, is on the
protection of individual students' rights, not the rights of any group or
subgroup of students.
64
This focus on the individual's rights, however, does not prevent indi-
viduals from joining together against an educational institution in a single
lawsuit. Indeed, courts have allowed women to maintain class action suits
on behalf of entire teams or on behalf of all present and future female
students at an institution who participate in or are deterred from partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics. 65 Certain consequences will result at
the remedial stage of trial depending on whether plaintiffs bring their
claims as individuals or in class actions. For example, an individual plain-
tiff may be able to recover monetary damages and specific injunctive re-
lief, but may be faced with mootness problems for prospective injunctive
relief. A class of athletes or students, on the other hand, may not face the
mootness argument, but may lack standing to request specific injunctive
relief, such as the reinstatement of a particular team.66 Thus, special at-
tention must be paid early on to the form of the suit and the remedy
sought.
2. Coaches and Tutors
Coaches and tutors are an integral part of interscholastic and intercol-
legiate athletics and, as such, are afforded protection under Title IX from
sex discrimination. 6 7 Where a coach is denied benefits by an educational
institution on the basis of his or her sex, Title IX offers a remedy to that
individual. 68 Nevertheless, these coaches or tutors must seek to vindicate
their own rights, not those of the student athletes they coach or teach.
The Regulations governing individual athletes' rights do not afford
coaches and tutors any protection. Instead, coaches and tutors are af-
62. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709.
63. See id.
64. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
65. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 979.
66. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833 (dictum). For a full discussion of the remedial conse-
quences of the plaintiffs' status, see infra notes 259 to 297 and accompanying text.
67. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982) (reading Title IX to




forded protections as employees of the educational institutions and are gov-
erned by different provisions of the Regulations.
69
Recently, female coaches have filed lawsuits under Title IX and other
employment provisions alleging unequal pay and treatment as a result of
their sex.70 While these suits are a fascinating new development in the
movement toward gender equity in intercollegiate athletics, this article
does not discuss the elements of these employment disputes.
3. Women's Organizations and Player Associations
Organizations or associations whose members are likely to suffer
harm as a result of unlawful discrimination by educational institutions are
potential plaintiffs in a Title IX suit. For example, organizations that rep-
resent women's interests or, more specifically, women athletes' interests,
may bring suit under Tide IX. An association may have standing to sue as
the representative of its individual members: "injury to the association's
members will satisfy Article III and allow that organization to litigate in
federal court on their behalf."7 1 Thus, as long as the organization can
satisfy the three-part test required for associational standing, the organiza-
tion may file suit to enforce Title IX.
The three-part test requires that "(a) [the association's] members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit." 72 The National Organization
for Women employed this associational standing doctrine to represent its
members in a California suit brought under Tide IX.
73
In choosing to bring an action on behalf of their members, however,
associations must be prepared to accept limited remedies that may give
ultimate control over compliance methods to the educational institutions.
Like the remedies available in class actions, the remedies available to a
representative organization are limited to general prospective injunctive
relief that will benefit the class as a whole. 74 Monetary relief will likely not
be recoverable. 75 Moreover, the educational institution may be allowed to
69. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1993) (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment in educa-
tional institutions).
70. See, e.g., Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. International Union, UAWv. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281 (1985); see aLso Hunt v. Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (discussing in general an
organization's standing to sue on behalf of its employees); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (same); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729 (1972)
(same).
72. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
73. . See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, California Nat'l Org. for Wo-
men v. Evans (No. 728548) (filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Santa Clara, February 3, 1993) (settled before trial).
74. See infra notes 259 to 297 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
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direct its own compliance efforts rather than being judicially directed or
"micromanaged."76
4. Men
Men have standing to bring suits under Title IX if they can establish
they have been discriminated against or denied equal benefits on the basis
of sex. This begs the question, however, whether a suit under Title IX can
be successful when brought on behalf of men. Male athletes will have dif-
ficulty establishing a prima facie case 77 under Title IX or its Regulations
since male athletes are the overrepresented gender in virtually every ath-
letic department in the country. 78 The only court that has decided a case
brought by male athletes under Title IX granted summary judgment
against the plaintiffs because it found Title IX afforded no protection to
the male athletes before it. In Kelley v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois,79 male athletes brought a Title IX suit alleging sex discrimination
because the University of Illinois had terminated their varsity swimming
team while retaining the women's swimming team. In granting summary
judgment for the university, the district court ruled that male athletes
were not entitled to protection at the University of Illinois because male
athletic participation percentages exceeded male undergraduate enroll-
ment percentages.8 0 While the plain meaning of Title IX would seem to
outlaw a school's decision to cut one team over another on the basis of
sex, the Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation allow (and cases
have allowed) affirmative actions taken on behalf of the underrepresented
gender,8 ' traditionally women. "Quite frankly, these interpretations [in
the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation] have converted Title IX
from a statute which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex (defined
as the elimination of or exclusion from participation opportunities), into a
statute which provides 'equal opportunity for members of both sexes.' "82
Despite this conclusion by the Kelley court that Title IX has somehow
been transformed by the Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation,
the legislative history behind Title IX demonstrates Congress intended it
to serve primarily as a remedy for current discrimination in educational
76. See infra notes 283 to 288 and accompanying text.
77. See infra part IVA
78. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (stating that national average for Division I women
athletic participation is approximately 30%, while national female college enrollment is ap-
proximately 50%); see also Steve Wieberg, Title IX: 20 Years After, A New Call for Action, USA
TODAY, June 8, 1992, at CIO (reporting on 86 Division I-A schools and finding that only 12
provided women's athletics more than 30% of total athletic funding).
79. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, No. 93-3205, 1994 WL 473875 (7th Cir. Sept.
1, 1994).
80. Id. at 242.
81. See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3(b), 106.41(c) (1993) (allowing affirmative action
and requiring equal opportunity, respectively); Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,416 (voluntary affirmative action measures are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
unequal treatment of male and female teams).
82. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241.
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institutions against women.8 3 Thus, whether Tide IX is labeled as "anti-
discrimination" or "affirmative action" legislation, the Regulations and the
Final Policy Interpretation have expanded Tide IX's legislative directive to
equalize federally financed educational opportunities for women with
those opportunities already provided to men. This expansion must be re-
garded as an implementation of the legislative purpose behind Tide IX
and not as a transformation of the statute as concluded by Kelley.
Consequently, although male athletes have technical standing to
bring suit under Tide IX, their suits will be subject to an immediate mo-
tion to dismiss, which will likely be granted, unless they can prove they are
underrepresented in the athletic department. 84 While men may argue
this "affirmative action" approach violates constitutional principles of
equal protection, federal courts have long recognized that acts taken and
legislation passed by governmental entities for the benefit of an histori-
cally deprived group will withstand constitutional challenge. 8 5 Moreover,
the current exclusion of men from Tide IX's remedy is not offensive as
long as men continue to receive disproportionately higher athletic oppor-
tunities than women. Title IX was passed as a result of women's need for
solid legal protection as they seek education and training for their later
careers.86 Once an educational institution establishes athletic participa-
tion equality, either gender will be able to bring suit under Title IX for
actions taken by an educational institution motivated by gender considera-
tions or which unfairly impact one gender. Until that time, however, men
are protected by institutional and historical biases operating in their favor,
obviating the current need for Title IX protection.
C. Title IX Defendants
Any educational institution receiving federal funds that allegedly fails
to provide a discrimination-free athletic department will be subject to suit
under Title IX. 8 7 An "educational institution" is defined as:
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school,
or any institution of vocational, professional or higher education,
except that in the case of an educational institution composed of
more than one school, college, or department which are admin-
83. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,423. "Millions of women pay taxes
into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the
support of institutions to which we are denied equal access." 117 CONG. REc. 39,252 (1971)
(comments of Rep. Mink). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36
(1979) (discussing legislative intent of Title IX). Title IX was passed "in view of the scope
and depth of discrimination" against women in educational institutions. H.R. REP. No. 554,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512.
84. In Cohen, the First Circuit rejected Brown's claim that effective accommodation for
women athletes violates the equal protection rights of men athletes. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900-
01. The court held that Congress had broad authority to remedy past discrimination and
had intended to do so under Title IX. Id. at 901.
85. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
86. See 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972) (comments of Sen. Bayh).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
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istratively separate units, such term means each such school, col-
lege, or department.
8
Certain types of educational institutions, such as military institutions, are
excluded from Title IX's reach.8 9 Individual universities, colleges, and
schools are traditional defendants in Title IX litigation. Depending on
the charter of the educational institution, however, the proper defendant
in place of the institution may be a governing body, for example, the Colo-
rado State Board of Agriculture (which governs Colorado State
University).90
At the secondary and post-secondary levels, separate schools and col-
leges often form together to form athletic groups or associations. The
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") is such a group; it is "a
voluntary association of public and private institutions."9 1 In defining the
term "educational institution," Title IX refers to the individual schools or
colleges within these groups. Thus, Title IX directs that the proper de-
fendant is not the NCAA itself, but the individual members of the NCAA.
This is especially true since the rules of the NCAA, or other such group,
are subject to change by vote of the individual members.
92
The Eleventh Amendment 93 serves as no protection to liability. State
run schools are deemed to have waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
by accepting federal funds.
94
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN TITLE IX ATHLETICS CASES: CASE ELEMENTS
AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. Stating a Prima Facie Athletics Case Under Title IX: Three Types of
Violations
The Regulations, Final Policy Interpretation, and the Investigator's
Manual all set out three areas in which an educational institution must
comply in order to avoid a Title IX violation in its athletics department.
95
These areas, referred to throughout this article as compliance areas, are:
(1) athletic financial assistance; (2) other athletic benefits and opportuni-
ties; and (3) accommodation of athletics interests and abilities.9 6 The Fi-
nal Policy Interpretation sets the three compliance areas apart as separate
considerations, even though the Regulations combine the second and
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1988).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(1)-(9).
90. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 827.
91. Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422 (suggesting suit must be
against individual institutions to change NCAA rules, since compliance with NCAA rules does
not serve as defense to member institutions).
93. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (1988).
95. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41(c)(1)-(10) (1993); Final Policy Interpretation, supra
note 2, at 71,415-17; INVESrnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7.
96. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17; INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 7.
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third compliance areas.9 7 Moreover, the Investigator's Manual states, "the
[Final] Policy Interpretation does permit separate investigations and find-
ings for three major areas" and goes on to delineate the three compliance
areas.
98
Educational institutions have argued that Title IX requires a program-
wide analysis, pointing to the Regulations and the Investigator's Manual as
support for this approach.9 9 Specifically, the Investigator's Manual calls
for a balancing of all compliance areas against each other to determine if
there is overall compliance with Title IX. 10 0 Thus, schools have argued
that a violation of a single compliance area cannot state a valid claim
under Title IX.1°1
Nevertheless, courts have found that failure to provide equal treat-
ment to female athletes in any one of the three compliance areas laid out
in the Final Policy Interpretation gives rise to a violation under Title IX.
10 2
"Although § 106.41(c) [of the Regulations] goes on to list nine other fac-
tors that enter into a determination of equal opportunity in athletics, an
institution may violate Title IX simply by failing to effectively accommo-
date the interest and abilities of student athletes of both sexes."' 0 3 The
same logic dictates that a violation of the financial assistance or other ath-
letic benefits compliance areas states a separate, valid claim under Title
IX, although no court has addressed the issue.
This article analyzes each compliance area. Particular emphasis is
given to the third compliance area, accommodation of athletic interests
and abilities, because it forms the cornerstone of Title IX as it applies to
athletics.
1. Financial Assistance Compliance Area
The first compliance area relates to the financial assistance or scholar-
ships an educational institution provides to its student athletes. Scholar-
ships are specifically governed by section 106.37(c) of the Regulations.
10 4
"[Institutions] must provide reasonable opportunities for [athletic scholar-
97. Compare Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17 with 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c) (1)-(10).
98. Ihwr.rIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7.
99. See, e.g., Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988-89 (defendants arguing "that Title IX requires a
program-wide analysis to determine compliance," not a single violation of 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c) (1)).
100. INVESGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7 (suggesting, in general, an overall ap-
proach that reviews the entire athletic program).
101. See, e.g., Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11 (defendants arguing that "the Investigator's
Manual requires that plaintiffs demonstrate an overall violation of either 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.37(c) or 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10) in order to sustain a claim of discrimination
under Title IX").
102. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 742 (rejecting Colgate's argument that overall compliance
with Title IX in the athletic department as a whole insulates Colgate from liability for specific
Title IX violations); see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828 (holding interests and abilities violation
sufficient to find Tide IX violation); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897 (holding failure to accommodate
interests and abilities sufficient for Title IX violation).
103. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828 (citation omitted).
104. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
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ship] awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in ... intercollegiate athletics."
1 0 5
The Final Policy Interpretation clearly defines the standard for mea-
suring compliance in this area. The OCR and courts are to divide the
amount of financial assistance to members of each sex by the number of
male or female participants 10 6 in the athletic program. If the comparison
results in a substantially equal amount or the school can offer nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for a disparity, the school has satisfied this compliance
area.10 7 The compliance area does not require a proportionate number of
scholarships; rather, it requires an amount of financial assistance propor-
tionate to men's and women's participation rates.10 8 In analyzing these
amounts, non-grant aid, such as work-study, also must be compared. 1° 9
In assessing an institution's purported nondiscriminatory reasons for
disparities in the amount of awards to men and women, the courts should
exercise caution. The Final Policy Interpretation sets out examples of al-
leged nondiscriminatory reasons that educational institutions put forth
during the notice and comment period for the proposed Policy Interpre-
tation. For example, the Final Policy Interpretation suggests a school may
provide unequal amounts of aid where more students of one gender hail
from out of state. 110 Yet, the OCR's experience in investigating schools
revealed that this alleged nondiscriminatory reason for unequal financial
assistance to women athletes could be the result of another discriminatory
practice by the institution, namely greater out-of-state recruiting for the
men's athletic program.11 1 "A disparity in recruitment of student athletes
may not be used to justify a disparity in athletic financial assistance."
12
Likewise, other discriminatory practices by the institution cannot be used
to justify disproportionate amounts of financial assistance to members of
each sex.
In measuring the proportionality of financial assistance, the OCR em-
ploys complicated statistical analyses known as the "Z"
113 and "T"1 14
tests.1 15 Where the percentage of athletes who are female is not propor-
105. Id.
106. The Final Policy Interpretation defines "participants" as those athletes who: "receive
institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to athletes" (e.g. coaching, equipment);
"are participating in organized practice sessions and other team meetings ... on a regular
basis"; "are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for each sport"; or "[wiho, be-
cause of injury, cannot meet [any of the above requirements] but continue to receive finan-
cial aid on the basis of athletic ability." Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415;
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 14.




111. INVES.IATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 20.
112. Id.
113. The "Z" test measures whether the difference between the percentage of total aid
awarded to one sex and the percentage of participants of that sex in the athletic program is
significant. INVES TGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 153.
114. The "T" test measures "whether the difference between the average [financial]
award to male and female athletes is significant." Id.
115. Id. at 19, app. D at 153-63.
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donate to the percentage of financial assistance provided to female ath-
letes, the statistical tests are employed by OCR to determine whether there
is a violation of the financial assistance compliance area. The tests are not
used to determine whether there is a difference between the awards of
financial assistance; that determination is assumed by the application of
the "Z" or "T" test. Instead, the tests are "used for determining whether
differences in the awards of athletic financial assistance to male and fe-
male athletes are significant."'
1 6
Neither the Regulations nor the Final Policy Interpretation requires a
plaintiff to use this complicated statistical analysis to demonstrate a viola-
tion of the financial assistance compliance area. Instead, a plaintiff need
merely show that the ratio of aid to participants is not substantially propor-
tionate. 17 Where, for example, women make up 34% of the athletic par-
ticipants, but receive only 28%118 of the athletic financial assistance
dollars, a court may hold, based on the 6% disparity alone, that the aid to
participants ratio is not substantially proportionate.1 19 Although statistical
analysis can serve as useful evidence in determining whether the aid to
participants ratio is substantially proportionate, the "Z" and "T" tests are
not bright-line standards a plaintiff must meet in order to state a
violation.
1 20
On the surface, schools appear to be meeting this compliance area.
In or about 1992, women athletes made up approximately one-third of the
athletes in NCAA Division I schools and received approximately one-third
of athletic scholarship dollars. 12 1 Nevertheless, women made up approxi-
mately 50% of the undergraduate populations at those schools.1 22 As will
be discussed below, this nearly 20% differential between enrollment and
female athletic participation violates the interests and abilities compliance
area stated in section 106.41(c) (1) of the Regulations. 123 It therefore de-
fies logic that section 106.37 of the Regulations would permit schools to
provide scholarships in proportion to a number of women athletes that
116. Id. at 153.
117. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
118. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 19 (sample numbers used in manual's
analysis).
119. Indeed, courts have made decisions on the "substantially proportionate" analysis re-
quired under the third compliance area discussed infra at section IV.A.3.a. See, e.g., Roberts,
814 F. Supp. at 1511-13 (10.6% disparity between female athletic participation and female
undergraduate enrollment unacceptable absent a showing of effective accommodation);
Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85 (school failed to provide opportunities to participate when
36.51% of women were involved in intercollegiate athletics while 55.61% of students enrolled
were women). Courts have made these decisions without resorting to the complicated analy-
ses proposed in the "Z" and "T" tests. Courts have, however, considered expert testimony on
whether the disparities in the proportionality are statistically significant. None have found
that statistical significance is a necessary element of a valid claim of violation of the third
compliance area. Likewise, statistical significance is not an element under the financial
assistance compliance area.
120. On discouraging bright-line standards for the substantially proportionate test of the
third compliance area, see infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
121. Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55.
122. Id. at 54.
123. See infra part IV.A.3.
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violates section 106.41(c) (1). Thus, even where schools are fully funding
scholarships for its women athletes in proportion to their participation
rates, this will not constitute compliance with Tide IX if those participa-
tion rates are not proportionate to the enrollment rates, in violation of
section 106.41(c) (1).124
Commentators have noted this problem with the financial assistance
compliance area in their calls for reform of the Tide IX Regulations.'
25
Short of legislative reform, however, courts should follow the Investiga-
tor's Manual's caution against accepting a school's nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for disparities in financial assistance provided to female athletes.'
26
Where the athletic participation. numbers themselves are in violation of
Tide IX, those numbers cannot justify failure to provide more financial
assistance to women athletes.
127
2. Other Athletic Benefits Compliance Area
The second compliance area deals with the provision of other athletic
benefits and opportunities. Here, the Regulations set out ten criteria to
consider in determining whether the educational institution is providing
"equal athletic opportunity" to members of both sexes. 128 These criteria
are: (1) effective accommodation of interest and ability; (2) provision and
maintenance of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and
practice times; (4) travel and per diem expenses; (5) opportunity to re-
ceive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and compensation
of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker rooms, practice, and com-
petitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training services and facili-
ties; (9) provision of housing and dining services and facilities; and (10)
publicity. 12 9 The Regulations also allow the consideration of other factors
in measuring compliance.
1 30
In addition to these ten criteria, the Final Policy Interpretation adds
two other factors useful in determining compliance under this compliance
area: recruitment of student athletes and provision of support services.'
3 '
Furthermore, the Final Policy Interpretation specifically separates the first
criterion, effective accommodation of interests and abilities, from the
other nine criteria set out in the Regulations.' 3 2 The nine remaining cri-
124. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Heckman, supra note 11, at 63.
126. INVESTIGATOR'S MNUAL, supra note 28, at 20 (disallowing disparities in recruitment
to justify failure to provide more athletic financial assistance and scrutinizing the award of
scholarship funds based on "reasonable professional decisions" when decision negatively af-
fects athletes of one sex).
127. See Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 539.
128. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1)-(10).
129. Id
130. Id.; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
131. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
132. Id. at 71,415 n.3. The Final Policy Interpretation makes effective accommodation of
interests and abilities a separate compliance area. Id at 71,417. For discussion of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area, see infra part IV.A.3.
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teria plus the two added by the Final Policy Interpretation make up the
other athletic benefits compliance area.
133
The Investigator's Manual treats each of the eleven criteria of this
compliance area separately.1 3 4 Nevertheless, the criteria should be evalu-
ated together as a whole to determine whether an institution satisfies the
other athletic benefits compliance area. 135 Indeed, this compliance area
provides for an equitable weighing of each of the eleven criteria against
the others to determine whether, in totality, the institution provides equal
opportunity.' 3 6 The main focus of the other athletic benefits compliance
area is on the treatment of female athletes and whether that treatment is
equal in effect to the treatment of male athletes.'3 7 The'treatment need
not be identical; instead, an institution must provide services and benefits
which are "equal or equal in effect."
138
Title IX permits nondiscriminatory differences in the provision of ath-
letic benefits.1 39 Indeed, these differences are necessary to sustain the in-
dividual athletic teams offered by the institution. A women's soccer team,
for example, need not have the same amount of equipment as a men's
hockey team. The nature of the sport may also require a greater or lesser
degree of recruiting to fill existing positions.14 0 For example, a large foot-
ball team will often require greater recruiting than any women's teams.
Publicity, event management, and competitive facilities also may differ ac-
cording to individual teams. The Final Policy Interpretation takes into
account these team-by-team differences and directs courts and the OCR to
consider factors inherent in the basic operation of the sport including
rules of play, replacement of equipment, rates of injury, nature of facili-
ties, and others.' 4 1 Although unequal expenditures on necessary services
and benefits may be considered in evaluating a school's compliance, une-
qual aggregate expenditures alone will not constitute non-compliance
with Title IX. 14 2 As long as the differences in the provision of services and
benefits are not based on discriminatory reasons, the differences are al-
lowed and should be encouraged.
143
133. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17.
134. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 29-102.
135. See id. at 7 ("OCR will investigate all 13 program components. However, the Policy
Interpretation does permit separate investigations and findings for three major areas, specifi-
cally: 1) athletic financial assistance - § 106.37(c) 2) accommodation of athletics interests
and abilities - § 106.41(c) (1) 3) other athletic benefits and opportunities - § 106.41 (c); (this
encompasses § 106.41 (c) (2)-(10), support services and recruitment).").
136. Id.; see, e.g., Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-46.
137. See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 14.
138. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 71,415-16.
142. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
143. Some feminist scholars encourage and celebrate differences between the genders
and find the drive for identical treatment as a threat to women's rights. "Women are being
asked to settle for some pared-down version of models that men have established. Develop-
ing alternatives that are more participatory and less exploitive presents a continuing chal-
lenge. The problem, thus reformulated, is how to gain equality without relinquishing
difference." Rhode, supra note 4, at 1763 (citation omitted). Another scholar questions
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Educational institutions, however, often invoke differences between
sports to justify discriminatory disparities in treatment between men and
women athletes. 1 4 4 Indeed, female athletes still seem to find themselves
being treated as second-class, even when compared to their male counter-
parts in the identical sport. 14 5 One author noted vast disparities between
the men's and women's basketball programs at the University of Colorado
at Boulder.1 46 Specifically, the women's program received 62% of the
budget the men's basketball program received. 147 The women's basket-
ball coach's total compensation package was only 38% of the total com-
pensation package of the men's basketball coach. 1 48 Women received less
money for equipment, less than half the men's budget. 1 49 Moreover,
men's training tables, university provided meals, had a budget twenty
times greater than women's.15° Finally, the men's recruiting budget was
nearly twice the size of the .women's recruiting budget, and growing larger
each year.' 5 ' While discrepancies between single sports cannot give rise to
a claim under Title IX, 15 2 the discrepancies tend to bear out in the wo-
men's athletics programs as a whole.
155
The disparities between men's and women's athletic programs are
often rationalized by universities and colleges under a recurring theory:
revenue generation. Since men's sports, particularly football and basket-
ball, generate revenues, universities argue special treatment is justified for
whether the men's athletics program should be the standard of equality for women athletes.
Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALEJ.L.
& FEMINISM 105, 107 (1990); see also Lyn LeMaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality
Perspective, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 123-27 (1982) (stating that the traditional three-step
model of athletics deters women from participating more than it does men); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIRED 122 (1987) (arguing that women should create a new
model of institutional athletics).
144. When the women's softball team sought reinstatement through informal means,
Colorado State responded that hard economic times and the public's desire to see men's
football and basketball required the university to cut other sports. In commenting on this
response to the softball players, Colorado State's Tide IX Coordinator wrote these expressed
purposes were often used to " 'justify and sustain discrimination.' " Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 5
n.4., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd in
part, rev'd. in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
145. See George, supra note 25, at 562; see also Rhode, supra note 5, at 1762-63 (comparing
the inadequate facilities appropriated for the women's crew, tennis, and field hockey teams
at Yale); Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (reporting dismal results of NCAA's gender equity
study).
146. George, supra note 25, at 557-58.
147. Id. at 560.
148. Id. at 562.
149. Id. at 563.
150. Id. (noting the university spent $30,000 on training tables for men and only $1,500
on tables for women).
151. Id. at 564.
152. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
153. See Wolff, supra note 3 (discussing the differences in benefits received by men's and
women's athletic programs); see also Wieberg, supra note 78, at ClO (noting that only 12 out




these athletes, particularly in recruiting and expenditures.1 5 4 The reve-
nue generation argument must be rejected for three reasons.
First, the argument itself is a fiction. The true financial situation of
most men's athletic teams, including football and basketball, is far from in
the black. In 1989, only 13% of the 524 Division I football programs man-
aged to cover their expenses. 15 5 Indeed, many men's programs lost far
more money than they earned, in some instances close to one million dol-
lars per year.156 Thus, men's athletic programs, like women's programs
which the institutions complain produce little or no revenue, are net ex-
penses to most institutions.
Second, and more important for purposes of legal analysis, the Final
Policy Interpretation has rejected the revenue generation argument as a
valid defense under Title IX. 1 57 Revenue producing sports are neither
exempt from nor provided special treatment under Title IX despite urg-
ing from numerous commentators to the contrary.1 58 As the authoritative
statement on Title IX from the implementing agency, the Final Policy In-
terpretation's rejection of the revenue generation argument should be fol-
lowed by courts.
Finally, allowing revenue generation as a defense fundamentally
changes the purpose of funding educational institutions with federal dol-
lars. Tax dollars are provided to these institutions not to make a profit but
to provide an education. Intercollegiate athletics departments, just like
music or theater departments or science labs, are an integral part of the
education experience and should not be converted to mini pro-sports
franchises. Otherwise, Congress and the Internal Revenue Service may
very well resolve to tax those universities that treat athletic programs as a
means of generating profit rather than a means of providing and supple-
menting a federally funded education.
159
No court has directly addressed the revenue generation argument
under Title IX. 6° When presented with the argument, however, courts
should reject it. Sports offered by federally funded educational institu-
tions should complement the educational process, not supersede it. Like
154. See Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (9th Cir. 1994) (accepting
the revenue generation argument under the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also George, supra
note 25, at 567-70 (mentioning the "market demands" analysis for why women's coaches are
paid substantially less than men's coaches); Wolff, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing traditional
argument that men's teams, which produce revenue, should be excluded from gender equity
concerns).
155. Wolff, supra note 3, at 55.
156. Id. (stating that the University of Colorado's football program lost more than
$800,000 in 1990, the year it shared the national championship with Georgia Tech); see also
George, supra note 25, at 567 (noting that the University of Colorado men's basketball pro-
gram lost over $400,000 in 1992).
157. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,421.
158. Id.
159. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 64 (noting some congressmen, the IRS, and the Federal
Trade Commission have considered taxing intercollegiate athletics); see also George, supra
note 25, at 568-69 (rejecting revenue generation argument and stressing importance of the
educational aspects of athletics as opposed to financial profitability).
160. Cf. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320-21 (accepting revenue generation defense under Fair
Labor Standards Act).
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the Favia court, future courts should focus on the educational benefits of
interscholastic and intercollegiate competition: the development of self-
confidence, physical and mental well-being, and the feeling of team cohe-
sion and accomplishment. 16 1 Simply because an all-male sport may bring
a school additional revenue, prestige, or alumni contribution cannot jus-
tify the denial of the educational benefits of athletics to women. Title IX
mandates that no person shall be denied benefits of any educational pro-
gram on the basis of sex. 162 Allowing schools to buy exemption from Title
IX for individual male teams makes a mockery of the plain language of
Title IX.
To analyze properly compliance with Title IX under the other athlet-
ics benefits compliance area, courts must review differences and/or dis-
parities under the criteria set out in the Final Policy Interpretation and the
Investigator's Manual without reference to revenue generation. In Cook v.
Colgate University, the district court performed this analysis and found Col-
gate in violation of this compliance area. 163 The women's hockey team
was provided far fewer benefits than the men's hockey team and, on that
basis, the district court found a violation.
16 4
Interestingly, the Cook court directly compared men's hockey to wo-
men's hockey and did not evaluate the athletic programs as a whole.165
Where the teams are identical, arguably there are no sport differences
which justify different treatment. 166 Thus, one could argue, when an edu-
cational institution sponsors separate programs for members of each sex
in the same sport, courts may apply the team-to-team analysis to determine
whether a school meets the requirements of this compliance area. If an
institution maintains men's and women's basketball teams, for example,
the women's basketball team need only prove a disparity between the
treatment of its team and the treatment of the men's basketball team.
Although the team-to-team approach may seem compelling at first,
the approach may end up doing more harm than good to women's sports
by needlessly hampering an educational institution's choice to foster a
particular team or teams. The team-to-team approach forces educational
institutions to focus their equal treatment efforts on women's teams which
have an identical male counterpart at the institution. Thus, women's bas-
ketball and soccer may get elevated in treatment, while women's field
hockey or gymnastics get overlooked. Yet, women's teams with male coun-
161. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583.
162. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
163. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
164. Id. at 745. In Cook, the court stated, "[t]he men's ice hockey players at Colgate are
treated like princes. The women ice hockey players are treated like chimney sweeps." Id.
165. See id. at 744-45. Plaintiffs provided examples in six areas where they contended
Colgate discriminated against them, including expenditures, travel, equipment, locker
rooms, practice times, and coaching. Id.
166. Differences in crowds drawn by either team may support different treatment for
event management and security. Nevertheless, no team differences justify disparate treat-
ment with regard to equipment, travel, lockers, team practice, etc. See Final Policy Interpreta-
tion, supra note 2, at 71,416.
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terparts may not be teams the institution or the bulk of its student body
wishes to foster.
For example, an educational institution may choose to operate and
foster a women's gymnastic team (which has no male counterpart) while,
at the same time, offering women's and men's basketball. Given the his-
torical success of the gymnastics team accompanied by the relatively high
cost of maintaining the sport, the educational institution may choose to
devote more funding to maintain the regional or national success of that
team rather than divert funds to women's basketball. The school may wish
to provide greater recruiting efforts and coaching to women's gymnastics
to continue as a "power house" in that particular sport. Moreover, female
students may wish to continue the focus on the gymnastics team as demon-
strated by the number of interested gymnasts, attendance at meets, and
the like.
On the other hand, if women's basketball is less successful and histori-
cally has gained less recognition from the institution and its students, the
institution should be free to choose to foster the gymnastics team over the
women's basketball team. This is true even where men's basketball may be
the institution's "power house" counterpart to women's gymnastics. Sim-
ply because a school chooses to foster men's basketball over men's hockey
or football should not require the school to equally prioritize the women's
side of the athletics program.
Nothing in Title IX prevents schools from fostering certain athletic
teams; Title IX merely prevents them from providing unequal treatment
between the sexes. The team-to-team analysis gives an educational institu-
tion the limited option of downsizing the successful men's basketball
team, or upgrading the less successful women's basketball team, by taking
funds from other teams such as the women's gymnastics team. Under a
program-to-program analysis, however, schools need not downgrade suc-
cessful teams to upgrade less successful women's teams simply because
there is a male counterpart team at the institution. As long as the institu-
tion is providing benefits to women that are equal, or equal in effect, to
the men's athletic program as a whole, a disparity between a single wo-
men's athletic team and its male counterpart should not violate this com-
pliance area. Equality should be measured by opportunities and benefits
to the group as a whole, not the individual or team.
167
To state a valid claim under Title IX, athletes must present prima
facie evidence that the entire women's program receives unequal treat-
ment in the criteria listed above. 16a In practice, women will be able to
present prima facie evidence since most educational institutions are not
providing women's programs equal benefits. The Final Policy Interpreta-
167. See Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX,
88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1265 (1979) (discussing why a selection of separate teams for men and
women is necessary).
168. See generally Wolff, supra note 3 (stating that women's sports receive less money for
scholarships and programs overall). Moreover, individual teams can request specific treat-
ment even though the violation goes to the program as a whole. See infra notes 275-89 and
accompanying text.
1994]
DENVER U /VEITY LAW REVIEW
tion and Investigator's Manual provide detailed guidance to courts in eval-
uating the criteria in which a plaintiff has alleged a violation. 169
Differences in a single criterion will not necessarily result in a violation of
the compliance area. Only where the single difference is substantial, such
as wholesale failure to recruit for women's sports, will a single difference
result in a disparity or violation. 170 Otherwise, the Final Policy Interpreta-
tion and the Investigator's Manual essentially use a "totality of circum-
stances" approach to assess an institution's compliance. 171 This approach
is appropriate because, unlike the other compliance areas, the other ath-
letic benefits compliance area requires evaluation of eleven different crite-
ria. Furthermore, this totality of circumstances evaluation allows courts to
balance shortfalls in one criterion against adequate services and benefits
in other areas.
172
The totality of circumstances approach is a workable solution to con-
serving scarce educational resources. This approach allows an institution
to balance the relatively minor provision of equipment to the women's
soccer team with other provisions like higher recruiting or newer uniforms
in women's soccer or more equipment in women's gymnastics. Moreover,
when applied on a program-to-program basis, the totality approach allows
an educational institution to retain flexibility in choosing which sports it
chooses to foster. The goal behind this compliance area is to look for
overall balance and an attempt to spread scarce resources equally, not
identically, between the sexes. A totality of circumstances approach helps
achieve that goal.
3. Interests and Abilities Compliance Area
The third and final compliance area is the effective accommodation
of athletic interests and abilities (interests and abilities compliance area).
The Regulations require educational institutions to ensure their "selection
of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of members of both sexes."' 73 Although the Regulations
combine this compliance area with nine other criteria, the Final Policy
Interpretation, Investigator's Manual, and case law make clear this crite-
rion is to be assessed as a wholly separate compliance area. 174 Failure to
provide full and effective accommodation of women's athletic interests
and abilities can create a separate and distinct violation of Title IX.
i 7 5
169. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-17; INvESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 29-96.
170. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415.
171. Id. at 71,417; see also INVESnIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 7-8.
172. See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 8.
173. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1).
174. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417; INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 7, 21; see, e.g., Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11.
175. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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The interests and abilities compliance area is the cornerstone of Title
IX as it applies to athletics. 176 "There is little question that this factor [of
effective accommodation of interests and abilities] is the most important
criteria listed in section 106.41(c)." 177 Without this compliance area, the
other compliance areas would be of little meaning. A simple example
demonstrates the point. Assume an educational institution has 48% men
and 52% women in its undergraduate population. The educational insti-
tution's athletic program, however, is 70% male and 30% female. Assume
further the female athletes each receive 100% scholarship (while their
male counterparts receive a range of 0% to 100% scholarships). The fe-
male athletes also have brand new showers, brand new equipment, and
first class travel. Under the analyses above, the educational institution is in
full compliance with the financial assistance and other athletic benefits
compliance areas. Nevertheless, the educational institution will probably
not comply with the interests and abilities compliance area, as discussed
below.1 78 Without the interests and abilities compliance area, upon which
the other two compliance areas depend, educational institutions can feign
gender equity by treating a few individual female athletes on a level equal
to or better than the male athletes. Indeed, educational institutions would
find it far less troublesome and less expensive to treat a single individual,
or small group of individuals, as "equals" than to bring true gender equity
to an entire athletic department.'
79
The Final Policy Interpretation states, "it is the achievement of 'equal
opportunity' for which recipients are responsible and to which the final
Policy Interpretation is addressed."18 0 The goal behind Title IX and the
Final Policy Interpretation is to see that educational institutions provide
equal athletic opportunities to women as an entire group, not just a few
select individuals hand-picked by educational institutions. 18 1 It would de-
feat the purpose of Title IX to allow institutions to doctor the symptoms of
176. The interests and abilities compliance area delineates the "heartland" of Title IX.
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897; see also Heckman, supra note 11, at 45 (stating that the interests and
abilities factor is the most significant of the 10 criteria).
177. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989.
178. At these enrollment participation number ratios (a 22% point differential), the edu-
cational institution unquestionably fails the "substantially proportionate" prong of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area. See infra part IV.A.3.a. For purposes of this example, it is
assumed the educational institution cannot show a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion or full accommodation of interests and abilities as these requirements are
discussed below. See infra parts IV.A.3.b, IV.A.3.c. Courts, however, should not find a viola-
tion of Title IX based solely on lack of substantial proportionality between female athletic
participation rates and female undergraduate enrollment. Instead, courts must also look to
the other two prongs of the interests and abilities compliance area to determine whether
there is unlawful discrimination. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
179. "Satisfaction of [the compliance area] factor is the only means by which greater
athletic opportunities for women and girls may be established. If women are afforded
greater athletic opportunities, by necessity more equipment, supplies, facilities, scheduling,
coaches, and scholarships will be required to insure equal athletic opportunity." Heckman,
supra note 11, at 45.
180. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,414.
181. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. "[A]n institution that offers women a smaller number of
athletic opportunities than the statute requires may not rectify that violation simply by lavish-
ing more resources on those women or achieving equivalence in other respects." Id.
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discrimination-less money and fewer benefits for women's sports-with-
out combating the source of the discrimination: lack of equal opportunity
to participate in athletics. Accordingly, this compliance area should be of
primary concern to the courts. Only where the playing field is level
through equal athletic opportunity can courts effectively evaluate compli-
ance in the other two compliance areas.
The Final Policy Interpretation divides assessment of the interests and
abilities compliance area into three categories: (1) "the determination of
athletic interests and abilities of students;" (2) "the selection of sports of-
fered;" and (3) "the levels of competition available including the opportu-
nity for team competition."1 8 2 Determination of interests and abilities183
and selection of sports, 184 while important, are secondary to the levels of
competition category; the Investigator's Manual includes the two former
categories in its discussion of the levels of competition category. 18 5
The levels of competition category of the interests and abilities com-
pliance area is intended to assess whether the institution provides overall
equal opportunities to men and women to participate and compete in ath-
letics. Institutions must provide equal opportunities to participate (called
opportunities to compete) and equal levels of team competition (called
competitive team schedules). 186 Competitive team schedules refers pri-
marily to the level of play at which the athletes compete.187
The opportunity to compete subcategory is the real focus of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area and has been the focus of the recent
Title IX litigation in athletics. This subcategory addresses the question
whether women and men are afforded the same athletic opportunities.1 88
182. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417. A schematic diagram of Title IX
is set out in the Appendix to this article.
183. The determination of interests and abilities discusses the manner in which an educa-
tional institution may assess the athletic interests and abilities of its underrepresented sex. Id.
The institution may choose any method of assessing interests and abilities, including surveys
or sections within the enrollment application, so long as the method, among other things,
does not discriminate against the underrepresented sex. Id.
184. The selection of sports category discusses the institution's responsibilities when it
offers a sport for one gender that it does not offer for the other and distinctions are made for
contact and non-contact sports. Id. at 71,417-18. For an analysis of this category, see
Heckman, supra note 11, at 45-62.
185. Determining interests and abilities is discussed under the third prong of the inter-
ests and abilities compliance area's competitive opportunities test set out below. See INVESm-
GATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25. Selection of sports is discussed in the "Cautions"
section of the interests and abilities compliance area. Id. at 26-27. The Investigator's Manual
indicates that a survey or assessment of interests and abilities is not required by the Tide IX
regulations or the Final Policy Interpretation. Id. at 27.
186. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418. A violation of either the oppor-
tunity to compete or competitive team schedules subcategories gives rise to separate viola-
tions of Title IX. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 990-91. A violation occurs when requirements of one
or the other, or both subcategories are not met. Id. at 991.
187. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; see also INVESTIGATOR'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 28, at 21 (noting "levels of competition" refers to the quality of competition
indicated by whether a team competes against other teams at the same division level).




To determine whether an educational institution affords equal opportuni-
ties, courts must apply a three-pronged test:' 8 9
(1) Whether the intercollegiate or interscholastic participation
opportunities for male and female students are substantially pro-
portionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among athletes, whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interests and abilities of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion, whether it can be demonstrated
that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated. 190
This section of the article analyzes these three prongs and discusses
how the federal courts have applied, and should apply, the test.
a. Substantially Proportionate
Recent Title IX litigation has repeatedly addressed the definition and
breadth of the "substantially proportionate" prong of the interests and
abilities compliance area.1 9 ' The Final Policy Interpretation does not de-
fine the term "substantially proportionate," 192 and the Investigator's Man-
ual provides no additional assistance: "There is no set ratio that constitutes
'substantially proportionate' or that, when not met, results in a disparity or
a violation. All factors for this program component [interests and abili-
ties] and any justifications for differences offered by the institution, must
be considered before a finding is made."193 How, then, do courts deter-
mine whether an institution's athletic participation rates are "substantially
proportionate" to its undergraduate enrollment rates? Recent cases pro-
vide some guidance.
In Roberts v. Colorado State University, the district court held a 10.5%
differential between women's enrollment and women's athletic participa-
tion was not in compliance with the "substantially proportionate" require-
ment of the first prong. 194 The Roberts district and circuit courts further
agreed that the OCR had found Colorado State in noncompliance with
this prong when its differential had been 7.5%, 12.5%, and 12.7%.1 9 5 In
Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, the district court found a 17.84%
differential not substantially proportionate. 19 6 Moreover, in Cohen v.
Brown University, the district court found an 11.6% differential not substan-
189. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
190. Id.
191. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511-13;Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp.
at 991.
192. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
193. INVESnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24.
194. 814 F. Supp. at 1512-13. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this finding.
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30.
195. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513.
196. 812 F. Supp. at 584-85.
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tially proportionate. 19 7 The smallest differential recognized by a court as
violating the substantially proportionate prong was the 7.5% differential
noted by the Roberts courts where the OCR found Colorado State in non-
compliance.19 8 Nevertheless, none of these cases provided a method for
other courts to analyze the "substantially proportionate" standard in the
future.199
In developing a workable application of the "substantially proportion-
ate" standard, courts must understand the purpose for using this appar-
ently amorphous benchmark. Neither the Final Policy Interpretation nor
the Investigator's Manual attempts to set a rigid, bright-line standard that
distinguishes compliance from noncompliance. To do so would require
an athletic institution to add or subtract individual athletes every year as
undergraduate enrollment rates fluctuated within normal matriculation
parameters or recruitment efforts. A rigid rule would be unable to take
into account an unexpected dearth in male enrollment or the equally un-
expected decision of a top female athlete to accept a scholarship from
another school. Accordingly, the Final Policy Interpretation and the In-
vestigator's Manual require "substantial proportionality," a standard which
ideally aims to keep the enrollment rates and participation rates in exact
proportion,2 0 0 but which can accommodate year-to-year fluctuations in the
enrollment and athletic participation. Courts should not undermine this
purpose by imposing a bright-line standard for compliance.
In practice, educational institutions have used bright-line standards
under the "substantially proportionate" analysis to justify continued dis-
crimination.20 1 To those educational institutions, "substantially propor-
tionate" has become a glass ceiling with which they attempt to justify their
deliberate limitation of athletic opportunities for women. Around the
country, institutions have come to set their sights on the 40% female ath-
letic participation demarcation. For example, the Big Ten Athletic Con-
ference set the 40% participation mark as a requirement for its
institutional members.20 2 While this is a step in the right direction, since
few schools are anywhere near the 40% mark, the Big Ten's arbitrary selec-
tion of 40% female athletic participation rate actually continues discrimi-
nation and ensures women will remain second class athletes.203
Institutional members of the Big Ten will strive for this 40% demarcation
regardless of their female undergraduate enrollment. An institution with
197. 809 F. Supp. at 991.
198. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513.
199. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 (stating the Tenth Circuit would not further demar-
cate the line between substantial proportionality and disproportionality other than to agree a
10.5% differential was not substantially proportionate).
200. "[I]f the enrollment is 52% male and 48% female, then, ideally, about 52% of the
participants in the athletics program should be male and 48% female...." INVESTIGATOR'S
MANuAL, supra note 28, at 24.
201. SeeKelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 240 (C.D. Ill. 1993).
202. See id.
203. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55; see also Wieberg, supra note 78 (noting that only 12




40% female undergraduate enrollment and one with 55% undergraduate
enrollment each strive for the same goal of 40% women athletic participa-
tion. Instead of reaching for "substantial proportionality," the educational
institutions reach for the arbitrarily determined and, in many cases, inex-
plicably low standard of 40% female athletic participation.
20 4
The "substantially proportionate" prong should not be applied to cre-
ate a glass ceiling through which female athletes will never pass, nor one at
which educational institutions will be found in compliance even though
their female enrollment rates are substantially higher than an arbitrarily
determined participation rate. To ensure true equality between the sexes,
this prong must not be applied like a pre-set quota as urged by some edu-
cational institutions. 20 5 Instead, the method of analyzing "substantial pro-
portionality" must reflect the purpose of the standard to bring about near-
exact parity while allowing for year-to-year fluctuations.
In future Title IX athletics litigation, the "substantially proportionate"
prong should be applied by using evidentiary presumptions. Under this
method of analysis, plaintiffs have the initial burden of proving the rates of
undergraduate enrollment and athletic participation are not exactly pro-
portionate. Plaintiffs could meet this burden by producing evidence of
the number of female undergraduate enrollees as compared with the
number of female athletes. Once disproportionality is established, a re-
buttable evidentiary presumption should operate in the plaintiffs' favor
that the participation rates are not "substantially proportionate" within the
meaning of the Final Policy Interpretation.
20 6
If the educational institution chooses to challenge the "substantially
proportionate" prong of the interests and abilities compliance area, it may
produce evidence to rebut the presumption now operating in plaintiffs'
favor. To rebut the presumption, the educational institution need merely
produce evidence that the disparity between the enrollment rates and par-
ticipation rates are due to enrollment fluctuations or unexpected transfers
of student athletes. Under this analysis, however, an educational institu-
tion cannot claim compliance with this prong by demonstrating its differ-
ential has always been less than 10% year after year. To allow such
evidence to justify participation-enrollment rate disparities would only
promote the glass ceiling defense discussed above. If a court determined
that any differential below 7% is substantially proportionate, educational
institutions will strive to hit the 7% differential and nothing more.
Schools will have no greater incentive to raise women's athletic participa-
tion higher than the number arbitrarily determined by the courts and will
continue to provide proportionately more athletic opportunities to men
204. The Big Ten's ultimate goal of 60/40 male to female participation ratio does not
preempt compliance with Title IX's requirements of equal opportunity for male and female
athletes because a school's "actions must be measured by Title IX's requirements." Kelley,
832 F. Supp. at 242 n.5. "The obligation to comply with [Title IX] is not obviated or allevi-
ated by any rule or regulation of any. . . athletic or other league, or association .... " 34
C.F.R § 106.6(c); see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
205. See Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240.
206. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418.
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simply because the schools have historically chosen to do so and prefer to
continue on that course. Schools will never treat women as equals in ath-
letics; rather, women will always get only as much as the courts require the
schools to give.
True nondiscriminatory fluctuations may only be proven by demon-
strating unexpected increases or decreases in matriculation for a certain
gender, changes in participation rates due to the graduation of a large
number of senior athletes, or similar'fluctuations. Unless proof of these
nondiscriminatory reasons for differences between the enrollment rates
and athletic participation rates can be found, educational institutions
should be unable to rebut the evidentiary presumption that athletic op-
portunities are not substantially proportionate.
If, however, an educational institution produces evidence of nondis-
criminatory reasons such as unexpected matriculation fluctuations, plain-
tiffs carry the ultimate burden of proving the participation rates are not
substantially proportionate to enrollment rates.20 7 Plaintiffs may present
statistical evidence that demonstrates the differences between the enroll-
ment and participation rates are statistically significant and demonstrate a
persistent pattern over a period of time. Statistical evidence is useful to
demonstrate that disparities between enrollment and participation rates
are not the result of mere chance or year-to-year fluctuations. Plaintiffs
may also introduce evidence that demonstrates women's participation
rates have never exceeded their enrollment rates.2 08 Arguably, true year-
to-year fluctuations would cause the female participation rates to some-
times exceed female enrollment rates. Plaintiffs may argue that the educa-
tional institution's assertion of nondiscriminatory factors are unjustified,
fabricated, or overstated. Of course, the ultimate burden lies with plain-
tiffs to persuade the trier of fact that the enrollment-participation rates are
not substantially proportionate.
20 9
The use of presumptions is a fair and reasonable way to apply the
"substantially proportionate" prong. The purpose of Title IX is to make
athletic opportunities equal It is therefore logical to presume that where
the participation rates are not equal to the enrollment rates, the educa-
tional institution is unfairly favoring one gender. The presumption is eas-
ily overcome where the institution shows the differential is not a result of
unfair favoritism, but a result of unanticipated changes in enrollment or
athletic participation. Furthermore, educational institutions are protected
from undue hardship by the fact that plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden
207. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on the substantially proportionate prong of the
interests and abilities compliance area. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829 n.5; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at
584.
208. No co-educational post-secondary institution reported in a 1992 USA Today study has
female participation rates which exceed female enrollment rates. Wieberg, supra note 78, at
CIO. This demonstrates that educational institutions are not prevented from "substantially
proportionate" rates by virtue of mere fluctuations. Instead, schools have made conscious
choices to continue to promote their men's athletics programs at the expense of their wo-
men's programs.
209. See supra note 207.
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of proof on this prong,2 10 and defendants may still find safe harbor in the
two additional prongs of this compliance area: showing a history and con-
tinuing practice of program expansion and full and effective accommoda-
tion of the interests and abilities.
2 11
The Investigator's Manual supports this evidentiary presumptions ap-
proach, noting that the ideal result is exact parity between enrollment
rates and athletic participation rates.21 2 Thus, exact parity is the logical
starting place for analyzing whether an institution meets the "substantially
proportionate" prong. Nevertheless, the Investigator's Manual directs the
OCR to consider "any justifications for differences offered by the institu-
tion" before making a finding under this prong.21 3 If a plaintiff can
demonstrate, however, that the asserted 'justifications" are less than genu-
ine or are also discriminatory, the justifications should not be used to vali-
date discrimination.
The desired effect of this evidentiary presumption approach is to stop
the existing search for the magical number at which an educational insti-
tution will be in compliance with this prong. There should be no pre-set
athletic participation number (such as 40%) or set differential between
enrollment and athletic participation (such as 10% or less) that establishes
compliance. Instead, the courts should focus on the manner in which an
institution allocates its limited athletic opportunities to men and women.
The manner of distribution of athletic opportunities and whether the dis-
tribution is a result of an existing preference for male sports underlies the
evidentiary presumption approach. Whether an educational institution
complies with this first prong will always remain a question for the trier of
fact. The presumption, however, will ensure that plaintiffs may effectively
challenge an educational institution's practice of keeping female athletes
close but never quite equal. Courts also must bear in mind that a violation
of this first prong does not end the inquiry under the interests and abili-
ties compliance area.
b. History and Continuing Practice of Program Expansion
Where an institution's enrollment rates are not "substantially propor-
tionate" to its athletic participation rates, the analysis moves to the second
prong: whether an educational institution can show a "history and contin-
uing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interest and abilities of the members of [the under-
represented] sex."2 14 This second prong of the opportunity to compete
analysis allows educational institutions to come into compliance with Title
IX by demonstrating continued progress toward gender equity in their
athletic departments. Where, for example, an institution became co-edu-
210. See supra note 207.
211. See discussion infra parts IVA.3.b., IV.A.3.c.
212. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24.
213. I&
214. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INVESTnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
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cational within the last decade, the institution's gradual, but continuous,
expansion of the newly-admitted gender's athletic opportunities satisfies
this prong. Thus, the educational institutions are given the opportunity to
reach gender equity at a reasonable pace and are not required to achieve
full equality overnight.
Like the "substantially proportionate" prong, however, this prong has
been used by long-time co-educational institutions to feign compliance
with Title IX.2 15 When Congress passed Title IX in 1972, many post-sec-
ondary educational institutions offered no athletic opportunities to their
female students. Since that time, institutions have expanded women's
sports in reaction to Title IX's passage. For example, Colorado State of-
fered no women's sports prior to 1970 and added eleven women's sports
during the 1970s in reaction to the mandates of Title IX.2 16 Thus, Colo-
rado State expanded its program from 0% female athletic participation in
the pre-1970 period to approximately 37.7% female athletic participation
in the 1992-93 athletic year.2 1 7 Allowing an educational institution to
claim it has a history and continuing practice of program expansion sim-
ply because it added sports in the 1970s, however, undermines Title IX's
purpose and renders the interests and abilities compliance area meaning-
less. As Judge Weinshienk succinctly stated in Roberts, "[a]cceptance of
this argument also would implicitly condone the attitude that female ath-
letes.., should be satisfied with their current opportunities given the pre-
1970 lack of participation opportunities for women in intercollegiate ath-
letics." 21 8 The history of expansion prong was never intended to allow
educational institutions to get off scot-free for present discrimination sim-
ply because they can demonstrate they added a few women's teams within
the last twenty years.
In analyzing history of program expansion, courts should focus on the
"continuing practice" language of this prong, since addition of teams at
the inception of women's athletics cannot provide a defense under Title
IX.2 19 The district court in Roberts suggested the relevant period for deter-
mining program expansion is the era in which Colorado State was put on
notice by the OCR that its participation rates were not substantially pro-
portionate to its enrollment rates. 220 This analysis, although relevant for
Colorado State, should not be applied as a standard. Some institutions
may not have the record of OCR investigations that Colorado State has.
22 1
Furthermore, notice to an educational institution is not an element of a
215. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
216. Defendants in Roberts used as a defense to plaintiffs' Title IX claim the fact that CSU
added 11 women's sports in the 1970s. Id.
217. I. at 1512, 1514.
218. Id at 1514.
219. It is important to note that a court would have to look at the entire history of the
women's athletic program if the institution had only recently begun accepting women into its
undergraduate enrollment and providing women athletic opportunities.
220. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1515.




violation of this compliance area. 222 Courts should not limit their inquiry
of program expansion to a period wherein the school was put on notice of
its potential Title IX violation. The sole inquiry under this prong should
focus on whether the educational institutions can demonstrate a continu-
ing practice of program expansion that responds to the developing athletic
interests of women.
223
In evaluating the history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion, courts also must look at the number of women's athletic teams
recently added and the increase in number of participation opportuni-
ties.22 4 If the institution shows a continuing practice of program expan-
sion for the underrepresented gender, the educational institution will be
found in compliance with this prong, and the interests and abilities com-
pliance area analysis ends.
225
Faced with economic cuts, however, most schools have been con-
tracting athletic programs for both men and women. Contraction of both
sexes' athletic programs, with a smaller contraction of women's programs,
cannot satisfy this second prong. The "expansion by contraction" argu-
ment was raised by Colorado State in the Roberts case, to no avail. Colo-
rado State claimed that since it had increased its participation numbers by
virtue of contracting its women's and men's athletic programs (eliminat-
ing 18 softball players and 55 baseball players), it showed a history of pro-
gram expansion. 2 26 The Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument.
We recognize that in times of economic hardship, few schools
will be able to satisfy Title IX's effective accommodation require-
ment by continuing to expand their women's athletics programs.
Nonetheless, the ordinary meaning of the word "expansion" may
not be twisted to find compliance under this prong when schools
have increased the relative percentages of women participating
in athletics by making cuts in both men's and women's sports
programs. Financially strapped institutions may still comply with
Title IX by cutting athletic programs such that men's and wo-
men's athletic participation rates become substantially propor-
tionate to their representation in the undergraduate
population.
227
The burden of proof for program expansion is placed on the educational
institution.
2 28
222. Although Congress directed that an educational institution must be notified of its
violation before federal funds are withdrawn, Congress, the Regulations and the Final Policy
Interpretation never directed that a plaintiff must prove an educational institution was on
notice in order to prove a violation. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
223. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INvESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
224. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514; INVESTIGATOR'S MANtUAL, supra note 28, at 24-25.
225. See INVESnGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25.
226. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1514.
227. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
228. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418 (stating the necessary inquiry
as "[w]hether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expan-
sion") (emphasis added); INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 21 (same); Roberts, 998
F.2d at 830 n.8 (noting that the language of Policy Interpretation places burden of proof on
the institution).
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c. Full and Effective Accommodation of Interests and Abilities
When athletic participation and undergraduate enrollments are not
substantially proportionate and where the institution cannot show a his-
tory and continuing practice of program expansion, the courts must ana-
lyze the third and final prong of the interests and abilities compliance
area's opportunity to compete test: "whether it can be demonstrated that
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program."
229
This prong allows institutions to provide greater athletic opportuni-
ties to one gender where the other gender simply does not wish or is not
able to compete. For example, a community college which primarily
serves older, part-time students may meet this prong. The school may of-
fer no scholarships or intercollegiate athletics. It may, however, offer in-
tramural athletics for its students. The school may demonstrate that it has
no (or very few) female participants because women have shown no inter-
est in competing in the intramural program (because of jobs, parenting,
etc.). In this instance, the institution would satisfy the third prong and
would not be in violation of the interests and abilities compliance area.
To evaluate this prong, courts must consider a number of factors: any
surveys conducted by the institution demonstrating athletic interest or
ability in the underrepresented gender; "expressed interests" of the under-
represented gender; club and intramural participation by the under-
represented gender; and, participation levels in feeder schools,
community programs, or physical education classes. 230 Moreover, the
manner in which the educational institution met the developing interests
of men, and whether the institution actively encouraged any male sport,
also must be considered.23 1 If an institution has cut an existing and viable
women's team, this prong will be easily satisfied by testimony by the plain-
tiff athletes regarding their interests and abilities in continuing play on
their former team.
232
Educational institutions have argued that they need accommodate
women only to the extent they accommodate men. Thus, the argument
goes, if male interest in baseball is unmet, the school may ignore women's
interest in softball.2 33 The First and Tenth Circuits have specifically re-
jected this argument.
2 34
Even if unmet interests and abilities are demonstrated by the under-
represented gender, an institution need not upgrade or create a new sport
229. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418; INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 28, at 21.
230. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25.
231. Id.
232. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32.
233. Id. at 831.
234. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 ("[T]his benchmark sets a high standard: it demands
not merely some accommodation, but full and effective accommodation. If there is sufficient
interest and ability among members of the statistically underrepresented gender, not slaked




where there is no reasonable expectation of competition for that sport
within the institution's normal competitive region. 23 5 If, for example, a
sufficient number of women at the University of Florida wish to institute a
cross-country ski team, the institution need not accommodate that interest
if cross-country skiing is not a sport available within the University of Flor-
ida's normal competitive region. Institutions, however, may be required
to actively encourage the development of such opportunities within the
competitive region where overall athletic opportunities have been histori-
cally limited for the members of one sex.23 6 So, for example, the entire
Pac Ten Conference could not decide to drop all women's volleyball, thus
providing themselves the excuse that there is no opportunity for women's
competition within the Pac Ten competitive region. Moreover, the histori-
cal discriminating practices of a group of educational institutions is not a
sufficient reason to justify and continue discrimination. Otherwise, the
old boys' network would have little incentive to change.
Plaintiffs carry the burden of proof for the third prong of the interests
and abilities compliance area.23 7 Although some district courts have held
otherwise, circuit courts have held the burden is on plaintiffs since proof
of disproportionality alone will not state a claim under Title IX. 238 Thus,
plaintiffs state a prima facie claim under the interests and abilities compli-
ance area by alleging and proving (1) the rates of female undergraduate
enrollment and the rates of female athletic participation are not substan-
tially proportionate, and (2) there are unmet athletic interests and abili-
ties in women attending the educational institution. A defendant
institution can avoid liability under this compliance area by proving a his-
tory and continuing practice of athletic program expansion for the under-
represented gender.
2 39
4. Discriminatory Intent: Not a Required Element
To state a claim under Title IX, a plaintiff need not prove discrimina-
tory intent.240 In construing Title VI, the statute on which Title IX was
modeled,2 4 1 a majority of the Supreme Court held that a violation of the
235. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831; see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,418;
INVES CGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 27.
236. See Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 746-47 (rejecting as defenses defendant's claims that wo-
men's ice hockey was not sponsored by NCAA, that region had insufficient competition, and
that high school women's ice hockey provided inadequate recruitment base for Colgate to
develop a women's team).
237. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831 (stating an institution would be hard pressed to
prove full and effective accommodation in the abstract).
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 214-28 and accompanying text.
240. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539-40 (1987).
241. Title IX was patterned after Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat.
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988)), and should be construed similarly. Grove City,
465 U.S. at 566; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694. Some courts have held, however, that Title VII, not
Title VI, is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards,
including the question of whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish discrimination
under Title IX." Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832-33 (quoting Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Col-
leges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987)).
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statute requires proof of discriminatory intent.242 Nevertheless, a different
majority agreed proof of discriminatory effect was all that was required to
state a claim under Title VI's implementing regulations.243 The first court to
reach this issue in Title IX litigation followed this Title VI analysis and
ruled the plaintiffs did not need to prove discriminatory intent on their
Title IX claim because they had alleged a violation of the statute and the
Regulations.2 44 Moreover, the recent athletics cases also hold discrimina-
tory intent is not required to state a claim under Title IX.245 Proof of
intent, however, may have an impact on the remedies available to a plain-
tiff, as discussed below.
2 46
B. Affirmative Defenses to a Title IX Athletics Case
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of violation under one
of the three compliance areas, the burden shifts to the defendant educa-
tional institution to establish affirmative defenses. This section discusses
what legitimate defenses allow an educational institution to maintain an
athletic program that violates one of the three compliance areas.
Nondiscriminatory reasons may be used to justify overall disparities in
all compliance areas except the interests and abilities compliance area.
2 4 7
In the interests and abilities compliance area, the only defense for a prima
facie violation is proof of a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented gender.
248
242. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983); see also Haffer, 678
F. Supp. at 539.
243. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2.
244. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 539-40 (stating Title IX regulations do not explicitly impose
an intent requirement).
245. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832-33; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1518; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at
584.
246. See discussion infra part V.B.
247. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415. The financial assistance com-
pliance area states: "[ii nstitutions may be found in compliance if... a resulting disparity can
be explained by adjustments to take into account legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors," and
the other athletic benefits compliance area states: "a finding of compliance may still be justi-
fied if the differences are the result of nondiscriminatory factors." Id.
248. Id. at 71,418 (setting out a three-pronged test for this compliance area, making the
second prong (whether institutions can show history and continuing practice of program
expansion) a defense to the failure to provide athletic opportunities substantially proportion-
ate to enrollment rates when interests are not fully and effectively accommodated). The
interests and abilities compliance area is the only compliance area in which courts are not
allowed to consider legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in assessing compliance.
The Investigator's Manual appears to contradict the Final Policy Interpretation on this
issue by directing the OCR to consider nondiscriminatory reasons for disparities in all com-
pliance areas. INVESrIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 3-4. Nevertheless, a closer reading
of the Investigator's Manual demonstrates support for the proposition that the only defense
to a violation of the interests and abilities compliance area is the second prong in that three-
pronged test; the Investigator's Manual makes no mention of nondiscriminatoryjustifications
that may serve as defenses. See id. at 24-27. Instead, the Manual discusses justifications for
differences in determining whether the rates are substantially proportionate, the first prong
of the test. For a discussion of this first prong, see supra part IVA.3.a. (concerning burden
shifting presumptions in establishing whether participation and enrollment rates are substan-
tially proportionate). Nondiscriminatory year-to-year fluctuations are not affirmative de-
fenses to a violation of the overall compliance area, but are evidence to consider in
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As for affirmative defenses in the other two compliance areas, the Fi-
nal Policy Interpretation and Investigator's Manual make repeated refer-
ences to the use of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons by an institution
to justify a disparity in one of these compliance areas. Nevertheless,
neither the Final Policy Interpretation nor the Investigator's Manual is
particularly good at cataloging these nondiscriminatory reasons. Some al-
leged nondiscriminatory reasons have been specifically allowed, while
others have been specifically rejected. This article makes no effort to dis-
cuss every possible nondiscriminatory reason an educational institution
may raise. Instead, this article discusses below some nondiscriminatory
reasons presented in the Final Policy Interpretation and some defenses
previously raised by educational institutions. In examining defenses raised
by educational institutions, courts should carefully examine the alleged
nondiscriminatory reason to ensure the reason is not a result of other
discrimination.
249
1. Team-by-team Differences: Allowed
Differences in teams, such as team-specific rules and regulations, are
allowed as an affirmative defense. 250 For example, if one team requires
more equipment or needs greater security for stadium events, an educa-
tional institution will not violate Title IX by reacting to the specific needs
of the particular team.
2. Temporary Annual Fluctuations: Allowed
Temporary annual fluctuations in the other athletics benefits area are
specifically allowed as an affirmative defense. 25 1 This prevents female ath-
letes from suing simply because the male athletes got more recruiting dol-
lars or other benefits in any one academic year.252 These annual
fluctuations are permitted to provide flexibility to the educational institu-
tion without exposing it to Title IX liability.
3. Voluntary Affirmative Action: Allowed
Voluntary affirmative action initiated by the educational institution to
correct historical conditions that have limited participation in athletics by
determining "substantial proportionality" under the first prong of the interests and abilities
compliance area test. Id.
249. For example, the Final Policy Interpretation allows as a defense to a violation of the
financial assistance compliance area that schools have more out-of-state male athletes, thus
requiring greater amounts of financial assistance. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at
71,415. Looking behind that reason, however, the Investigator's Manual points out that
schools had more out-of-state male student athletes because the schools recruited more for
men than for women. INVasnMATOR'S MANuAL, supra note 28, at 20. This discriminatory
recruiting practice cannot be upheld as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for failure to
provide appropriate amounts of financial assistance to women athletes.
250. See Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,415-16.
251. Id.
252. If greater benefits are afforded to men on a regular basis, as opposed to a single
academic year, the educational institution may be in violation of the other athletic benefits
compliance area.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the members of one sex is an affirmative defense to a Title IX violation.253
Thus, if an educational institution maintained an athletic department
which had men as the overrepresented gender, the educational institution
could raise the affirmative action defense to correct past discrimination
against women to any suit brought by male athletes.
4. Compliance with NCAA or Other Rules: Rejected
An educational institution cannot hide behind the rules and regula-
tions of the NCAA or other such group as a defense for its discriminatory
conduct. The Regulations and the Final Policy Interpretation specifically
reject this as a defense.
254
5. Financial Constraints: Rejected
Many a school has claimed its hands are tied from complying with
Title IX because of the economic woes facing most of this country's educa-
tional institutions. As difficult as these economic times may be for educa-
tional institutions, "a cash crunch is no excuse."
255
Otherwise, if schools could use financial concerns as a sole rea-
son for disparity of treatment, Title IX would become meaning-
less. Under such circumstances, a school could always use a lack
of funds as an excuse to deny equality because it costs money to
implement equivalent women's programs with long standing
men's programs. This cannot be either the spirit or meaning of
Title IX.
2 56
6. Equal Reductions in Male/Female Athletic Programs: Rejected
An educational institution's protestations that it has not discrimi-
nated, but equally cut male and female teams, will likewise not serve as an
affirmative defense. An educational institution may not equally cut teams
when one sex is already underrepresented. To do so will almost always
result in a violation of the interests and abilities compliance area.
[W]here budget restrictions have led a recipient to eliminate
sports previously offered, there is frequently a compliance prob-
lem with this program component. The tendency is for institu-
tions to eliminate a sport previously offered to women who are
already underrepresented in the institutions' athletic programs.
The result has been that women are now more disadvantaged by
the elimination of a women's team despite sufficient interest and
ability to sustain a viable team. In this situation, the institution
may well be in violation of this program component.
25 7
253. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,416; 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) (1993).
254. 34 C.F.R. § 106.6(c) (1993) ("The obligation to comply with [Title IX] is not obvi-
ated or alleviated by any rule or regulation of any... athletic or other... association ...
see also Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,422.
255. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583 (no exception to Title IX's requirements because of
school's financial difficulties).
256. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 750.
257. INVEsTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 28, at 27.
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just as ordinary budget reductions will not afford safe harbor, "equal op-
portunity" budget reductions will not justify the continuation of pre-ex-
isting gender inequality.
258
V. REMEDIES FOR TITLE IX VIOLATIONS IN ATHLETIc PROGRAMS
The stated remedy for a violation of Title IX is the withdrawal of fed-
eral funds from the noncomplying educational institution. 259 Neverthe-
less, Congress requires the Department of Education to notify an
educational institution of its failure to comply before withdrawing federal
funds or taking any other action against the institution.2 60 Moreover, the
enforcing agency must attempt to secure compliance by voluntary means
before taking any further action.
26 1
In practice, OCR has never withdrawn federal funds from an educa-
tional institution as a result of Title IX noncompliance in athletics. 262 In-
stead, as in the case of Colorado State University, the OCR makes repeated
attempts to secure compliance from the educational institution through
voluntary means and conducts periodic compliance reviews to ensure the
institution has met its goals.2 63 In effect, Title IX's twenty-year standing
threat of withdrawing federal funds has done little to bring compliance in
educational institutions across the country. 264 Regulatory remedies
against the institutions have proved worthless, perhaps because the
OCR has failed to take a hard line with noncomplying educational
institutions.
265
258. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32.
259. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Stan-
dardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 77 (1992).
263. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513, 1515-16 (discussing OCR's 1983 compliance review
of Colorado State). Colorado State made several representations to the OCR in its corrective
action plan upon which OCR based its finding of Colorado State's "compliance" with Title
IX. Nevertheless, OCR specifically conditioned compliance on Colorado State's promise to
carry out the corrective action plan. Colorado State, however, did not meet the goals laid out
in the corrective action plan, failing to attain the female participation numbers it pledged it
would meet. Indeed, in some instances, Colorado State misrepresented participation num-
bers to the OCR. Id. at 1515-16.
264. See id., 814 F. Supp. at 1513 (noting Colorado State's evidence that every educational
institution in this country would be in violation of Title IX if 10.6% point differential is not
"substantially proportionate" and rejecting same as a defense for Colorado State); see also
Wieberg, supra note 78, at CIO (noting the disparity in 86 Division I-A schools of men's and
women's athletic funding); Wolff, supra note 3, at 54-55 (noting lack of spending in most
aspects of women's sports).
265. OCR's action with respect to Colorado State provides a good example of agency
inaction. In OCR's compliance review of Colorado State, the agency did little to truly en-
force Title IX's provisions as it applied to the athletic department. At trial, it became known
that Colorado State had misrepresented its female participation numbers to the OCR. Trial
Transcript at 477, 483-85, Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No.
92-Z-1310) (testimony of Rosalyn Cutler, Colorado State Title IX Coordinator), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
Furthermore, as part of its compliance plan, Colorado State promised to build a softball
facility. Id. at 491-92. OCR based its original finding of compliance, in part, on this promise
to build a softball facility. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516. Colorado State, however, never
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Private litigation, however, now poses a greater threat to educational
institutions if they fail to comply with Title IX's gender equity mandates.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,
2 6 6 which allowed a private litigant to recover money damages for a
Title IX violation, educational institutions are more likely to pay closer
attention to their Title IX obligations than ever before. 267 Broad injunc-
tive relief also gives schools an incentive to avoid Title IX litigation. This
portion of the article discusses the remedies available to successful plain-
tiffs under Title IX.
A. Injunctive Relief
The right to injunctive relief under Title IX seems to be beyond ques-
tion. In Franklin, the Supreme Court impliedly accepted without discus-
sion that a plaintiff could recover equitable relief for a violation of Title
IX.268 Furthermore, in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,269
a majority of the Supreme Court agreed injunctive and other equitable
remedies were appropriate for violations of Title VI,2 7 0 the statute on
which Title IX was modeled. Courts have followed these cases in imposing
injunctive remedies in Title IX athletics cases.
271
The question then is not whether injunctive relief is an available rem-
edy, but instead, what type of injunctive relief is available. In keeping with
the plain dictates of the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation, a
court may order an educational institution in violation of Title IX to cre-
ate a compliance plan demonstrating the school's intended actions to
remedy the violation. 272 Under such an equitable remedy, the court
would function much like the OCR by monitoring the educational institu-
tion's progress toward meeting the terms of the compliance plan. Finally,
the Roberts court suggested that an appropriate remedy in a class action
case would be to enjoin the violating institution's conduct of its men's
built the facility and never informed OCR of its failure to build the facility. Trial Transcript
at 492-93, Roberts (No. 92-Z-1310). OCR failed to learn of Colorado State's noncompliance,
never took any corrective actions against Colorado State, and never took any steps to with-
draw federal funds. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1515-16.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Guinnett County Public Schools discussed the
OCR's response to Ms. Franklin's administrative complaint: since the offending teacher had
resigned and the school had instituted a grievance procedure, the OCR found the district
had come into compliance and terminated its investigation. 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1031 n.3 (1992).
266. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
267. Id. at 1038 n.8.
268. See id. at 1032, 1036.
269. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
270. Id. at 584, 607 (White, J., writing the opinion for the Court in which four Justices
concurred in the judgment and four Justices dissented).
271. See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-35; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906; Roberts,
814 F. Supp. at 1518-19; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 1001; Cook, 802
F. Supp. at 751.
272. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906 (stating the district court intended to require Brown Uni-
versity to propose a compliance plan rather than mandate the creation or deletion of particu-
lar athletic teams if Brown was found in violation of Title IX).
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varsity competition until the institution presented a plan which would
bring it into compliance with Title IX.
273
Plaintiffs, however, generally seek more specific injunctive relief to
remedy their injuries, such as the creation or reinstatement of a specific
women's athletics team. In every federal district court case thus far, plain-
tiff athletes have been granted the requested injunctive relief.274 Defend-
ant institutions, however, have challenged the courts' ability to impose
such specific remedies as the reinstatement of a specific team, claiming
the courts are inappropriately intruding on the institution's discretion.
275
Since Title IX does not require institutions to fund any particular number
or type of athletic opportunities, courts have been somewhat receptive to
this argument from the defendant institutions.
276
A distinction is developing based on whether the Title IX action is
brought by an individual plaintiff or as a class action. When a plaintiff has
brought a claim in her individual capacity, specific injunctive relief is ap-
propriate. 2 77 When, on the other hand, the action is brought on behalf of
a class, the more appropriate remedy may be broad-based injunctive relief
that gives educational institutions discretion in the manner in which they
will comply with Tide IX.2 7 8 In cases brought by athletes in their individ-
ual capacities, allowing an educational institution in violation of Title IX
to devise its own compliance plan would force plaintiffs to become "unwill-
ing representatives in a class action suit they chose not to bring."2 79 When
plaintiffs come as a class, however, "the many routes to Title IX compli-
ance make specific relief most useful in situations where the institution...
demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to exercise its discretion in a
way that brings it into compliance with Title IX."
2 80
District courts, however, are limited in the reach of their injunctive
relief, even when awarding specific relief. In Roberts, the district court or-
dered the reinstatement of the women's softball team.2 8 1 While monitor-
ing Colorado State's compliance with the court's order, the district court
ordered Colorado State to hire a coach promptly, recruit new members,
and organize a fall season of softball, all in response to Colorado State's
273. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833.
274. See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1519; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583-85; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at
1001; Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751.
275. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906; see also Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833 (arguing that institution
should have been given an opportunity to present a compliance plan).
276. See id.; see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)
("As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.")
277. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34.
278. Id. at 833. "Were this a class action, there might be some power to defendant's
argument that an order specifically requiring an institution to maintain a softball team goes
further than is necessary to correct a violation of Title IX." Id.; see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 906-
07 (court will initially require university to propose compliance plan rather than court man-
dating teams added or deleted).
279. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833-34.
280. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 ("In default by the school
authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad
power to fashion a remedy that will assure [compliance with federal law].")
281. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1519.
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apparent "foot-dragging."282 Colorado State complained that this ampli-
fied order from the district court amounted to "micromanaging" of Colo-
rado State's athletics program.
28 3
The court of appeals accepted this argument to some extent.
Although the district court could order Colorado State to provide the soft-
ball team with all incidental benefits of varsity status, it could not go be-
yond the mandates of Tide IX. The Tenth Circuit ruled, "[n]othing in
Title IX requires an institution to create a 'top flight' varsity team."
28 4
The Tenth Circuit further determined that the district court did not have
the power to ensure that the reinstated softball team had a good sea-
son.2 85 Where the district court's order was directed at eliminating a con-
dition which did not violate federal law, the court exceeded the
appropriate limits of its power.28 6 Since Tide IX mandates equal opportu-
nity in the other athletics benefits compliance area, 287 the district court's
order regarding coaching, recruiting, equipment, field schedules, and
uniforms was affirmed.2 88 These types of specific relief were appropriate
to remedy claims brought by plaintiffs in their individual capacity.
Choosing to bring an action in an individual capacity gives the plain-
tiff the advantage of obtaining specific, individual relief. Nevertheless, cer-
tain trade-offs accompany the decision to bring the suit in an individual
capacity. In Cook, the plaintiffs brought the action in their individual ca-
pacity rather than as a class action. 28 9 In the lower court, the federal mag-
istrate judge ordered Colgate University to grant varsity status to the
women's ice hockey team.290 When Colgate appealed this decision, how-
ever, the appellate court found the issue moot because all plaintiffs had or
would have graduated from Colgate by the time the injunctive relief was
to take effect.29 1 Plaintiffs' action did not fall within the exception to
the mootness doctrine for situations capable of repetition, yet evading
review.292
[T]hese plaintiffs may not litigate the claims of students un-
named and unrepresented in this action. We have suggested that
a student's claim may not be rendered moot by graduation if he
or she sued in a "representational capacity" as the leader of...
a[n] organization.... [H]owever, the complaint herein sought
282. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 826.
283. Id. at 834.
284. Id. at 835.
285. Id.
286. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977), for the proposition that
federal court decrees exceed appropriate limits if aimed at eliminating conditions that do
not violate the Constitution or do not flow from the violation).
287. See supra part IV.A.2.
288. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834. The district court did not require Colorado State to provide
additional scholarships to its softball players. Nevertheless, Colorado State will have to com-
ply with the requirements of the financial assistance compliance area. See supra part V.A.1.
Otherwise, women athletes may bring a new suit for violation of that compliance area.
289. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 739.
290. Id. at 751.
291. Cook, 992 F.2d at 19.
292. Id. at 19-20 (citing Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
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damages and injunctive relief solely on behalf of the plaintiffs
individually, not as representatives of the women's ice hockey
club team or other "similarly situated" individuals.
29 3
In a class action suit, however, graduation of representative plaintiffs will
not render the case moot.
2 9 4
Furthermore, injunctive relief granted to individuals may have force
and effect only as long as those individuals remain students at the institu-
tion. Roberts suggested Colorado State could return to court and seek to
have the injunction dissolved once all individual plaintiffs had transferred
or graduated.2 9 5 Favia, on the other hand, held that modification of an
injunction is inappropriate in a class action simply because some of the
named plaintiffs have graduated.29 6 Given the remedial ramifications of
the status chosen, plaintiffs and their counsel must carefully weigh the rel-
ative advantages and disadvantages of proceeding as a class or as individu-
als. Plaintiffs must have in mind the injunctive remedies they wish to
recover before they file suit. Plaintiffs may attempt to find the best of both
worlds by bringing a class action suit on behalf of a specific athletic team, its
members, and all future members of the team. This approach could pre-
vent the mootness problem while preserving the ability to get specific in-
junctive relief, such as the reinstatement of the specific team.
Moreover, to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs must meet the stan-
dard test set out for injunctions:
(1) Success on the merits (or likely success for preliminary
injunction);
(2) irreparable harm to the plaintiffs;
(3) balance of interests between the parties, that is, whether the
harm to the plaintiffs outweighs the potential harm to a defendant if the
injunction is granted; and
(4) the public interest favors granting an injunction.
29 7
293. Cook, 992 F.2d at 20 (citations omitted).
294. See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344. Favia presented a case where the court ordered specific relief
for the representative plaintiffs in a class action suit. The complaint alleged the plaintiffs
represented all women students or potential students who participated or sought to partici-
pate in the intercollegiate athletic program sponsored by IUP. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579.
There are three possible reasons for Favia's apparent divergence from the class/individual
distinction drawn by Roberts and Cohen. First, reinstatement of those specific teams would be
an appropriate remedy for the affected subclass of plaintiffs if the named plaintiffs were
construed to be representatives not only of all women students but also of all actual and
potential members of the individual teams they represented. Favia, 7 F.3d at 342-43 (noting
that reinstatement would benefit the class, though to differing degrees as individuals, and
that women currently attending and planning to attend IUP would be interested in partici-
pating in gymnastics). Second, Favia notes that IUP did not have a specific overall plan to
achieve total compliance with Title IX. Id. at 344. Finally, Favia reviewed a preliminary, not a
permanent, injunction. To preserve the status quo, the district court ordered reinstatement
of the cut teams. Id. at 342. The court implied that final injunctive relief should be of the
more general, broad-based type suggested by Cohen for class actions. See i. at 344.
295. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834.
296. Favia, 7 F.3d at 342, 344.
297. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902 (citations omitted); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583 (citation
omitted).
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1. Success on the Merits
Necessary elements of proof to establish success or likely success on
the merits have been discussed fully above. The other elements are dis-
cussed here.
2. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs may demonstrate irreparable harm in several ways. The
methods discussed and recognized by the courts have related to individual
and team harms. In Cohen, for example, the court found that the poten-
tial harm from Brown University's decision to cut women's teams would be
irreparable to the teams cut: "[P]laintiffs would suffer irremediable injury
in at least three respects: competitive posture, recruitment, and loss of
coaching."298 Favia recognized the irreparable harm to the individual
athletes:
By cutting the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams, IUP
has denied plaintiffs the benefits to women athletes who compete
interscholastically: they develop skill, self-confidence, learn team
cohesion and a sense of accomplishment, increase their physical
and mental well-being, and develop a lifelong healthy attitude.
The opportunity to compete in undergraduate interscholastic
athletics vanishes quickly, but the benefits do not. We believe
that the harm emanating from lost opportunities for the plain-
tiffs are likely to be irreparable.
299
3. Balancing the Interests
The only harm raised by a defendant institution thus far has been a
financial one. Courts have soundly rejected financial constraints as an ex-
cuse for discrimination.30 0 Thus, the financial harm to defendants is out-
weighed by the irreparable harm plaintiffs will suffer as a result of
defendant's unlawful gender discrimination.30 ' Defendants can always re-
allocate resources which have been historically designated for men's ath-
letics or a school may cut back in other areas.
30 2
4. Public Interest
As stated succinctly by the district court in Favia, "[t]he public has a
strong interest in the prevention of any violation of constitutional
rights."3
03
If a plaintiff can demonstrate success or likely success on the merits,
other athletics cases under Title IX support the imposition of injunctive
relief. Indeed, the elements other than success on the merits are nearly
298. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
299. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583.
300. E.g., Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 530 ("[F]inancial concerns alone cannot justify gender
discrimination.").
301. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 905; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
302. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
303. Id. at 585.
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presumed given the nature of the violation in an athletics claim. Thus,
injunctive relief is a remedy plaintiffs can anticipate with certainty, should
plaintiffs clear the success on the merits hurdle. As discussed above, how-
ever, the nature of that injunctive relief will be determined based on the
status of the plaintiffs before the court.
B. Monetary Relief
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin laid to rest the question
whether a plaintiff could recover monetary damages in a private right of
action under Title IX.3 0 4 The unanimous Court gave real leverage to vic-
tims of educational institutions' gender discrimination by holding that Ti-
tle IX relief includes, among other things, compensatory damages. 30 5
Franklin was a sexual harassment case wherein a high school teacher/
coach sexually harassed and assaulted a female high school student. De-
spite lower court decisions, the Supreme Court held that the student was
entitled to compensatory damages under Title IX for the emotional dis-
tress she had suffered as a result of the sexual harassment. 30 6 Relying on
precedent, the Court presumed Congress intended all appropriate reme-
dies, including monetary relief, to be available under Title IX since Con-
gress did not express a contrary intent.30 7 Indeed, Justice Scalia noted
that Congress has twice addressed Title IX since a private right of action
was implied by Cannon and implicitly acknowledged that damages are
available.
3 08
The question left unresolved is whether a plaintiff must prove inten-
tional discrimination to recover compensatory damages under Title IX.
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished other cases that held com-
pensatory damages were not recoverable by stating those cases dealt with
unintentional discrimination. Since the facts before the Franklin court in-
volved intentional discrimination, the Court did not address the applica-
tion of those cases to Title IX3 0 9 and did not decide whether proof of
intent is a prerequisite to the recovery of monetary damages.3 10
Those who argue that damages are not recoverable for unintentional
discrimination incorrectly point to the Supreme Court's decision in Guard-
304. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
305. Id. at 1032.
306. For a discussion of Franklin and its history, see Note, supra note 9.
307. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
308. Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988) (withdrawing States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1988) (providing that, in suits
against States, "remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for [viola-
tions of Title IX] to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a
suit against any public or private entity other than a State")) (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 1037. The main case distinguished by the Franklin court was Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), because it involved a case of unintentional
discrimination under the Spending Clause. The Court never determined to what extent, if
any, Pennhurst would apply in cases of unintentional discrimination under Tide IX.
310. Some courts have misconstrued Franklin's limited holding and interpreted it as pre-
cluding the recovery of monetary damages except in cases of intentional discrimination. E.g.,
Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1457 (D. Colo. 1994).
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ians Association v. Civil Service Commission.3 1 1 In Guardians, the Court dis-
cussed the award of compensatory damages under Title VI.3 12 The
plaintiffs sought monetary compensation for unintentional discrimination
as a result of the disparate impact the New York City Police Department's
testing policy had on racial minorities. The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' award of compensatory damages for the disparate impact
discrimination, but there was no majority opinion discussing the reason
for the reversal. Given the confusion caused by the multiple opinions,
some commentators have incorrectly construed Guardians as having ruled
that compensatory damages are not recoverable for a claim of uninten-
tional discrimination.
3 13
In fact, there was no majority on whether compensatory damages are
recoverable for unintentional discrimination. Justice White, joined byJus-
tice Rehnquist, was the onlyJustice in Guardians to express such an opin-
ion.3 14 Justice Powell, joined by ChiefJustice Burger, opined that Title VI
did not afford a private right of action at all, and, if it did, it only allowed
such private actions for intentional discrimination.31 5 He did not reach
any further issues. Justice O'Connor asserted that discriminatory intent
was a necessary element of Title VI claims and that the implementing reg-
ulations allowing otherwise were invalid.3 16 She did not reach any further
issues. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens all agreed that
retroactive and prospective relief are available for intentional and unin-
tentional discrimination under Title VI. 3 17 Justice Stevens opined that
monetary relief was available for violations of the implementing regula-
tions through disparate impact discrimination. 3 18 Thus, a majority of the
Supreme Court has not ruled, under Title VI or Title IX, whether com-
pensatory damages are recoverable for unintentional discrimination.3 19
311. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Title VI, dealing with racial discrimination, is the statute
upon which Title IX was modeled. See supra note 241.
313. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 1372 (stating Guardians court determined Title VI did
not authorize award of compensatory damages for unintentional discrimination). In con-
struing similar anti-discrimination provisions under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 7 94(a) (1988), some courts have relied on Guardians to deny monetary damages in in-
stances of disparate impact discrimination. See, e.g., Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Schs., 725
F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984).
314. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-603.
315. Id. at 609-11. Justice Powell's opinion as to no private right of action was rejected
soundly by a majority of the Court in Cannon. Moreover, five justices in Guardians specifically
agreed that a claim could be stated under Title VI for unintentional discrimination. Lower
courts have followed this reasoning in Tide IX cases and rejected Justice Powell's opinion in
Guardians. See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832.
316. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-15. A majority of the Guardians court rejected this opin-
ion. See supra note 315.
317. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id at 645 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, 1J.)
318. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
319. But see Consolidated Rail Corp. v, Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631 n.9 (1984) (noting a
majority of the Guardians court agreed that "retroactive relief is available.., for all discrimi-
nation, whether intentional or unintentiona4 that is actionable under Tide VI") (emphasis ad-
ded); Franklin, 112 S. CL at 1035 (quoting same).
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A closer analysis of Title IX, the Regulations, the Final Policy Inter-
pretation, and the scant cases construing them, demonstrates that com-
pensatory damages are recoverable even in instances of unintentional
discrimination. Courts must start with the presumption set forth in Bell v.
Hood: "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done."320 Absent congressional
limitation on the remedies available under a statute, the general principle
set forth in Bell v. Hood must control.
321
The only previously suggested limitation on the general Bell v. Hood
principle is the limitation typically placed on Spending Clause legislation
as set forth in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.32 2 In holding
in Guardians that compensatory damages were not recoverable under Title
VI, Justice White resorted to this limitation on Spending Clause legisla-
tion, which he determined Title VI to be.323 Relying on Pennhurst, Justice
White held that "make whole" remedies are typically not appropriate
under Spending Clause legislation. 3 24 Spending Clause legislation is
much like a contract: in return for federal funds, recipients agree to com-
ply with federally imposed conditions.3 2 5 To be valid, those conditions
must be knowingly accepted by the institution. 32 6 The Court held that
where a recipient is in violation of the legislation, the recipient should be
given the option of complying or withdrawing and terminating the receipt
of federal funds.
32 7
However, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished
Pennhurst and held that even though Title VI was Spending Clause legisla-
tion, compensatory damages need not be limited solely to cases of inten-
tional discrimination.3 28  Justice Marshall persuasively argued that
Pennhurst was inapplicable to the facts before the Court in Guardians since
Pennhurst found the violation urged by plaintiffs was not an actual "condi-
tion" imposed on recipients of federal funding.32 9 Pennhurst merely dis-
cussed what obligations were imposed as a result of the statute at issue in
that case. It never discussed what consequences flow from the failure to
comply with a known condition. 33 0 Unlike the statute at issue in Pen-
nhurst, Title VI clearly imposes the condition on recipients of federal
funds that no person shall be denied benefits or subjected to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race. 33' Therefore, argued Justice Marshall, recipients
320. Bel, 327 U.S. at 684; Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033.
321. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
322. 451 U.S. 1, 17; see also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596 (White,J.) (construing limitations
on damages under Title VI, which was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause).
323. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598.
324. Id. at 596.
325. Pennhurs, 451 U.S. at 17.
326. Id.
327. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 596-98.
328. Id. at 628-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 628-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
330. See id. at 628-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of funds under Title VI have ample notice that their programs must not
have any discriminatory effect.
332
Similarly, providing an environment free from discriminatory effect is
also a clear requirement of Title IX. The statute states that no person
shall, on the basis of sex, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to
discrimination by an educational institution that receives financial assist-
ance.33 3 Title IX does not specify that the denial of benefits or discrimina-
tion be intentional. Indeed, given the strong directive that no person shall
be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex, the statute encompasses
any form of discrimination, intentional or disparate impact. The statute's
clear language prohibits all discrimination. Thus, by accepting federal fi-
nancial assistance, educational institutions agree to comply with the condi-
tion that no person in their programs shall be subjected to any form of
discrimination. The existence of disparate impact discrimination in a fed-
erally funded educational institution is a violation of the plain language of
Title IX.
3 3 4
Furthermore, the Regulations and Final Policy Interpretation also
support the argument that avoiding all forms of discrimination is a condi-
tion of receiving federal funds. In providing athletics, the Regulations re-
quire educational institutions to provide "equal athletic opportunity" to
members of both sexes.3 3 5 No distinction is drawn for unequal opportuni-
ties that result from unintentional discrimination. Moreover, the Final
Policy Interpretation directs a finding of compliance or noncompliance to
be based on "whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in
language or effect."33 6 Like the clear language of Congress expressed in
Title IX, the clear language of the implementing agency demonstrates
that Title IX covers intentional and disparate impact discrimination based
on sex. Educational institutions, therefore, have clear notice that, by ac-
cepting federal funds, they are under an obligation to maintain an envi-
ronment in which no person is subjected to any form of discrimination.
The Pennhurst limitation is inapplicable to Title IX for another rea-
son. The Supreme Court impliedly rejected the idea that educational in-
stitutions should be protected from unknown "conditions" when it
implied a private right of action under Title IX in Cannon.33 7 As a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon, additional "conditions" were
imposed on recipients that were not known before the Cannon decision.
These conditions include costs of hiring counsel and defending a private
action, monetary liability for attorneys' fees, and costs of complying with
332. Id. at 629-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
333. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
334. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 628-32 (Marshall,J. dissenting) (arguing educational insti-
tutions are fully aware of the nondiscriminatory "conditions" placed on them by Title VI and
that disparate impact discrimination violates these "conditions").
335. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1993).
336. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2 at 71,417, 71,418 (emphasis added) (defin-
ing standards under other athletic benefits and interests and abilities compliance areas).
337. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709-10.
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injunctive relief.3 3 8 Likewise, courts should reject the argument that fed-
erally funded educational institutions should be protected from monetary
damages for disparate impact discrimination because this is a new "condi-
tion" not previously known to them. The purpose of Title IX was to pro-
tect individuals from discrimination, not to protect schools.
33 9
Finally, it is not altogether clear that Title IX was passed solely pursu-
ant to the Spending Clause. Petitioners in Franklin argued that Title IX
had also been passed under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.3 40 Since the Supreme Court found that
Pennhurst did not prevent the award of compensatory damages in cases of
intentional discrimination, the Court never decided under what authority
Congress passed Title IX.3 4 1 The legislative history of Title IX, however,
supports the argument that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guar-
antees of equal protection are sources of authority for Title IX: "Tide IX is
an anti-discrimination law. It prohibits discrimination based on sex in ed-
ucational institutions that are recipients of Federal assistance. The legisla-
tive history of Title IX clearly shows that it was enacted because of
discrimination that ... was being practiced against women in educational
institutions."3 42 "Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury
and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the support
of institutions to which we are denied equal access." 343 Title IX was
passed "[i]n view of the scope and depth of the discrimination" against
338. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Swygert, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion based on Pennhurst and fully chroni-
cling added "conditions" as a result of Cannon), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982). These
"conditions" imposed by virtue of creating a private right of action can have a higher mone-
tary impact than a compensatory damages award. Counsel for Colorado State's softball play-
ers, for example, sought over $400,000 as an interim award for attorneys' fees not including
time spent on the Tenth Circuit oral argument or Colorado State's petition for certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Plaintiffs' Motion for an Interim Allowance of Attorneys' Fees
and Costs Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
at 26, Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd in
part, revd in part sub nom., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
339. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1191 n.3 (SwygertJ., dissenting).
340. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 n.8.
341. Id. One federal court has held Title IX is Spending Clause legislation and denied
the recovery of any compensatory damages under Title IX. Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1187. Title
IX was classified as spending power legislation because the expenditure of federal funds for
educational institutions justified the imposition of the prohibition against sex discrimination.
Id The Lieberman court concluded, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin, that
compensatory damages were not recoverable for a claim of discrimination under Title IX.
Only injunctive relief and attorneys' fees were allowed. Id. at 1188. Nevertheless, Lieberman's
ultimate decision, that no damages are recoverable in any instance, has been clearly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Franklin. Moveover, the dissent in Lieberman persuasively argued
that Pennhurst was inapplicable to Title IX in the same way Justice Marshall argued it was
inapplicable to Title VI. Finally, Lieberman never considered whether Title IX had been
passed pursuant to another source of congressional authority such as the Fourteenth
Amendment.
342. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,423.
343. Comments of Representative Mink, 117 CONG. Rac. 39,252 (1971); see also Cannon,
441 U.S. at 704 n.36 (discussing legislative intent of Title IX).
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women in educational institutions.3 44 The main purpose is not to aid
schools through funding, but to prevent the use of federal funds to sup-
port gender discrimination and to remedy past discrimination. 345 Thus,
the Fifth Amendment, which gives Congress broad authority to remedy
past discrimination,3 4 6 is a source of congressional authority for Title IX.
In applying the Bell v. Hood principle of awarding all appropriate rem-
edies, courts should award compensatory damages even in instances of dis-
parate impact discrimination. Congress has addressed Title IX twice since
the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon implying a private right of ac-
tion. 34 7 In both instances, fully aware of the Cannon ruling, Congress de-
clined to limit the private right of action in any manner, choosing instead
to expand plaintiffs' rights under Tide IX.3 48 In the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act, Congress broadened the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City
College v. Bell,349 which limited the application of Title IX to specific pro-
grams or activities within schools receiving federal funds, by defining pro-
gram or activity to mean all the operations of a college or university.
3 50
More telling is the fact that in the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act,
Congress waived states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to litigation
under Title IX and under other civil rights legislation. 35 1 In doing so,
Congress directed that all remedies otherwise available, both legal and eq-
uitable, are available against a state. Apparently, Congress anticipated that
legal remedies, including damages, would be available in Tide IX
litigation.
35 2
Congress has made no attempt to limit the application of the tradi-
tional presumption in favor of all appropriate remedies for a violation of a
federal right to Title IX.353 Certainly, an analysis of the remedial provi-
sions under Title IX confirms that Congress has not limited the recovery
of compensatory damages under Title IX to instances of intentional dis-
crimination.3 54 In Title VII, Congress specifically limited the recovery of
monetary damages to instances of "intentional discrimination (not an em-
344. H.R. RFP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2512.
345. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
346. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901.
347. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 1, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)); Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
506, t. X, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)).
348. Unlike its silence under Title IX, Congress has specifically addressed, and limited,
the remedies available under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Con-
gress provided that a complaining party under Title VII may obtain compensatory and puni-
tive damages where a respondent/defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Id.
349. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
350. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 ("[T]he term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean[s] all the
operations of... a college, university ......
351. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
352. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Congress had
implied a damages remedy under Title IX).
353. Id. at 1036.
354. Id. at 1035-36.
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ployment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)."3 55
Having thus demonstrated its ability to limit the recovery of monetary
damages when it chooses, Congress refrained from so limiting Title IX's
remedies. Since Congress conspicuously failed to place remedial limita-
tions on Title IX similar to those placed on Title VII, Bell v. Hood mandates
that all remedies apply for claims of intentional and unintentional discrim-
ination.3 56 Whether compensatory damages is an appropriate remedy is
an issue left to the sound discretion. of the court.
3 5 7
Despite the multiple opinions in Guardians, a later Supreme Court
decision, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darone,35 8 found a majority of the
Guardians court agreed that retrospective relief, or back pay, was a form of
compensation to which a Title VI plaintiff was allowed whether the dis-
crimination was intentional or not.3 59 The Court so held because retro-
spective compensation was deemed a form of equitable relief.360 Future
damages are also recoverable under Title IX.36 1 Failure to provide pro-
spective monetary relief would deny some plaintiffs the benefit of any rem-
edy. For example, if an athlete were in her senior year when a school
decided to cut her sport in violation of Title IX, retrospective compensa-
tion would be inapplicable. Moreover, future injunctive relief would be of
no value to the graduating plaintiff. Only future money damages can rem-
edy that plaintiff. In such instances, courts should avoid limiting remedies
where doing so will deny a plaintiff any remedy at all.3 6 2 "If no relief were
available to [plaintiff] here, it would be pointless to remand to the district
court. An exercise to find liability without finding a remedy would be an
exercise in futility."
3 63
In order to assure that a plaintiff who has suffered a wrong has a rem-
edy, courts should not limit Franklin to cases of intentional discrimination.
Victims of discrimination must also be allowed to seek remedies for the
discriminatory effect of school actions and policies. In many instances of
discrimination within federally funded athletic departments, however,
proving intentional discrimination may not be a very difficult task. Each
institution has specifically chosen to offer different participation opportu-
355. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Although Title VII and Title IX are similar
in that they prohibit discrimination, they differ in their focus and purpose. Title VII is a
deterrence-based statute, focusing on the discriminatory actions of employers. "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer - [enumeration of prohibited acts]." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Title IX, on the other hand, is an impact-oriented statute, focus-
ing on the discriminatory effect on victims of gender discrimination. "No person .. .shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from . .. or be subjected to discrimination ... ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1988).
356. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033, 1035.
357. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 634 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (stating that issue of compen-
satory damages in intentional and disparate impact discrimination is best decided by federal
district courts as triers of fact).
358. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
359. Id. at 630 & n.9.
360. See id. at 630 n.9, 631 n.10.
361. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038 (holding that future damages and emotional distress
damages were recoverable in Title IX litigation).
362. Id.
363. Pfeiffer v. School Bd. for Marion Ctr. Area, 917 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1990).
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nities to athletes based on their gender (for example, men's basketball v.
women's basketball). Moreover, each institution has full control over the
number of athletic opportunities, the financial aid, and the other athletic
benefits provided to members of each sex. Therefore, the educational in-
stitution's deliberate acts of distributing athletic opportunities and re-
sources in a manner which continually favors men is intentional, not
accidental or unintentional, discrimination. Although there is probably
no intent to discriminate against the individual herself, there is intent to
discriminate against women as a group when favoring and preferring men
as a group.
One can easily contrast intentional discrimination by an athletic de-
partment with disparate impact discrimination by looking at the facts in
Guardians.36 4 The plaintiffs in Guardians presented a claim of uninten-
tional discrimination resulting from the disparate impact a facially neutral
police entrance exam had on racial minorities. 36 5 In giving the entrance
exam, the police department was not purposely trying to eliminate minori-
ties as police department applicants. Instead, the test indirectly limited the
number of racial minorities in hiring and limited minorities' promotion
and job retention because the test contained a racial bias.3 66 Likewise,
one could argue that educational institutions may indirectly discriminate
against women or minorities because they require college entrance exams
that contain a gender or racial bias. This would be an instance of dispa-
rate impact or unintentional discrimination.
Unlike the disparate impact of a race or gender biased test, failure to
provide proportionate athletic opportunities to women is direct, inten-
tional discrimination by the institution. The institution's conscious acts to
offer only a discrete number of positions to women is a deliberate and
direct limitation on their ability to participate in athletics. Although
schools may provide separate teams to men and women athletes,
3 67
schools may not provide unequal athletic opportunity. A school would be
hard pressed to argue that it accidently failed to provide women with more
athletic opportunities. It is difficult to imagine a school accidentally, yet
consistently, maintaining participation numbers at a level 10% to 15%
lower than female enrollment rates. Likewise, a school intentionally deter-
mines the amount of financial aid it will award to women athletes, the
number of new uniforms they will have, and whether women athletes will
travel to away games by bus while their male counterparts travel to the
same location by airplane.
Intention, under tort law, is not necessarily a hostile intent or a desire
to do any harm to the injured party. Instead, intent is defined as taking
deliberate actions designed to bring about a result that will invade the interests
of another in a way that the law does not sanction.36 8 It is the deliberate
364. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582.
365. Id. at 585.
366. Id. at 585-86.
367. Final Policy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 71,417-18.
368. WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971).
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act which is the focus, not the concomitant effect on others. Applying the
same analysis to Title IX, the school's deliberate act of providing fewer
participation slots, operating dollars, and financial assistance to women
must be the focus, not whether the school, by taking these actions, in-
tended harm to any individual female athlete.
Thus far, no court has reached the issue of monetary damages in a
Title IX athletics suit.3 6 9 Based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin
and the general principles stated therein, however, all monetary relief
should be available to female athletes who prove a violation of Title IX
whether or not they prove discriminatory intent. The question of damages
is one of proof and not one of substantive law. Courts should allow female
athletes to present evidence of all damages and award all appropriate re-
lief3 70 regardless of the educational institution's intent. Discriminatory ef-
fect is the issue.
C. Altorneys'Fees
As prevailing parties, plaintiffs371 are entitled to attorneys' fees in-
curred in pursuing their Title IX claims. 3 72 "In any action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of ... [Title IX] ... the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party .... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. " 3 7 3 Although the award of attorneys' fees is discretionary, 374 a pre-
vailing plaintiff should recover fees unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.3 75 The purpose of awarding attorneys' fees
is to "ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil
rights grievances."
376
Fee awards are designed to give attorneys incentive to prosecute civil
rights actions which they would otherwise be unable or unwilling to prose-
cute.3 77 Many Title IX athlete plaintiffs will be college-aged (or younger)
students with limited financial resources. Moreover, the potential legal
fees for these actions far outweigh what a student-plaintiff might win as
compensatory damages at trial, making a contingency fee structure unap-
369. Colorado State settled the damages portion of its suit with the softball player plain-
tiffs. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833. In Cook, the district court denied plaintiffs monetary dam-
ages because plaintiffs were fully aware before matriculating that Colgate did not sponsor a
varsity women's ice hockey team. Cook, 802 F. Supp at 751. That case, however, did not
discuss whether damages were generally available to remedy a Title IX violation or whether a
plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination to recover such a remedy.
370. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1032.
371. If defendants are found to be prevailing parties, they too may be entitled to attor-
neys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. V 1993). Nevertheless, the standard for the recovery
of attorneys' fees by a defendant is far more stringent than by a civil rights plaintiff. To
recover attorneys' fees, a defendant must prove that plaintiff's claims were frivolous, unrea-
sonable, or groundless. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978) (discussing fees under Title VII).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976)).
376. Id.
377. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1983).
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pealing to potential counsel. Thus, the award of fees is necessary to en-
sure that these claims will be prosecuted by competent counsel.
Finally, the award or the potential award of attorneys' fees provides a
strong incentive to educational institutions to comply with Title IX. Coun-
sel for Colorado State's softball players, for example, sought an interim
award of attorneys' fees of over $400,000.378 This request did not include
fees for appellate arguments to the Tenth Circuit or briefing in response
to Colorado State's petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. An award of attorneys' fees of this size will cause educa-
tional institutions to re-think their priorities within their athletic depart-
ments, providing those institutions with the incentive to come to early
settlements with plaintiffs should litigation be initiated. Accordingly, at-
torneys' fees themselves become an integral remedy necessary to the
proper enforcement of Title IX and other civil rights statutes.
CONCLUSION
After twenty years of virtual paralysis in its application to athletics,
Title IX is becoming the vehicle for gender equity that Congress intended
it to be. Indeed, in the last few years, courts have recognized Title IX
claims concerning unequal athletic benefits and expanded the remedial
arsenal available to female athlete litigants. Moreover, female athletes are
using litigation as an effective weapon to vindicate women's rights to ath-
letic equality that historically have been denied by schools. After two de-
cades of struggling to implement a law that on its face prohibits gender
discrimination, women have finally made courts recognize that "[e]qual
athletic treatment is not a luxury .... Equality and justice are not luxu-
ries.... They are essential elements now codified under Title IX."
'3 79
Gender discrimination in school-sponsored athletic departments is
still rampant. Nevertheless, Title IX litigation, with its potential for money
damages and wide-ranging injunctive relief, provides the first real hope for
bringing true gender equity to athletics. In the Title IX litigation arena,
women athletes have just begun to level the athletic playing fields. Despite
admirable initial litigation victories by women athletes, Title IX athletics
litigation is in its infancy. Many issues have yet to be reached or resolved
by federal courts. This article discussed many of those unresolved issues
and presented substantive and procedural methods for analyzing claims of
Title IX violations in athletics in hopes of continued pursuit of expanded
athletic opportunities for women. Courts should implement these sub-
stantive and procedural guidelines to permit the continued effective use of
Title IX litigation to bring gender equity to athletics.
378. See Plaintiffs' Motion for an Interim Allowance of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant
to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, at 26, Roberts v.
Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.) (No. 92-Z-1310), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart
sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 580 (1993).








YARDSTICK DAMAGES IN LOST PROFIT CASES: AN
ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
ROGER D. BLAIR* AND AMANDA KAY EsQuIBEL**
INTRODUCTION
A business, which is a profit generating asset of its owners, can be
damaged or destroyed in a variety of ways: franchise terminations, refusals
to deal, tortious interference with contractual relationships, other business
torts, contract breaches, and so on.1 When destroyed, the business's own-
ers have lost their asset and, consequently, the stream of profits generated
by it.2 Not surprisingly, the victimized owners often seek to recover their
lost profits through litigation. Two traditional techniques exist for deter-
mining these lost profits: the "before-and-after" approach and the "yard-
stick" approach. 3 The before-and-after approach compares the plaintiff's
business to itself during different time periods, before and after the
wrongful act.4 The yardstick approach typically compares the plaintiff's
* Huber Hurst Professor of Business and Legal Studies, Department of Economics,
University of Florida. B.A. 1964, M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1968, Michigan State University. Financial
support provided by the College of Business Administration is gratefully acknowledged. A
good deal of this paper was completed while I enjoyed the hospitality of the Department of
Economics at the University of Hawaii.
** Attorney, Amanda K. Esquibel, P.A., Miami, Florida. B.A. 1983,Jacksonville Univer-
sity; M.B.A 1989,J.D. 1989, University of Florida. We have received useful suggestions from
James A. Burt, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Lawrence Kenny, Scott D. Makar, Mark Rush, and
Deborah Sampieri, who must not be blamed for any remaining errors.
1. Allen S. Joslyn, Measures of Damages for the Destruction of a Business, 48 BROOK. L. REV.
431, 431 (1982). With the limitations discussed, the analysis presented in this paper may
apply to any legal theory.
2. It is analytically useful to focus on a business's income stream rather than its tangible
assets. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
3. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 266 (1946) (upholding a damage
award calculated by means of the before-and-after approach without reaching the question of
the validity of the yardstick approach); see also Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 671-
72 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that future profits are an appropriate measure of damages and
that a treble damage instruction is unnecessary); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271
F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that under antitrust laws it is necessary to prove both
unreasonable restraint of trade and a causal connection between the defendant's act and the
plaintiff's lost revenue in a private treble damages action). For a discussion of the assessment
of lost profits in antitrust actions, see Richard C. Hoyt et al., Comprehensive Models for Assessing
Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1233 (1976). Hoyt et al. identify a
third approach known as the market share approach, which compares the relative market
shares of the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. at 1239. The market share approach attempts
to compensate for deficiencies in the before-and-after and yardstick approaches. Id. at 1233.
The Supreme Court recognized the validity of the market share approach in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). See Hoyt et al., supra, at 1241. To
employ the market share approach, considerable data on relevant market definition, market
sales, market economics, and market entry conditions are required. Id. at 1243. See generally
E. COMprON TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANrrRus-r AcrONs 302-57 (1965) (dis-
cussing the damage measures available in antitrust cases).
4. Hoyt et al., supra note 3, at 1233-36.
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business to another business that is substantially similar.5 The underlying
assumption of the yardstick approach is that "but for" its destruction, the
plaintiff's business would have performed as the one to which it is being
compared, thereby providing a measure (or yardstick) of the plaintiff's
injury.
6
This article provides a detailed examination of an econometric
method of estimating damages by the "yardstick" approach. Generally
when employing the "yardstick" approach, a plaintiff attempts to find a
clone of its destroyed business. 7 These attempts are usually unsuccessful
because clones do not exist in real world markets.8 This article strives to
overcome this obstacle by using econometric methods9 to construct a
"composite business" that is a "statistical clone" of the plaintiff's business.
Using this composite model, the plaintiff can project the profits that his
business would have earned had it not been destroyed. Although this
measure of damages has not received much attention and is not as fre-
quently employed as the before-and-after approach, it nevertheless has
great potential.
This article identifies some of the problems associated with the tradi-
tional yardstick approach to measuring damages. It then illustrates the
use of econometric modelling to construct a "statistical clone" of a hypo-
thetical plaintiff's business with some data obtained from a restaurant
chain.
I. THE YARDSTICK APPROACH TO DAMAGES
A. The Millers' Tale
A hypothetical example is helpful in illustrating the application of
econometrics to the yardstick approach. The B&E Development Corpora-
tion ("B&E") owns a chain of highly successful restaurants in the casual
theme segment of the restaurant industry. These restaurants, which are
known as Jolly Rogers, serve seafood and other family fare in a casual set-
ting. In an effort to expand its culinary empire faster, B&E decided in
5. Id. at 1236-39.
6. Id.
7. For example, in Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1970),
the plaintiff, a wrongfully terminated automobile dealer, offered proof of sales projections of
other dealers in different markets. Similarly, in Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc.,
308 A.2d 477, 483 (RI. 1973), the Rhode Island Supreme Court found evidence of McDon-
ald's' extensive experience elsewhere to be admissible to prove lost profits at a specific loca-
tion. While it is nearly impossible to find an identical business, the clone approach requires
only that the two businesses be comparable and similarly situated in their respective areas of
competition. TIMBEA.KE, supra note 3, at 330. If a single firm is used for comparison pur-
poses, the variations between the two will be taken into account by the trier of fact. Id. Our
approach accounts for these variations in a systematic way.
8: See, e.g., Home Placement Serv. Inc. v. Providence Journal Co.,-819 F.2d 1199, 1206
(lst Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff must show "product, firm and market comparabil-
ity" and that the yardstick firm is "unaffected by the defendant's antitrust violation").
9. Econometrics is the application of statistical methods to economic models of mar-
kets or firms. See generallyJAN KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS (1971).
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1987 to begin franchising some of its new locations. 10 But things did not
go smoothly for B&E's franchising efforts and in 1990, as a result of con-
tinuing quality control problems, B&E decided to abandon its franchise
operations and terminate its franchisees. Following the terminations, B&E
began operating the formerly franchised locations.
Not surprisingly, the franchisees were negatively affected by this deci-
sion. Mark and Mary Miller, in particular, were outraged because of the
numerous personal and professional sacrifices they had made to become
franchisees, only to be terminated after a scant ten months of operation.
By terminating their franchise, B&E destroyed the Millers' business.
The Millers were determined to sue for their damages suffered from
the destruction of their business. In determining damages for the destruc-
tion of a business, the general rule is that the plaintiff may recover an
award of lost profits." This rule treats a business as an asset that produces
a stream of profits for its owners.1 2 The plaintiff's damages are the pres-
ent value of these lost profits, which is expressed by the following
equation:
L, L2  L,_PV(L) = L,+ L2L +•••
1+i (1+i) 2  (1+i)'
where PV(e) signifies present value, L represents the lost profits, i is the
discount rate, and the subscripts on L denote the year in which the lost
profits would have been earned.
Assuming that the discount rate (i) is constant, a compact way of ex-
pressing this summation is
10. For an examination of the problem of quality assurance for the franchisor and the
conflicts that arise between a franchisor and its franchisees, see Scott Makar, In Defense of
Franchisors: The Law and Economics of Franchise Quality Assurance Mechanisms, 33 VILL. L. REv.
721 (1988).
11. Lost profits are widely accepted as a form of consequential damages for a wrongful
breach of contract under common law principles. See Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d
1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1007 (1985); Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 853-54 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). Similarly, many franchise
termination statutes provide for recovery of lost profits. See, e.g., Busch v. National Sch. Stu-
dios, Inc., 389 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987) (apply-
ing Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law).
In a case of the complete destruction of a business, the present value of the lost profits,
which represent the return on the business as an asset, equals the going concern value but
for the business's destruction. The profit stream must be reduced to present value by dis-
counting at a rate that reflects the time value of money as well as business risk. Present value
is the value of a dollar, which will not be received until sometime in the future, adjusted to
determine its equivalent value if it were received today. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 536 (1983), the United States Supreme Court endorsed the present
value concept, stating that "the damages award is paid in a lump sum ... and when ...
invested will earn additional money." For an exposition of discounting methods, see EUGENE
F. BRIGHAM, FINANcLt MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACnCE 89-127, 90 (4th ed. 1985) ("[O]f
all the techniques used in finance, none is more important than the time value of money.").
See also Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 663-64 &,n.14 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
"because future profit potential is a principal element of a firm's going concern value an
award should not include both").
12. In the case of a partially destroyed business, the lost profits equal the decrease in the
business's going-concern value due to the partial destruction.
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where I denotes summation and T is the length of the damage period.
When a business has been destroyed and cannot be reestablished, the ap-
propriate value for T arguably is infinity because businesses do not neces-
sarily have finite lives. If this is true, a further simplification is possible if




For example, if the projected loss were $100,000 per year forever and the
discount rate was 12.5%, then the present value of the lost profits would
be
$100,000
PV(L) = $100-000 = $800,000
0.125
In the Millers' case, the lost profits approach represents the only
proper conceptual measure of damages. 13 Since the Millers had only 10
months of actual experience operating a Jolly Rogers restaurant, the
before-and-after approach to damage estimation is not a viable option.
1 4
This leaves the yardstick approach as the most appropriate technique to
determine damages.
13. From the standpoint of economic theory, the destruction of a plaintiff's business
represents a lost opportunity to make profits on this investment. Occasionally courts refer to
and permit an award of loss of going concern value in lieu of, but not in addition to, the lost
profits. However, the lost profits measure and the going concern value measure are not so
much alternative valuations of damages as they are different names for the same thing. The
going concern value of a business is the amount received when a business is sold as an operat-
ing business. In essence, the going concern value of this profit producing asset is the present
value of the profit stream associated with it. See Richard R. Rulon, Proof of Damages for Termi-
nated or Precluded Plaintiffs, 49 ANIramusr L.J. 153 (1980). "[ T ] he resulting value should be a
reasonable approximation of what a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept
for the business." Id. at 155 (citation omitted). For a comprehensive analysis of lost profits
in franchise termination cases, see Roger D. Blair, Measuring Damages for Lost Profits in
Franchise Termination Cases, 8 FRANcHISE L. J. 3 (1988) (demonstrating lost profits method,
discounting principles, alternative measures of business valuation and the mitigation
principle).
Agreement on the conceptual measure, however, is simpler than empirical measure-
ment itself. The parties will dispute each element of the present value calculation: (1) the
estimate of lost profit, each period, (2) the appropriate discount rate, and (3) the duration
of the damage period. While each of these is important, our focus is on ways of estimating
the lost profits. In these calculations, the interest rate (i) need not be held constant and may
vary from year to year. Similarly, the annual profit (L) may change over time due to growth
in the business, anticipated business cycle influences, the introduction of new competition,
and similar influences.
14. Some courts have permitted damage recoveries on the basis of very short operating
histories. See Mechanical Wholesale, Inc. v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 432 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1970) (one month); Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 390 P.2d 677 (Wash. 1964) (six months);




The ideal yardstick would be an identical business functioning in an
independent yet identical market. In other words, the ideal yardstick
would be a clone of the plaintiff's business. If a clone existed, its perform-
ance would reflect the "but for destruction" performance of the plaintiff's
business. Clones, however, rarely exist in the real world. Characteristics of
demand and supply vary in myriad ways: population size, wealth, income,
age distribution of the population, racial and/or ethnic composition, fe-
male labor force participation rates, quality of operations, hours of opera-
tion, prices charged, presence of competitors and locational convenience
can vary widely across different geographic markets. Finding an identical
twin of Mark and Mary Miller's restaurant would be exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible.
Case law, however, does not demand that the Millers find an identical
twin. Instead, it imposes the less stringent requirement of substantial simi-
larity, permitting the use of the yardstick approach.1 5 The yardstick ap-
proach is nonetheless vulnerable to arguments that the yardstick
candidate differs from the plaintiff's business in ways which make the
comparison meaningless and render the plaintiff's damage estimate
speculative.
16
B. The Case Law
In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,17 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed evidence of damage estimates using both the before-and-after ap-
proach and the yardstick approach.' 8 The plaintiffs were independent
movie exhibitors who claimed rival exhibitors received films before the
independent exhibitors as a result of an illegal conspiracy with the defend-
ants. 19 Because of the continuous delays in distribution, plaintiffs lost
profits. 20 The plaintiffs introduced two damage estimates at trial.21 The
first estimate used a comparison of the plaintiffs' operations with those of
another competitor during the conspiracy period.2 2 The competitor,
which obtained movie releases in advance of the plaintiffs, was comparable
in size to the plaintiffs. 23 The competitor's equipment and location made
it less attractive to movie theater patrons. 2 4 Despite the differences, the
15. See TIMBERIAKE, supra note 3, at 302-57.
16. See Hoyt et al., supra note 3, at 1237-39. In some cases, lost profits are too speculative
to form the basis for a damage award, but are accepted anyway because the alternative would
be the denial of recovery to a wronged party. See 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION I 344(c)
(1978); see also Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, Speculative Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L.
Rav. (forthcoming 1995).
17. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
18. Id. at 257-58.
19. Id. at 253-54.
20. Id. at 254.
21. Id. at 257. Although damages should be an award of lost profits, the jury in Bigelow
may have based its award on lost receipts or lost earnings. Id. at 258.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
yardstick estimate showed a decline in the plaintiffs' business. 25 The sec-
ond estimate compared the performance of the plaintiffs' business before
and after the violation. 26 This before-and-after approach also demon-
strated that the plaintiffs' business had declined during the conspiracy
period.
27
On the issue of damages, the Court addressed the defendant's argu-
ment that because the plaintiffs' business and the yardstick business com-
peted in the same market, the conspiracy actually enhanced the financial
performance of the selected yardstick.28 The yardstick evidence, there-
fore, amounted only to speculation regarding the impact of the conspiracy
upon the plaintiffs' performance.2 9 Consequently, the defendant argued
that both measures were invalid.30 The Court rejected this argument and
upheld the lower court's damage award.3 1 The Court carefully affirmed
on the basis of the before-and-after evidence alone, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether the yardstick evidence would have provided sufficient sup-
port for the verdict.a
2
By negative implication, one may draw the inference from Bigelow that
the yardstick approach is a viable technique.3 3 The yardstick business in
Bigelow, however, was not in an independent market; therefore, its finan-
cial success could be attributed at least in part to the violation.
Cases such as Farmington Dowel Products v. Forster Manufacturing Co.
34
also illustrate what factors a court considers significant in determining
whether a yardstick business is substantially similar.3 5 In Farmington, the
defendants violated the antitrust laws by discriminating in price.3 6 The
district court refused to admit evidence offered by the plaintiff's expert
that used one defendant's business as a yardstick.3 7 The district court
identified several ways in which the two businesses were not comparable.
38
First, the product lines were different.39 While the plaintiff had a single
product, the defendant's business was more diversified. 40 Second, the
methods of distribution differed considerably. 4 1 The plaintiff's business
25. Id. at 258, 260. On the issue of fact of damage, the Court considered the two esti-
mates to be cumulative evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was harmed. Id. at 260.
26. Id. at 258.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 260-63.
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 266.
32. Id.
33. Another inference to be drawn from Bigelow is that the yardstick approach is inferior
to the before-and-after approach because of the difficulties associated with finding a substan-
tially similar business in an independent market.
34. 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970).
35. Id. at 82.
36. Id. at 65. Price discrimination is illegal if it may "substantially... lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
37. Farmington, 421 F.2d at 82.






had little sales organization compared to the defendant's national sys-
tem.4 2 Third, significant differences existed between the financial struc-
tures of the two firms. 43 The plaintiff's business was minimally
capitalized, while the defendant's business was adequately capitalized.
44
Finally, the defendant operated in the same market as the plaintiff, not an
independent one, meaning the yardstick's profits included the illegal
profit gained from the price discrimination.45 On appeal, the court of
appeals affirmed the exclusion of the yardstick evidence.
46
In an effort to overcome similar problems, the plaintiff's expert in
Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co.4 7 introduced a composite yard-
stick-a rudimentary version of that to be discussed later in this article.
48
Because of the geographic proximity of two competitor theatres to the
plaintiff's theatre, and because the seating capacity of the plaintiff's thea-
tre was about one half that of the two competitors' theatres combined, a
major assumption of the damage evidence was that the plaintiff's business
was comparable to a composite, or average, of the two competitor theatres
"taken together and halved." 49 The court was required, therefore, to ex-
amine both the independent market issue and the substantial similarity
issue. Echoing Bigelow and Farmington Dowel, the court pointed out flaws in
using firms within the same market as yardsticks.5 0 The profits reflected
the illegal activity because the yardsticks operated in the tainted market.5
The court criticized the damage estimate for failing to accommodate dif-
ferences between the plaintiff and the yardstick's film supply, bidding
practices, and revenues and expenses associated with films not affected by
the conspiracy.52 Based on these foundational weaknesses, the court re-
jected the composite technique.5 3
Although the court in Admiral Theatre rejected the composite yard-
stick damages as too speculative, the idea of using a composite when there
are no substantially similar businesses is nonetheless a good one. A useful
composite would contain all the characteristics of the plaintiff's business
but would not suffer from the infirmities associated with operating in the




45. Id. This sentiment was echoed in the Todorov decision regarding a physician's claim
for a share of the monopoly profit, which he lost through a hospital's denial of staff privi-
leges. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438, 1452-53 n.23 (11 th Cir. 1991).
46. Farmington, 421 F.2d at 83.
47. 437 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977).
48. Id. at 1297. In Admiral Theatre, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy in film distribution.
Id. at 1272-73. Before delineating its reasons for rejecting this unconventional approach, the
court noted that the foundation upon which the plaintiff built the case was a contributing
factor in not overcoming a directed verdict. Id. at 1274.
49. Id. at 1297.
50. Id. The court also questioned the validity of plaintiff's assumption that better film
quality for the plaintiff would have had no effect on the yardstick's patronage. Id. at 1298.
51. Id. at 1298.
52. Id.
53. Id. In some instances, industry averages have been used successfully. See, e.g., Tuc-
son Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 245 P.2d 423, 429 (Ariz. 1952).
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method because it is an attempt to build a "clone" where a suitable substi-
tute does not actually exist.
54
The difficulty with the composite approach was aptly illustrated in Ad-
miral Theatre. The composite did not withstand a rigorous analysis. For
the composite yardstick approach to be effective, it must be more scien-
tific. Econometric or statistical techniques can be used to develop com-
posite yardsticks that will provide a better foundation for comparison with
the plaintiff's business and withstand judicial scrutiny. Techniques like
multiple regression analysis allow an expert to systematically incorporate
more relevant data in a composite yardstick and consequently produce a
more reliable and precise damage estimate. In the next section, a yard-
stick is constructed through the use of statistical techniques that are sim-
ple to follow.
II. AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO YARDSTICK DAMAGES
Econometrics is a blend of mathematical and statistical methods that
is used to analyze economic data.55 A basic tool of econometrics is multi-
ple regression analysis, a statistical technique that has proved to be ex-
tremely useful in estimating the effects of one or more economic variables
on some item one is interested in measuring. In the language of statistics,
this item is referred to as the "variable of interest."5 6 In the context of a
suit for commercial damages, the variable of interest is lost profits, be-
cause that is what a plaintiff is entitled to recover as a result of a defend-
ant's wrongful conduct. 57 In simple terms, if one is interested in
estimating profits, multiple regression analysis is a statistical method of
identifying the set of factors that impact upon or determine profits. In
addition, multiple regression analysis provides a way to estimate the size of
each factor's impact on profits. Therefore, multiple regression analysis, by
isolating and estimating the importance of the determinants of profits,
54. For other cases discussing yardstick damages, see Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434
F.2d 556, 563-67 (2d Cir. 1970) (termination of an automobile distribution franchise);
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 575-78 (10th Cir. 1961) (government
purchase of ore allowed as a yardstick measure of plaintiff's damages); Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1959) (to prove lost sales, plaintiff introduced the
sales of a comparable product); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 391 (9th Cir.
1957) (plaintiffs based their lost profits estimate on the assumption that they would have
made as much working for themselves as they and their previous employer made combined);
Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440, 444-50 (E.D.
Pa. 1960) (lack of business history and lack of yardstick made it necessary to construct a
hypothetical profit projection); Homewood Theater, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 110 F. Supp. 398,
412 (D. Minn. 1952) (classic yardstick case where plaintiff introduced evidence showing the
gross receipts of comparable theatres); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 69 F.
Supp. 103, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (another classic yardstick case where plaintiff introduced
evidence of the receipts of a comparable theater operated by the defendant).
55. For thorough treatments of econometrics, see JAN KmENTA, ELEMENTS OF
ECONOMETRICS (2d ed. 1986). See also G.S. MADDALA, INTRODUCTON TO ECONOMETRICS (2d
ed. 1992).
56. For a compact treatment of multiple regression analysis, see Franklin M. Fisher, Mul-
tiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 702 (1980). For more extended devel-
opments, see KMENTA, supra note 55. See also MADDALA, supra note 55.
57. In an antitrust context, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in
Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. Rv. 751 (1980).
[Vol. 72:1
ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
makes possible the prediction of profits "but for" the wrongful action. Ab-
solute certainty about the size of the loss cannot be attained, but the avail-
able data can be used to make the estimate as scientific as possible.
Furthermore, multiple regression analysis can scientifically indicate the
level of certainty associated with a damage estimate. For plaintiffs desiring
to use multiple regression analysis or any other evidence of damages,
proof of damages does not require absolute certainty. On the contrary,
the case law provides that "reasonable certainty" or a "reasonable infer-
ence" is enough.5 8 Because multiple regression analysis is a scientific
method, it offers a plaintiff the potential for obtaining damage evidence
that is more likely to satisfy this standard than other types of damage evi-
dence that may be presented anecdotally or on an ad hoc basis. Multiple
regression analysis works by using a random sample drawn from the popu-
lation and making a statistical inference or conclusion about the popula-
tion from the observed characteristics of the sample. The analysis
expresses that inference or conclusion in terms of the level of certainty or
degree of confidence associated with the conclusion.
59
A. Fundamental Steps in Multiple Regression Analysis
Any sound multiple regression analysis proceeds through several or-
derly steps.
Step 1. First, one builds an economic model and thereby identifies the
most important economic and demographic factors that influence the va-
riable of interest. Economic theory determines which variables should be
included and which should be excluded.6 Practical problems of imple-
mentation relating to the availability or reliability of data may require sub-
sequent modification of the model, but the initial focus should be on the
theoretical construction of the model.
At this stage, the model is in a general, abstract form:
P = f(XYZ)
In this equation, P represents profit and is the dependent variable of inter-
est to be explained by the model. The independent variables-those that
determine or explain profits-are X, Y and Z. Finally, the f(o) notation
denotes the mathematical relationship, whatever it may be, between the
independent variables and the dependent variable. In other words, the
58. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) ("the jury may make a
just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and render its verdict
accordingly"); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931) ("The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are
not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to
the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount."); Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co.,
642 F.2d 845, 858 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) ("averages may be used to show that the
plaintiff generally lost money over time").
59. Degrees of confidence have a very precise statistical definition; simply put, however,
they are measures of one's confidence in a model or the reliability of that model.
60. In particular, it is inappropriate to let the data dictate the specification of the model.
If this is done, the results will be ad hoc and may be of no use in predicting sales or profits in
general.
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value of P is explained by or dependent on the values of X, Y and Z, and
conversely, X, Y, and Z determine or explain the value of P.
Step 2. The second step in this process is to select a specific functional
or mathematical form that will accurately express the relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent variable. For most practical
purposes, a linear relationship is assumed, at least initially. This means the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables would ap-
pear to be a straight line if plotted on a graph with one of the axes repre-
senting P and the other representing X or Y or Z. In other words, a linear
relationship means that one would expect that there would be some ratio
(e.g., 3:1 or 2:1) that would always explain the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. One may assume that the eco-
nomic model can be expressed as follows:
P = a + bX + cY + dZ
Of course, we do not live in a linear world. It is unrealistic to expect that
the relationship between P and X, Y or Z is precisely linear or does not
change depending on the value of variables. But in some instances, a lin-
ear approximation, although not precisely accurate, may provide a suffi-
cient level of certainty to be used for purposes of legal proof-a
determination which should be jointly made by the lawyer and expert.
When linear approximation is not accurate, however, nonlinear estima-
tion methods can be used. They require a more complicated multiple
regression model that is conceptually the same as a linear model but in-
volves higher-level mathematics.
Step 3. Having specified a clear mathematical relationship between
the dependent variable (P) and a set of independent variables (X,Y,Z), the
third step involves gathering data, because one must have observations or
sample data on all of the variables P, X, Y, and Z. Normally, a sample
drawn from the population is examined instead of the entire population.
Statistical inference permits us to make judgments about the population
on the basis of sample information. The sample data are drawn from ap-
propriate data sources, which will vary from case to case. In many in-
stances, company records can be tapped for important economic variables
such as sales, prices, output, employment, production capacity, salaries
and wages, and the like. Data on population, age distribution, ethnicity,
wealth and other economic and demographic factors can be obtained
from public sources or from private data collection services. In some
cases, the data must be compiled from market transactions.
In any event, care must be exercised to insure that the data are re-
corded accurately and that common measurements are used. For exam-
ple, if annual advertising expenditures are recorded from one restaurant
location, then annual advertising expenditures must be recorded for all
locations. It would distort the analysis if quarterly data were inadvertently
included for several locations. Moreover, it is helpful if the data span the
same time period; otherwise, exogenous economic factors could distort
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the analysis. 6 1 Suppose, for example, that one firm is on a July 1 through
June 30 fiscal year and another is on a September 1 through August 31
fiscal year. Hurricane Andrew devastated the Miami area in August 1992.
The influence of this devastation appears in the 1992 fiscal year for one
firm but not for the other. This is a potential source of distortion that may
require adjusting the data.
Step 4. The fourth step is to use the multiple regression model con-
structed to analyze the data for the particular case at hand. This will be
examined in greater detail in the next section.
Step 5. Finally, one must interpret the results of the analysis and apply
them to the problem of damage estimation. This too shall be examined
below.
B. Application to Jolly Rogers
We will use the Jolly Rogers hypothetical to develop the concept of
multiple regression analysis and its application in proving yardstick dam-
ages. Following termination, the Millers sued the B&E Development Cor-
poration and won a resounding victory. Among the remedies they
requested were damages for lost profits. To make a damage award to the
Millers, one must estimate the lost profits during the 1990-1992 period.
6 2
One approach to estimating lost profits relies upon the historical ex-
perience of the business in question. As discussed before, this approach
may be a problem if the franchisee does not have a long financial history,
which is precisely the Millers' situation. The yardstick approach addresses
this problem by examining the economic performance of other similar
franchisees and drawing inferences about the Millers' performance "but
for" the wrongful termination. In this regard, multiple regression analysis
is a useful tool because it assists in estimating profits for the terminated
franchisee using the factors that determine profits for other franchisees.
To this end, we will estimate the relationship between profits and certain
economic and demographic variables for the outlets in the franchise sys-
tem. We can then employ the specific characteristics of the Millers' loca-
tion and the estimated relationship for franchisees generally to statistically
infer the Millers' lost profits.
A sample of seventy-five restaurants in the Jolly Rogers system was se-
lected for analysis. B&E's records provided information on profits by loca-
tion in 1990. These data displayed a wide range of values: the lowest profit
figure was $80,300, the highest was $266,600, and the average was
$153,500. The distribution within this range is provided in Table 1. From
these data alone, it would be difficult to predict the profit level that the
61. It is possible to control for these exogenous factors, and one must be sure to do so if
data are drawn from different time periods. In addition, this makes the analysis more
complicated.
62. This may be a bit too simplistic and unfair to the Millers. To some extent, momen-
tum is critical to business success. This interruption could have adverse consequences that
extend into the future despite the injunction. In this event, future losses will have to be
estimated as well.
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Millers could reasonably expect. One might consider using an average,
but multiple regression analysis provides a more scientific and accurate
prediction.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF FRANCHISEE PROFITS 1990









* Measured in thousands of dollars.
Experience has shown that patrons of this franchise system are drawn
largely from those who live within a five-mile radius of the restaurant. As a
result, we are interested in the economic and demographic characteristics
of the population within a five-mile ring around each location. The initial
model, which is very simple, has only one independent variable. Specifi-
cally, this model expresses restaurant profits as a function of the total pop-
ulation within a five-mile ring surrounding each restaurant location. 63 In
Figure 1, each restaurant location is represented by a point that reflects
the population within a five-mile ring and the profits at that location. An
examination of Figure 1 does not reveal any precise mathematical rela-
tionship between population and profits. The horizontal line represents
the average profit of $153,500 across the entire sample of seventy-five loca-
tions. Those restaurants located in less populous areas tended to have
below average profits. Conversely, Figure 1 indicates that restaurants lo-
cated in more populous areas generally had higher profits. This suggests
that we do not want to rely upon the sample mean for an estimate of profit
at any particular location.
Multiple regression analysis allows us to uncover the general tendency
of profit to increase with population and to approximate it with a straight
line. Thus, the initial regression equation is specified as
P = a + bPOP + e
where P represents profit, POP represents population within a five-mile
ring, and e accounts for random disturbances or factors other than POP.
By including the random disturbance term, we recognize that the profit
figure equals the sum of a deterministic component, a + bPOP, and a
probabilistic component, e. 64 The deterministic portion is composed of
63. A private data collection service obtained the population data.
64. Adding the random error term in the regression equation makes the model proba-
bilistic rather than deterministic. As a result, there is a whole range of values for P corre-
sponding to each value of the independent variable. For instance, one restaurant with
[Vol. 72:1














0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000
POPULATION
the identified independent variables (in this case, just POP) that we ex-
pect to explain the franchisee's profit (P). The probabilistic component
of the equation is the unexplained portion of P, those factors other than
population within a five-mile ring influencing the value of P, which is re-
ferred to as the random error. The inclusion of e is an explicit recogni-
tion that a precise relationship between profit and population is unlikely
in real life. While population may help to explain profits, it does not com-
pletely explain or determine them. In other words, it is unlikely that we
can completely explain P. While we believe that our model captures the
major determinant of sales, population within a five-mile ring, there are
other variables that have relatively minor effects on the dependent
variable.
65
200,000 people within a five-mile ring may have profits of $95,000 per year, while another
restaurant in a different location that also has a population of 200,000 within a five-mile ring
may have profits of $125,000. Naturally, this means that P cannot be predicted exactly, but
we can make certain probabilistic statements with measurable degrees of confidence.
In statistical generalities, this set of values for P is referred to as a probability distribu-
tion. A probability distribution is the range of values and frequency of values of P. In other
words, P may range between 0 and $1,000,000 with 0 and $1,000,000 being very uncommon
and $153,500 being the most common value. A graph of all the values of P around the
average value of P would produce a probability distribution.
65. The cumulative influence of these minor effects, however, may not be trivial and,
therefore, must be captured. The random error incorporates these minor factors in the
regression model. It is assumed that the cumulative impact of these minor factors is small
relative to the influence of the independent variable(s). Moreover, it is assumed that these
influences can be treated as though they occurred by chance, i.e., that on average they will
cancel each other out and have no net effect on our damage estimate.
There are three standard assumptions regarding statistical properties of the error term.
First, we assume that the expected value of the error term is zero. This means that if we take
repeated samples, the random error term for any particular value of POP is on average
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C. Estimation of the Regression Parameters
The model presented in the initial regression equation (1) is a linear
one. Since the expected value of e is zero, on average it will wash out.
The next task is to estimate a and b, which are known as the regression
coefficients or the parameters of the regression model. The goal is to ob-
tain estimates of a and b that will provide a straight line that best fits the
data in Figure 1. The notion of a "best fit" implies some standard. The
statistical standard employed is that of a measure known as "least
squares."66 A statistical computer program is most often used to calculate
least squares. This technique finds estimates of a and b such that the sum
of the squared deviations of the observed values of P from the values that
lie on the regression line are minimized. In other words, for any given a
and b, one calculates the difference between the actual value of P and the
predicted value, squares these differences, and then totals. Then different
values for a and b are chosen until the lowest value for the sum of the
squared deviations is found. In that sense, the least squares regression line
"fits" the data "better" than any other line. Using these "best fit" estimates
of a and b, we construct the straight line through the data plotted in Fig-
ure 1.
For the observations plotted in Figure 1, least squares regression
yields the following estimates:
67
a = $114,125
zero-it is neither positive nor negative and, therefore, it will wash out on average. This is
extremely important, because if the expected value of the error term were not zero, then we
could not estimate the effect of POP on P simply by looking at different values for POP. In
this event, changes in POP would be related systematically to changes in e and our model
would not provide a good estimator because it is really not explaining variations in P.
The second assumption about the random error term is that its probability distribution
is norma, i.e., it follows the classic bell-shaped curve. A normal probability distribution has
the majority of the values distributed close to the mean or average value; as you move further
from the mean the frequency of the values drops off. Normality of the error term means that
for every value of POP, the random error is distributed normally around its mean or average
value, which we just assumed equals zero. This seems like an extremely restrictive assump-
tion, but it is less so than one would think. Recall that the error term is due to the presence
of a large number of small influences that are not explicitly included in the model. Each of
these minor influences produces a small deviation of P from the value that it would assume if
the relationship between POP and P were completely deterministic.
An interesting statistical result is that such random unsystematic errors tend to be distrib-
uted normally. Normality of the error term is an extremely useful property for two reasons.
First, it makes precise probability statements about the regression results possible because we
know so much about the normal distribution. Second, it is essential for an important prop-
erty of the estimators, which we will examine in more detail below. The third assumption is
that the error term is homoskedastic, which simply means that every random error has the
same (albeit unknown) variance. In our example, this means that the variance of the error
term is not greater for areas with larger populations than for areas with smaller populations.
In other words, the chance of observing a small error rather than a large error is the same for
all values of POP. This assumption is very important because regression analysis is a form of
averaging that deals with small random deviations in an efficient way provided that they are
independent. If the random errors are not independent, then something should be done
explicitly to deal with this. See KMENTA, supra note 55; see also Fisher, supra note 56.
66. See KMENTA, supra note 55 for an especially clear derivation of the least squares esti-
mation formulas. The mathematics is straightforward and uncontroversial.
67. The caret or "hat" over a variable is a signal that this is an estimate of the true





where $114,125 is the vertical intercept of our regression line and $.15 is
the slope. In Figure 2, we have reproduced the observations displayed in
Figure 1. In addition, we have used $114,125 as the intercept on the verti-
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The estimates indicate that each restaurant enjoys average annual
profits of some $114,125 irrespective of the population base. In addition,
average profits will increase by $.15 per person within the five-mile ring.
If, for example, there were 400,000 people within a five-mile ring around a
particular site, this simple model would predict average annual profits of
$114,125 plus $.15 times 400,000 people or, $60,000, for a total of
$174,125.
When using least squares regression analysis, one must be aware that
the results are sensitive to extreme values in the sample. Because extreme
values represent relatively large deviations, they can distort our perception
of the true relationship. Extreme values are known as outliers, because
they tend to fall outside the expected range of values for the data.68 When
one plots the data as we have done in Figure 1, one can identify observa-
tions that do not seem to fit. With the least squares method, outliers must
be handled with care. Any temptation to discard outliers must be resisted
68. For clear examples of how an outlier can distort the regression analysis, see MAD-
DALA, supra note 55, at 88-96. See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter 0. Steiner, Quantitative
Methods in Antitrust Litigation, LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 69, 93.
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because these observations may provide important information and actu-
ally improve the reliability of the model.
The first step in a prudent analysis of outliers is to determine if the
potential outlier is really a problem by dropping these observations and
allowing the computer to "refit" the line using the modified data set. If
the new line is not appreciably different from the first one, the outliers are
usually not troublesome. Nonetheless, it may be wise to retain these obser-
vations, especially if the data set is small.
If the modified data set produces a substantially different regression
line, the outliers must be inspected more closely. Sometimes outliers indi-
cate mistakes in either data collection or data entry. In these cases the
error should be corrected or the outlier should be removed from the data
set and replaced with the corrected value. If the outlier is a reliable data
point, it generally should remain in the model because of the information
it inherently provides about the variability in the sample data.69 The ana-
lyst must be very careful when he elects to delete any data. In a litigation
context, such decisions will be challenged and justification must be pro-
vided in order to avoid the impression that the results were contrived.
70
In terms of our data set, an outlier would be a data point with a value
of, say, $500,000. Such a value may be observed if someone mistakenly
recorded an extra zero or it might reflect actual profits for an exception-
ally successful restaurant. If the former, it should be corrected. If the
latter, it may improve the model because it is an indicator that, given cer-
tain factors, such a value for profit is possible.
D. Hypothesis Testing
For our regression model to be useful in predicting profit, the in-
dependent variable, population, must actually contribute some informa-
tion to explain profit. To test the utility of the regression model, one must
test the validity of the hypothesis that population is a determinant of
profit. To understand the testing method, it is necessary to understand
the meaning of the model's parameters.
As discussed previously, the first parameter, a, is the intercept on the
profit axis. Literally interpreted, this parameter indicates that when a res-
69. See Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 68, at 93.
70. Michael 0. Finkelstein & Hans Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-
Fixing Cases, LAw AND Co rTMP. PRons., Autumn 1983, at 145, 150-153, relates an extreme
example of massaging the data. In Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,485 (N.D. Ga. 1980), the plaintiff's experts found that the prices of chicken were actually
lower during the conspiracy period than their model would have predicted absent the con-
spiracy. To conclude that prices were higher, they excluded all observations during the con-
spiracy period where actual prices were not above the model's predicted price. On a purely
statistical basis, one would expect that half of the time the prices actually observed will ex-
ceed the predicted value and half of the time they will fall below the predicted value. The
experts' justification for deleting those instances where observed prices were below the pre-
dicted prices was that the conspiracy was effective only on an intermittent basis. Be that as it
may, by looking at only the observations that support the a priori suspicion that prices should




taurant is located in a spot with no population within five miles, it will have
$a in profit. In this example, P = $114,125 when POP = 0. This interpreta-
tion, however, is unreliable because it is based on values falling far outside
the range of the sample data. In the data set, there is not a single business
at a site where there are no people within five miles. In fact, the smallest
population recorded in the sample data was 32,000 and the next smallest
was 93,000. Therefore, predictions outside the data range that rely on the
interpretation of the intercept are suspect and should be avoided if at all
possible.
71
The second parameter, b, also discussed previously, is the slope of the
regression line. For the purpose of this model, b indicates that for each
additional person living within five miles of a restaurant location, the
model predicts that the business will experience an additional $b in profit,
which in this example equals an additional $.15. Since this parameter is
critical for prediction, this parameter must be tested to ensure that it is
statistically significantly different from zero.72 In other words, the test will
determine whether the original hypothesis is valid, i.e., whether the in-
dependent variable, POP, contributed to the determination of or ex-
plained the dependent variable, P.
The model's hypothesis is given below in two parts. The first is the so-
called "null hypothesis," which states that the independent variable, POP,
does not in any way explain P or provides no information in predicting the
dependent variable, P. The "alternative hypothesis" states that there is a
functional relationship between the independent and dependent
variables:
H0:b=0 Ha:b*0.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the statistical inference is that some
statistically significant relationship exists between population and profit.
Rejection also indicates that the model has some utility for prediction. A
computer program performs this hypothesis testing.
73
The results of this computer testing indicate that the probability of
drawing a sample of seventy-five restaurants that would produce an esti-
71. Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 68, at 95.
72. For an interesting analysis of statistical significance and legal standards of proof, see
David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1983, at 13. See also David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61
WASH. L. REv. 1333 (1986). For the statistical analysis, see KMENTA, supra note 55.
73. The program produces what is called a "t-statistic" to evaluate the coefficient's statis-
tical significance. The resulting t-statistic can be compared to critical values that correspond
to any predetermined level of statistical significance, which is referred to as the alpha level.
The alpha level is a statistical measure of confidence; the degree of confidence is inversely
related to the alpha level. For example, customary alpha levels are .05 and .01. An alpha
level of .01 signifies greater confidence than an alpha level of .05. The t-statistic tells the
analyst whether the slope coefficient, in our case b, is statistically significant (different from
zero) and the degree of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis, which states that the true
value of b is zero. In our case, the t-statistic for the estimate of b is the ratio of the coefficient
estimate (b) to the standard error of the estimate s:
t = b/sL = .15/.032 = 4.69
The standard error of the estimate of b is denoted as s. This is a measure of the varia-
tion in the estimate of b. Numerically, in this example,
% = 0.032
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mate of b equal to $.15, when in fact the true value of b is zero, is less than
one percent. This is the sort of statement that one can make about the
certainty associated with the regression results, in statistical language a
"probabilistic statement." As is true for any regression result, one cannot
say that POP is, in fact, a determinant of P. One can, however, make a
probabilistic statement that the statistical result indicates that it is ex-
tremely likely that this is the case. The estimate of b is said to be a reliable
predictor of profits or, in the language of statistics, "statistically signifi-
cant." The null hypothesis is, therefore, rejected, and it can reasonably be
inferred that POP is a determinant of profit.
The regression model generates a point estimate-or a specific nu-
merical value-of b, which in this instance equals .15. This point estimate
is our best guess as to the true coefficient. To get a feel for how precise
this point estimate may be, one may turn to the "confidence interval" for
this estimate. First, we start with the degree of confidence or certainty that
we want, say 95 per cent, the common degree of confidence used by statis-
ticians. Then we use the estimate of b and its standard error, which is a
measure of the range of possible values for b, to construct the confidence
interval. 7 4 As a result, we can make the following sort of probabilistic*
statement: If one takes repeated samples and calculates confidence inter-
vals in the same fashion, then (i-a) per cent of those confidence intervals
will enclose the true value of b.7 5 The smaller the confidence interval, the
more precise the estimate. In our example, the 95% confidence interval is
0.087 < b < 0.213.
While out point estimate was $.15, the bounds on the 95% confidence
interval are approximately $.09 and $.21. In other words, we can say that
we are 95% sure that the true value of b falls in this range.
There is another way to evaluate how well the estimated regression
line fits the observed data. This is the coefficient of determination, which
is usually denoted by R2. This measure is calculated by breaking down the
variation in the dependent variable (P) into its component parts and iso-
lating the proportion of the variation in profit accounted for by the in-
dependent variable (POP). 7 6 In this example,
R2 = 0.2447,
which means that the variation in population across the seventy-five restau-
rant locations explained about a quarter of the variation in profits across
those locations. For a simple model like ours, one might consider this to
74. As a general matter, the confidence interval for the estimate of b is where t,_2 /2 is
the value of a t-statistic with n-2 degrees of freedom that cuts off a/2 of the area under the t
distribution at each tail. Notice that in this expression the end points are random variables
because b appears. For a clear explanation of the value of confidence intervals in resolving
legal disputes, see generally Herbert Solomon, Confidence Intervals in Legal Settings, in STATIS-
TICS AND THE LAw, 455-73 (M. DeGroot et al. eds., 1986). For further discussion, see gener-
ally D. H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73
CORNELL L. Rav. 54 (1987).
75. See KMENTA, supra note 55, at 188-89.
76. Since R is a proportion, it must assume values between zero and one. Furthermore,




be a rather good performance. On the other hand, the model leaves
about seventy-five per cent of the variation unexplained. A word of cau-
tion: preoccupation with indiscriminately "improving" the RF, as some
literature may unintentionally encourage, may be inconsistent with objec-
tive analysis and may actually decrease the reliability of the model if there
is no scientific rationale for the steps taken to increase R1
2.77
E. Statistical Properties of Least Squares Estimators
Under the assumptions of the least squares regression model, the re-
sulting estimates have some desirable statistical properties. 78 First, the
least squares regression estimators, i.e., the estimates of a and b, are unbi-
ased, which means that the expected value (or the mean) of the estimator
is equal to the true value of the population parameter. This is important
because sample data rarely encompass the universe of possible values,
known in statistics as the population. A sample is a subset of the popula-
tion. In our case, the expected value of d is a and the expected value of b
is b. This property is important because, on average, the least squares es-
timators are correct. Biased estimators, on average, will be wrong.
Second, the least squares regression estimators have a smaller vari-
ance than any other linear, unbiased estimator. In this sense, these es-
timators are deemed "best." In combination, these two properties define
efficiency. If the estimator is unbiased, and the variance of the estimator is
smaller than the variance of any other unbiased estimator, then the esti-
mator is said to be efficient.
Third, the least squares regression estimators are consistent, which
means that as the sample size increases, the bias (if any) approaches zero
and the variance approaches zero.
F. A More General Model
In our example, it could be argued that the model is too simplistic. It
contains only one explanatory variable, population within five miles of the
restaurant location. Other variables influencing demand such as income,
wealth, racial composition, educational attainment, and the like could also
be important. This possibility cannot be ignored at the outset unless eco-
nomic theory suggests that these variables should not be included. Ac-
cordingly, we return to the first step in the regression analysis; the use of
economic theory to identify the relevant economic and demographic vari-
ables to include in the model.
77. See, e.g., Glen A. Stankee, Econometric Forecasting of Lost Profits: Using High Technology to
Compute CommercialDamages, FLA. Bus. J.,June 1987, at 83, 85 (noting that "the higher the R-
squared factor, the more reliable the predictions will be"). Stankee adds, however, that the
R can be inflated by simply adding more explanatory variables to the regression model,
which encourages a "kitchen sink" approach to modelling. Id. As our article points out, what
should be included in the model is a matter of economic theory.
78. For the technical developments of these properties, see generally KMENTA, supra
note 55.
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As we concluded earlier, profits are dependent upon the size of the
local population. We therefore included the population within a five-mile
radius of each restaurant site. In addition to the sheer size of the popula-
tion, other characteristics of the population may be relevant. For exam-
ple, eating in a restaurant is more expensive than eating at home. Thus,
sales also may be influenced by the income and wealth of the local popula-
tion. Accordingly, we may want to include measures of household income
or per capita income and a wealth measure such as the value of housing in
the area. Further, since meal preparation at home is time consuming and
women may be disproportionately saddled with that responsibility, female
work force participation rates may influence sales as well. To the extent
that educational attainment is important in the decision to frequent the
restaurant chain in question, we may want to include variables for median
educational attainment in years and the percentage of the population that
graduated from college. If racial composition seems important, one can
include a variable indicating the percentage of the total population that is
a given race. Finally, in our case, the restaurant is built in two configura-
tions that can be categorized as "large" and "small." Those locations with
large versus small restaurants must be identified to see whether the config-
uration of the restaurant is a determinant of success.
When we go to a more complete model by adding other independent
variables, graphically plotting the resulting relationship becomes impossi-
ble because its dimensions cannot be captured on a flat surface. The con-
ceptual basis of the techniques, however, remains the same. The
expanded model may look like the following:
P = b0 + b, POP + b 2 L + b3 MHV + b 4 HHI + b 5 MEA + b6 FWP + e
P = annual profit
POP = total population within a five-mile ring
L = 1 if restaurant is large and 0 otherwise
MHV = median housing value
HHI = median household income
MEA = median educational attainment in years
FWP = female work force participation rate
e = random error term
In order to estimate the regression parameters, that is, the coefficients b0
through b6, one must gather data on each of these variables for every res-
taurant in the sample. A computer program is then used to calculate the
least squares regression estimates of the coefficients.
The results in this case are as follows:
P = $47,078 + $.187 POP - $1670 L
+ $2.87 HHI + $.60 MHV - $588 MEA
+ $98.55 FWP
79




All of the variables, except median educational attainment (MEA) and the
dummy variable for large restaurants (L), are statistically significant at
conventional alpha levels, i.e., a = .05 or a = .01. Furthermore, the expan-
sion of the model has greatly improved our ability to explain the profit
performance of the restaurants in the Jolly Rogers system: the R2 is now
.741, which means that about 74% of the variation in profit across Jolly
Rogers restaurants is accounted for by variation in these variables.
The interpretation of the coefficients is slightly different. One infers
that, after controlling for other variables, a one unit change in the variable
under consideration will cause a change in profit equal to the coefficient.
For example, when population (POP) increases by one person, annual
profit (P) of the restaurant rises by $.187. When median household in-
come (HHI) in the area rises by a dollar, restaurant profits increase by
$2.87. Notice that increasing median educational attainment (MEA)
causes restaurant profits to decrease by $588. We can avoid the conclusion
thatJolly Rogers appeals mostly to the uneducated by noting that this coef-
ficient is not statistically significant. In the case of the restaurant size, L is
a so-called dummy variable because it can take on values of only zero and
one. Its coefficient provides information on the differential effect, if any,
that can be attributed to having the "large" restaurant. Here, we got a bit
of a surprise because it appears that having a large configuration actually
caused profits to decrease by $1670. This result could also be spurious since
the coefficient was not statistically significant. When evaluating a multiple
regression analysis and determining what estimates are reliable, one must
focus generally only on those that are statistically significant.
G. Estimation of Lost Sales: The Millers' Tale Resolved
The regression coefficients were estimated on the basis of a sample of
seventy-five restaurants in the Jolly Rogers system. This average relation-
ship may be used to estimate the profits that the Millers lost in 1990. In
order to do this, one must have the economic and demographic data for
the Millers' location. Once the data are substituted into the estimated
regression equation, an estimate of what the profits would have been but
for the termination can be calculated. Assume the actual values for the







Plugging these numbers into our equation reveals that the estimated
profit for 1990 is $224,032.
For the years 1991 and 1992, the demographic data for the Millers'
location may be different than those used to estimate the 1990 profit fig-
ure. If this is so, the 1991 and 1992 data must be substituted and the
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estimated profit re-calculated for 1991 and 1992. To arrive at the Millers'
total lost profits, one must add interest to the lost profits to compensate
for the fact that they did not have the benefit of this money during 1990-
1992.80
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODELS
A multiple regression model is of little use to a litigant if it is deemed
inadmissible. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. 8 1 Relevant ev-
idence is defined to be evidence tending to make the existence of a mate-
rial fact more or less probable than without the evidence. 82 Based on this
definition of relevance and the previous discussion, it seems obvious that
multiple regression analysis is relevant evidence. The amount of harm, if
any, suffered by a litigant is often the centerpiece of a trial and almost
always an important fact to be determined. Damage estimates that mea-
sure that harm are therefore unquestionably a material fact in a litigant's
case. Multiple regression analysis, by its inherent nature, tends to prove
the material fact of damages. Hence, so far, our multiple regression analy-
sis seems judicially irresistible. Furthermore, multiple regression analysis
is really nothing more than a scientific means of projecting lost profits
based on an assortment of data. The projection method has long been
recognized as a legitimate means of proving damages.
83
Multiple regression analysis, however, is a statistical technique and in
some respects the law has looked askance at statistical "proof." The princi-
pal reason for this jaundiced judicial view of statistics is probably predi-
cated on the view that statistics may lie or be used to deceive. People may
also lie or deceive. This does not, in and of itself, preclude the admissibil-
ity of oral testimony. We contend, therefore, that statistical evidence
should be no different and consequently admissible, provided that the liti-
gant seeking to have the statistical evidence admitted is able to conform to
the common law rule that proof of damages must be reasonably certain
and not speculative.
8 4
Generally, the term "speculative" means that the evidence sought to
be admitted is founded on illogical assumptions that have no basis in fact
or experience. To be admissible, a multiple regression analysis cannot be
80. This is consistent with the well-established and generally accepted concept of the
time value of money.
81. FED. R. Evro. 402. This article makes reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence on
the assumption that most states have evidence codes similar to the Federal Rules.
82. FED. R. EVID. 401.
83. See, e.g., Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc., 773 F.2d 1506, 1511 (9th
Cir. 1985).
84. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.")
For an outline of the legal principles governing recovery of lost profits and cases sup-
porting the same, see generally ROBERT L. DUNN, REcovERY OF DmAXG.ES FOR LosT PROFITS
(4th Ed. 1992).
For a legal and economic analysis of the concept of"speculativenes," see generally Roger
Blair & William Page, supra note 16.
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speculative. In other words, the assumptions underlying both its theoreti-
cal construction and its data must be logical and based on generally ac-
cepted statistical principles. This is eminently reasonable when one
considers that multiple regression analysis is proffered through the testi-
mony of an expert. Since the expert is subject to cross-examination on
this and all aspects of his testimony, the expert must be qualified to render
a statistical opinion. Weaknesses in the assumptions or logic of a multiple
regression analysis can be rooted out by cross-examination. Our judicial
system relies heavily on cross-examination to do this in many other con-
texts-why not with statistical models? Moreover, if any expert's arithme-
tic or other mathematical computation is part of his testimony, he may
have to explain his method and results. Likewise, a multiple regression
analysis is nothing but a sophisticated mathematical analysis requiring an
expert and a computer to perform it properly. Furthermore, the subject
matter of this expert's testimony is discoverable, and should a litigant wish
to counter the testimony of his opponent's expert with that of his own
expert, he is free to do so. Such is the nature of the adversarial process.
Since juries may be wary of statistics, unless simplified by an expert,
multiple regression analysis may appear hopelessly difficult. Therefore,
serious consideration should be given to the method of its presentation.
The results should only be presented by those intimately familiar with
both statistical technique and the data at issue. Otherwise, the effective-
ness of multiple regression analysis may be lost in a morass of technical,
and perhaps largely irrelevant, difficulties. Furthermore, multiple regres-
sion analysis will often produce "common sense" results. The expert
should therefore stress the logic of the model in light of everyday experi-
ence and impress them with the scientific method behind the model.
As a simple example, let us say using our previous illustration that Iam
Bullsheet, a renowned expert, testifies that the Millers' profits should have
been lower by $1670.00 because they had a large restaurant. Mr. Bullsheet
should be subject to cross-examination both on that point (as it was within
the scope of his direct testimony) and with respect to the statistical insig-
nificance of the "large" restaurant coefficient and the apparent illogic of
such a statement in light of everyday experience. More advanced cross-
examination may relate to the assumptions discussed previously regarding
the inherent statistical properties of the model and the sample data.
Another interesting observation of the judicial process is that far less
reliable statistical evidence is admitted every day. For example, experts or
other witnesses often are asked about the frequency of certain events oc-
curring, the likelihood of their occurrence, the effect of their occurrence
on something else or the existence (or lack thereof) of a causal relation-
ship between events. These types of questions are all asking for a subjec-
tive probability assessment of events. They ask for information akin to that
produced by our multiple regression analysis. Due to biases of all sorts,
including human error in perception, such subjective probabilities may be
seriously flawed in comparison with a truly scientific, statistical analysis of
the events. Therefore, somewhat ironically, the judicial system that refuses
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statistical evidence may forego far more reliable and objective evidence in
favor of other forms of evidence that are less reliable and even biased.
8 5
Multiple regression analysis is not a dubious statistical technique.
Rather, it is well-recognized and widely used by economists and statisti-
cians. The principles upon which it is based are generally accepted by
practitioners and academics alike. Furthermore, numerous well-respected
statistical treatises and textbooks deal in depth with this type of analysis.
86
Multiple regression analysis is not a suspect bit of hocus pocus designed to
inflate (or deflate) figures to mislead a jury. To the contrary, it is a scien-
tific method designed to rationalize the presentation of statistical
evidence.
While this argument must be tailored to the facts and circumstances
of a given case, it is imperative that the above points be made at trial when
proffering statistical evidence of any kind. This will improve the likeli-
hood of admissibility and preserve the issue for appeal.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a statistical method for creating a
composite yardstick that is not plagued by the conceptual flaws of less so-
phisticated methods.8 7 The composite yardstick also provides a way to es-
timate lost profits where it might otherwise seem too speculative to do so
due to lack of historical financial data or a similar, yet independent, busi-
ness. Thoughtfully employed, multiple regression analysis provides a ra-
tional technique for reliably estimating commercial harm to a business. It
represents a technological advancement founded upon a long accepted
method of calculating damages.
85. For a general text on the use of statistics in legal proceedings that includes a chapter
on cases involving statistical evidence and demonstrates the wide breadth of applications, see
DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1986) (especially
Chapter Ten, Cases Involving Statistical Evidence, 545-95).
86. But cf. Fischer Black, The Trouble with Econometric Models, 35 FIN. ANALVS'r J., Mar.-
Apr. 1982, at 3 (explaining the problem of confusing correlation with causation); David F.
Hendry, Econometrics-Alchemy or Science?, 47 ECONOMicA 387 (1980) (noting nonsense conclu-
sions drawn from simple correlations, unreliable data, and various errors of linear regression
models); Edward E. Leamer, Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics, AM. ECoN. REv., Mar. 1983,
at 31, 33 (noting the limitations and somewhat arbitrary character of statistical inferences).
87. For a seminal work on the subject of composites, see MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN
(1818). Baron Frankenstein's innovative composite was unprecedented, but it proved
troublesomely uncontrollable and was ungratefully determined to turn against its creator.
Undoubtedly, Shelley intended her work as an allegory about brilliant but short-sighted ex-
pert witnesses under cross-examination.
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It is not surprising that a commercial culture would grant special con-
stitutional protection to commercial speech. There is, however, no reason
to suppose that special protection for commercial speech in our cultural
context promotes the overall freedom and well-being of the public. A
strong case can be made that in our culture, reducing the constitutional
protection of commercial speech would actually tend to promote freedom
and well-being in the long term. This is not because some commercial
speech is false, fraudulent, or deceptive. The focus of attention should
instead be on non-deceptive commercial speech, framed in the broader
context of our culture.
Because this Article's argument is broad in scope, it begins by estab-
lishing some perspective before focusing on the current case law of com-
mercial speech. Thus Section I below briefly surveys some of the classic
discussions of commodity consumption and well-being. The Article then
turns to the contemporary social science literature. This literature sug-
gests that for most contemporary Americans, there is actually only a mini-
mal relationship, if any, between consumption and well-being.
Section II discusses further the effects of commercial speech-in par-
ticular, the dominance, within its sphere, of commercialism in our cultural
context. Commodification and commercial speech are pervasive in our
society. Section II traces the implications of this state of affairs for free-
dom of speech generally.
Most important for free speech doctrine is the absence, in our cul-
ture, of any meaningful institutional challenge to the influence of com-
mercialism and commercial speech. No cultural institution is able, or
inclined, to provide significant "counterspeech" to the broad "message,"
intended or unintended, of commercial speech. Any reasonable regula-
tion of commercial speech, whatever its more particular justification, actu-
ally tends, at least minimally and indirectly, to contribute to freedom and
well-being. Such regulation has this effect by implicitly raising the issue of
the proper role of commercialism and commercial speech in our society.
There is, at a minimum, nothing in the Free Speech Clause that should
bar a society from democratically acting on these beliefs, along with any
other appropriate grounds for reasonably regulating commercial speech.
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. The author
thanks Richard Delgado, Jay Mootz, and Steve Smith for their thoughtful reactions to previ-
ous drafts.
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This does not mean that government itself can be expected to coun-
terbalance the influence of commercialism, or that implicitly questioning
the cultural sovereignty of commercialism by itself establishes viable alter-
natives to commercialism. Reasonable regulation of commercial speech is
merely one step in the process of legitimizing and democratically facilitat-
ing free choices of less commercial styles of life, in ways consistent with the
Free Speech Clause and the rest of the Constitution.
With this basic argument in place, Section III surveys the most impor-
tant discussions of the constitutional status of commercial speech. The
commentators have been hopelessly split on whether or how to protect
specially commercial speech. This dispute stems largely from commenta-
tors' inclination to insist on either a broad or a narrow range of values or
purposes underlying the Free Speech Clause, and to define each of those
values or purposes in ways friendly or unfriendly to commercial speech.
This Article seeks to avoid this trap. One way of bypassing this intermina-
ble conflict is to adopt the broader cultural institutional focus I have intro-
duced above. Thus this Article does not rest on a narrow, controversial
view of why we value free speech in the first place.
To this point, I have relied on intuitive, uncontroversial ideas of the
meaning of commercial speech. Classifying speech as either commercial
or non-commercial often will be easy. But what if the idea of commercial
speech turns out to be so complex or contestable as to be unusable in
practice? Section IV is intended to allay such fears and offers a method for
minimizing the cost of judicial errors in misclassifying commercial and
non-commercial speech in borderline cases.
Section V then considers in some detail the case law establishing the
degree of special protection currently accorded commercial speech. As
matters stand, the constitutional tests imposed on regulations of commer-
cial speech are unreasonably demanding or, at best, so inescapably subjec-
tive and indeterminate as virtually to invite an unsympathetic court to
strike the regulation down. This state of the law does not serve the public
interest.
Finally, the Conclusion expands the theme of the preceding section,
warning that the level of protection currently given to commercial speech
jeopardizes reasonable regulation of that speech in a wide variety of sub-
ject matter areas. Whether the benefits of striking down reasonable regu-
lation of commercial speech in these areas outweigh the social costs of
doing so is, in our cultural context, doubtful in the extreme.
I. WELL-BEING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The relationship between acquiring consumer goods and genuine
happiness or well-being has long been doubted. Classically, for example,
Epictetus argues that "if you have not the want of riches, know that you
possess more than this [rich] man possesses and what is worth much
[Vol. 72:1
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more."' Epictetus raises the possibility that the desire for riches and the
objects acquired from riches may be self-defeating and pathological. 2 Ep-
ictetus argues as well that the costs of consumption may take the form not
merely of the loss of leisure or some other consumer good or service, but
of an unintended, unforeseen change for the worse of one's character. 3 A
lifestyle emphasizing consumption is said to transform one's character ad-
versely, in ways that the consumer does not recognize even after the fact.
4
Thus Epictetus denies that a lifestyle emphasizing consumption is typically
rational, in the sense of being chosen with conscious awareness of its most
important costs.
Skepticism as to the relation between consumption and happiness is
not unexpected in classical or medieval writers, but similar sentiments are
expressed from surprising quarters. Consider, for example, the observa-
tion of Adam Smith, a writer not insensitive to the power and virtues of
economic markets:
[W]ealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no
more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind
than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys; and like them too,
more troublesome to the person who carries them about with
him than all the advantages they can afford him are
commodious.
5
Rousseau develops this theme in discussing the conversion of luxuries into
"negative" necessities that have largely lost the power to please, but whose
absence creates unhappiness. 6 Following Rousseau's lead, Immanuel Kant
argues that "with growing wealth we acquire fresh wants, and the more we
satisfy them the keener becomes our appetites for more." 7 Henry David
Thoreau amplifies this theme in positing that "[m]ost of the luxuries, and
many of the so-called comforts of life, are not only not indispensable, but
positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind."
8
Thoreau suggests two additional relevant points. First, his reference
to "so-called comforts" suggests with Rousseau that our inevitable adjust-
ment to a good means that we derive only diminishing satisfaction from
that good, while becoming more vulnerable to its loss and to whatever
1. THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS book IV, ch. 9, at 399 (George Long trans., A.L. Burt
ed. 1885); see also THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS book VII, § 15, at 126 (Arthur Waley trans.
1938) ("The Master said, He who seeks only coarse food to eat, water to drink and bent arm
for pillow, will without looking for it find happiness to boot.").
2. See THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS, supra note 1, at 399.
3. See id. at 400.
4. See id.
5. Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments, in 1 BRIaSH MORAItSrS 309 (part IV, ch.
1) (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1897) (Dover 1965).
6. JEANJ. RoussEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALIY part II, at 113 (Maurice W. Cranston
trans., Penguin 1984) (as commodities "degenerated into actual needs, being deprived of
them became much more cruel than the possession of them was sweet; and people were
unhappy in losing them without being happy in possessing them").
7. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 7 (Louis Infield trans., Hackett 1992) (1930)
(citing Rousseau); see also STANLEY LEBERGOTT, PURSUING HAPPINESS 69 (1993) (quoting EMILE
DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 249 (1952)).
8. HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 13 (Brooks Atkinson ed., Modem
Library 1950).
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disutility may attach to our fear for its loss. Thus Thoreau, Rousseau and
Kant hint at a loosely "addictive" quality of consumption. But Thoreau
does not see addiction as inevitable. Thoreau argues instead that once we
have obtained what is necessary for life, "there is another alternative than
to obtain the superfluities; and that is, to adventure on in life now, [one's]
vacation from humbler toil having commenced." 9 For Thoreau, the alter-
native to endless acquisition and consumption is not asceticism, self-de-
nial, or nirvana, but an affirmative, active use of one's liberation.
Early Marx was struck by the almost miraculous transformative powers
of wealth and the acquisitions made possible by wealth. 10 Marx was
equally interested in the ideas of authenticity and alienation in its various
forms. 1 Authentic, non-commodified bases and standards of human rela-
tionships and human standards may, in Marx's view, become historically
possible. Some of these themes have been developed by later writers
under the ambiguous 12 rubric of "commodity fetishism."13 In an informal
sense, commodity fetishism refers to the tendency for the sphere of mar-
ket exchange of goods and services to expand in ways destructive to the
fullest and highest development of personality.
It is possible that market transactions tend, at least among the imme-
diate parties, to in some sense maximize wealth. 14 The theorists of com-
modity fetishism may respond, however, that it is a further and fallacious
step to infer from this that human well-being in the broadest sense is most
fully realized when social relationships are converted into market-based
relationships, or when the logic of the commercial market affects the na-
ture of those social relationships.
A society's attempt to satisfy the full range of its needs through com-
modity exchange has been described as an aspect of the process of reifica-
9. Id. at 14; cf. Ralph W. Emerson, Thoreau, in THE OXFORD AuTHoRs: RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 475, 477 (Richard Poirier ed. 1990) ("He chose to be rich by making his wants
few."); WzuiAm WORDSWORTH, 1 THE POEMS 568 (John 0. Hayden ed., Penguin 1990) ("Get-
ting and spending, we lay waste our powers.").
10. KARL MARx, EARLY WRTnNGs 191-93 (T.B. Bottomore trans., 1964) (Third Economic
and Philosophical Manuscript).
11. See, e.g., id. at 192-94; cf. JAC QuEs Etu.ut, MONEY AND POWER 76-79 (LaVonne Neff
trans., 2d ed. 1984).
12. See MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. Rxv. 1849, 1872 n.85 (1987)
(referring to a non-technical sense of commodity fetishism in which one is said "to have one's
identity too tied to possessions, to be too dependent upon thing-ownership for pleasure and
a sense of self-worth"). We should, of course, recognize the increasingly important role of
commercial services as opposed to commercial goods in our culture. Consider purchases of
a wide range of advertised commercial services that in other cultures would be unnecessary
because of the depth of genuine friendships. In our culture, friendship may itself be com-
mercialized, and thereby impaired or tainted, or left undernourished.
13. Commodity fetishism in a non-technical sense has been identified simply as "the
continuing emphasis on 'transactions' under capitalism." William J. Wagner, The Contractual
Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endoument Critique, 41 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 1, 148 n.654 (1990).
14. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech
and the Values of Free EApression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 433 (1971) (maximum informa-




tion.' 5 The reification of commodities, importantly, does not reflect the
conscious, knowledgeable decision or intention of individuals or of the
public collectively. It has been said that "[t]he commodity form... neces-
sarily functions independent of, or autonomously from, the will of the sub-
jects who set it in motion." 16 On this view, the commodity form, and the
role of commodity exchange, tend to take on lives of their own.' 7 To the
extent that this is so, persons can hardly be said to be sovereign, free, and
autonomous with regard to the scale and scope of commodity exchange.
Thus pervasive commodification is not simply the embodiment of free
choices. Equally importantly, though, commodification tends to be self-
justifying. The very pervasiveness of commodity exchange tends to make
any departure from commodity exchange as a way of fulfilling human
needs and potentials seem unnatural, utopian, or simply inconceivable.1
8
Thus the free market exchange of goods and services is not the unequivo-
cal embodiment of human development, human freedom, and fulfilled
intention.19
One should consider as well how the early capitalists described by
Max Weber, driven by other-worldly considerations, would have reacted to
the historical shift in focus from capital accumulation to consumption,
however inevitable such a shift may have been.2 0 By the early part of the
twentieth century, writers such as Thorstein Veblen
2 1 and R.H. Tawney22
deemed a significant portion of the production and consumption of
goods as "waste," not in the sense that such goods were unwanted, 23 but
that consumers had unnaturally learned to want such goods,24 even
though those goods did not genuinely serve human well-being.
2 5
15. See GEORGE Lujkcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 91 (Rodney Livingstone
trans., 1971); see also HERBERT MARCUSE, NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 172-73 (er-
emyJ. Shapiro trans., 1968).
16. Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of
the Law, 11 LAw. & Soc'y REV. 571, 574 (1977) (emphasis deleted).
17. See id.; Marlin H. Smith, The Limits of Coyright: Property, Parody, and the Public Domain,
41 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1272 n.202 (quoting A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 86-87 (Tom
Bottomore et al. eds., 1983)).
18. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 991-92 (1985).
19. Cf MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 351 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978) ("[t]he various modes of want satisfaction, always the result of struggles between differ-
ent interests, often exert a far-reaching influence beyond their direct purpose").
20. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANr ETHmIC AND THE SPITrr OF CAPrrALISM 172 (Talcott
Parsons trans., Scribner's 1958); see also THOMAS S. ROBERTSON, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 102
(1970).
21. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Mentor 1953) (1899).
22. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920).
23. See VEBLEN, supra note 21, at 78.
24. See id. at 69.
25. See id. at 78; TAwNEY, supra note 22, at 37-38.
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These themes were in turn developed byJohn Maynard Keynes2 6 and
at length byJohn Kenneth Galbraith.2 7 Nevertheless, it is still standard for
anyone trained in economics to think of consumer choices, in the absence
of force and fraud, as revealed free preferences, and to think of non-fraud-
ulent commercial speech as contributing to the efficiency of markets and
to wealth maximization.
The contemporary discussion of the relationships among consump-
tion, commercial speech, and well-being is addressed below, but it is useful
to bear in mind two preliminary points. First, it is not inconsistent for
someone to both wish to lead a life emphasizing consumption, and to be
chagrined or embarrassed if too many other people make the same
choice. By analogy, confining one's charitable donations exclusively to,
say, Amnesty International does not imply that one should be pleased if
everyone else does so as well. And second, we must not take the language
itself of free markets, freedom of commercial speech, and revealed prefer-
ences to mean that we need not examine the actual effects of those institu-
tions on human freedom, happiness, and well-being. Whether
contemporary commercial speech actually promotes freedom and well-
being is a partly normative and partly empirical question, and not simply a
matter of the definitions of free markets and commercial speech.
The relationships among commercial speech, consumption, happi-
ness, and freedom are doubtless complex. We may be tempted to think of
them as simply mutually supporting, without conflict. But we may also
suspect that matters may be more complicated than this, at least in today's
highly developed economies. The novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch
argues, for example, that "modem industrial society, with all its vast diver-
sity of entertainments and mass of incoherent information (of which tele-
vision may serve as image and example), has radically changed people's
lives and mode of well-being, bringing some benefits and doing much
damage."
28
An important link in the argument for the protection of commercial
speech, and of advertising in particular, is that such speech promotes
wealth maximization, and thus satisfaction and well-being. But the linkage
between wealth maximization and well-being or happiness, at least for our
society, in our time, should not be established merely by definition. Let us
then consider, for our culture, the evidence bearing upon the assumed
linkage between wealth, consumption, and well-being.
26. See John M. Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in EssAYS IN PERSUA-
SION 358, 365 (1963) (referring to needs "which are relative in the sense that we feel them
only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows").
27. SeeJoHN K. GALarrI, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 120 (1958) ("Nothing in economics
so quickly marks an individual as incompetently trained as a disposition to remark on the
legitimacy of the desire for more food and the frivolity of the desire for a more elaborate
automobile."); see alSO JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE OF CONTENTMENT 8 (1992) ("One
may marvel at the attraction of often frivolous and dispensable consumer artifacts and enter-
tainments in our time, but their ultimately controlling appeal cannot be doubted.").
28. IRs MURDOCH, METAPHYSICS AS A GUIDE TO MORALS 372 (1992).
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In some respects, it might be improper to treat wealth or income as
an adequate proxy for consumer spending. But given the remarkably low
contemporary American private savings rate2 and the evidence that over
90% of American incomes are devoted to consumption,3 0 it seems reason-
able to draw upon the literature discussing the relation between income
or wealth and reported happiness.
For many economists, voluntary consumption of non-defective goods
is not the beginning, but the end of any inquiry into the relationship be-
tween consumption and happiness.3 ' This approach in turn reinforces
the process by which "the market culture teaches us that money is the
source of well-being."3 2 Many of us suppose that we would be significantly
happier, over the long term, if we were able to afford to buy some particu-
lar set of commodities. Based on the available social science evidence,
however, this belief is likely wrong.
It has been observed, for example, that "[wihile GNP and material
standards of life have advanced substantially in the post-World War II de-
cades, the extent of happiness and the rate of subjective satisfactions have
not."3 3 In particular, real income rose quite substantially in the United
States in the period from 1957 to 1973, but reported levels of satisfaction
declined slightly during this period.3 4 During this same period, interest-
ingly, the percentage of those describing themselves as "very happy" stead-
ily decreased, and this decrease was most evident among the most
affluent.
3 5
It is tempting to dismiss these findings as largely a reflection of
unique historical events. Naturally, it may be thought, a pre-Sputnik
America would, all else equal, be happier than a post-Vietnam era
America. To this, several replies may be made. First, the trends referred
to above have not reversed themselves in the years following 1973.36 As
the data is extended in time, it becomes increasingly difficult to dismiss as
aberrant or artifactual. Second, trying to explain the data on reported
happiness in terms of broader cultural and historical events comes peril-
ously close to undermining, rather than rescuing, the notion that wealth
and consumption lead to happiness. And finally, the weak, limited rela-
tionship between income or expenditures and happiness is supported
from a number of angles.
29. See generally THE U.S. SAVINGS CHALLENGE: PoLIcv OrIONS FOR PRODUCTIVrrY AND
GROWTH (Charles E. Walker et al. eds., 1990); LAWRENcE H. SUMMERS & CHRIS CARROLL, WHY
Is U.S. NATIONAL SAVING So Low? (1987).
30. See LEBERGOTr, supra note 7, at 65.
31. See Robert E. Lane, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 113 PUB. INT. 56, 61 (1993).
32. 1L
33. GEORGE KATONA, PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 363 (1975).
34. See RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENr REVOLUTION 116 (1977).
35. See Angus Campbell, Subjective Measures of Well-Being, 31 Am. PSYCHOLOGISTr 117, 118
(1976).
36. See Alan T. Durning, Are We Happy Yet? How the Pursuit of Happiness is Failing, 27
Frrums-r 20, 21 (1993) (percentage of those reporting themselves as "very happy" fluctuating
but stable at roughly one-third since the mid-1950s).
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In fact, there is evidence suggesting that the linkage between income
and happiness is growing weaker over time in the United States.3 7 In any
event, a number of surveys illustrate the weak relationship between money
and happiness. 38 The evidence extends far beyond the American context.
Robert Lane concludes, for example, that "[i] n almost all developed coun-
tries there is no substantial relation between income and well-being."
39
And the evidence in the American context can be particularized. For ex-
ample, a 1973 study indicated that despite regional differences in income,
when Southern state residents are "asked to evaluate the quality of their
lives, they are modestly but consistently more positive than people living in
the other major regions of the country."40 A survey of 22 large lottery
winners "found no clear difference between their happiness and that of
controls."41 Nor does wealth tend to be associated with reduction in the
amount of worrying; instead, "it simply changes the subject"4 2 of the
worrying.
As a general rule, then, with some qualifications, happiness does not
appear to be strongly linked with income and wealth, or, presumably, con-
sumer expenditures guided, facilitated, or prompted by commercial
speech. Turning from survey data to introspection confirms key elements
of this conclusion. The philosopher James Griffin observes that "[i]t is
depressingly common that when even some of our strongest and most cen-
tral desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even worse, off."
43
As we have seen, the typical inability of consumption to generate last-
ing satisfaction has been variously diagnosed. When discussing consump-
tion-based lifestyles, contemporary writers tend, again consistent with
introspection, to recur to concepts such as self-defeatingness 44 and the
"hedonic treadmill," 45 to the phenomenon of being trapped,4 6 and of be-
ing "addicted."4 7 This literature thus helps quantify or make more precise
the observations of some of the historical writers discussed above. Thus,
for example, based upon his important survey work, the political scientist
Ronald Inglehart concludes that "[w]hile increased prosperity may pro-
duce a short-term sense of gratification, an individual gradually adjusts his
aspiration level to his external circumstances; after a certain time lag, one
takes a given level of prosperity for granted and aspires to more." 48 This
result should not be surprising.
37. See MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS 94 (1987).
38. See id. at 93 (citing several studies).
39. Lane, supra note 31, at 57.
40. Campbell, supra note 35, at 118.
41. ARGYLE, supra note 37, at 97.
42. Lane, supra note 31, at 60.
43. JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING 10 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PuB. INrEREs-r 3, 10
(1973).
45. Id.; Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
46. Easterlin, supra note 44, at 10.
47. Id.; TIBOR ScrrovsKy, HuMAN DESIRE AND ECONOMIC SATISFACTION 118 (1986).
48. INGLEHART, supra note 34, at 147.
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If getting and spending, perhaps via commercial speech, does not sig-
nificantly affect happiness, there are stronger influences on happiness.
The evidence suggests that happiness is more crucially affected, generally,
by "social relations, work, and leisure."49 These sources of satisfaction
often do not depend upon market-based consumption of goods and serv-
ices.50 Nor, for that matter, do we tend to find genuine friendship, appro-
priately stimulating work, and leisure in general to parallel consumption
as an entrapping, self-defeating "treadmill."5 1 If wealth is subject to the
law of diminishing returns, 52 genuine friendship does not seem to be simi-
larly vulnerable.
5 3
Admittedly, it is not easy to measure attributes like the "quality" of
work or friendship in a rigorous way. But measurement problems do not
obscure the basic message. Incidentally, the evidence seems to suggest
that "informal visits between neighbors and friends, family conversation,
and time spent at family meals have all diminished in the United States
since mid-century,"5 4 though this may have been offset by more interest-
ing work for some persons.
Why we remain on the hedonic treadmill need not be fully answered
here. It may be that at least some relationships, creative work, and pro-
ductive, potentially enjoyable leisure activity require investments, initial
sacrifices, or training which we are now unable or unwilling to under-
take.5 5 But a more important explanation, it would seem, for remaining
on the hedonic treadmill may be more broadly institutional, with commer-
cial speech at the heart of that explanation.
Before taking up the broader role of commercial speech in our cul-
tural context, though, one should acknowledge the possibility that the
genuinely poor, whether conceived of as a relatively poor nation-state, or
as a segment of a particular society, would be significantly better off at
higher consumption levels, or would, more particularly, be happier as a
result of uninhibited non-deceptive commercial speech.
As it turns out, there is some controversy over whether poor societies
are significantly unhappier than rich societies.5 6 In any event, as the
United States presumably does not fall into the former category, broadly
increasing our collective happiness through additional consumer spend-
ing seems unlikely. More interesting is the relationship between income
and happiness among the poor within our own society. This precise ques-
49. Durning, supra note 36, at 20; see also Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
50. See Scrrovsw, supra note 47, at 119; see also Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective
Values and the Future, 71 TEX. L. REV. 805, 809 (1993) ("[A] market-based society has a ten-
dency to push people towards those things that it can provide-goods and services-while
the real sources of satisfaction are outside the capability of the marketplace to provide.").
51. See Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
52. See, e.g., Ruut Veenhoven, National Wealth and Individual Happiness, in UNDERSTAND-
INC ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 9, 19 (Klaus G. Grunert & Folke Olander eds., 1989).
53. See Lane, supra note 31, at 63.
54. Durning, supra note 36, at 22.
55. See ScrrovsKy, supra note 47, at 123.
56. Compare, e.g., Lane, supra note 31, at 56-57 and sources cited therein with AaRGam,
supra note 37, at 94 and Easterlin, supra note 44 (work is re-examined in Lane, supra note 31).
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tion must be kept in perspective. We plainly ought to take relief of poverty
far more seriously than we do, whether this would be politically popular or
not. This is a matter of justice and basic moral principle quite independ-
ent of survey evidence of subjective satisfaction among the poor.
5 7
With this understanding, it is certainly plausible to argue that the de-
clining marginal utility of wealth 58 is of scant relevance to the poor, and
that money can at least reduce some forms of brute distress, such as reliev-
ing cold or hunger.59 It is thus not surprising that people in poverty
within our society tend to report greater unhappiness.60
Assuming, then, some negative correlation between poverty within
the United States and happiness, the question for our purposes then be-
comes whether the poor can be made significantly happier through a re-
gime of specially constitutionally protected commercial speech. In some
respects, this is a difficult question. But we must not lose sight of the obvi-
ous. A poor person benefits far more from a warm coat than from com-
mercial speech about coats, even when the indirect benefits of
unrestricted commercial speech in enhancing quality and driving down
prices are considered.
Doubtless the poor may, to take one example, benefit from prescrip-
tion drug price advertising, directly or indirectly, at least under some
health insurance and welfare policies. But there are costs for the poor as
well. It is possible that prescription drug price advertising may affect the
commercial viability of small, independent pharmacies owned by persons
with a long-term stake in a poor community. There may be some tradeoff
between price and the availability of a pharmacist with ties to the poor
community who is able and inclined to treat the local poor as individuals,
who knows their broader needs, and who can establish the kind of per-
sonal, caring relationship of the sort that existing evidence suggests is im-
portant to happiness.
6 '
As well, we must consider that as constitutional protection for com-
mercial speech increases, so may the potential for commercial speech to
manipulate and distract the poor, without violating whatever restrictions
may exist on fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech.
Along with useful information about accessible goods in accessible places
comes the broader, phantasmagorical effects of contemporary advertising
as well.
57. See, e.g., KA.r, supra note 7, at 42-43.
58. See Veenhoven, supra note 52, at 19.
59. See ARctYL, supra note 37, at 93.
60. See id. at 94; Lane, supra note 31, at 57; Campbell, supra note 35, at 121.
61. See generally Durning, supra note 36 and Lane, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
For discussion of similar issues without special reference to the poor, see the several opinions




I. THE EFFECTs OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
One need not deny the beneficial effects of commercial speech gen-
erally or of advertising in particular. However maldistributed wealth may
be, there is plainly more of it, in some obvious sense, in a materialist-ori-
ented consumer economy.62 Commercial speech, including various forms
of advertising, obviously plays a significant role in this process. This dis-
cussion does not minimize the plight of the poor, who plainly are better
off with consumer goods such as clothing and food.6 3 More broadly, the
society as a whole clearly benefits from rapid dissemination of accurate
information concerning, for example, a safe and uniquely effective drug
treatment for a serious illness.
64
As well, it is difficult to deny the adverse consequences on wages and
employment if many of us tomorrow abandoned familiar consumption
levels in favor of communing with nature or verse composition.
6 5 Of
course, my proposal to accord no special constitutional protection to com-
mercial speech does not seem likely to lead to any such consequences.
Those persons who eventually discover themselves in possession of excess
income and wealth may reasonably be advised to enhance the effective
market demand of the poor.
Nor should we deny that the very activity of searching for, selecting,
and acquiring commercial goods and services may itself be utility-enhanc-
ing.66 On the contrary, "it is a cliche to say that the best way to deal with
being depressed is to go shopping."6 7 Whether this is actually the best
path to well-being seems, however, given the evidence and analyses dis-
cussed above, 6 rather doubtful. Or so a reasonable government might
come to believe.
Neither is it necessary for us to endorse any distinction between natu-
ral, healthy, and authentic consumer needs and artificial, unhealthy, or
contrived consumer needs.69 To some degree, as Jean Baudrillard has ar-
gued, modem advertising often tends to break down any traditional dis-
tinction between authentic and contrived, artificial responses to
advertisements. 70 It might be noted, though, that if any distinction be-
tween natural and contrived responses to advertising tends to dissolve, it
62. See KATONA, supra note 33, at 363.
63. See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE: TOWARD A HUMANIZED TECHNOL-
oGY 120 (Ruth N. Anshen ed., 1968).
64. See Keith B. Leffler, Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug Adver-
tising, 24 J.L. & ECON. 45, 74 (1981).
65. See FROMM, supra note 63, at 131.
66. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRrTCS
521-22 (1991) [hereinafter LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN]. But see ROBERT E. LANE,
THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 469 (1991).
67. Stuart Ewen, Advertising and the Development of Consuh er Society, in CULTURAL Poirrcs
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 82, 85 (Ian Angus & Sut Jhally eds., 1989).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 1-61.
69. See, e.g., FROMM, supra note 63, at 124; JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF TELEVISION 125 (1978) (citing, perhaps controversially, an electric hair dryer
as a contrived, artificial, implanted need).
70. SeeJean Baudrillard, The Masses: The Implosion of the Social in the Media, 16 NEW LITER-
ARY HISTORY 577, 578-79 (Marie McLean trans., 1985).
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may become more difficult to specify how commercial speech distinctively
serves any of the values typically thought to underlie the free speech
clause. 7 1 If, for example, our responses to ads tend to be neither classi-
cally manipulated nor authentic, it may be hard to say why that murky
state of affairs is most consistent with genuine autonomy.
Finally, we need not ascribe to commercial speech, and to commer-
cial advertising in particular, powers they do not possess. Plainly, neither
particular advertisements nor broader ad campaigns are invariably effec-
tive. It is reported, for example, that "about 70% of test-market brands are
not expanded nationally and can therefore be classed as failures." 72 The
ability of advertising to influence choice among competing brands often
does not translate into effective influence over whether one buys that gen-
eral kind of good at all. 73 And even when advertising affects behavior, the
effect may well be temporary.
74
None of this implies, however, that commercial advertising is without
significant, long-term, intended or unintended effects on American cul-
ture and decisionmaking. It is admittedly true that advertisements often
compete against each other,75 with one product's gain being another
product's loss. But the proliferation of ads does not amount simply to a
process of mutual annihilation. Importantly, advertisements that conflict
or compete at one level may, at another level, mutually reinforce one an-
other. Such effects need not be intended or even recognized. Consider,
by way of loose analogy, that in the natural world, two or more separate
waves may mutually interfere or tend to cancel each other if they arrive
out of phase, or they may tend to reinforce one another,76 thereby in
some respect heightening their potential impact.
At a fairly specific level, an ad for a particular drug, as "reinforced" by
other ads for competing and non-competing drugs, may tend in our cul-
tural context to promote drug ingestion more generally as a response to
medical, psychological, and even social problems. As one former partici-
pant in the process has written, "[w]hile it might matter to Upjohn or
Cutter Laboratories which drug a consumer buys, both are in agreement
that they benefit whenever people seek any drug rather than a nondrug
solution to a problem." 77 More precisely, though, this mutual reinforce-
71. See infra note 78; see also Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Commu-
nication, 71 TEx. L. REv. 697, 712 (1993) (noting commercial ads have "helped devalue the
coin of communication by developing a massive, unthinking tolerance for nonsense" (quot-
ing LEo BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 7 (2d ed. NTC Business Books 1984) (1967))).
72. J. Hugh Davidson, Why Most New Consumer Brands Fai HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1976, at 117; see also MICHAEL NovA , THE SPi-rI OF DEMOCRATIC CAPrrTALsM 108 (1982)
("The history of advertising is full of quirks and failures.").
73. TIBOR ScrrovsKy, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY 205 (1976).
74. See Lester D. Taylor & Daniel Weiserbs, Advertising and the Aggregate Consumption
Function, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 642, 650 (1972).
75. NovAK, supra note 72, at 108.
76. E.g., NICK HERBERT, QuANruM REALI=y 74 (1985).
77. MANnER, supra note 69, at 126.
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ment and "generalization" process would seem to operate whether it is
intended or even recognized by any party, including the audience.
78
More broadly, even when commercial ads compete, or fail to sell a
particular product, they may at least inadvertently, through their mutually
reinforced cumulative impact, legitimize and support commercial con-
sumption as a style of life and a solution to life's problems.79 Thus it is
only a harmless exaggeration to say that " [a] dvertising serves not so much
to advertise products as to promote consumption as a style of life."80
Thus while consumers reject or ignore most of the particularized ad
messages they receive, as would inevitably be the case, they may be less
able to resist the unintended broader "message" of the superiority of com-
mercial consumption as a basic approach to living.8 ' This assumption re-
flects a realistic assessment of the contemporary balance of cultural forces.
Consider that one writer has estimated that by the age of retirement, the
typical American will have seen at least two million television commer-
cials.8 2 This is a remarkable figure. Children's television programming,
where basic preferences might be formed, commonly seeks to merge sub-
stantive programming and commercial huckstering.8 3 The vector of
forces tending to engender commercial consumption is, plainly, powerful.
By itself, the power of commercial speech to shape inadvertently our
culture might not be so troubling, were it not for the fact that today, in
our cultural context, there is no realistic prospect for effective "counter-
speech" tending to promote noncommercial approaches to life's problems
and opportunities. In our cultural circumstances, no institution currently
devotes any real energy or resources to provide a counterspeech remedy 4
for the implicit message of our commercial culture.8 5 Of course, some
78. Actually, the case for restricting commercial speech is additionally strengthened to
the degree that the typical ad does not reflect an actual intent to promote an ethos of materi-
alism or consumption, or any other broadly social idea. See, e.g., R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE
FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAw 1-31 (1990).
79. See Durning, supra note 36, at 22.
80. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NAROissisM 137 (1979) [hereinafter LASCH,
THE CULTURE]; see also LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN, supra note 66, at 518.
81. See Ewen, supra note 67, at 83. Again, it is possible that the expansion of commer-
cialism tends to promote the atrophy of the most non-commercial elements of other cultural
institutions.
82. NEIL PosTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 126 (1985); see also Collins & Skover,
supra note 71, at 707 (noting twelve billion display ads, 2.5 million radio ads, and 300 thou-
sand television commercials generated each day; average person spends one and a half years
watching commercials).
83. SeeJAMES B. TwrrcHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE 246-47 (1992) (arguing that children's
television cartoons are essentially a merchandising medium); see also Ellen Edwards, The Chil-
dren's Half-Hour: Hostage to Toy Makers?, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at Al (arguing that chil-
dren's television is driven by toymakers).
84. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that prohibition of free speech is dangerous and not to be done to avert merely
trivial harms), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
85. See LAscH, THE CULTURE, supra note 80, at 140 (arguing that teachers pacify students
by making school painless); LEBERGOTr, supra note 7, at 34-35 (arguing that Western culture
maximizes pleasure as a goal); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Psychology of First
Amendment Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEx. L. REV. 819, 826 (1993) (quoting LEo BOGART, STRAT-
EGY IN ADVERTISING 107 (2d ed. 1984)).
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elements of many cultural institutions speak, albeit softly or occasionally,
against consumption-oriented styles of life. But even their message is
often mixed, and it is overridden by the broader culture.
This is a thesis about the sustained balance of cultural institutional
forces. It is admittedly not a theme the correctness of which can be
demonstrated to a skeptic by a few footnote citations. Its plausibility is
presumably widely accepted, and the evidence for its truth can be derived
from a mere glance at our contemporary culture. As well, some portion of
those who have urged special constitutional protection for commercial
speech may find my basic thesis regarding the current institutional role of
commercial speech to be plausible and important, and thus reconsider
their position on the constitutional protection of commercial speech.
This is not to argue the more controversial thesis that genuine free-
dom of speech requires at least rough equality of resources among con-
tending forces.8 6 All one need argue is that in our current cultural
circumstances, no single cultural institution, or set of such institutions, is
either inclined to, or able to, provide any substantial "countervailing"
speech to counteract the broad, reinforced influence, whether intended
or not, of commercial advertising speech. A "bias," in the sense of a dis-
tinct vector of cultural institutional forces, toward some form of consump-
tion of commercial goods and services clearly characterizes our day.
87 Of
course, some persons are less affected by this cultural bias than others, but
this would be true of even the most dominant cultural tendencies in any
society.
One should take a moment, though, to consider a possible objection
to, or extension of, the argument thus far. Perhaps one might argue that a
parallel analysis could be developed for the political sphere, and particu-
larly for the case of competing electoral candidates of opposing ideologies
or parties. Isn't it possible that even genuinely competing electoral candi-
dates may, like some waves in the natural world, or like most commercial
advertising speech, tend perhaps unintentionally to reinforce certain basic
political themes, so as to "bias" public thinking, perhaps in ways not re-
sponded to by other institutions?
Certainly, a debate continually dominated by one range of ideologies
or parties may tend, even unintentionally, to delegitimize other political
options. But for our present purposes, there are important disanalogies
between contemporary electoral competition and the competition of the
marketplace. A casual examination suggests that most commercial ads in
86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that to restrict speech of
some elements in society to enhance voice of others is "wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment"); see also Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627 (1988);J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (analyzing Buckley and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974).
87. The language of "bias" in this respect is drawn from FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL. LIMITS TO
GROWTH 84 (1976). Note that this bias need not be toward "conspicuous" consumption or
toward the most expensive affordable goods and services. There may well be fluctuations in a
society's consumption patterns over time from the exotic to the plain and functional. See also
Holly Brubach, Sackcloth and Ashes, 67 NEw YORKER, Feb. 3, 1992, at 78.
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all media do not refer invidiously to any competitor's good or service, let
alone to all significant competitors. Where ads are comparative, they are
often done with a light touch. There is rarely any implication that any
competitor's product or service is, in any absolute sense, shoddy, danger-
ous, or not of value in the abstract.
In the electoral realm, however, invidious comparisons are com-
mon,88 even increasingly so.89 While the effects of "negative" or "attack"
ads in political campaigns may be complex and difficult to track,90 such
ads often repel the public, contributing to voter disenchantment, apathy,
cynicism, and low voter turnout.9 1 Certainly, there is a greater sense con-
veyed that one's electoral opponent is affirmatively unworthy or harmful
than is typically conveyed in the commercial context. Thus electoral
speech by competing candidates may not be as typically mutually reinforc-
ing as in the case of commercial ads.
Of course, this is not to deny that the constant exposition of main-
stream political ideologies tends to make alternative perspectives seem im-
plausible or inconceivable; this is a central problem in democratic theory.
This problem, however, need not be resolved here. Instead, the reader is
invited to accept either of two views. First, that mainstream political
speech tends, at least by omission, to unreasonably stigmatize some or all
non-mainstream political speech and that in the name of equality or free-
dom, the government should do something about this. Or second, that
there is a significant difference between the ways in which commercial
speech marginalizes non-commercial attitudes and the ways in which
mainstream political speech marginalizes non-mainstream political views,
such that it is reasonable to regulate commercial speech in ways unaccept-
able in the realm of political speech. On either of these views, the argu-
ment for the reasonable regulation of commercial speech can go forward.
Nor is it correct to think of all commercial ads as propositional. As
any investigation suggests, advertising has undergone qualitative change
over time.92 Many, though hardly all, contemporary ads are largely
imagistic or atmospheric, or seek to link a product with a mood, a celeb-
rity, or a somehow assumedly appealing non-celebrity, without proposition
88. See, e.g., Neal J. Roese & Gerald N. Sande, Backlash Effects in Attack Politics, 23 J. AP-
PLIED Soc. PSYcHOL. 632, 651 (1993) (arguing that politicians frequently resort to a discus-
sion of emotional issues).
89. See Sharyne Merritt, Negative Political Advertising: Some Empirical Findings, 13 J. ADVER-
"rISING 27-28 (1984); Ruth Shalit, The Oppo Boom: Smearing for Profit Takes Off, NEw REPUBLIC,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 16; see also Campaigns in the Muck, USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 1994, at Al (increased
negative campaigning anticipated by political consultants for 1994).
90. See Gina M. Garramone, Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads, 61 JouRNAISM Q. 250
(1984) (arguing that backlash is most common effect of negative advertising); Merritt, supra
note 89, at 37 (admitting that study was limited due to focus on only one election); Roese &
Sande, supra note 88.
91. See Merritt, supra note 89, at 37; Roese & Sande, supra note 88, at 651. For broader
discussion, see generally KAREN S.JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARYA. COPELAND, NEGATIVE POLI-rCAL
ADVERISING: COMING OF AGE (1991).
92. See RAYMOND WILuAMS, TELEVISION: TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM 68 (1974)
(arguing that television, as it evolves, is allowing people to experience educational processes
rather than just being taught about the processes).
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or promise.93 Such ads are neither true nor false, and neither descriptive
nor misleading in the traditional sense.9 4 While some modern ads may
perhaps be thought of as "semihypnotic and irrational"95 by design, and
others as traditionally propositional, many contemporary ads are non-
propositional.
To the extent that freedom of speech is a matter of a search for some
propositional truth, protecting ads that do not implicate truth or falsity is
in that respect misguided. Such ads are neither fraudulent, deceptive,
misleading, nor the opposite, thus cohering poorly or not at all with some
of the categories and criteria by which the Supreme Court examines such
speech. 9 6
Of course, not all commercial speech disdains truth and falsity. More
broadly, regulation of contemporary commercial speech raises interesting
issues of genuine freedom of speech and of freedom in general. The
point of reasonable restrictions on commercial speech is not, however, to
flatly prohibit underlying transactions between commercial sellers and po-
tential buyers. 97 In our cultural context, the effects of reasonable regula-
tion of commercial speech on freedom are more subtle.
It is important, for example, not to confuse "diversity of product
choice with diversity of life-style or thoughts."9 8 Having a choice among
brands or products would be a poor sort of freedom if one's culture left
one unable to take less consumption-oriented alternatives seriously. More
particularly, to the extent that we participate in consumption fads on the
basis of popularity, or "bandwagon" effects, 99 we are neither choosing au-
tonomously, nor achieving any genuinely worthy community, especially
between generations.
10 0
More insidiously, over the long term, in a cultural context in which
consumption is a dominant and only ineffectively challenged theme,
largely unregulated speech on behalf of consumer goods and services may
93. See PosrmAN, supra note 82, at 127 (commercial ads as increasingly non-
propositional).
94. See Ju.Es HENRY, CULTURE AcANsr MAN 47 (1963); MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF
INFORMATION 59 (1990) (discussing the work of Jean Baudrillard); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text; Todd F. Simon, Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather Than
Content, 20 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 215, 239 (1985) (arguing that non-objective advertising is "in-
herently unverifiable").
95. FROMM, supra note 63, at 123; Bailey Kuklin, Sef-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U.
CrN. L. REv. 649, 649 (1992).
96. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986)
(citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
97. See KATONA, supra note 33, at 376 (questioning Fromm's assertion that the consumer
is passive and questioning the need for legal restrictions on advertising); NovAy, supra note
72, at 108; ScrrovsKy, supra note 47, at 126 (arguing that although consumer stimulation is
expensive, the proper remedy does not include denying the stimulus to the consumer).
98. MANER, supra note 69, at 125.
99. See HARvEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR
MICROEcONomics 48-49 (1976) (defining "bandwagon effect" as "the desire to join the
crowd").
100. See generally Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public
Life, 13 AM. PROSPECT 35 (1993). See alsoJhally, supra note 50, at 813 (commercial culture as
discouraging bonds with future generations).
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tend to change our basic tastes, capacities, and judgments10 1 in ways we do
not anticipate or even recognize. Some of these changes, such as increas-
ingly demanding standards for product warranties, may well be benign.
Others, however, such as loss of capacity to value, to enjoy, or even to
envision non-market solutions to problems, are not.10 2 To claim that a
"free market" in non-deceptive commercial speech makes us genuinely
freer thus raises, at a minimum, serious problems of measurement and
commensurability. Why must a democratic society interpret its constitu-
tion to bias the choice in the commercial direction if that society wishes to
maximize the most valuable sorts of freedom?
To illustrate this general problem, let us consider, almost at random,
one particular scenario. With regard to a typical consumer good, the in-
terests of producers and consumers may both be served, via expansion of
market and economies of scale, if consumer tastes regarding a product
can be modified in the direction of some homogeneous fairly low com-
mon denominator. 10 3 There need be nothing narrowly or classically de-
ceptive or coercive about this taste modification process, in the sense that
no literal force or fraud is applied. Jazz or classical music, say, is still in
some sense available, but is widely found to be genuinely unpalatable. Ad-
mittedly, in utilitarian terms, consumers may well gain from even rather
intensive development of this process, at least in some sense. But the price
in freedom may be high.
True, one must grant that freedom in general and freedom of speech
are hardly equivalent. But for our immediate purposes, the most relevant
commonly cited purpose or value underlying freedom of speech is that of
"self-realization," or the development and flourishing of the personal-
ity. 10 4 The dubious effect of largely unregulated commercial speech on
consumers' genuine self-realization means that such speech may actually
undermine the purposes of free speech as much as it may undermine free-
dom more generally.
Thus, even setting aside all cases of false or otherwise deceptive com-
mercial speech, it is far from clear that freedom in general, or at least
freedom of speech, is unequivocally maximized by special constitutional
protection for commercial speech. What tips the balance, again, is a real-
istic assessment of contemporary institutional forces and the absence of
any real institutional capacity for, or interest in, challenging the domi-
nance of the culture of commercial speech.
101. See ScrrovsKy, supra note 73, at 5 (arguing that the theory that consumers know what
is best for them is unscientific and inaccurate).
102. See id.; see also Allan C. Hutchinson, More Talk: Against Constitutionalizing (Commercial)
Speech, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 15 (1990) ("a commercially saturated atmosphere" as tending to
"trivialize and impoverish democratic politics").
103. See Scrrovsmz, supra note 73, at 9 (arguing that sellers cater to the "desires everybody
shares").
104. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Ra,. 646 (1982); RobertJ. Sharpe, A Comment on
Allan Hutchinson's Money Talk: Against Constitutionalizing Commercial Speech, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J.
35, 39 (1990).
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As matters stand, any reasonable governmental restriction on com-
mercial speech thus serves, if only minimally, to reduce the degree of cul-
tural institutional bias105 in favor of a commercial speech-guided culture
of consumption. Whether such restrictions on commercial speech tend,
in the aggregate, to promote genuine happiness, freedom, or human dig-
nity by reducing that bias should be left to reasonable democratic deci-
sionmaking. It is then up to the society to take other necessary steps
toward legitimizing or encouraging less commercial ways of life, consistent
with the Constitution and other democratic policy preferences.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE VALUES UNDERLYING FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
The question of whether, or how stringently, to protect constitution-
ally commercial speech has proved remarkably resistant to consensus. Per-
haps symbolically, the leading modern free speech theorist, John Stuart
Mill, was obviously ambivalent as to the level of protection properly to be
accorded some forms of commercial speech. 106 Contemporary writers
are, if not individually ambivalent, at least mutually divided.
10 7
One broad camp favors some degree of special First Amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech.' 0 8 Writers in this camp recognize that
many commercial ads they would protect are less propositional than
imagistic or symbolic, but they note that such ads may promote distinctive
lifestyles, such as materialism or hedonistic consumption, as might fully
protected non-commercial speech. 10 9 Failure to protect commercial
speech may, according to some, even be dangerous. Such failure to pro-
tect commercial speech fully may, it is said, provide government with "a
powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by classifying it as merely
commercial."" 10
In contrast, there is a broad group of writers more skeptical of the
need for special protection for commercial speech."' In this camp, it is
sometimes argued that special protection for commercial speech may en-
105. For broader background, see Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure 71 IowA L.
REv. 1405, 1425 (1986) ("Contemporary social structure will, if left to itself, skew public
debate.").
106. SeeJOHN STUART MIL, ON LIBERTY 168-69 (Penguin ed. 1974) (1859).
107. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Mar-
kets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 6-9 (1989) (providing a broad typology of approaches to the consti-
tutional status of commercial speech).
108. See, e.g., Leading Cases of the 1992 Supreme Court Term, 107 HAv. L. REv. 144, 225
(1993) (stating that the Supreme Court "continues to leave 'commercial speech' with insuffi-
cient protection").
109. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. Rav. 777, 791 (1993).
110. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627,
653 (1990).
111. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 237 (1993)
(commercial speech as allegedly less closely connected with "expressive" interests than is
political speech); Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and
Society, 88J. PHIL. 113, 128 (1991) (asserting that "an unregulated marketplace of ideas seems
essential for political speech but not for commercial speech").
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danger, rather than strengthen, protection for political speech, on the
grounds that such a policy might, over time, erode any public conviction
of the core value of freedom of speech. 112 Alternatively, it has been ar-
gued that commercial speech generates fewer "external" benefits uncap-
tured by the speaker than does political speech."13
Typically this battle is played out, quite inconclusively, over the rela-
tionship between commercial speech and one or more of the values or
purposes thought to underlie special protection for free speech. Perhaps
the basic problem in this regard is that "[i]n a pluralistic, heterogeneous
society, such as ours, people disagree sharply over the needs, interests, and
desires that give rise to the evaluative points of the First Amendment tax-
onomy of worth."
1 14
Thus it has been argued that commercial speech is either unre-
lated,11 5 or at best differently linked, 116 to the values thought to underlie
the Free Speech Clause. Not surprisingly, the contrary also has been ar-
gued, on various grounds. Commercial speech, it is argued, typically ex-
presses "ideas and values."' 1 7 Professor Burt Neuborne has observed that
"abandoning protected commercial speech altogether denies consumers
access to valuable information."1 18 Michael Perry has argued for protec-
tion of commercial speech under what he calls the "democratic" and "epi-
stemic" conceptions of free speech."a 9 Writers such as Martin Redish
120
and Daniel Farber 12 1 have noted the artistic value of at least some com-
mercial advertisements.
This sort of persistent, apparently unresolvable controversy is paral-
leled by the debate over the relationship between commercial speech and
the more particular value of self-realization. Some writers have argued
112. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 449, 486 (1985).
113. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SuvioLK U. L. Ra,. 1,
39-40 (1986). Of course, to the extent that commercial speech, or advertising in particular,
helps to generate a culture of commodity consumption, such speech may create external
effects, both positive and, as we have suggested, negative.
114. Heidi L. Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 1241 (1994).
115. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 353 (1978) (noting the public's interest
in commercial speech messages as "totally irrelevant to first amendment values").
116. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REv.
422, 460 (1980) ("Commercial speech does not promote the underlying values of the system
in the same manner as does other expression.").
117. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL.
L. F. 1080, 1091.
118. Burt Neuborne, A Rationale For Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK.
L. Rav. 437, 440 (1980); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising."); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978).
119. MichaelJ. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L.
Rav. 1137, 1171-72 (1984).
120. Redish, supra note 14, at 431.
121. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372,
384 (1979).
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that commercial speech typically promotes self-realization, 122 while others
are more skeptical on this score.1 23 This debate remains unresolvable
largely because of ambiguity surrounding ideas such as self-expression and
autonomy.124 Roughly, self-realization in the sense of acting as one hap-
pens to wish with respect to receiving commercial messages is obviously
promoted by freedom of commercial speech. In contrast, if we think of
self-realization in terms of human dignity or the highest development of
the human personality, the connection between commercial speech and
such self-realization will seem much more dubious. Whether unregulated
non-deceptive commercial speech promotes self-realization in the sense of
happiness or subjective well-being has been controversial, but as we have
seen above, 125 available evidence suggests that it does not.
In this context, little is gained by insisting upon a controversially nar-
row view of free speech values. Perhaps the leading exponent of such an
approach is C. Edwin Baker. Professor Baker argues that "interpretations
of the free speech clause should focus on the liberty or freedom of the
speaker"1 26 as opposed to that of any actual or potential audience. As
Professor Baker then develops the argument, corporations-or more par-
ticularly, non-household-oriented, non-media corporations other than la-
bor unions-fall outside the scope of the Free Speech Clause.1 27 This is
because such corporations are, in a competitive market, structurally
bound to pursue profit in some relevantly constrained, determinate way
that sufficiently explains their speech, and cannot otherwise pursue truth,
anyone's self-realization, or freedom.
128
Each of the necessary steps in Professor Baker's subtle and complex
argument will be plausible to some. But the combined controversiality of
those steps leads one to suspect that the argument is acceptable only to a
subset of those already disposed to deny special constitutional protection
to commercial speech. Given the overall stringency of Professor Baker's
premises, his theory is of only limited use in persuading those who are
agnostic on the question of protecting commercial speech.
122. See, e.g., David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv.
359, 361 (1990); Kenton F. Machina, Freedom ofExpression in Commerce, 3 L. & PHIL. 375 (1984)
(arguing for full protection for commercial speech on "autonomy" grounds).
123. See, e.g., Michael Davis, The Special Resiliency of Commercial Speech as Deus Ex Machina, 6
L. & PHIL. 121 (1987) (replying to Machina, supra note 122); Thomas H. Jackson & John C.
Jeffries,Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Proces and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. Rv. 1, 14
(1979) (asserting "commercial speech has no apparent connection with the idea of individ-
ual self-fulfillment").
124. See, e.g., NicHoIAs WOLFSON, CORPORATE Fis-r AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 63
(1990) (linking the ideas of self-expression, human dignity, and autonomy).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 1-61.
126. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv.
1, 4 (1976).
127. See id. at 13, 28, 40.
128. See id. For further relevant discussion by Professor Baker, see C. Edwin Baker, Adver-
tising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2097, 2232-33 (1992) (expanded in C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PREss (1994)). Of course, structural constraints may
be a sufficient explanation for speech without being necessary to explain the speech, which
may have other sufficient motivations.
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More generally, theorists' understandable focus on whether, or to
what extent, commercial speech promotes the values thought to underlie
the Free Speech Clause has been unproductive because of the equivocality
and controversial nature of the concepts involved. It is largely because of
this methodological dead end that one takes a different tack. First, the
widely presumed linkage between typical commercial speech and freedom
or happiness is in doubt. Second, the practical irrelevance of "counter-
speech" responses to commercial speech in a cultural context in which no
institution is either able or inclined to provide any such challenge on a
meaningful scale is noted.
IV. COMMERCIAL AND NoN-COMMERCIAL SPEECH
To this point, we have set aside the question of a precise, maximally
useful definition of commercial speech, relying instead on uncontroversial
examples. A precise and widely useful definition, allowing courts or other
persons to classify easily and uncontroversially instances of speech into
commercial or noncommercial may well not be possible. But one may at
least provide some reason for believing that ambiguities in the idea of
commercial speech will not commonly generate implausible or seriously
harmful results.
In this respect, the Supreme Court has been of limited assistance.1 2 9
The leading commercial speech case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,130 referred to "speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction.' "131 On the other hand,
the Court has also, in the influential case of Central Hudson Gas &. Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'3 2 referred to "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."
1 3 3
Apart from their inconsistency, these two definitions of commercial
speech are useful only in particular contexts. Consider first the "no more
than propose a commercial transaction" approach. Intuitively, commer-
cial speech may involve more than merely a proposal without losing its
commercial character. This definition may serve in contexts of commer-
cial advertising, securities offerings, and other areas, as long as nothing
hangs on the fact that this definition itself does not specify what is meant
by 'commercial.' But other intuitively commercial forms of speech, such
as many proxy statements, corporate financial statements, reports to share-
holders, commercial contracts, product safety brochures, warranties, prod-
uct labels, and so on do not fit neatly within the category of "proposals."
13 4
129. See David F. McGowan, supra note 122, at 400-02 (discussing and critiquing judicial
inconsistency in defining the scope of commercial speech).
130. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
131. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
132. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
133. Id. at 561.
134. See Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment 78 Nw. U. L. REx. 1212, 1214 (1983).
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On the other hand, the "solely economic interests" approach to defin-
ing commercial speech may include some instances of commercial speech
beyond mere proposals, but it also leaves out much that is ordinarily con-
sidered commercial speech. 13 5 Consider, for example, the central exam-
ple of a typical commercial advertisement for a perfume, an elaborate
exercise machine, a hair replacement technique, cigarettes, or athletic
shoes. Now, these and similar ads may relate in part to the economic in-
terests of producers and consumers. Far more is at stake, however, than
"solely"136 economic interests in the purchase of these and many other
products and services.
These definitions are thus in certain respects less than ideal. But no
simple, invariably helpful alternative definition seems attainable. It has
been declared that "the doctrine of commercial speech rests on a clean
distinction between the market for ideas and the market for goods and
services." 13 7 This approach is useful in certain respects. It is helpful, for
example, in reminding us of the important truth that often speech about
markets, generally or in particular, and especially speech about whether or
how such markets should be regulated, transcends commercial speech.
Plainly, though, markets for ideas, however we reasonably define
"ideas," and markets for goods and services are not mutually exclusive. It
is not difficult to imagine that authors and publishers of all sorts of books
propounding ideas may be in part motivated by a quest for profit, as, in
turn, may many of the book's purchasers.13 8 Inquiring into the degree, or
the causal necessity, of profit motivation on a case-by-case basis is obviously
problematic.
No simple distinction between the markets for ideas and for goods
and services is thus possible. But this does not mean that the distinction is
useless for all purposes, or that no serviceable distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech is possible. Commercial speech can
be a viable category even if it has no "essence." Professor Christopher
Stone has observed that "[w]e may be able to find nothing better than
'family resemblances' among members of the commercial speech set."13 9
One is at least able to distinguish commercial speech well enough to
justify treating commercial speech differently from political speech. The
most important reasons for this differential treatment have been set forth
at some length above. 140 But a bit more may be said to enhance interest
in the distinction. Professor Ronald Coase wonders why governments
should be deemed generally more competent to regulate commercial than
135. See id. at 1222.
136. See supra text accompanying note 133.
137. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 123, at 2; see aLso Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (declaring that "advertising pure and simple" is clearly
within the bounds of commercial speech).
138. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 159-60 (1982) (de-
clining to include all profit-motivated speech within the category of commercial speech).
139. Christopher D. Stone, Theorizing Commercial Speech, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 95, 113
(1988).
140. See supra sections I-I1.
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political speech. 14 1 If Professor Coase is right, much of the fuss over dis-
tinguishing commercial and political speech would seem misplaced.
But this skepticism is itself misplaced. No doubt some government
regulation of commercial speech is really driven by an enterprise's desire
to impose restrictions on entry by potential competitors, by a wish to un-
justly discriminate, or by a range of other anticompetitive motivations.
142
But this is hardly the whole story, and it is implausible to imagine that a
particular government can be equally trusted to regulate fairly its own rival
political parties, movements, and ideologies along with commercial enter-
prises and commercial speech.
The point may be put this way: it is at least plausible in some cases
that we are better off protecting unpopular political ideas, perhaps for the
sake of promoting an ethos of tolerance.1 4
3 On the other hand, few1 44
would argue that we are better off, even in the long run, legally protecting
the advertisement of latently dangerous products and relying on the tort
system, Consumer Reports, and the possibility of criminalizing the produc-
tion of the goods themselves to minimize the carnage. Banning an obvi-
ous carcinogen and banning an allegedly harmful political party require
entirely different justifications.
This is not to minimize the potential for abuse of the government's
power to regulate commercial speech. But such abuse can be reduced by
means other than specially protecting commercial speech. Most, if not all,
denunciations of an enterprise's attempt to reduce competition by induc-
ing the government to restrict commercial speech are themselves fully pro-
tected political speech. Any government actions reducing competition by
restricting commercial speech should be subject to a judicial test of rea-
sonableness under the Free Speech, Equal Protection, and Due Process
Clauses. 145 Any restrictions of commercial speech that are, for example,
racially invidious 146 should be subjected to the most stringent judicial
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
1 47
There is thus no reason to suppose that permitting reasonable gov-
ernment regulation of even non-deceptive commercial speech could not,
at least over the long term, provide significant net social benefits. But we
must do what we reasonably can to prevent political or other socially valua-
ble kinds of speech from being inadvertently swept into the net of com-
mercial speech regulation.
141. See R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6J. LEC.AL STU. 1, 2 (1977); see also Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-Histoy of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv.
747, 751-52 (1993); Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's
Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L REV. 45 (1985).
142. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1317, 1361-62 (1988); David A. Strauss, Constitutional Protection for Commercial
Speech: Some Lessons from the American Experienc, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J. 45, 45 (1990) (emphasizing
speech regulation as a possible cover for discrimination).
143. See generally LEE BOLLtNGER, THE ToLERANT SocaEw (1986).
144. But see HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (Eric Mack ed. 1982) (1884).
145. Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
146. See Strauss, supra note 142, at 45.
147. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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It is not difficult to think of cases that test the classificatory boundary
of political and commercial speech: a cigarette manufacturer's corporate
support of the Bill of Rights,148 or a clothing manufacturer's advertised
stance on social issues. 14 9 Ironically, some ads may even play off the pub-
lic perception of the fraying of many social relationships, offering con-
sumption-oriented solutions.1 50 A desperately poor person who is
reduced to begging may engage in commercial or political speech, or
both. 15 1 A magazine such as Consumer Reports may seek to guide consumer
purchases, but with no financial stake in the recommended goods and
services.152 Presumably scientifically based health claims may be made on
behalf of particular products, sometimes in the context of an otherwise
purely commercial ad.
153
However, it is important not to overestimate the scope and severity of
these sorts of arguable borderline cases. Most typical advertisements will
be classified as commercial speech on any reasonable theory. Most speak-
ers, on the other hand, who wish primarily to convey a political message
can readily avoid entanglement with the problem of commercial speech
on any reasonable definition. Thus the costs of misclassifying political or
commercial speech are likely limited.
In particular kinds of cases, special considerations may play a role in
classifying an instance of speech as commercial or non-commercial. Con-
sider, for example, a claim that egg yolks are nutritionally beneficial, de-
spite or because of their cholesterol content. Some courts may wish to
distinguish between proponents of such a claim based not on the presence
or absence of a pecuniary stake, but on a broader consideration of what
reactions would logically please the particular speaker. A scientist who
sees special nutritional benefit in egg yolks presumably wants people to
actually eat, rather than merely buy, the eggs. An egg producer who
makes the same claim, on the other hand, may or may not care what pur-
chasers of eggs actually do with them, and may be most pleased by pur-
chasers who buy eggs, throw them away, and then buy more.
There is no guarantee that some acceptable shortcut method for de-
ciding particular close cases will always be available. On the other hand,
approaches are available to reduce the costs, if not the risk, of misdeciding
genuinely close cases. For example, courts faced with a close classification
148. See Leo Bogart, Freedom to Know or Freedom to Say, 71 Tax. L. REv. 815, 816 n.5
(1993).
149. Brubach, supra note 87, at 78; see also LAscH, THE CULTURE, supra note 80, at 139
(discussing the phenomenon of advertisements attempting, reasonably or otherwise, to link
themselves to the idea of freedom).
150. See Ewen, supra note 67, at 93.
151. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Young v. New
York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
152. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 519, 541 (1979) (Consumer Reports entitled to full free speech protection).
153. See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expres-
sion and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 V ND. L. REv. 1433 (1990) (arguing for
protection of scientific health claims in the context of commercial advertising); see also Na-
tional Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
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problem may notice that speakers may have some antecedent control over
their own destiny. At least some speakers are easily able, if they choose, to
formulate what they wish to say in a way that makes their speech as clearly
non-commercial as reasonably possible under the circumstances.
Courts may thus wish to establish a reasonable and socially desirable
incentive for speakers who fear their speech may be classified commercial.
A judicial rule might take something approaching the following form: in
genuinely close, borderline cases only, the court may wish to protect spe-
cially speech where the speaker came as close as reasonably possible,
under the circumstances, to presenting the speech in question as clearly
non-commercial. What is "reasonably possible" must be considered in
light of the speaker's own resources and capacities, as well as the speaker's
interests in not sending a distorted or insincere message, or in addressing
an undesired audience.
154
Thus in borderline cases of commercial speech, the courts should
look to the range of speech alternatives antecedently available to the
speaker, and determine whether more clearly non-commercial speech al-
ternatives were essentially ignored. For example, a court might point out
to a store that it is not difficult to express one's views as to the Fourth of
July without also describing items for sale on that occasion in lavish detail.
Perhaps in cases on the border of commercial and non-commercial
speech, more can be realistically asked of major corporations1 55 than of
the destitute.1
56
V. INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL PROTECrION AS ExCESsIVE PROTECTION FOR
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Currently, the Supreme Court majority seems to accept the idea of
according commercial speech, in at least some cases,1 5 7 some lesser de-
gree of constitutional protection than is given to political or other fully
protected speech. The basic contours of the current constitutional test for
regulating commercial speech were set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'5 8 which concerned regulation of the
promotion of electricity consumption, for the sake of energy conservation.
There, the Court established a four-part test that begins by specifying that
the speech at issue:
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
must ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substan-
154. For a more elaborate exposition of this theme in a related context, see generally R.
George Wright, Speech an Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 27 (1987).
155. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) ("Advertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from govern-
ment regulation simply by including references to public issues.").
156. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993) (referring to "an intermedi-
ate standard of review"); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 435 (1978) (toleration of more imprecise regulation of commercial than of polit-
ical speech); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
158. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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tial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental inter-
est asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.159
In practice, the Central Hudson test is problematic because it erects obsta-
cles to reasonable regulation of purely commercial speech at every turn.
The test invites constitutional challenges to such regulations on grounds
so vague and open-ended as, in many cases, to encourage the expression
of mere subjective judicial preference. Let us consider the elements, and
complications, of the Central Hudson test in turn.
It is important to bear in mind that the general burden of proof in
these cases is on the government. 16 However useful this burden place-
ment may be in political speech cases, in the commercial speech context it
tends to undermine reasonable government regulation at every stage of
the Central Hudson test.
Consider first the test's invitation to the government to prove that the
speech at issue is "misleading."161 However familiar the idea of "mislead-
ingness" may seem, in practice its application is often complex and inde-
terminate. With regard to commercial speech, typically, "[t]he line
between truth and falsity ... is hardly crystal clear." 162 More broadly,
cases suggest that "verification is very difficult in both the political speech
and the commercial speech areas."
163
The problem here is in part that typical commercial claims may be,
even if in some sense true, deceptive or misleading to some persons to
some degree. 164 The court is thus required to decide what degree of de-
ception, of what number of persons, with what sorts of arguable conse-
quences, is required before the speech will be labeled as misleading. 165 A
court may inquire, for example, whether a commercial claim is misleading
because "it unduly emphasizes trivial or relatively uninformative facts."1 66
We are left to wonder what degree of emphasis upon the relatively trivial is
due.
Further muddying the water is that in most deceptive advertising
cases, the crucial question is not whether a given advertising claim is mis-
leading, but whether the presumably misleading claim can fairly be
159. Id. at 566.
160. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2089 n.7 (1994); Edenfield, 113 5. Ct. at 1800; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 71 n.20 (1983).
161. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
162. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the first Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. Rav. 1181, 1192 (1988).
163. Robert Pitofsky, First Amendment Protections and Economic Activity, II GEo. MASON U.
L. REv. 89, 91 (1988).
164. See Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 775,
783 (1979).
165. See Shiffrin, supra note 134, at 1219; see also Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. Partnership,
27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing the inherent unworkability and indeterminacy of
any "least sophisticated consumer" standard in the consumer protection area); Clomon v.
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
166. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988) (citations omitted).
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ascribed to the claimant. 167 The speaker may thus simply dispute the gov-
ernment's interpretation of the meaning or meanings of the ad for partic-
ular audiences.
168
These sorts of complications often are played out through judicial
subdivision of the concept of misleading commercial speech. For exam-
ple, the Court has been known to consider merely whether the speech at
issue is misleading "in the abstract,"169 without explaining what is meant
by such a qualifier. Courts have varied their degree of scrutiny of commer-
cial speech depending upon whether the speech at issue is variously
deemed actually, 170 inherently,1 7 1 potentially, 72 necessarily,' 7 3 demon-
strably, 174 or possibly175 misleading.
176
None of these characterizations, however, bypasses the need for
loosely constrained judgments about the extensiveness, degree, and conse-
quences of misleading speech. In some cases, the misleadingness of the
speech is reducible by means such as a disclaimer. But courts must then
judge, somehow, whether the phrasing, prominence, and clarity of the dis-
claimer are sufficient, or whether the disclaimer, if sufficiently conspicu-
ous, tends unduly to create confusion.
177
Once any issues of misleadingness are somehow resolved, the court
must consider whether the government can identify a substantial interest
167. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 659 (1985);
see also ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 1976) ("For the most
part the petitioners admitted that Wonder Bread did not have the nutritional qualities al-
leged to have been claimed for it in the challenged advertisements, but they denied that the
advertisements represented that the bread did have those qualities.").
168. See ITT Continental Baking Co., 532 F.2d at 214 ("children below the age of seven
would generally tend to accept the 'fantasy growth sequence' in Wonder Bread advertising as
literal truth"); see also id at 218 ("it is fair to suppose that the commercials in question were
designed to avoid making any specific nutritional misrepresentations while at the same time
conveying the general idea that Wonder Bread would somehow significantly contribute to
growth in children"). Relying on free speech cases from other contexts, though, an adver-
tiser might wish to argue that its free speech rights must not be held hostage to speech
standards appropriate for children. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see
also Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989).
169. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
170. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988).
173. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982).
174. Id.
175. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc.,
851 F.2d 365, 374 n.9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1988).
176. In addition, different degrees of support are required by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion depending upon whether the commercial claim includes an assertion of support by
scientific tests or not. See Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1492 n.3 (1st Cir.
1989). Importantly, the FTC then goes on to subdivide the former category into "specific" or
"non-specific" claims, usually requiring "two well-controlled scientific studies" in non-specific
claim cases. Id.
177. See id. at 1497. For a case illustrating the indeterminacy of these sorts of inquiries,
see Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993)
(discussing the proper characterization of ads relating Kraft Singles to milk and calcium
content).
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underlying the regulation. 178 This is not a trivial inquiry. The govern-
ment's burden in this respect "is not satisfied by mere speculation or con-
jecture; rather, a government body.., must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real."1 79 Depending upon their degree of sympathy for the
state regulation, courts may identify the interest, or combination of inter-
ests, at stake in more and less favorable ways.180 The idea of "demonstrat-
ing" the reality of a harm is daunting; it is not clear that even a criminal
case requires the prosecutor to "demonstrate" literally the existence of the
charged harm. Whatever the term "demonstrate" is taken to mean, it is
available for use in derailing any reasonable regulation of commercial
speech.
Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions "leave little insight as
to what criteria the Court used" 18 1 in specifying the relevant state inter-
ests, or in determining their substantiality. The combination of literally
rigorous language and the lack ofjudicial guidance invites litigation of any
governmental regulation of commercial speech.
18 2
The problem is made worse at the next stage of the inquiry, during
which the government must "demonstrate" 183 that the regulation at issue
will "in fact" advance the specified substantial interest "in a direct and ma-
terial way." 18 4 In this context, directness has been associated with "an im-
mediate connection between the prohibition and the government's
asserted end."185 On the other hand, directness has been contrasted vari-
ously with connections that are tenuous, 18 6 highly speculative, 18 7 ineffec-
tive, 188 only remotely supportive of the government interest,18 9
178. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
179. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. CL 2084, 2089 (1994).
180. For an example of a generous characterization, see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986) ("the legislature's interest . .. is not necessarily to
reduce demand for all games of chance, but to reduce [local] demand for casino gam-
bling"). The Court could, of course, have insisted on something like a "substantial" reduc-
tion in casino gambling.
181. Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
182. The Seventh Circuit has noted that "[cioncrete evidence of past effects is likely to be
difficult and expensive, if not impossible, to obtain in most deceptive advertising cases." Na-
tional Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 165 (7th Cir. 1977).
183. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089; Edenfidd, 113 S. Ct. at 1800; see also Philip B. Kurland,
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: " Twas Strange; 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twos
Pitfu,4 'Tws Wondrous Pitifu", 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 7 (1987) (endorsing a requirement of
demonstrating, as opposed to merely asserting, the efficacy of promoting the government
interest).
184. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089; Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.




188. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980); Cal-Almond Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429, 437 (9th Cir.
1993).
189. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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conditional,' 9 0 or involving only limited incremental, 19 1 speculative, 192 or
marginal1 93 support for the government interest.
19 4
The potential for these concepts, which are largely just opposing end
points on progressive continua, to serve as merely conclusory labels for
opposing outcomes is obvious. More interestingly, the focus on "direct-
ness" or "immediacy" itself seems misconceived. If the idea is taken liter-
ally, why should we care whether the regulation advances the government
interest directly or indirectly, as long as the advancement itself is substan-
tial? The Court's choice of the "directness" terminology is surprising, in
that the Court has, in a famous line of Commerce Clause cases, learned to
focus on the substantiality of relationships, as opposed to their directness
or indirectness.
95
Finally, under Central Hudson the government must show that the reg-
ulation "is not more extensive than is necessary"1 9 6 to promote the govern-
ment interest at stake. Literally, this test would allow courts to strike down
reasonable regulations of commercial speech on the basis of the existence,
real or supposed, of some slightly less restrictive and available alternative
regulation. It need not be difficult for courts to envision such alterna-
tives,' 9 7 with or without 1 9 8 sufficient evidence of their practicality or cost
in other values, including the speech rights of other persons.
In Board of Trustees v. Fox, the Court specified that the "not more ex-
tensive than necessary" requirement was not to be taken literally, in the
sense of a requirement that the government utilize the supposedly least
restrictive means to further the state interest at issue.1 99 While Fox in this
respect lightened the burden on government regulation of commercial
speech, it also required that the costs of the government regulation be
"carefully calculated." 20 0 The discretion of judges was then enhanced by
requiring that the reasonableness20 ' of the degree of fit between the gov-
190. Id. at 569.
191. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
192. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2706 (1993).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971) (clearly repudiating any
reliance in the commerce clause cases upon the direct versus indirect distinction); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1937) (distancing itself from reliance on
such a distinction); Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 307-08 (1936) (relying upon the
direct versus indirect distinction).
196. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
197. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (filing of attorneys'
client solicitation letters with a state agency); In re RM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) (filing
with state of copies of all attorney general mailings); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour-
ism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 356-57 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing wide range of unac-
knowledged alternatives to the state's regulatory scheme); see alsoJohn M. Blim, Comment,
Free Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,88 Nw. U. L.
REy. 733, 766 (1994) (noting the typical judicial assumption that misleading commercial ads
can best be dealt with by mandated warnings and disclosures).
198. See, e.g., In re RM.J., 455 U.S. at 206.
199. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81.
200. Id. at 480. But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510
(1993) (placing the burden of proof on the government).
201. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
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ernment interest and the scope of the restriction be determined through a
balancing process. The scope of the restriction must be " 'in proportion
to the interest served.' "202
Thus the current test at this stage invites a judge to determine
whether the scope of the regulation is, through some unspecified measur-
ing process, worth its costs. Whether one restriction is actually more bur-
densome to freedom of speech than some envisioned alternative, however,
may not be clear to begin with. An alternative regulation might affect
more speakers, or affect fewer speakers more severely. The simplest calcu-
lation will involve determining whether some assumedly slight or moder-
ate loss in fulfilling the government interest at stake outweighs, say, some
reduced overall burden on freedom of commercial speech. Trading off
the degree of promotion of a partially indeterminate state interest, under
two alternative regulatory schemes, against the overall degree of burden
on freedom of commercial speech under both regulations simply invites
the expression of a court's predisposition.
The story is thus much the same at every stage of the established judi-
cial test of restrictions on commercial speech. Any court unsympathetic
with any reasonable regulation of commercial speech may, without undue
strain, apply current case law to strike down the regulation at issue.
CONCLUSION
Overall, as a broad cultural institution, commercial speech can more
than take care of itself without special constitutional protection under the
Free Speech Clause. In our cultural context, the broad, often unintended
implications underlying commercial speech are not constrained by any sig-
nificant vector of cultural forces. Reasonable regulations of commercial
speech, whatever their more particular and immediate justifications,
would tend at least minimally to reduce the cultural dominance, within its
sphere, of commercial speech. There is no reason in the Free Speech
Clause not to pursue this course, in which the largely inadvertently ac-
crued power of commercial speech would be fairly reduced for the sake of
greater cultural freedom, and of the values underlying freedom of speech
itself. A democratic government should at least be allowed to accept such
an approach.
Special constitutional protection for commercial speech is thus cur-
rently bad enough. Things could, however, get even worse. Special pro-
tection of commercial speech may make reasonable state and federal
regulation of business enterprises increasingly difficult in a number of ar-
eas, environmental2 0 3 and securities20 4 regulation being merely two exam-
ples. This would simply not be worth the cost in public values. As an
202. Id. (quoting In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203); see also United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2708 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d
1038, 1041 (11th Cir.) (scope of restriction must be "in proportion to the interest served"),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
203. See Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the
Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NoTRE DAME L. Ray. 533, 534 (1994) ("The
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admittedly extreme example, since preventing a milk producer from sell-
ing above or below a specified price obviously restricts indirectly that pro-
ducer's accurate commercial speech, conceivably a business might seek to
relitigate classic economic substantive due process cases, such as Nebbia v.
New York,205 under the' Free Speech Clause.
The Supreme Court has of late sought to emphasize the value of com-
mercial speech.20 6 Without arguing that commercial speech is in all cases
to be considered as valuable as political speech, the Court has in some
respects impliedly equated their value. The Court has, for example, held
that a city may not attack problems of safety or aesthetics by limiting only
commercial speech and not political speech if commercial speech is no
more related to the harm or to the state interests than is political
speech.
207
Thus the Court has created something of an Equal Protection Clause,
metaphorically, for commercial speech. Unless commercial speech is
more related to the harm to be regulated than is political speech, it can-
not be disproportionately regulated. But this is actually a curious result.
Imagine a ship that will sink unless two units of weight are jettisoned. On
board are five weight units of commercial speech and five weight units of
political speech. The Supreme Court has, in effect, forbidden us from
tossing two units of commercial speech overboard, thereby saving most of
the commercial speech and all of the political speech.
This result is simply not required by a reasonable view of our reasons
for protecting free speech in the first place, or of our current cultural
circumstances. 20 8 It instead indicates the judicial tendency to protect spe-
cially commercial speech at the expense not only of the purposes underly-
1993 Court raised commercial speech to a level of protection that would likely require courts
to strike down many state environmental statutes.").
204. See Manuel S. Klausner, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 11 Gao. MASON U.
L. Rav. 83, 87 (1988) ("the area of federal securities legislation is ripe for the assertion of first
amendment defenses"); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 226-27 (1985) (White, J., concur-
ring in result) (casting doubt on some SEC regulation of stock market newsletters by unregis-
tered investment advisors); SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1988).
205. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a criminal conviction of Nebbia for selling milk at
prices beyond those permitted by statute). These cases admittedly would involve proposals
for an illegal transaction, but in which the weight of the state's interest in regulating the
underlying transaction could be balanced against the severity of the restriction on commer-
cial speech.
206. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1511 (1993);
see also id. at 1521 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I hope the Court ultimately will come to
abandon Central Hudson's analysis entirely in favor of one that affords full protection for
truthful, noncoercive commercial speech about lawful activities.").
207. See id. at 1516; see also Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that under Discovery Network, noise regulation of speech must generally apply equally
to commercial and political speech), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994).
208. The Court may, on this basis, eventually reconsider certain other distinctions, in-
cluding its refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech, or to apply de
novo appellate review to all cases of commercial speech. On the overbreadth issue, see Wa-
ters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1885 (1994) (no application of overbreadth doctrine to
commercial speech); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989) (same); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (same). For discussion of the possible applica-
tion of de novo appellate review to commercial advertising cases, see Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970
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ing freedom of speech in the first place, but of any democratically
expressed view of freedom, well-being, and the proper scope and limits of
purely commercial values.
F.2d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990)), cert. deniAd, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
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JEB. v. ALABAMA EX REL TB:. DISCRIMINATION BY ANY
OTHER NAME...
INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Batson v. Kentucky' that peremp-
tory challenges2 motivated by race violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.3 In 1994, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.,4 the
Court extended Batson to include gender-based peremptory challenges.
Pursuant to Batson and JE.B., once a litigant demonstrates a prima facie
case of race or gender discrimination, the party accused of discrimination
must come forward with a race or gender-neutral explanation for exercis-
ing the peremptory challenge. Lower court implementation of Batson and
lower court proscription of gender-based peremptory challenges moti-
vated by gender prior toJE.B. indicate, however, that courts readily accept
explanations for peremptory challenges that are merely pretexts5 for dis-
crimination. This history suggests that JE.B. will not, in fact, eliminate
gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In order
to rid the jury selection process of this and all types of discrimination, the
peremptory challenge system should be abolished and replaced with a
procedure that will prevent the injection of bigotry into American
courtrooms.
6
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge ajuror without assigning, or being
required to assign, a reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action,
both civil and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges. After a party has used all
her peremptory challenges, she is required to utilize challenges for cause to eliminate poten-
tialjurors. BLACK'S LAw DICrlONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws").
4. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
5. While trial court acceptance of litigants' pretextual explanations serves as ajustifica-
tion for the elimination of the peremptory challenge system, the argument for elimination is
further supported by the fact that the Batson and JE.B. decisions failed to address many
important issues which will undoubtedly give rise to substantial litigation and judicial ineffi-
ciency. These issues include the absence of an adequate standard by which to determine
whether a party has established a prima facie case of improper exclusion, the appropriate
remedy upon a finding of improper exclusion, and the ability of a litigant to raise a Batson
challenge where the opposing party excluded members of the panel who were of a particular
race or gender, but where the petit jury nevertheless included members of the excluded
class. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153 (1989).
6. While this Comment calls for the abolition of the peremptory challenge system be-
cause it engenders discrimination in the jury selection process, at least one commentator has
suggested that peremptories should be eliminated because the Supreme Court cannot limit
the application of Batson to race and gender. Eventually, argues this commentator, the Court
will "have to protect everyone," and because the peremptory challenge will no longer be
exercised with full freedom, it must be eliminated. J. Christopher Peters, Note, Georgia v.
McCollum: It's Strike Three for Peremptory Challenges, but Is it the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L.
REv. 1723, 1757-58 (1993).
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Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of the jury selec-
tion process and the role of the peremptory challenge. Part I also ex-
plores the history of race and gender discrimination in the jury selection
process. Part II offers an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in JE.B. Part III discusses the purposes supposedly served by the per-
emptory challenge, as well as the harms suffered by those who are
excluded from jury service due to the discriminatory exercise of this de-
vice. Additionally, Part III examines the inability of courts to distinguish
between legitimate reasons for peremptory strikes and those that serve as
mere pretexts for discrimination. Finally, Part IV suggests the replace-
ment of the peremptory challenge system with an affirmative selection sys-
tem that will serve to rid the jury selection process of discrimination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Jury Selection Process and the Peremptory Challenge
The concept of trial by jury has its origins in early Roman law. 7 In the
Anglo-Saxon tradition, the concept first appeared in 1166 A.D. with the
Assize of Clarendon,8 which required inquiry into robbery and murder by
"the twelve most lawful men."9 In early England the members of the jury
were chosen based upon their knowledge of the event at issue. This prin-
ciple developed into the view that, in order to assure an impartial jury,
members of the jury pool should know nothing of the instant litigation.1 0
The trial by jury system immigrated to America with the colonists who trav-
eled from England.11 Subsequently, it became a protected right in the
United States under the Sixth Amendment 1 2 for criminal proceedings and
under the Seventh Amendment13 for many civil proceedings.
In order to implement properly this constitutional safeguard, a fair
procedure for selecting ajury is necessary. 14 While theJury Selection and
Service Act of 1968,15 which governs jury selection, does not dictate a par-
ticular method of assembling a venire or jury panel, courts most often
utilize voter registration lists to select randomly a cross section of the com-
munity. Once the venire or jury panel is selected, the judge, often with
7. See id, at 1725; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 119 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing
trial procedure in ancient Rome).
8. The "Assize of Clarendon" was a series of ordinances initiated by King Henry II of
England in an assembly of lords at the royal hunting lodge of Clarendon. These ordinances
attempted to improve procedures in criminal law and established the grand jury system con-
sisting of twelve men. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANNicA 348 (1985); see also S. Alexandria Jo, Com-
ment, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based Peremptory
Challenges, 22 PAC. L.J. 1305, 1306 n.7 (1991).
9. Peters, supra note 6, at 1725-26.
10. Id. at 1726.
11. Id.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" in all criminal prosecutions).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served" for all suits at common law where the value at controversy exceeds twenty dollars).
14. Peters, supra note 6, at 1726.
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-78 (1988).
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the aid of counsel, conducts a voir dire' 6 examination of the prospective
jurors. Voir dire is conducted to ascertain whether the prospective jurors
are acquainted with the facts of the case or the parties involved in the
dispute. 17 The parties aim, through voir dire, to determine whether the
prospective jurors have a predisposition regarding the merits of the case.' 8
The jurors primarily are asked questions regarding their backgrounds,
work, and families. 19 With this information, the litigants strive to discern
whether the potential jurors harbor any biases that would hinder their
ability to serve fairly and impartially as jurors.
After voir dire, the parties may strike a potential juror from the panel
for cause.20 Cause challenges must be exercised on the basis of articulated
bias.2 ' Such challenges allow parties to eliminate jurors for "narrowly spec-
ified, provable, and legally cognizable" reasons. 22 Pursuant to cause chal-
lenges, jurors who have exhibited actual or implied bias may be excluded.
Actual bias refers to the potential juror's subjective state of mind, while
implied bias is presumed by law from the existence of relationships or
interests of the juror.2s Permissible justifications for cause challenges are
often codified, limiting removal ofjurors to situations where, for instance,
the juror has been convicted of a felony24 or will be a witness in the litiga-
tion. 25 Trial judges are given the discretion to grant or deny cause
challenges.
2 6
The parties may also exercise a limited number of peremptory chal-
lenges.2 7 A peremptory challenge is the right to challenge ajuror without
assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge. The
parties may employ peremptory challenges "without a reason stated, with-
out inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
2 8
16. Voir dire literally means "speak the truth." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JEROLD H. IsaRAL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 718 (1984).
17. Jo, supra note 8, at 1307.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. Id. at 1307.
20. Robert L. Harris, Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptoy Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L.
Rxv. 1027, 1030 (1991).
21. Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 40 UCLA L. Rxv. 517, 519 (1992).
22. Id. at 519.
23. Susan L. McCoin, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The Rights of Prospec-
tive Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1225, 1226 n.5 (1985).
24. ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(5) (1986); see also Bray, supra note 21, at 569 & n.4.
25. TEX. CIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 35.16(a)(6) (West 1989); see also Bray, supra note 21,
at 569 & n.5.
26. BrentJ. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials,
21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 227, 227 (1986).
27. Harris, supra note 20, at 1030-31.
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Generally, jurisdictions utilize one of
two general challenge procedures: the "struck system" and the "sequential system." In juris-
dictions that employ the struck system, the size of the jury pool is equivalent to the size of the
petitjury plus the sum of peremptories allotted to both parties. If, for example, the required
jury is twelve and each side is allowed five peremptory challenges, the jury pool will consist of
twenty-two individuals. After the jury pool is assembled and subjected to voir dire, the parties
exercise their cause challenges. Those removed for cause are replaced by other prospective
jurors who also are examined in voir dire. The parties then alternate exercising their per-
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Unlike the jury system as a whole, the Framers did not expressly incor-
porate peremptory challenges into the Sixth Amendment.29 Despite this
exclusion, the Supreme Court traditionally has given the practice an ele-
vated position. In 1887, in Hayes v. Missouri,30 the Supreme Court found
that
[e]xperience has shown that one of the most effective means to
free thejurybox from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the
peremptory challenge. The public prosecutor may have the
strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered,
from his habits and associations, and yet find it difficult to formu-
late and sustain a legal objection to him.
3 1
More recently, in the 1965 case Swain v. Alabama,32 the Court implied that
peremptory challenges effectuate a fair trial:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes
of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.
33
This formidable history and the strong rhetoric adhered to by
Supreme Court justices throughout American jurisprudential history
served to fortify the lofty position the-peremptory challenge has held in
courtrooms in this country.3 4 Recently, however, a majority of Supreme
Court justices have recognized the potential and actual abuse engendered
by the exercise of peremptory challenges. With the decisions in Batson
and J.E.B., the Court has begun to chip away at a legal device that no
longer has a place in American society.
emptories against the twenty-two members of the jury pool or use all their peremptories at
once, depending on the jurisdiction. See Gurney, supra note 26, at 228.
In "sequential system"jurisdictions, the number of people assembled for voir dire equals
the size of the petit jury. After each individual is examined, the parties exercise both for
cause and peremptory challenges. The process continues until the parties exhaust their per-
emptories and, after completion of the challenges for cause, enough jurors remain to form a
petitjury. Id.
29. Harris, supra note 20, at 1031.
30. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
31. Id. at 71; see also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("The right to
challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of
the rights secured to the accused . . . . Any system for the empaneling of a jury that
pre [v] ents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be
condemned.").
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. Id. at 219.
34. While the judiciary in the United States has concentrated on eliminating racial and
gender discrimination in the use of the peremptory challenge, Canada has recently equalized
the number of challenges given to each side and England has eliminated the peremptory
challenge entirely. Except for special circumstances, jurors under English and Canadian sys-
tems cannot be questioned about their beliefs and prejudices during voir dire nor can they
be investigated prior to trial. SeeJudith Heinz, Peremptoy Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Com-
panson of Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoOp. L.J.
201, 205-206 (1993) (comparing the history and current status of peremptory challenges in
the United States, England, and Canada).
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B. The History of Racial Discrimination inJury Selection
In 1879, the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia35 held that a
West Virginia statute36 that excluded blacks from service on grand and
petit juries3 7 violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 8 This landmark deci-
sion established for the first time that a state could not exclude deliber-
ately a racial group from jury service. For almost a century after Strauder,
the Court upheld the right of racial minorities to serve on juries through
proper inclusion in the jury selection process.3 9 In 1965, however, the
Court held in Swain v. Alabama4° that a prosecutor's discriminatory intent
in the use of peremptory challenges could only be demonstrated by evi-
dence of the systematic removal of African-Americans from juries over a
period of time.4 1 This "crippling burden of proof"42 effectively rendered
the peremptory challenge immune from equal protection challenges.
4 3
The Court subsequently recognized, however, an excluded juror's interest
in nondiscriminatory jury selection 44 and the harm to the judicial process
caused by such discrimination.
45
In 1986, in line with these developments, the Court overruled Swain
in Batson v. Kentucky.4 6 In Batson, the Court eased the defendant's burden
of proof, ruling that evidence of a discriminatory pattern of peremptory
challenges in a defendant's own trial may be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.4 7 Once a defendant establishes a prima facie
case, the state must come forward with race-neutral explanations for pe-
remptorily challenging racial minorities.48 Since the Batson decision, the
35. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
36. The West Virginia statute provided: "All white male persons who are twenty-one
years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as
herein provided." Id. at 305.
37. It is the duty of a grand jury to receive "complaints and accusations in criminal cases,
hear the evidence adduced on the part of the state, and find bills of indictment in cases
where they are satisfied a trial ought to [occur]." A petit jury is the ordinary jury called for
the trial of civil or criminal actions. BLACK's LAw DicrioNARY 855-56 (6th ed. 1990).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (holding that once a prima facie case
has been established, the burden is on the state to prove that the exclusion is not racially
motivated); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (ruling that testimony of witnesses estab-
lishing the total exclusion of blacks from jury service made out a prima facie case of the
denial of equal protection). Seegenerally William D. Griggs, Recent Development, 50 TEa. L.
Rav. 385, 389 (1983) (examining the history of racial discrimination in the jury selection
process).
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
41. Id. at 227.
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 (overruling the burden of proof established in Swain).
43. Warren D. Hayes, Recent Development, State v. Knox: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Expands Equal Protection on Racially Motivated Peremptory Challenges, 68 TUL. L. REv. 713, 715
(1994).
44. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972).
46. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
47. Id at 96.
48. Id.
1994]
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Court has repeatedly affirmed and expanded the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to race-based peremptory challenges. 4
9
C. The History of Gender Discrimination in Jury Selection
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
held that exclusion of African-American males from jury service was un-
constitutional. 50 The total exclusion of women from juries, however, en-
dured well into the twentieth century.5 1 Derived from English common
law, 52 this exclusion was justified as a means by which women could be
shielded from the gruesome and shocking realities of the courtroom, 5 3
because women were thought too delicate and naive to witness the brutal
scenes depicted within the courtroom.
54
To advance gender-motivated jury selection claims, criminal defend-
ants have utilized both the Sixth Amendment's right to a "fair and impar-
tial jury"55 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.56
Prior to 1990, it appeared the Court would employ Sixth Amendment
logic to eliminate gender-based peremptory strikes, just as criminal de-
fendants had effectively utilized Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to rid
the jury selection process of other types of gender-based discrimination. 57
49. See Georgia v. Carr, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992) (requiring defense to supply race-neutral
explanations for peremptorily striking all white persons from the jury); Georgia v. McCollum,
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (applying Batson to defense peremptories in criminal cases); Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause to private litigants in a civil case); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352
(1991) (accepting the parties' categorization of the excluded juror as "Latino" or "Hispanic"
and holding that, where members of such identifiable groups were excluded for reasons of
ethnicity, the use of peremptory strikes would violate Equal Protection as interpreted by Bat-
son); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (ruling that a defendant could raise a Batson chal-
lenge even though he was not the same race as the defendant).
50. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
51. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (holding that the exclusion of wo-
men from jury service was neither a due process nor an equal protection violation because
women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life").
52. See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that,
at common law, women were excluded from juries under the doctrine of propter defectum
sexus, literally the 'defect of sex') (quoting 2 WinuAM BLACKsrONE, COMMENTARs *362).
53. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ret T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1994).
54. I.
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id.
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (ruling that excluding women from jury
venires so that they may tend to their domestic responsibilities is not a sufficiently valid inter-
est to deprive the defendant of his or her constitutional rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down, under the Sixth
Amendment, an affirmative registration requirement that exempted women from mandatory
jury service unless they volunteered to serve); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)
(holding that women may not be excluded from the venire in federal trials in states where
women were eligible for jury service under local law).
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In Holland v. Illinois,5 8 however, the Court refused to extend the applica-
tion of the Sixth Amendment to peremptory challenges, effectively closing
the door on the possibility that the Sixth Amendment could be utilized to
rid the jury selection process of gender-based peremptory strikes. 59
Unable to eliminate gender-based peremptory strikes through appli-
cation of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, proponents of eliminating
such strikes looked to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. This proved to be a difficult task. Unlike race, gender is not con-
sidered a suspect class for purposes ofjudicial review. 60 The Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not, therefore, subject gender-based classifications to
strict scrutiny.6 1 Such classifications are subject merely to intermediate
review.62 Undoubtedly influenced by the fact that gender is not a suspect
classification, the Court seemingly had proscribed the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to gender-motivated peremptory strikes when it
refused to review the issue in three post-Batson cases.63 By granting certio-
rari in J.E.B., however, the Court agreed to examine the issue in depth.
II. J.E.B. v. ALAMA Ex REL T.B.
A. Facts and Procedural History
JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.64 originated in 1991 when the state of
Alabama initiated a paternity and child support action against J.E.B.65
The State alleged thatJ.E.B. was the father of a child born to T.B.66 Dur-
ing voir dire, the state used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to strike
men from thejury.6 7 Subsequently, ajury of twelve women foundJ.E.B. to
58. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
59. Id. at 480. The Court stated that although the Sixth Amendment requires a repre-
sentative venire panel in order to be considered an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community, "[i]t has never included the notion that, in the process of drawing
the jury .... initial representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused
and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interest." Id.
60. While sex is not a suspect class, a plurality of justices agreed that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inher-
ently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Fontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (citations omitted).
61. Strict scrutiny requires that state legislation be narrowly tailored to further a compel-
ling governmental interest. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2818 (1993).
62. Under intermediate review, classifications must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
63. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
989 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Brown, 345 S.E.2d 393 (N.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986)
(O'Conner, J., concurring) (noting that as Batson depends on this country's profound com-
mitment to racial equality, it should not be applied outside of the context of race-based
discrimination).
64. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
65. Id. at 1421.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1422. The trial court assembled 36 potential jurors consisting of 12 males and
24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, 10 of the remaining jurors were
male. The state then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors. SinceJ.E.B.
used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, all the selected jurors were female. Id.
at 1421-22.
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be the father of the child.68 J.E.B. argued the state's gender-based per-
emptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause and urged the court
to afford him the procedures required under Batson.69 The trial court
refused, concluding that Batson did not extend to gender-based peremp-
tory strikes.
70
B. The Majority Opinion
InJE.B., the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that in both crim-
inal and civil litigation, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-spon-
sored intentional discrimination based upon group stereotypes that en-
dorse and fortify prejudicial views. 71 The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection based on gen-
der or on the presumption that a potential juror will be biased simply
because the person is a man or a woman.72 According to the Court, gen-
der, like race, is an unconstitutional "proxy" ofjuror capability and objec-
tivity. 7 3 Utilizing the heightened scrutiny standard traditionally afforded
gender-based classifications, the Court required "an exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for the classification.74 The Court held that the chal-
lenges failed heightened scrutiny because they did not substantially
further the state's interest in achieving a fair and impartial jury.75 The
Court refused to accept the state's argument that gender-based peremp-
tory challenges further this interest by eliminating a group that may be
partial to a particular defendant. 76 The state's stereotypic assertion, the
Court opined, would not serve as justification for gender-based peremp-
tory challenges. 77 Just as the state's generalizations would be impermissi-
ble if made on the basis of race, they were impermissible when made on
the basis of gender.
78
68. Id. at 1422. The scientific evidence presented at trial established J.E.B.'s paternity
with 99.92% accuracy. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. ML
70. Id.
71. Id at 1422.
72. Id at 1430.
73. Id. at 1421.
74. Id. at 1425 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1426.
76. Id. The state maintained that its use of gender-based peremptory strikes was based
upon the belief that men, although otherwise qualified to serve on a jury, might be more
sensitive and responsive to the arguments of a man alleged to be the father of a child in a
paternity action, while women might be inclined to favor the complaining woman in such
suits. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1427. Explanations for exercising peremptory strikes against people of color
that were found by lower courts to be impermissibly based on race include: United States v.
Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that type of employment, age, and
residence were not sufficient non-race reasons under the circumstances); Roman v. Abrams,
822 F.2d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to accept the argument that potential jurors were
struck because their knowledge of electronics, bookkeeping, and computers may prevent
them from accepting the reasonable doubt standard), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1052 (1989);
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that general refer-
ences to a juror's unsatisfactory background and unspecified dissatisfaction with answers in
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The Court was quick to note, however, that its decision did not imply
the elimination of all peremptory challenges.79 The Court held that its
ruling was not inimical to the state's legitimate interest in utilizing such
challenges to secure a fair and impartial jury.80 In other words, parties
may still use peremptory challenges to strike individuals whom they feel
are less suitable than other potential jurors or who are members of a
group or class not subject to heightened scrutiny.81 The Court's decision
simply disallows parties from using gender as a proxy for bias.8 2 Once a
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination based on gender has
been made, the party exercising the strike must offer a gender-neutral ex-
planation for the strike.8 3 The party's justification need not rise to the
level of a cause challenge.8 4 Instead, the explanation must simply be gen-
der-neutral and may not serve as a pretext for discrimination. 5
C. Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment with the majority but wrote
separately to discuss the costs associated with the Court's ruling against
gender discrimination. According to Justice O'Connor, the Court's deci-
sion will, like Batson, result in the proliferation of mini-hearings8 6 con-
cerning peremptory challenges and will further erode a device that plays
an essential role in securing a fair and impartial jury.87 She also asserted
juror's questionnaire fail to satisfy Batson); Pacee v. State, 816 S.W.2d. 856, 859 (Ark. 1991)
(striking juror because of "demeanor" was not a sufficiently specific race-neutral explana-
tion); People v. Arrington, 843 P.2d 62, 64-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (removing juror pe-
remptorily because juror had pending race discrimination suit against his employer was not
race-neutral and was invalid); State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.) (ruling that perempto-
rily striking two African-Americans because they were "liberal" was not sufficiently race-neu-
tral explanation when party failed to question the stricken jurors about their alleged bias),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Tolbert v. State, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (Md. 1989) (rejecting
prosecution's claim that it generally strikes young females where stricken jurors were 38 and
54 years of age respectively); Commonwealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 904 (Mass. 1991)
(holding that prosecution failed to articulate a race-neutral explanation for peremptory chal-
lenge of sole black juror when the prosecutor claimed that juror reminded him of the de-
fendant's mother; that juror lived in location where defense witnesses lived; and that because
defendant's mother had become hysterical during the arraignment, as a black woman, the
juror might not be impartial); State v. Goode, 756 P.2d 578, 582 (N.M. Ct. App.) (stating that
"[b]y far the most common factor noted by courts holding a state's explanations to be pretex-
tual is a varying treatment of white and nonwhite panel members"), cert. denied, 756 P.2d 1203
(N.M. 1988); State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Wis.) (reversing defendant's convic-
tion where prosecution's stated reason for striking prospective juror was that the prosecution
had no information about the prospective juror), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990). See Doug-
las B. Dykes, Comment, Articulation of Non-Race Based Reasons for Peremptoy Challenges After
Batson v. Kentucky, 17 Am.J. TRAL ADvoc. 245, 264-65 & n.142 (1993) (examining unaccept-
able reasoning in the justification of purportedly race-based peremptory challenges).




83. Id. at 1429-30.
84. Id. at 1430.
85. Id.
86. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "[iln further constitutionalizing jury selection pro-
cedures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-
will become part of the main event." Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that by disallowing peremptory challenges based on gender, the Court de-
creases the litigants' ability to base their strikes on what are often accurate
gender-based assumptions about juror views. 8 8 Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that the prohibition of gender-based peremptory strikes should not
be applied to private civil litigants or criminal defendants because they are
not, in her view, state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges.
8 9
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment of the Court, wrote sep-
arately to explain that, pursuant to the legal framework required by equal
protection analysis, precedent leads to the conclusion that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause prohibits gender discrimination in the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. 90 According to Justice Kennedy, just as the Equal
Protection Clause forbids sex discrimination in the selection of jurors, it
prohibits peremptory challenges based on sex.9 1 His concurrence empha-
sized the importance of individual rights in equal protection analysis, in-
cluding the right of an individual to participate in the political process.
92
D. Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion in which he
asserted that race and gender discrimination are different. 93 In Batson,
the Court balanced the practice of peremptory challenges with the com-
mands of equal protection and held that in the case of race-based per-
emptories equal protection was superior. 94 Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the differences between race and gender discrimination,
however, indicate that when sex, not race, is at issue, the scales should tilt
in favor of peremptory challenges.
95
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
also dissented. Justice Scalia asserted that since all groups are subject to
peremptory challenges, gender-based peremptories do not result in the
denial of equal protection. 9 6 According to Justice Scalia, the Court's deci-
sion simply demonstrates the Justices' politically correct views in matters
pertaining to the sexes. 97 The result of this decision, which is neither
88. Justice O'Connor noted studies indicating that in rape cases, female jurors are some-
what more likely to convict than male jurors. Furthermore, she asserted that while there
have been no definitive studies, it is clear that a person's gender and resulting life experience
will impact an individual's view in sexual harassment, child custody, and spousal and child
abuse cases. Id at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice argued that while race-
based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, gender-based classifications are reviewed
under a heightened, but less strict standard. Furthermore, while racial groups make up nu-
merical minorities in American society, the population is nearly equally divided between men
and women. Finally, according to the ChiefJustice, racial equality has proven to be a more
difficult goal to achieve than gender equality. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99).
95. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mandated nor permitted by the Constitution, is the erosion of a practice
that historically has been an essential aspect of the right to a fair jury
trial. 98
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Benefits and Harms Engendered by the Use of the Peremptory Challenge
Proponents of the peremptory challenge point to its two distinct pur-
poses. First, it serves as a "safety net" for challenges exercised for cause. 99
The peremptory allows the parties to reject a juror for a partiality they
cannot name or explain. 10 0 Thus, because it enables the parties to re-
move presumably biased jurors, the peremptory challenge is considered
one of the most effective means of securing a fair and impartial jury. 101
Furthermore, the peremptory challenge furthers the symbolic legiti-
macy of a fair jury trial. 10 2 This view finds its roots in fourteenth century
England, when Parliament eliminated the power of the king's attorneys to
exercise peremptory challenges.' 0 3 This action demonstrated the sym-
bolic significance of a defendant's opportunity to play an active role in the
determination of the composition of the jury.10 4 The peremptory chal-
lenge is:
'a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous.' With this tool, the de-
fendant may dismiss from the jury, for any unspoken reason,
those he most hates or fears so that he is left with a 'good opin-
ion of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert her.'
0 5
Pursuant to this principle, the defendant, who helped choose the jury, will
be satisfied with its composition and, therefore, the verdict will appear
fair. Further, because the verdict appears fair to the defendant, the com-
munity will also be confident that the judgment is just.10 6 Although the
modern American judicial system allows prosecutors, as well as defend-
ants, to exercise peremptory challenges, the peremptory challenge still, in
some respects, retains the symbolic character first recognized in medieval
England.
Although the peremptory challenge may serve these important pur-
poses, litigants' continued discriminatory exercise of this device and the
resultant harms of this discrimination call for the elimination of the per-
emptory challenge altogether. When a litigant is allowed to exercise her
98. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Hayes, supra note 43, at 721.
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 55 (1978) (as-
serting that jury selection was, for centuries, the product of "hunches, unsymptomatic past
experience, intuition, [or] stabs in the dark"); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that peremptory challenges are based on "seat of the pants instincts").
101. Swain, 380 U.S. at 217-18.
102. Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge
Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 794 (1986).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting 4 WitLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353) (citations omitted).
106. Id.
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peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner several harms result.
First, without the broad range of social experiences often found in groups
comprised of both sexes, juries may be ill-equipped to evaluate the facts
presented. 10 7 For example, all male juries may not understand the fear
and helplessness felt by battered wives who, in self defense, wound or mur-
der their batterers.'0 8 Misunderstanding important testimony relating to
gender issues, such as spousal abuse, can create the opportunity for un-
conscious prejudice.
10 9
Secondly, when potential jurors are excluded from juries because of
their gender, those excluded are deprived of their basic democratic right
to participate in the community's administration of justice. 10 Like the
right to vote, jury service is one of the most fundamental ways an individ-
ual citizen can participate in the democratic process.'' Serving as ajuror
can be an empowering experience, especially for women who historically
have been subjected to gender discrimination. When women are ex-
cluded from jury service because of their gender they are stigmatized by
the implication that they are not equals and that they are unable or unwill-
ing to be impartial.
112
Finally, discriminatory use of peremptory challenges undermines the
legitimacy of and confidence in the fairness of the justice system.1 13 Wo-
men who are excluded because they are women see that the law is treating
them unequally with respect to jury service, and they may come to believe
that the law will treat them unfairly in other contexts as well. 114 Fairness
to litigants, inclusion of citizens of both sexes, and the integrity of the
justice system all demand that discrimination be recognized and elimi-
nated in the exercise of peremptory challenges. As the following discus-
sion demonstrates, in order to achieve this goal, peremptory challenges
must be abolished.
B. Pretextual Reasoning
JE.B. will not eradicate gender discrimination in the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. Lower courts applying Batson and lower courts at-
tempting to ban gender-based peremptory challenges prior to JE.B. have
found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate race and gender-neu-
tral reasons for peremptory strikes and mere pretexts for discrimination.
When lower courts implement JE.B., they necessarily will have similar dif-
ficulties. While theJE.B decision is a historic step toward the elimination
107. Theodore McMillan & ChristopherJ. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unful-
filled, 58 UMKC L. REv. 361, 362 (1990).
108. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2
UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 35 (1992).
109. Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472,
1559 (1988).







of gender discrimination in the jury selection process, it will simply elimi-
nate the most blatant discriminatory peremptory challenges. Thinly dis-
guised pretexts for gender discrimination, on the other hand, may survive
judicial examination. In light of this difficulty, the effort to remove dis-
crimination from the jury selection process would be best served if per-
emptory challenges were eliminated altogether.
1. Pretextual Reasoning in Race-Based Peremptory Challenges
The evidentiary analysis required byjE.B.115 is identical to the analy-
sis established by the Court in Batson.' 16 Lower courts have had difficulty,
however, implementing Batson, which suggests that the application of
JE.B. will be equally problematic. The difficulty arising from the applica-
tion of Batson stems from litigants' use of pretextual reasoning in the justi-
fication of peremptory challenges. Litigants have become proficient at
offering acceptable reasons for their strikes,1 17 and the courts have readily
accepted these often pretextual explanations, which enables attorneys to
avoid the commands of Batson.
1 18
Significantly, the Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance to
the lower courts in assessing purportedly race-neutral explanations offered
by litigants. 119 In Batson, the Court merely noted that a litigant "must give
a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for
exercising the challenges." 120 While the Court held that a litigant's rea-
sons must be related to the particular case to be tried, 12 1 this requirement
has failed to provide the lower courts with an adequate standard by which
to examine a litigant's proffered explanations.
Pursuant to this indefinite standard, lower courts have accepted justi-
fications based on non-racial characteristics that are, in fact, merely racial
and ethnic surrogates. 12 2 Justifications for peremptories are clearly prox-
ies for race and ethnicity when there is a dramatic statistical correlation
between the trait and race or ethnicity. 123 Studies, for example, have indi-
cated that residence, especially in urban areas, often serves as a surrogate
115. SeeJE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
116. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
117. Id. at 106 (Marshall,J., concurring).
118. Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibit-
ing Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 685, 694 (1993) (discussing
lower court acceptance of pretextual explanations).
119. Id.; see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (finding it unnecessary
to address the issue of pretext where prosecutor struckjurors because of their Spanish-speak-
ing ability).
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 98.
122. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 175.
123. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Ecluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups From
Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REa. 761, 789-91 (discussing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
371-72 (1992), and the statistical impact of excluding spanish-speaking latino jurors).
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
for race or ethnicity. 12 4 As one court has stated, "[r]esidence ... acts as
an ethnic badge... [and] can be the most accurate predictor of race."
125
In United States v. Uwaezhoke,126 for example, an African-American de-
fendant was on trial for participation in a drug conspiracy. 127 The defend-
ant objected when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an African-
American woman.1 28 The prosecutor explained that the woman was
stricken because, as a postal worker and a single parent who rented an
apartment in Newark, NewJersey, she "may be involved in a drug situation
where she lives." 129 The court held that the explanation was facially race-
neutral.' 3 0 The prosecutor's explanation, however, was clearly based
upon unfounded stereotypes. He simply assumed that a single, black wo-
man living in Newark would reside in low income housing and that areas
of low-income housing are drug infested.' 3 ' Thus, the potential juror's
race, her neighborhood, and crime and violence became amalgamated,
one serving as a surrogate for another.'
3 2
Additionally, lower courts have accepted justifications for peremptory
strikes against people of color where white jurors, exhibiting the same
characteristics that presumably prompted the peremptory strikes, remain
on thejury.l3 3 While some courts have held that the unequal application
124. See, e.g., Michael F. Potter, Note, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal
Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a "Racial Inclusionay Ordinance", 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151,
1154 (1990) (finding that race determines housing patterns); Richard H. Sander, Comment,
Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. R~v. 874,
875 (1988) (stating that "[e]very major metropolitan area in the United States still has a large
ghetto; in many cities, over eighty percent of the black population lives in virtually all-black
neighborhoods").
Litigants have argued that other characteristics also serve as racial and ethnic surrogates.
See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (insufficient education);
United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v.
Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (relatives with criminal records); United States v.
Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d
1228, 1233 (6th Cir.) (group membership), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992); United States v.
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (religion), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990);
United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Car-
tlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987) (lack of substantial income); see also Gordon, supra
note 118, at 699-705 (discussing courts' willingness to accept explanations for peremptories
that are racial or ethnic surrogates).
125. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992).
126. 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
127. Id. at 389.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 393.
131. Gordon, supra note 118, at 700-01.
132. "Through mental association, African-Americans, their neighborhoods, crime and
violence all become amalgamated, giving rise to tenacious stereotypes-innocent and unin-
tentional perhaps, but stereotypes nonetheless." Bishop, 959 F.2d at 828 (9th Cir. 1992).
Bishop held that the peremptory challenge of an African-American woman because she lived
in Compton, a neighborhood in South Central Los Angeles where seventy-five percent of the
residents were African-American, was a discriminatory racial proxy. Id. at 822, 827; see also
Gordon, supra note 118, at 702, 740 (discussing purportedly neutral explanations that are, in
fact, racial and ethnic surrogates).
133. Gordon, supra note 118, at 706.
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of peremptory challenges is unacceptable,1 3 4 other courts have allowed
such strikes even though they are clearly pretextual. 135
In United States v. Alvarado,13 6 for example, the prosecutor perempto-
rily struck an African-American juror with children the age of the defend-
ant, claiming she might be unduly sympathetic.' 3 7  The prosecutor,
however, failed to strike white members of the venire with children of an
age similar to the defendant's.13 8 The trial court accepted the proffered
rationale.' 3 9 Although the Second Circuit noted that the force of a chal-
lenger's explanation for strikes against people of color is substantially
weakened by evidence that white members, to whom the same explanation
applies, were not challenged, the judicial officer was entitled to assess each
explanation in light of all the relevant evidence. 140 Despite evidence indi-
cating the explanation was pretextual, the Second Circuit upheld the trial
court's finding.
14 1
Finally, peremptory challenges based on attorneys' subjective impres-
sions are often accepted by lower courts. 1 42 As such impressions are essen-
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to accept the prosecu-
tion's proffered explanations because they were applied only to African-American jurors);
United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (disallowing strike against His-
panic who resided in La Mesa, California because prosecutor failed to strike a white juror
who lived in La Mesa); see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 706-07, 719 n.230 (citing Jones v.
Ryan).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1991) (accepting prof-
fered explanation of youth, although nineteen-year-old white juror remained unchallenged);
United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1246 (11 th Cir. 1991) (accepting rationale for strike
of African-American woman because of her previous association with defense counsel, even
though several white jurors also had contact with defense counsel), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1279 (1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (allowing youth,
unemployment, and relatives with drug convictions as reasons for strikes of African-American
jurors, although one white juror was young and unemployed and another had been con-
victed of drug charges); Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 648-49 (lth Cir. 1990)
(allowing strike of African-American woman because she worked for the school board, while
white women who worked for the school board were not stricken), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954
(1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 n.5 (lth Cir. 1990) (accepting strikes
against African-Americans based on age, family drug problems, and misunderstanding voir
dire questions, although white jurors exhibiting the same characteristics were not stricken);
United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing strike of African-Ameri-
can, who was young and single, even though white juror exhibited the same characteristics);
see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 719 n.231.
136. 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 25-26.
141. Id. at 26.
142. Courts have accepted a variety of subjective impressions as explanations. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1992) (impressions of attitude; nervousness and
tone of voice), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1060 (1993); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457
(9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
967 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (impressions of eye contact); Reynolds v. Benefield,
931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991); United States v. Clem-
ons, 941 F.2d 321, 323-24 (1991) (impressions of dress); United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d
393, 395 (8th Cir. 1991) (impressions of inattentiveness during voir dire); United States v.
Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 749-
50 (lth Cir. 1991) (jurors' facial expressions); United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d
Cir.) (same), aff'd, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d
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tially unverifiable, they can easily hide discriminatory intent.143 Judges
rarely notice a particular juror's mannerisms and trial courts are not in a
position to assess an explanation based upon a subjective opinion. 144 Fur-
thermore, appeals of such challenges are difficult, as written records can-
not support or negate an attorney's subjective impression.
145
In Barfield v. Orange County,146 for instance, a prosecutor claimed that
an African-American juror was peremptorily struck because she "was look-
ing at me, and looking at my client, and looking at the Defendant's table
with an expression that conveyed to me some hostility, and it was my gut
feeling, based on her facial expression that she was likely to not be fair and
impartial to the [defendant]." 147 The trial court accepted the prosecu-
tor's explanation, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that "[h]ostile
facial expressions and body language are legitimate" rationales for the ex-
ercise of a peremptory challenge.1 48 Subjective impressions, however,
such as that offered by the prosecutor in Barfield, are often affected by an
attorney's realized or unrealized racism. 14 9 Similarly, a judge's own big-
otry may lead her to accept an attorney's rationale as plausible.
150
Because of the similarities between race and gender discrimination
present in both the character of the prejudice and the analysis required by
the court, the problematic nature of the Batson decision necessarily fore-
shadows the difficulties lower courts will encounter in the application of
JE.B. Under Batson, litigants satisfy their rebuttal burdens by reciting un-
reviewable explanations that are merely pretexts for racial discrimination.
Because it is simply too difficult to review intelligently and accurately liti-
gants' motives in the peremptory exclusion of jurors in the racial context
and, by implication, in the gender context, the peremptory challenge sys-
tem should be eliminated.
2. Pretextual Reasoning. in Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges
Prior to the Court's decision in Batson, state courts, unable to utilize
Sixth Amendmentjurisprudence in the examination of the validity of gen-
der-based peremptories, 151 "turned to their own state constitutions and an
analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion."152 Therefore, years before the Supreme Court decided Batson and
JE.B., numerous state courts disallowed the use of both race-based and
93, 95 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (impressions of body language); United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d
1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988) (impressions of demeanor); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d
1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United State v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir.
1987) (same); see also Gordon, supra note 118, at 719 nn.243-252 (citing court decisions
where peremptory challenges based on litigants' subjective impressions were accepted).
143. Gordon, supra note 118, at 709.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
147. Id. at 646.
148. Id. at 648.
149. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. See discussion supra Part I.C.
152. See, e.g.,Jo, supra note 8, at 1315.
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gender-based peremptories.15 3 Furthermore, after the Court's decision in
Batson, several state and federal courts held that the Batson rationale ex-
tended to peremptory strikes motivated by gender.1 5 4 Thus, while lower
courts have not yet specifically applied J.E.B., an analysis of lower court
cases that proscribed the use of gender-based peremptory challenges dem-
onstrates that, while J.E.B. may eliminate the most flagrant instances of
gender discrimination, the implementation of the decision will prove
problematic because courts routinely accept the pretextual explanations
offered by attorneys in defense of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
Like many purportedly race-neutral explanations, facially neutral ra-
tionales offered for the peremptory removal of women are often simply
surrogates for gender. Justifications for peremptories are surrogates for
gender when there is a high statistical correlation between the trait and
gender. Just as residence may serve as a proxy for race, employment in a
particular field often serves as a surrogate for gender. For example, wo-
men enter the field of nursing in dramatically higher numbers than men,
demonstrating a correlation between gender and nursing.155
In State v. Burch,156 a pre-J.E.B. decision, the Washington Court of
Appeals held that peremptory challenges on the basis of gender violated
both federal equal protection and the state's equal rights amendment.
1 57
The Burch court held that, under the circumstances, the defendant had
established a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.
1 58
During rebuttal, the prosecutor claimed that one of the excluded women
jurors had been stricken because, as a nurse who worked at a women's
clinic, she would find the defense witness, also a woman, "extremely credi-
ble."15 9 The court found this explanation sufficiently gender-neutral. 160
The prosecutor's rationale, however, was the product of uncorrobo-
rated stereotypes about women. She assumed that a nurse in a women's
clinic who acted as a caregiver to women would be sympathetic towards a
female witness and unable to be impartial. This explanation is not gender
neutral because it is "founded on gender stereotypes which view women as
generally governed by emotion, instinct, and feeling rather than reason,
judgment or common sense."16 1 In this sense, the court allowed the fu-
153. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979).
154. See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990); New York v.
Irizarry, 195 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). But see United States v. Hamilton, 850
F.2d 1038, 1041 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d
867, 870 (R.I. 1987).
155. Telephone interview with Lori Brotzman, Program Assistant, Office of Student and
Academic Support, University of Colorado School of Nursing, (June 2, 1994) (stating that
647 women and 43 men are enrolled in the University of Colorado School of Nursing).
156. 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Id. at 361-63.
158. Id. at 365.
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sion of the potential juror's sex, her profession, and a particular set of
characteristics, enabling one to serve as a surrogate for another.
162
Furthermore, as in the context of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges,16 courts have accepted justifications for peremptories against wo-
men where men jurors with the same characteristics remain on the jury.
Although the mere presence of the unequal application of peremptories
evidences pretextual reasoning, courts continue to rule that such applica-
tion does not warrant a finding of improper use of peremptories.
The court in People v. Inzarry'6 found, pursuant to state prohibitions
and the federal constitution, gender-based peremptory challenges were
unlawful.' 65 The court held that the prosecution's challenges against fe-
male jurors established a prima facie case of gender-based discrimina-
tion. 166 Against a panel of an unusually high number of men, the
prosecutor challenged nine women and only one man.' 67 Furthermore,
the manner in which the peremptories were exercised showed an appar-
ent attempt to rid the jury of women.1 68
The challenged women had diverse employment and family back-
grounds, and, for the most part, the voir dire provided no anti-prosecution
inclination.' 69 In fact, several of the women had relatives who were police
officers, and others had been crime victims. 170 The men who were not
challenged disclosed information about themselves similar to the facts re-
vealed by the challenged women.' 7 1 After the prosecution gave specific
explanations for the removal of the female jurors, the court ruled that
seven of the nine peremptory challenges were exercised for reasons in-
dependent of gender.17 2 Despite the prosecutor's failure to strike male
members of the venire with characteristics similar to those of the chal-
lenged females, the court ruled that the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges was not pretextual and, thus, not unlawful.
Finally, courts have accepted explanations for the peremptory re-
moval of prospective jurors based on litigants' subjective impressions. As
in the context of race, 173 subjective impressions can camouflage unlawful
motives. Litigants wishing to keep jurors of a particular sex off the jury
can merely provide the court with a subjective rationale based on an un-
verifiable impression, and, as noted above, courts are not equipped to
judge the validity of such impressions.
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
164. 536 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
165. Id. at 638.
166. Id. at 643.





172. Id. at 645.
173. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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In Mouzon v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,17 4 a woman employee
brought suit against her employer alleging gender bias and sexual harass-
ment.175 The plaintiff claimed the defendant's three peremptory chal-
lenges were exercised against female jurors on the basis of gender in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.1 76 During voir dire, one of the
excluded female jurors said she would find sexually explicit testimony em-
barrassing.1 77 The defendant claimed that, due to this statement and her
demeanor at the time she made the statement, the juror was hypersensi-
tive and an unacceptable juror.1 78 The court found this explanation to be
gender neutral.1 79 It is possible, however, that the juror appeared hyper-
sensitive, especially with respect to sexual matters, simply because tradi-
tionally women are seen as virginal and innocent. Thus, the attorney's
subjective impression of the juror, and the court's subsequent acceptance
of his explanation, may have been affected by sexist attitudes.
In light of lower court experience concerning the evaluation of liti-
gants' purportedly gender-based explanations, it is apparent that JE.B. is
an imperfect remedy for gender discrimination in the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. Lower courts are not equipped to assess explanations that
are surrogates for gender-based classifications. The eradication of gender
discrimination in the context of the peremptory challenge can only be
achieved through the elimination of this device.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE SELECTION
As discussed above, the peremptory challenge serves as a "safety net"
for challenges exercised for cause and represents the symbolic legitimacy
of the jury system. 1 80 As the preceding discussion illustrates, however, de-
spite judicial regulation of peremptory challenges, such challenges allow
litigants to discriminate in the jury selection process.18 1 A new system
should be introduced into American courtrooms that will serve the valid
goals of peremptory challenges and preclude discrimination in the jury
selection process. An affirmative selection 182 system will accomplish these
tasks.
174. No. CIV.A.93-3686, 1994 WL 197165 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 1994).




179. Id. at *2.
180. See discussion supra Part III.A.
181. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
182. This method was originally proposed in Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection:
A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781 (1986). Since the publica-
tion of Altman's Note, numerous scholars have endorsed this method, including Alschuler,
supra note 5; Harris, supra note 20; Heinz, supra note 34; and Hans Zeisel, Affirmative Peremp-
totyJuty Selection, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1165 (1987).
A number of commentators have suggested alternatives other than affirmative selection,
including the replacement of peremptories with a system of cause challenges, Gurney, supra
note 26, at 257-62; the expansion of the jury pool, id. at 262-66; the improvement of the
effectiveness of cause challenges, id. at 266; disallowing reliance on jurors' self-assessment of
bias, id. 266-68; the improvement of voir dire, id. at 268-73; the reduction of the number of
peremptories given to each side, id. at 274; the enactment of statutes that would restrict the
1994]
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A. The Procedural Requirements
Like the current jury selection process, in an affirmative selection sys-
tem, twenty-four venirepersons would be drawn randomly from the jury
pool.' 8 3 These twenty-four individuals would then be subject to voir dire
and challenges for cause.' 8 4 After challenges for cause, each party would
choose twelve jurors and list them in order of preference. The lists would
be submitted to the judge. Regardless of their rank, the judge would seat
on the petit jury those venirepersons who appear on both lists. 185 Next,
alternating between the lists, the judge would seat each party's selections
in descending order until the proper number of jurors is reached.
1 8 6
B. Affirmative Selection Satisfies the Traditional Objectives of the Peremptory
Challenge
While the peremptory challenge system acts as a "safety net" for chal-
lenges exercised for cause and presumably allows the parties to secure an
impartial jury, l8 7 the affirmative selection system also allows for the selec-
tion of an impartial jury. First, affirmative selection guarantees a fair con-
test between the litigants. Since the parties have equal power to select
jurors, neither party has the opportunity to stack the jury in her favor.
1 8 8
Furthermore, because jurors who appear on the lists of both parties are
seated first, jurors who are suitable to both parties become part of the petit
jury. Finally, because the parties have equal ability to choose acceptable
application of peremptory challenges, Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's
Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1176 (1993); the incorporation of an ethical
rule into the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would
prohibit discrimination against members of the venire during jury selection, Gordon, supra
note 118, at 713; and the adoption of a due process standard, Note, Due Process Limits on
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HAav. L. Rav. 1013 (1989).
183. Altman, supra note 182, at 806.
184. Id.; see discussion supra Part I.A.
185. Altman, supra note 182, at 806.
186. Id. One commentator, in an effort to expand Altman's affirmative selection system,
recommends that after the judge seats those jurors who appear on both parties' lists the
remaining jurors should be subject to removal if, to the court's satisfaction, the moving party
provides a neutral explanation justifying their dismissal. The trial judge should permit these
challenges alternately, allowing each side to utilize as many strikes as the peremptory chal-
lenge system allows. Under this system, the trial judge should assess the similarities and dif-
ferences between the challenged and unchallenged venirepersons to determine whether the
explanations for removal are based on specific biases not shared by other panel members. It
is in this manner, argues the commentator, that the trial judge should determine whether
the explanations are merely pretexts for discrimination. If both parties expend their chal-
lenges and the petit jury has not been empaneled, the judge should randomly select the
remaining jurors from the jury panel. Harris, supra note 20, at 1063.
This variation on Altman's affirmative selection system fails to remedy the problem of
pretextual reasoning engendered by peremptory challenges. As in the peremptory challenge
context, courts are not equipped to evaluate the validity of a litigant's purportedly neutral
explanation. A superficial examination of the similarities and differences between chal-
lenged and unchallenged venirepersons will not enable the judge to ferret out explanations
that are, in fact, surrogates for race or gender-based classifications, unequally applied to indi-
viduals on the venire panel, or based on a litigant's subjective impression of a particular
panel member. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
187. See discussion supra Part III.A.
188. Altman, supra note 182, at 807.
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jurors if there is an insufficient number of mutually acceptable jurors,
each has the opportunity to seat those individuals whom she thinks may be
partial toward her case. 189 Therefore, assuming the litigants' choice of
jurors is influenced by their respective interests, affirmative selection pro-
duces a balanced jury. It "lets the parties determine which biases or com-
munity members are important to their cases, and their competing
interests should affect a balance of biases on the jury."
190
While the symbolic legitimacy engendered by the defendant's ability
to shape the composition of the jury through the exercise of peremptory
challenges is an important purpose of the challenge, this objective can be
accomplished in an equally satisfactory manner through the implementa-
tion of an affirmative selection system. Through this system, the defend-
ant has the opportunity to choose one half of the jury and the jury will not
be seen as merely an extension of the prosecution. 19 1 Furthermore, to the
extent that affirmative selection allows for the inclusion of more minori-
ties and for a more equal representation of both genders, "it promotes
public confidence in the jury since popular participation instills respect
for the system." 192 The replacement of peremptory challenges with af-
firmative selection will not destroy the confidence litigants and the public
have in the jury system, but will, in fact, promote it. Like the peremptory
challenge system, affirmative selection produces an impartial jury and pro-
motes the symbolic legitimacy of the jury trial. Unlike the peremptory
challenge system, however, affirmative selection does not create a forum
in which pretexts for discrimination are accepted as reasonable explana-
tions for the exclusion of individuals from petit juries.
193
CONCLUSION
Eliminating gender-motivated peremptory challenges will take more
than the pronunciation by the Court in JE.B., because, despite the law,
attorneys will continue to employ peremptories in a discriminatory man-
ner. The case of race-based peremptory challenges provides an unfortu-
nate example of the persistence of racial stereotypes in courtrooms
through the use of pretextual reasoning. Similarly, in state and federal
courts where gender-motivated peremptory challenges have been disal-
lowed, explanations given by attorneys and subsequently accepted by
judges to justify the removal of women jurors echo attempts to exclude
African-American jurors while presumably adhering to the mandates of
Batson. Experience, thus, demonstrates the necessity of abolishing the per-
emptory challenge system in order to rid our jury selection process of dis-




191. Id. at 808.
192. Id.
193. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2.
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PRUNING THE JUDICIAL OAK BY SEVERING THE AIDING
AND ABETTING BRANCH
Congress and those charged with enforcement of the securities laws stand
forewarned that unresolved questions concerning the scope of [private
10(b)] causes of action are likely to be answered by the Court in favor of
defendants'
INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlaw-
ful to use deceptive devices or make misleading statements "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Under section 10(b), private
actions have been said to represent a "judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn," 2 as courts increasingly have accorded
leniency to such actions. For nearly three decades, lower federal courts
have allowed private parties to bring suit based on aiding and abetting
claims pursuant to section 10(b). 3 Over the same time period, the
Supreme Court has declined to rule on the validity of such claims. 4 The
Supreme Court's silence recently ended with its decision in Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank,5 which held that the conduct proscribed by section
10(b) does not include aiding and abetting a primary violator. Conse-
quently, private parties no longer can maintain suits based on such
claims. 6 The Court's holding overrules substantial lower court precedent
allowing aiding and abetting liability. This decision illustrates the continu-
ation of the Contraction Era of securities law7 and for the time being halts
causes of action based on aiding and abetting section 10(b) violations.
8
1. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1115 (1991) (KennedyJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1966).
4. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976).
5. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
6. Id.
7. The term "Contraction Era" refers to the post-1975 decisions in which courts denied,
restricted, and criticized implied private causes of action under the securities laws. See Alan
R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination,
52 ALa. L. Rav. 637, 648 n.64 (1988).
8. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
both announced their disapproval of the Court's decision. Senator Dodd declared the Court
"has laid down the gauntlet for Congress." SEC Advocates Legislation to Preserve Section 10(b)
Aiding and Abetting Liability, 26 Sc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 691, 691 (May 13, 1994). Senator
Metzenbaum, deeming the Court's reasoning "bizarre," introduced the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Amendment Act of 1994 in response. 140 CONG. Rac. S9460 (daily ed. July 21,
1994).
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This Comment analyzes the Court's decision in Central Bank. Part I
examines the historical development of aiding and abetting liability and
the judicially conservative trend of recent Supreme Court decisions in the
securities law arena. Part II provides the factual background, procedural
history, and majority and dissenting rationales of Central Bank. Part III
analyzes the Court's decision. The analysis praises the majority's judicial
restraint, criticizes the dissent's reliance on suspect methods of statutory
construction, and discusses possible implications of the decision. The
larger policy issue of whether aiding and abetting liability might serve as a
valuable addition to section 10(b) is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Though aiding and abetting liability may be desirable to some commenta-
tors, this Comment takes the position that section 10(b), as it currently
reads, cannot and should not be construed to allow such liability.
I. BACKGROUND
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and the subse-
quent economic depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act") 9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 1 0
Congress passed the Acts to protect investors from fraudulent conduct in
connection with securities transactions,1 1 thereby substituting a philoso-
phy of full disclosure for the prevailing philosophy of caveat emptor.
12
Together, the Acts create an extensive scheme of liability, with the 1933
Act regulating initial distribution of securities and the 1934 Act regulating
post-distribution trading.'
3
The use of aiding and abetting liability by private parties has prolifer-
ated in recent years, becoming the most important secondary liability doc-
trine used in section 10(b) actions. 14 Prior to Central Bank, many
commentators felt the doctrine had become so established that the
Supreme Court would never reject it.15 Other commentators and courts
questioned the validity of private aiding and abetting claims given the
Supreme Court's restrictive textual approach to securities law in recent
years.
16
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. Cheryl L. Pollak, Comment, Rule 10b-5 Liability After Hochfelder: Abandoning the Con-
cept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 218, 218 (1977).
12. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (citing SEC v. Capi-
tal Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
13. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994).
14. Thomas L. Riesenberg, Supreme Court to Examine Aiding and Abetting Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 7 INsIrHrs, no. 8, August 1993, at 34. In the past, aiding and abetting liability was
used almost exclusively by the SEC. More recently, almost every private § 10(b) action con-
tains an aiding and abetting claim. Id.
15. See, e.g., William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aid-
ing and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statu-
tory Scheme, 14J. CoRe. L. 313, 315-18 (1988).
16. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, passim.
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A. Primaiy Violations and Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) prohibits the use of deception or manipulation, as spec-
ified by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.17 Pursuant to the authority
granted in section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule lob-5, which requires
traders to either disclose inside information or abstain from trading based
on such information.'
8
While the text of section 10(b) does not provide for a private right of
action, courts have inferred such a right based on the maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium, which is to say, where there is a right there is a remedy.19 In a
suit based on a section 10 (b) violation, a purchaser or seller 20 of any secur-
ity can bring a claim against any person engaged in manipulation 2 ' or
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of the security.22 For
the claim to succeed, the plaintiff must satisfy three judicially created
thresholds. First, the defendant must have engaged intentionally or know-
ingly in manipulative or deceptive conduct 23 on which the plaintiff re-
17. Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Section 10 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection the with purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Section 10 is a catchall provision, "but what it catches must be fraud." Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). The Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Throughout this Comment, the author refers to § 10(b); however, any construction lim-
iting conduct actionable under § 10(b) also limits Rule lOb-5 because the Rule gains its au-
thority from § 10(b). Rulemaking authority granted to an agency gives it the power to adopt
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress, not the power to make law. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
19. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
20. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975) (illus-
trating the history of lower federal court holdings allowing only actual purchasers and sellers
to sue under § 10(b)).
21. In the securities law context, "manipulation" is a term of art referring to practices
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that artificially affect market activity.
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
22. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
23. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). The Court also rejected
negligence as a basis for liability. Id. at 199; see also Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222,
228 (1980) (holding omissions to be actionable only if defendant had a duty to disclose);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (limiting the conduct actionable to misstate-
ments or omissions of material facts and manipulation of securities pricing).
1994]
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lied.2 4 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct
proximately caused an injury.2 5 Finally, the defendant must have used the
United States mail, a national security exchange, or interstate commerce
to further the manipulation or deception.
26
Additional judicial construction of the section eventually expanded
liability and allowed for private actions based on a defendant aiding and
abetting the primary violator.27 This construction of the section resulted
in defrauded investors suing banks,28 accountants, 29 lawyers, 30 underwrit-
ers,3 1 and stock exchanges3 2 due to the typical insolvency of the primary
violators in the wake of failed securities schemes.
3 3
In contrast to the judicially implied private right of action for section
10(b) violations, several sections of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act expressly
provide for private remedial measures. 3 4 However, none of these sections
provide for aiding and abetting liability. While none of the sections pro-
vide an express private remedy for aiding and abetting, other sections of
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act provide for secondary liability in the
form of "controlling person" liability.3 5 The 1934 Act allows the SEC to
censure or restrict the activities of persons associated with a broker-
24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). Along with finding reliance a re-
quirement, the Court also clarified the definition of materiality in regard to reliance as the
"substantial likelihood that the disclosure or the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able." Id. at 231 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see also Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (holding plaintiff need not show
reliance when basing action on an omission).
25. See Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256, 1261 (4th Cir. 1993); In re
Control Data Corp. Securities Litigation, 983 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986).
26. Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
27. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind.
1966).
28. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
29. See, e.g., H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
31. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
33. See John T. Vangel, Note, A Complicity-Doctrine Approach to Section 10(b) Aiding and
Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 180, 180 (1989).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988) (creating private cause of action for false statements or
omissions in registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988) (same for the sale of securities
by way of a material misstatement or omission); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (same for manipu-
lative practices, e.g., wash sales and matched orders); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (same
against owners, officers, and directors who engage in short-swing trading); 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1988) (same for misleading statements in forms filed with the SEC). In contrast to the
express rights of action granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Commodity Exchange Act
expressly provides for a private cause of action based on aiding and abetting a violator. 7
U.S.C. § 25(b)(3) (1988).
35. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988) (providing for "control-
ling person" liability, unless such person "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (providing for
controlling person liability with the same 'good faith' exception).
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dealer3 6 who willfully aid and abet or otherwise induce a securities viola-
tion by another.3 7 In addition to the foregoing express provisions for sec-
ondary liability, the 1934 Act imposes supervisory duties on exchanges and
clearing agencies.
3 8
The first case to address aiding and abetting liability in the securities
arena, SEC v. Timetrnst, 39 illustrates its criminal law antecedents. The SEC
alleged that Timetrust had engaged in a scheme to defraud purchasers of
securities40 and that Timetrust had done so with the "aid and abetment"
of others.4 ' In deciding whether the SEC could invoke properly an in-
junction based on aiding and abetting a securities violation of section
17(a), the court noted that the Criminal Code of the United States pro-
vided for aiding and abetting liability in a criminal proceeding.4 2 The
court then concluded that "no good reason appears why this same rule
should not apply in an injunctive proceeding to restrain a violation of the
same statute."
4 3
The landmark decision allowing civil liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of section 10(b) came in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insur-
ance.44 The district court relied on tort law principles to allow a private
action based on an aiding and abetting theory. In Brennan, Dobich Securi-
ties Corporation, from whom the plaintiffs had purchased defendant cor-
poration's stock, used a short selling scheme 45 to create an artificially high
market price for the stock.46 The plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern knew
of Dobich's conduct but permitted it to continue by failing to report
Dobich to the SEC.47 The plaintiffs argued that by failing to report the
improper activity, the defendants "knowingly and purposely encouraged
an artificial build-up in the market for its stock."48 As a result of such
aiding and abetting, Midwestern "was allegedly in a more favorable posi-
tion for potential mergers" being negotiated.
49
36. "Broker-dealer" is a term of art referring to a securities brokerage firm. BLACK'S LAW
DICTONARY 193 (6th ed. 1990).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1988). Pursuant to authority granted by the Investment
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act, the SEC also has authority to discipline invest-
ment advisers who aid or abet a securities law violation. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b)(3), 80b-
3(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
39. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
45. Short selling occurs when a seller contracts for the sale of stock the seller does not
own, "so as to be available for delivery at the time when, under rules of the exchange, deliv-
ery must be made." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1379 (6th Ed. 1990). Short selling is not illegal
in and of itself, but in Brennan Dobich did not cover (buy and deliver) as the rules required.
Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
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Midwestern attacked the complaint by challenging the aiding and
abetting theory, contending section 10(b) did not provide authority for
the claim and that the legislative history indicated that Congress chose not
to proscribe aiding and abetting.50 The district court rejected Midwest-
ern's contentions, reasoning courts had allowed private section 10(b) ac-
tions based on general principles of tort law and that these same
principles should guide the construction of section 10(b) with respect to
the issue of aiding and abetting liability.5 1 The court relied on the Re-
statement of Torts section 876, stating that principles formulated therein
are the "logical and natural complement" to a section 10(b) implied right
of action.
52
Other courts ultimately followed Brennan's rationale and similarly re-
lied on tort law to hold peripheral defendants liable as aiders and
abettors.
53
All federal courts of appeals considering whether aiding and abetting
liability exists under section 10(b) have concluded that it does.54 The ma-
jority rule, as represented by the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits, requires: (1) an independent violation of section 10(b); (2) the
aider and abettor's knowledge of the violation; and (3) substantial assist-
ance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary viola-
tion.55 The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits articulate the
elements in a slightly different manner, requiring that the aider and abet-
tor knowingly and substantially assist in the primary violation.
5 6
50. Id. at 675-77.
51. Id. at 680-82 (citing Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.
1965); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
52. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, reading substan-
tially the same today as the Restatement of Torts did in 1939, provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); see,
e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL.
L. REv. 80, 84 n.29 (1981).
54. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 & n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
55. See Landy, 486 F.2d at 162-63; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d
199, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1989); Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 (3rd Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir.
1981); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979). The Ninth
Circuit also uses this formula but additionally requires actual knowledge of the violation by
the aider and abettor. See Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 822 (1983).
56. See, e.g., Bane v. Sigmundr Exploration Corp., 848 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1988);
Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Woods v.
Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1985). Some commentators view the differ-
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The Seventh Circuit employs a stricter analysis than the other circuits.
Aside from requiring satisfaction of the three-pronged majority rule, the
Seventh Circuit requires as a threshold matter that the aider and abettor
possess the same level of scienter as the primary violator and that the aider
and abettor commit one of the manipulative or deceptive acts.57 In Barker
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,58 the plaintiffs brought a claim
against an accounting firm and a law firm for aiding and abetting. The
Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment, stating that an aider and
abettor must meet the same standards as a primary violator but need not
actually sell the security.
59
B. Aiding and Abetting Application Problems
No clear distinctions exist between primary and secondary liability in
the securities law context. Generally, plaintiffs sue the same person as
both a primary violator and as an aider and abettor, 60 and courts spend
minimal time analyzing the distinction. 61 At times, courts impose liability
based on both capacities.
62
Some courts distinguish between primary liability and aiding and
abetting liability by using a direct/indirect participant duality.63 Under
this type of analysis, a primary violator directly participates in the fraud,
while a secondary violator only indirectly participates in the fraud. SEC v.
Coffey6 4 illustrates this distinction. In Coffey, the State of Ohio purchased
notes from an issuing company.65 The SEC alleged the issuing company
made misrepresentations to the state and to a rating agency to achieve a
"prime" rating for the notes.66 The SEC named the company's financial
vice-president as one of the defendants, and, in deciding whether to im-
pose primary liability on the officer, the court examined whether the fi-
nancial vice-president had direct contacts with the misled parties. 67
Courts occasionally base the distinction between a primary violator
and an aider and abettor on the role the person played in the transaction.
In DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co.,68 the court limited primary
ences between the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits' test and the test applied by the
First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits as inconsequential. See, e.g., Joel S. Feldman, The
Breakdown of Securities Fraud Aiding and Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform Standard be Resurrected?,
19 SEC. REG. L.J. 45, 73 (1991).
57. Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); see LHLC Corp. v. Clu-
ett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986).
58. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 495.
60. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 640.
61. Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318.
62. See, e.g., Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 & n.5 (1983) (recog-
nizing, but not discussing, the dual liability found by the trial court).
63. See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1365 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Id
67. Id. at 1315.
68. 644 F. Supp. 1517 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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liability to actual buyers and sellers of securities, persons acting in roles
that statutes expressly specify as liable, or persons acting in roles that con-
stitute an integral part of the statutory scheme. 69
The lines drawn in DM1 and Coffey do not offer valid distinctions be-
cause the text of section 10(b) covers "any person."70 If "any person" can
"directly or indirectly" commit a primary violation, the distinctions fail to
separate sufficiently aiders and abettors from primary violators.
The Seventh Circuit limits primary liability to those persons otherwise
covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.7 1 Under this view, the court limits
primary liability to buyers, sellers, issuers of securities, the board of direc-
tors of the issuer, persons signing or preparing a prospectus, and any con-
trolling persons. 72 As noted previously, the Seventh Circuit also requires
that the aider and abettor engage in a manipulative or deceptive act. Ar-
guably, under the Seventh Circuit's approach, aiding and abetting liability
constitutes a mere label attached to accountants, lawyers, trustees, and
such whose actions constitute primary violations of section 10(b).
73
While some commentators and courts have suggested that no distinc-
tion exists between primary and aiding and abetting liability, others have
defined secondary liability in terms of duty. 74 Still others beg the ques-
tion, describing a primary violator as one who commits acts directly pro-
scribed by law and a secondary violator as one upon whom the court
imposes liability because of a relationship with the primary violator. 75 In
any event, the jurisprudence prior to Central Bank provided no clear or
meaningful distinction between primary and aiding and abetting
liability.
76
C. Supreme Court Decisions in the Contraction Era
Courts developed private remedies and aiding and abetting liability in
the Expansion Era of securities law.77 During this era, courts increasingly
69. Id. at 1519.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
71. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494-95 (7th Cir.
1986).
72. See Mary T. Doherty, Note, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, 25 IND. L. REv. 829,
839-40 (1992) (arguing the Seventh Circuit's distinction is different from other circuits in
that it focuses on the defendant's role in the statutory scheme rather than his role in the
fraudulent scheme).
73. See id. at 852 (suggesting also that aiding and abetting has been all but eliminated in
the Seventh Circuit).
74. See, e.g., David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597,
600 (1972) (classifying persons owing a duty to the public as primary violators).
75. See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318-20.
76. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 56, at 46 (contending that the distinction defies precise
definition).
77. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 648; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. LJ. 891,
923 (1977) (arguing the Court has shifted its views on federal securities law from an expan-




formulated new private actions and remedies. 78 Beginning in 1975, the
Supreme Court entered a new phase in which its decisions began to limit
the doctrines developed during the Expansion Era.79 The Court ex-
pressed concern over the implications of the expansive liability created in
the Expansion Era and began to restrict such liability.80 The ensuing
"contraction" period consequently resulted in courts rejecting new private
actions and criticizing the existing private actions.
8 '
The Supreme Court's decisions during the Contraction Era demon-
strate a recurring trend to look continually to the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme to ascertain congressional intent.8 2 This textual
approach to statutory construction differs dramatically from the original
approach used by the courts in recognizing private actions and aiding and
abetting claims. The difference in the two approaches caused courts and
commentators to question the validity of private actions based on aiding
and abetting.
8 3
The Court's securities law decisions in the Contraction Era can be
grouped roughly into three interrelated categories. The first category
consists of cases in which the Court considered whether a particular sec-
tion implied a private cause of action.8 4 Cases in the second category dis-
78. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468-69 (1969) (holding that a
merger involves both a purchase and sale and recognizing Rule lOb-5 application in a proxy
solicitation situation); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964) (finding an implied
cause of action for violation of Rule 14a-9 and instructing courts to provide effective remedial
measures); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963) (holding
scienter unnecessary in an SEC injunction proceeding under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1974) (ruling that an
earnings forecast constituted a fact and allowing a lOb-5 claim based on such a forecast);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding lOb-5 broad enough to include
negligence); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (allowing lOb-5
claims for all forms of fraud, not just traditional ones); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1967) (easing the buyer/seller requirement of 10b-5); Miller v. Bargain City,
USA, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing an open market buyer to maintain a
lOb-5 suit based on false statements filed with the SEC); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer,
225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (allowing a corporation to sue its officers and directors
for 101>5 violations and relaxing privity); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (recognizing a 10b-5 violation by silence and dispensing with privity
requirement).
79. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 648 n.64.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090
(1993); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102-04 (1991); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S.
723, 756 (1975).
83. SeeAkin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F.
Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Fischel, supra
note 53, at 91-96.
84. See generally Tamar Frankel, Implied Righs of Action, 78 VA. L. Rxv. 553 (1981) (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of the Court's decisions involving implied private remedies for securi-
ties violations).
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cuss issues concerning the extent of the prohibited conduct.8 5 Cases in
the third category address aspects of the private liability scheme. 86
During the Expansion Era, the Court followed an enforcement ra-
tionale approach in deciding whether a particular section implied a pri-
vate remedy. Under this rationale, the Court allowed private actions based
on the necessity of supplementing SEC enforcement of the statutory
scheme. 87 In Cort v. Ash,88 the Court restricted this enforcement rationale
and articulated a four part test for deciding whether an implied private
remedy existed.89 Subsequently, the Court further narrowed the test and
articulated the dispositive inquiry as whether Congress intended to create
a private remedy.90 This line of cases demonstrates a withdrawal from the
earlier tort law rationale of implied private remedies and highlights the
Court's focus on statutory construction.
91
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldey92 illustrates the second category of cases, in
which the Court considered the scope of the conduct on which a plaintiff
could base a cause of action. In Hochfelder, the plaintiffs premised their
cause of action on a theory of "negligent nonfeasance."9 3 While the plain-
tiff's complaint alleged the defendant had aided and abetted a violator of
section 10(b), the Court declined to address this issue. 94 The Court, rely-
ing on the language of the statute, ruled that a section 10(b) claim re-
quires scienter.95 Finding the language clear in the overall statutory
85. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (holding that a duty to disclose
does not arise from the mere possession of non-public information); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 691 (1980) (holding that the scienter requirement is the same for SEC injunctive pro-
ceedings and private party claims); Chiarela, 445 U.S. at 228 (holding that nondisclosure
violates § 10(b) only when the defendant owes a disclosure duty to the plaintiff); Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977) (holding that regardless of the fairness of the
terms, Delaware short-form mergers do not violate § 10(b) where there is full disclosure);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (requiring intent to deceive).
86. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091-
92 (1993) (recognizing a right of contribution for § 10(b) violations); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (imposing a reliance requirement on the plaintiff); Bateman Eich-
ler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (denying the use of the in pari
delicto defense to liability); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 (limiting standing to buyers and
sellers).
87. See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (implying a private cause
of action under § 14(a) in order to supplement enforcement of the statutory scheme).
88. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
89. The four-part test established in Cort for implying a private remedy asks: (1) Is the
plaintiff a member of the beneficiary class of the statute?; (2) Is there any explicit or implicit
indication that Congress intend a private remedy?; (3) Is a private remedy consistent with the
legislative scheme?; and (4) Is the cause of action one of basically state concern typically
relegated to state law? Id. at 78.
90. "The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
91. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 650-661 (analyzing the validity of aiding
and abetting liability under the Cort four-part test); Fischel, supra note 53, at 90-94 (discuss-
ing the validity of § 10(b) secondary liability under the Court's Contraction Era view); Fran-
kel, supra note 84, passim (discussing the evolution of the Court's implied remedy analysis).
92. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
93. Id. at 190.
94. Id. at 193 n.7.
95. Id. at 201.
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scheme, the Court held that the text of the section controlled the
decision.
9 6
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau97 illustrates
the third category of cases, in which the Court faced issues concerning the
procedural aspects of the private liability scheme. In Musick, the Court
considered whether defendants in a private section 10(b) action could
seek contribution from other defendants.9 8 The Court held in the affirm-
ative, basing its decision on the overall statutory scheme. 99 The Court
stated that when faced with questions as to the individual components of
an implied private action, it must infer how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the action been an express provision. 100 In mak-
ing its inference, the Court announced its continuing goal to avoid "con-
flict with Congress' own express rights of action, to promote clarity,
consistency and coherence for those who rely upon or are subject to lOb-5
liability, and to effect Congress' objectives in enacting the securities
laws."101 Musick demonstrates the Court's consistent use of the textual ap-
proach, even when it expanded the components of a private right of
action.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the "Au-
thority") issued bonds in 1986 and 1988 with a total face value of $26
million.10 2 Central Bank, the petitioner, acted as an indenture trustee for
the bond issue.103 Landowner assessment liens secured the bonds.
10 4
The bonds contained covenants requiring the value of the land subject to
96. Id.
97. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
98. Id. at 2086.
99. Id. at 2090-91. The Court looked first to the language of§ 10(b), but noted it "pro-
vides little guidance." I. at 2090. The Court next turned to sections 9 and 18 of the 1934
Act, stating that the sections were of "particular significance in determining how Congress
would have resolved the question" as the sections target the same dangers as § 10(b). Id. at
2090. The Court found sections 9 and 18 both to contain nearly identical rights of contribu-
tion, and thus inferred a right of contribution for § 10(b) defendants. Id. at 2091. In dissent,
Justice Thomas asserted that the majority's decision "unfortunately nourishes 'a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.' " Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
100. "Our task is not to assess the relative merits of the competing rules, but rather to
attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue...." Id. at 2089-90.
101. Id. at 2090 (citation omitted); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-44 (promot-
ing clarity); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (effecting Congress's objectives).
102. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994).
103. Id. An indenture, in the context of business financing, refers to a contract that es-
tablishes the terms of the bond issuance. BLAcK's LAw DiCnoNARY 770 (6th ed. 1990). An
indenture trustee performs duties specifically set out in the indenture and is only liable for
the performance of those duties. The indenture trustee thus has the duty to examine all
evidence to ensure it conforms to the requirements of the indenture. 15 U.S.C. 77ooo(a)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
104. CentralBank, 114 S. CL at 1443.
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the liens to be worth at least 160% of the total outstanding principal and
interest. 105
The covenants additionally required the developer of Stetson Hills,
AmWest Development, to provide evidence that the 160% threshold was
met each year. 10 6 The 1988 appraisal, provided in January, contained
land values virtually unchanged from the 1986 appraisals. 10 7 In contrast,
property values in the Colorado Springs area generally had declined over
the same period of time.108 Because of the conflict between the appraisal
and the general Colorado Springs real-estate market, Central Bank had its
in-house appraiser review the 1988 evaluation.1l 9 The in-house appraiser
concluded the 1988 evaluation appeared overly optimistic and recom-
mended hiring an outside appraiser for an independent review of the
appraisal.110
After a series of letters, Central Bank agreed to postpone the in-
dependent evaluation until December 1988.111 By the time the 1988
bond issue closed in June, First Interstate Bank had bought $2.1 million
worth of the 1988 bonds.' l2 The independent review began in December,
but before completion of the review, the Authority defaulted on the 1988
bonds.
113
First Interstate sued the Authority, an underwriter, a junior under-
writer, and a director of AmWest, alleging that the parties had violated
section 10(b). 1 4 First Interstate also sued Central Bank, alleging Central
Bank aided and abetted the other defendants in violating section
10(b). 1
15
The district court granted Central Bank's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground no genuine issue of material fact existed, holding
that allegations of recklessness did not satisfy the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting. 116 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that reckless-
ness did satisfy the scienter element for an aiding and abetting claim.
1 17
The court of appeals did not consider the existence or validity of aiding
and abetting liability under section 10(b)."
8
Central Bank filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted. 119 The original petition raised two issues: (1) whether an












116. See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 900 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
117. thing, 969 F.2d at 903.
118. Id. at 898-904.
119. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
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been breached; and (2) whether recklessness satisfies the scienter require-
ment.120 The Court, sua sponte, directed the parties to brief the issue of




In the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that section 10(b) proscribes conduct involving manipulation or decep-
tion but does not proscribe aiding and abetting a primary violator.12 2 The
Court considered whether aiding and abetting fell under "the scope of
conduct prohibited," or whether it concerned the elements of a private
right of action.1 23 The Court stated that determining the elements of the
section 10(b) private liability scheme poses difficult problems because the
statute fails to create expressly a private cause of action and provides no
guidance in regard to the elements of such a scheme.1 24 With respect to
the scope of conduct, however, the Court held that the text of the statute
controls any decision.'
25
Concluding that aiding and abetting constitutes conduct, the Court
turned to the text of section 10(b) and noted the language did not men-
tion aiding and abetting.' 2 6 The Court explained that it had refused to
allow section 10(b) claims based on conduct not expressly proscribed by
the text of the statute and emphasized its continued adherence to the lan-
guage of the statute.
127
Respondent and the SEC argued the use of the phrase "directly and
indirectly" in section 10(b) demonstrated congressional intent to prohibit
aiding and abetting.' 28 The Court considered the statutory scheme of se-
curities laws and rejected the argument, noting that Congress used such
120. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 61 U.S.L.W. 3463, 3464 (Jan. 5, 1993) (No. 92-
854).
121. Central Bank, 113 S. Ct. at 2927.
122. Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1455.
123. Id at 1445. See generally supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (discussing cases
that fall under the first and second prong of the analysis). Under the first prong, the text of
the statute controls the decision while under the second prong, the Court is required "to
infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the [private liability scheme] issue" had
an express private right of action for aiding and abetting been included in the 1934 Act.
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
124. Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1446.
125. Id
126. Id. at1446-48. "Our consideration of statutory duties, especially in cases interpreting
§ 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered by
§ 10(b). That bodes ill for the respondents, for 'the language of Section 10(b) does not in
terms mention aiding and abetting.'" Id. at 1447 (quoting Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae
8).
127. Id. at 1446.
128. Id at 1447.
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"directly and indirectly" language numerous times12 and at no time did
such language consequently impose aiding and abetting liability.
130
After finding that the text of section 10(b) dictated the outcome, the
Court concluded that an analysis of the express rights of action granted by
the 1934 Act would reach the same result.131 The Court found that while
some of the express causes of action in the securities acts specify categories
of possible defendants, none of the express causes of action in the 1934
Act proscribe aiding and abetting.' 3 2 The majority concluded that inter-
preting section 10(b) to proscribe aiding and abetting would create an
anomaly because such liability would not attach to any of the express pri-
vate rights of action in the Act.'
33
In addition to considering textual analysis, the Court considered
post-legislative history and policy arguments.' 3 4 The respondents cited
two post-legislative committee reports 135 the Court dismissed as contain-
ing only "oblique references to aiding and abetting liability." 13 6 More-
over, the Court stated the reports were merely an interpretation by a
Congress that was not responsible for passing section 10(b).1 37 The re-
spondents, invoking the acquiescence doctrine, argued that congressional
silence demonstrated approval of aiding and abetting liability.13 8 The pe-
titioner pointed out that Congress had rejected three prior proposed
amendments that expressly would have incorporated aiding and abetting
liability.13 9 The majority reasoned that the acquiescence doctrine 140 de-
129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (2) (C) (1988) (addressing direct and indirect ownership
of stock); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (2)-(3) (1988) (addressing direct or indirect interest in puts,
calls, straddles, or options); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78p(a) (1988) (addressing direct or
indirect ownership of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (addressing direct or indirect con-
trol of person violating the Act).
130. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447; see also Fischel, supra note 53, at 95 n.83 (positing
that "[o]ne plausible interpretation of the 'direct or indirectly' language is that it allows
liability to be imposed upon a defendant even though such defendant does not himself use
the jurisdictional means (i.e., mail a letter in interstate commerce)"). But see In re Atlantic
Fin. Management, 784 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting the "direct or indirect" lan-
guage as encompassing principal/agent liability).
131. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448-49. In undertaking this analysis, the Court essentially
concluded that the same outcome would result under either prong of its test. Thus, the
Court's holding did not ultimately depend on the framing of the issue as "conduct" or as "an
element of the private liability scheme."
132. Id at 1449.
133. Id
134. Id at 1452-54.
135. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6044-45; H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1983).
136. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id. at 1453.
140. In addition to the "acquiescence doctrine," the Court addressed the "rejected propo-
sal doctrine" and the "reenactment doctrine." See id. at 1450-53. "Acquiescence doctrine"
refers to a theory according to which judicial gloss obtains the force of legislation by congres-
sional inaction. The "rejected proposal doctrine" posits that rejected proposals indicate that
courts cannot construe statutes to resemble the rejected proposals. The "reenactment doc-
trine" incorporates settled statutory construction when the Congress reenacts the statute
without disturbing the settled construction. For a summary of these doctrines as well as an
in-depth discussion on the dangers of using congressional inaction as an indication of legisla-
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served little weight and that the post-legislative history did not point to any
definitive answer.
14 1
The Court addressed policy arguments by considering the uncertain
and expansive litigation created by aiding and abetting liability and con-
ceded the availability of policy arguments favoring aiding and abetting lia-
bility. 142 The Court, however, refrained from basing its decision on policy
rationales, stating that "policy considerations cannot override our inter-
pretation of the text and structure of the [1934] Act, except to the extent
that they may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would
lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it."
143
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Black-
mun, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined. The dissenters argued that the major-
ity had given "short shrift to a long history of aider and abettor liability
under [section] 10(b)," 144 adding that every court of appeals to have con-
sidered the issue has upheld such liability.1 45 The dissenters argued that if
any confusion existed, it concerned the elements of aiding and abetting,
not its existence or validity.14 6 The dissent further stated that the major-
ity's rationale imperiled other firmly rooted theories of secondary liability
not expressly addressed in securities statutes.
1 47
In contrast to the majority's approach, the dissenters framed the issue
as whether a plaintiff has a right to sue a person who aids and abets a
primary violator.1 48 The dissent reasoned that because the 1934 Act had
been adopted against a backdrop of liberal construction in which "courts
regularly assumed ... that a statute enacted for the benefit of a particular
class conferred" the right to sue violators, section 10(b) should confer a
right of action against aiders and abettors.
149
Putting aside the liberal backdrop underlying the passage of the 1934
Act, the dissent argued that the doctrine of aiding and abetting liability
tive intent, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67
(1988).
141. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453. Here the acquiescence doctrine favored allowing
aiding and abetting liability, but the rejected proposal doctrine indicated the invalidity of
aiding and abetting liability. The Court noted that Congress had not reenacted § 10(b);
therefore, the reenactment doctrine did not bolster the respondents arguments. lI& at 1452.
142. Id. at 1453-54.
143. Id. at 1453-54 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
144. Id. at 1456 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1457.
147. Id. at 1456, 1460 n.12 (mentioning conspiracy, respondeat superior, and common
law agency principles).
148. The dissent argued the Court should uphold "the private right of action against aider
and abettors . .. [and follow] the traditional common law presumption, that a statute en-
acted for the benefit of a particular class conferred on the members of that class the right to
sue." Id. at 1456-57 (emphasis added). Thus, the dissent did not concern itself with whether
§ 10(b) proscribed aiding and abetting, but rather focused on a private plaintifFs right to
sue-a distinct and separate issue.
149. Id.
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had become so well established that the Court should not disturb it.150
The dissent noted that federal criminal law imposes liability on aiders and
abettors of section 10(b) violators1 5 1 and argued that imposing civil liabil-
ity on aiders and abettors would not place an unfair duty on those who
Congress has opted to leave unregulated. 15 2 While conceding that Con-
gress, not courts, should create rights, the dissent argued that in this case,
the long history of aiding and abetting liability provided a secure founda-
tion for the imposition of liability.
153
III. ANALYSIS
A. Flaws in the Dissent's Rationale
The dissent's argument misses the point and ignores the statutory
construction goals of the modern Court. The liberal backdrop of the 1934
Act allowed private rights of action against persons engaged in conduct
proscribed by statute. Aiding and abetting liability, properly seen, does
not hinge on whether a plaintiff has a right to sue; rather, it focuses on
whether the defendant has engaged in conduct prohibited by the stat-
ute.1 54 Implying a private remedy redresses conduct prohibited by the
statute, while implying liability for aiding and abetting changes the pro-
scription of the statute by expanding its scope. 155 In the first instance,
Congress has proscribed the conduct and the Court merely allows a rem-
edy. In the second instance, the Court proscribes conduct and implies a
remedy. Thus, expanding the scope represents a greater usurpation of
Congressional power.
The dissent compounds its misconception of the issue by failing to
validate aiding and abetting liability under the rationale of Musick, Peeler
& Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau' 56 During the Contraction Era,
150. Id at. 1457-58.
151. Id. at 1459 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). In response, the majority noted that the
Court has "been reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition
alone." Id. at 1455. The majority further pointed out the illogic of the dissent's argument by
stating "[ilfwe were to rely on this reasoning now, we would be obliged to hold that a private
right of action exists for every provision of the 1934 Act, for it is a criminal violation to violate
any of its provisions." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988)).
152. Id. at 1459.
153. Id. at 1460.
154. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). On their own accord, the
dissenters contend that the liberal backdrop confers "the right to sue violators of that statute."
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
155. See Fischel, supra note 53, at 93. The dissent consistently argues in favor of a plain-
tiff's right, but does not recognize that a private remedy redresses the wrong proscribed by
Congress.
156. 113 S. Ct 2085 (1993). At first blush, one might think the Court's decision in Cen-
tral Bank directly conflicts with Musick as the former eliminates a form of secondary liability
while the latter provides for the right of contribution among violators of § 10(b). This con-
tention fails to understand that the right of contribution established in Musick is the right of
contribution between persons jointly liable for the violation. I. at 2086. Thus, the right of
contribution established in Musick is not dependent on the existence of secondary liability.
See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; Wiu. L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 50, at 309 (4th ed. 1971) (addressing contribution and the joint tortfeasor); Rob-
ert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rv. 130, 136 (1932)
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courts have used a textual approach in seeking out congressional intent
when implying a private remedy or defining the contours of such a cause
of action. 15 7 The statutory scheme of the 1934 Act weighs heavily against
imposing aiding and abetting liability.1 58 None of the sections of the 1933
Act or the 1934 Act expressly providing for a private cause of action im-
poses aiding and abetting liability. Additionally, where Congress did im-
pose controlling person liability, a form of secondary liability, it provided a
good faith defense.1 59 The dissent undermines its rationale by failing to
address congressional intent and the negative implication of the statutory
scheme.
Moreover, the dissent erred by relying on the extensive history of aid-
ing and abetting liability in the context of section 10(b) claims. This error
consists of two components: relying on congressional silence and relying
on settled lower court precedent.
Congressional silence, the passage of time, and agreement among the
courts of appeals does not add validity to an erroneous decision.1 60 When
Congress acts, it does so collectively and in an affirmative manner.'
6 1
Congress creates law by enacting statutes and cannot legislate without such
action. Thus, courts cannot reliably use the silence of Congress to infer
legislative intent.
1 62
(addressing contribution and equality); William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
CAL. L. Rav. 413, 429-43 (1937) (addressing contribution and several liability).
157. See supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's Con-
traction Era decisions).
158. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 653 (asserting that both the negative
implication and post legislative history lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
impose aiding and abetting liability); Fischel, supra note 53, at 94-99 (arguing that both statu-
tory scheme and legislative history indicate that § 10(b) does not impose aiding and abetting
liability).
159. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (stating that "[Il]egislative silence is
a poor beacon to follow"; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Aaron presented the
issue of whether the SEC had to establish scienter for an injunction to enforce Rule lOb-5.
Four years earlier, the Court had held that private parties must establish scienter, but lower
courts had interpreted the decision as not compelling a scienter requirement in injunctive
proceedings. The SEC built a strong acquiescence argument, but the Court responded by
stating, "it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission's interpreta-
tion falls far short of providing a basis to support a construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds
with its plain meaning." Id. at 694 n.ll; see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1104 (1991) (rejecting an acquiescence argument as to § 14(a) of the 1934 Act).
See generally Eskridge, supra note 140 (criticizing the use of congressional inaction as a form of
precedent).
161. See, e.g., U.S. Cowsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 946 (1983) (stating that bicameral enactment and presentation are "integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers").
162. "It does not follow.., that Congress's failure to overturn a statutory precedent is
reason for this Court to adhere to it." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175
(1989); see REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975);
Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative Histoy, 11 HorsTRA L. REv.
1125, 1133 (1983); Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 207, 214-15
(1917); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities", 64 B.U. L REy. 737 (1984); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syn-
tax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. LJ. 515
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The acquiescence of a subsequent Congress does not indicate the in-
tent of the enacting Congress. 163 The Court has often stated that "views of
a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of
an earlier one."164 "[E]ven when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent
legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a stat-
ute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its
enactment."165 If the affirmative statements of a subsequent Congress do
not provide a meaningful basis for inferring legislative intent, the silence
of a subsequent Congress provides even less.
1 66
The parties in Central Bank advanced competing arguments based
upon post-legislative history. While the respondent argued that acquies-
cence and reference to secondary liability in committee reports weigh in
favor of allowing aiding and abetting liability, the petitioner argued the
rejected amendments that would have incorporated aiding and abetting
language into section 10(b) weigh against such liability. 16 7 In favoring the
acquiescence doctrine over the rejected proposal doctrine, the dissent
fails to support its decision with any reasonable rationale. The post-legisla-
tive history of section 10(b), at best, provides an inconclusive answer.
While all previous courts of appeals that considered the question may
have agreed that aiding and abetting liability existed, considerable confu-
sion existed among the same courts regarding the proper application of
such liability.168 The confusion among circuit courts may stem from a
(1982) (approving only limited use of congressional silence as an interpretive tool). The
dissent's acquiescence argument would carry more weight if the Supreme Court previously
had upheld the validity of aiding and abetting liability, yet the Court had twice reserved for
decision the validity of such liability. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutor Stare Decisis, 88 MicH. L. REv. 177, 186-200 (1989) (contending that ignorance, iner-
tia, interpretational ambiguity, and irrelevance make it difficult to infer congressional ap-
proval from congressional inaction); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Intrpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 809-10 (1983) (suggesting that reliance
on post-enactment legislative materials usurps prior Congressional power without "going
through the constitutionally prescribed processes for repeal"); Patricia M. Wald, Some Obser-
vations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L REv. 195, 205
(1983) (stating that "it is particularly risky to draw inferences from subsequent congressional
refusals to act").
164. See Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
165. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980).
166. Grabow, supra note 162, at 750.
167. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 56, at 72-73 (claiming that such confusion must eventu-
ally be addressed). Additionally, the dissent may have given "short shrift" to lower court
questioning of the validity of private actions based on aiding and abetting. See, e.g., id. at 72-
73 (claiming that such confusion must eventually be addressed). The dissent also may have
given "short shrift" to lower court questioning of aiding and abetting liability. See Akin v. Q-L
Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that there is a "powerful argument that
... aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private parties pursuing an im-
plied right of action"); Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986) (providing that courts have "frankly acknowledged
that, in light of recent Supreme Court cases, there is some ambiguity about the existence of a
civil cause of action for aiding and abetting"); Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 220
n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing that "[t]he status of aiding and abetting as a basis for liability
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conceptual problem with the use of aiding and abetting in the section
10(b) context. The theory of aiding and abetting developed mainly from
criminal law and, to a lesser extent, tort law. 169 These areas of law mainly
revolve around physical acts. 170 The aiding and abetting concept in crimi-
nal and tort law rests on degrees of physical presence and action, which in
the physical context indicate culpability.
171
In the context of physical torts and crimes, one can rely on physical
presence and action to distinguish between primary violators and aiders
and abettors. In the securities context this analysis results in confusion.
172
Reliance on these antiquated doctrines results in irreconcilable concep-
tual problems and uncertainty in application. 1 73 The confusion and con-
flicting results in applying the aiding and abetting doctrine evidences this
lack of usefulness.
In the spirit of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," the dissent argued that
the majority would stand on firmer footing if aiding and abetting liability
interfered with the effective operation of securities laws. 174 Such an ap-
proach ignores at least two adverse consequences of aiding and abetting
liability. The first problem becomes evident when comparing aiding and
abetting liability with "controlling person" liability. Sections 15 of the
1933 Act and 20 of the 1934 Act impose "controlling person" liability.1 75
In addition, these sections provide for a good faith defense. To circum-
vent the use of the good faith defense, plaintiffs sought to impose aiding
and abetting liability instead of, or in addition to, controlling person liabil-
ity. 17 6 This use of aiding and abetting frustrates congressional purpose by
under the securities laws is in some doubt"); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (providing that "[i]t is also doubtful that a claim for 'aiding and abetting' or
'conspiracy' will continue to exist under 10(b) [because Hochfelder] implicitly holds that aid-
ing and abetting liability will not exist apart from liability for a direct violation"), aff'd, 735
F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 101 F.R.D. 715, 722-23 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (providing that "[t]he notion that aiding and abetting securities fraud consti-
tutes ajusticiable violation of law is itself a questionable assertion"),rev'd, 800 F.2d 1008 (10th
Cir. 1986). Again, the dissent makes no attempt to validate its reasoning in light of the
confusion in the application of aiding and abetting liability.
169. Tort law does not fully embrace the concept of primary and secondary liability;, how-
ever, the concept ofjoint tortfeasance is widely accepted. This concept recognizes independ-
ent contributions to an indivisible tort, with each tortfeasor equally liable for the entire
harm. See Pollak, supra note 11, at 246-47.
170. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1989) (illustrating only physical harms
to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property). The petitioner directed the Court's attention to
this point but the Court did not discuss the difficulties of importing a physical tort concept
into the economic arena of securities law. See Petitioner's Opening Brief 28 n. 20. Notably,
courts do not usually apply § 876 outside the context of physical torts except in § 10(b) cases.
4 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 7, § 8.5(614) (4); see Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 495 U.S. 375, 388 (1983) (claiming that securities law is not coextensive with common
law).
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1989); 2 WAYNE LAFAvE & AusIN W.
ScoTr, CiMINAL LAw § 6.2, at 495-98 (1979).
172. Ruder, supra note 74, at 621-22 (suggesting that tort law offers little or no help in the
securities context).
173. Feldman, supra note 56, passim
174. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1459.
175. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the distinction between aiding and abetting liability and other
forms of secondary liability, see Sally T. Gilmore & William H. McBride, Liability ofFinancial
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allowing plaintiffs to prevent defendants' use of a good faith defense. By
eliminating the use of aiding and abetting as a basis for a section 10(b)
cause of action, the Court rightfully has prevented plaintiffs from circum-
venting the good faith defense provided by Congress.
A second problem with aiding and abetting liability arises when a pri-
vate party bases a cause of action on silence. To recover from a primary
violator for silence, the plaintiff must show a duty existed and that he re-
lied on that duty.1 77 A plaintiff could, however, bring an aiding and abet-
ting claim based on silence and recover without showing either duty or
reliance. 178 This functionally allows plaintiffs to side-step the Court's re-
strictions on section 10(b) liability.
Efficient financial markets, while inherently chaotic, require a stable
and predictable legal foundation upon which they can rely. The inconsis-
tent, ad hoc manner in which courts apply aiding and abetting liability
frustrates the market system. In the past, the resulting uncertainty has left
facilitators of financial markets unsure about the boundaries of permissi-
ble conduct and the scope of possible liability.1 79 Additionally, the uncer-
tainty has resulted in defendants having to settle even the most frivolous
claims.1 80 These increased costs eventually flow to the investor.' 8 1 In the
Institutions for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Securities Laws, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 811,813-
814 (1985).
177. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 & n.9 (suggesting silence is
actionable only when a duty exists between the parties).
178. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 72, at 851-52 (concluding that an aider and abettor can
be found liable for failure to disclose despite absence of duty). Courts focus on a defendant's
intent in a claim based on silence, rather than on duty. Tort law, however, does not require
intent as an element of an aiding and abetting claim. PatrickJ. McNulty & DanielJ. Hanson,
Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J.
14, 39-43 (1993).
179. Feldman, supra note 56, at 73.
180. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr. & Michael J. Norton, Professional Advisors: "Am I My Brother's
Keeper?", 23 COLO. LAw. 1795, 1795 (1994). Because of the uncertainty surrounding § 10(b)
claims, the defendant often chooses to pay a settlement rather than run the risk of an adverse
judgment. See, e.g., 2 Louis Loss, SEcurmEs REGULATIONS 1792 (2d ed. 1961) (relatively few
IOb-5 cases go to trial on the merits); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restric-
tions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 n.129 (1980) (plaintiffs have an incentive to bring groundless and
contrived claims because of the likelihood of settlement as opposed to adjudication);
Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545 (1980) (presenting the results of a study showing
that only 2.3% of the litigated shareholder claims resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs).
181. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Manag-
ers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 945, 962-65 (1993) (discussing the
effects of unnecessarily raising the cost of capital). "When a corporation pays ajudgment or
a settlement, the value of the corporation's stock may fall and its cost of capital rise. In that
event, not only do shareholders sustain a loss, but the productivity of the firm may decline-
at some cost to the society." Frankel, supra note 84, at 577-78.
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end, the beneficiary 182 of the statute pays the cost of the uncertainty, a
result which frustrates congressional purpose.
1 83
B. Majority's Rationale
The majority's approach follows the textual analysis laid out in its pre-
vious Contraction Era decisions. Instead of treading upon the "quick-
sand" of the acquiescence doctrine, 184 the majority directs courts to look
at the text of the statute and the statutory scheme to ascertain congres-
sional intent. While this approach does not result in absolute precision, it
allows participants in the financial market to predict adequately the scope
of the statute. 185 This predictability will minimize unnecessary costs in fi-
nancial markets and thereby benefit investors.
The Court's decision establishes a two-prong analysis for deciding is-
sues presented by the implied private remedy litigation under section
10(b). If the Court faces a question as to the components of a private
cause of action, it will decide the issue based on congressional intent as
ascertained from the overall statutory scheme. If the Court faces a ques-
tion as to what conduct a party can base a private cause of action on, it will
turn to the text of the section at issue. While the second prong involves a
fairly simple analysis, the first prong may cause hesitation because the
Court is forced to infer how the enacting Congress would have decided
the issue.
186
This approach will help prevent securities law from becoming loose-
jointed because it focuses on consistency and conformity with the overall
statutory scheme. The dissent's rationale would allow erroneous lower
court precedents to flourish. The majority's statutory construction analy-
sis curbs the growth of unintended secondary liability and leaves policy
decisions to Congress.
C. Possible Ramifications
Plaintiffs and courts often used aiding and abetting as a "misnomer,"
labeling the defendant as an "aider and abettor" when "primary violator"
would more accurately describe the defendant. 187 Since the inception of
182. Some economists have concluded that empirical evidence does not support the be-
lief that investors have benefitted from securities regulation. SusAN M. PHiuiPs &J. RIcHARD
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC IN'rEnxsr (1981); GeorgeJ. Benston, Required Disclosure and
the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. EcoN. REv. 132
(1973); Greg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security
Issues, 24J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,
37 Bus. LAw. 721 (1964). For a general discussion of the economics of regulation, see STE-
PHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
183. See Akin v. Q-L Inves., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992).
184. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940).
185. While the textual analysis will not allow participants to predict flawlessly the applica-
tion of a statute, it does assure participants that courts cannot impose liability for a violation
not expressly stated in the statute.
186. In considering the scope of conduct prohibited, "the text of the statute controls our
decision." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
187. Akin, 959 F.2d at 526.
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aiding and abetting liability, courts have seldom sought to make a mean-
ingful distinction between aiders and abettors and primary violators.1 88
The majority in Central Bank concedes that courts need not apply the
scope of primary liability narrowly.1 89 As a result, courts and litigants will
now begin to flesh out the limits of primary liability.
Opponents of the Court's decision in Central Bank claim the decision
will permit fraudulent conduct to run rampant.19 0 These opponents be-
lieve that Central Bank will immunize lawyers, accountants, bankers, and
other similarly situated parties from liability for fraudulent conduct. 19 1
This fear ignores the main focus of the Court's decision: to violate section
10(b), the defendant must have committed some fraudulent act. If an
accountant, lawyer, banker, or any other party fraudulently provides an
investor with false information, the investor can bring suit against that per-
son as a primary violator.' 9 2 Most likely, the Court's decision will act to
exonerate only those persons who did no vouching or played no role in
the falsifying itself.193 Thus, the decision does not give the "green light"
to fraudulent action but instead forces plaintiffs to allege and subse-
quently prove fraud on the part of the defendant.
While the Court's decision probably will not disturb the implied pri-
vate cause of action for violations of section 10(b),194 it casts doubt on the
validity of other forms of judicially imposed secondary liability under sec-
tion 10(b) such as respondeat superior, agency, and conspiracy. 195 At the
outset, it would seem that the Court's decision jeopardizes all of these
188. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
189. "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a ma-
nipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 101>5 are met." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
190. Senator Metzenbaum stated that Central Bank "gives clearly fraudulent behavior the
green light." 140 CONG. Rac. 59460 (daily ed. July 21, 1994).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding allegations against preparer of an offering circular sufficient to survive motion for
summary judgment without relying on an aiding and abetting analysis); SEC v. Washington
County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that primary liability does not re-
quire face-to-face contact).
193. However, prior to the Central Bank decision courts hesitated to impose aiding and
abetting liability when the defendant did "not engage in conduct that intentionally misleads
or lulls a victim." IX Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4486 (3d ed.
1992). Also, aiding and abetting liability remains a potential theory in private actions based
on state securities law violations. See generaly Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liabil-
ity Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. Rv. 1027 (1992). Plaintiffs' counsel often may seek
remedies in state courts due to the Supreme Court's decisions restricting private actions
under the federal securities laws. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw § 7.03,
at 133 (1989).
194. The existence of a private cause of action is "simply beyond peradventure." Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). But see Michael J. Kaufman, A Little
"Right" Musick: The Unconstitutional Judicial Creation of Private Rights of Action Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 297-335 (1994) (arguing that the
implied private cause of action under section 10(b) is unconstitutional).
195. See, e.g., A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 624 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding a broker-
age firm can act only through its agents and is accountable for the actions of its officers);
Harrision v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing
respondeat superior liability in the § 10(b) context); Eastwood v. National Bank of Com-
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forms of secondary liability, yet a distinction may exist between conspiracy
and the two other forms of secondary liability mentioned above. Conspir-
acy, similar to aiding and abetting, imposes liability based upon conduct
(an agreement to engage in proscribed conduct). Respondeat superior
and agency represent a more vicarious form of liability based on a relation-
ship between the primary violator and those with the burden of secondary
liability.19 6 Both respondeat superior and agency are more akin to "con-
trolling person" liability and therefore courts might view them as more
consistent with the statutory scheme. If so, conspiracy liability would not
survive while respondeat superior and agency would be fertile claims. It




The continuing strict textual approach applied by the majority in Cen-
tral Bank injects a degree of certainty and clarity into the complex area of
securities law. The Court's rationale provides securities attorneys and
their clients with a meaningful basis from which they can determine the
scope of permissible conduct and potential liability. Contrary to the opin-
ion of some alarmists, the Court's decision does not give a "green light" to
fraudulent conduct but rather forces courts to more carefully consider the
culpability of defendants. 198
Paul Dmitri Zier
merce, 673 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-81 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (discussing conspiracy liability for a
§ 10(b) violation).
196. While the terms secondary liability and vicarious liability are often used interchange-
ably, the notion of vicarious liability would be limited more properly to liability based on
relationships rather than liability based on conduct. See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318 n.28.
197. Central Bank echoes the substance of Justice Kennedy's concurring-in-part and dis-
senting-in-part opinion in Virginia Bankshares. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. More-
over, it would seem more onerous to allow judicially created forms of liability such as
respondeat superior and agency to be applied when Congress's intent was to impose control-
ling person liability. See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978);
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975).
198. No longer will investors be able to "have their cake and eat it, too" as they will not be
able to recover from advisors on an aiding and abetting theory if the investment loses money
for any reason. See Lidstone & Norton, supra note 180, at 1796.
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